The arc of revolutions has two acts: rupture - upending the status quo - and the craft of repair. Often, the second is as hard as the first. Today's Pax Fragilis in Gaza is narrow, given the continuing humanitarian crisis, regional reactiveness, limited scope of de-escalation channels, multiple actors' motivations for a permanent ceasefire, and the capabilities of Israel and Palestine to build a pathway with certainty.

India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.

Chinese President Xi Jinping set two centennial goals and a 2027 target for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation. This is in line since its founding in 1927, when the PLA has undergone continuous technological, doctrinal, and manpower transformation. Guided by Xi’s goals, it is adapting to evolving warfare trends drawn from experience and observation. For India, the implications arise not only from the PLA’s modernisation but also from emerging military and geopolitical dynamics.

The currents shaping the relationship between the Indo-Pacific’s two largest democracies are not trade winds but terabits flowing through fiber-optic cables and the instant signals of digital payments. Jakarta and New Delhi are forging a landmark digital alliance—one that goes beyond technology. At the heart of this digital handshake lies the plan to link Indonesia’s BI-Fast with India’s Unified Payments Interface.

This year marks the fifth anniversary of the India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed in 2020 to boost defence and security ties and enhance trade and investments. But the foundations had been laid earlier in 2009, when India and Australia elevated their relationship to a Strategic Partnership. The bilateral has evolved significantly, making Australia one of the most stable partners in a rapidly changing global order.

The colonial penal code never imagined a world where software, not a human, amplifies hatred. Section 197 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita now penalises ‘acts prejudicial to national integration’ carried out through electronic communication.

In China’s White Paper on national security, the country congratulates itself for maintaining peace and development and bringing “stability in a tempestuous world.” It also pats itself on the back for “creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South” thus leading to an adjustment of the international balance of power. Worth studying are its global initiatives – a new governance order.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India comes after three years, and the outcomes from it throw up interesting issues. Three read-outs issued from this visit. One from the Chinese side and two from the Indian side. The diverse nature of the India and Chinese read-outs is striking. Certainly the visit yielded benefits; the test lies in the deliverables.

There was much at stake for the U.S.-Russia summit at Alaska – more than just the future of Ukraine. It will put the world back on economic track, and ease East-West relations, under stress for an on-going tariff war. For now, diplomacy has played a successful hand.

U.S. President Trump will meet Russian President Putin on August 15. A positive outcome may mean removal of punitive U.S. tariffs on India for buying Russian oil and resolving its dilemma of placating a partner country with growing commercial, geopolitical and defence ties, or pursuing strategic autonomy, keeping its old friends and take an economic hit? Is Russia the red line for India?