The SCO aims to be more than a security dialogue, because churn in the global order means not only military power but includes new instruments like infrastructure, energy and technology. The SCO has potential here. China’s factories, Russia’s energy and resources, India’s technology and services, and Central Asia’s location and minerals, connected to Iran and Pakistan’s location on the Arabian Sea, could become a formidable economic geography.

Japan’s recently-released defence white paper marks a significant turn in intent and policy. The country’s long focus on economic security is now blended with its defence capacity, bringing together foreign policy, intelligence, and economic, technological and industrial capacities into a “comprehensive architecture for national defence.” This is a new conception of national security in Japan.

The Manila meetings of ASEAN, held amid continuing crises in Ukraine and West Asia, have demonstrated that ASEAN centrality has not gone out of fashion. Neither the U.S. nor China, despite scepticism about ASEAN's effectiveness, wishes ASEAN institutions to disappear. India, Russia, Japan, Australia, the EU and the UK likewise continue to use these meetings as valuable platforms for Indo-Pacific engagement.

The legacy of the Modi-Takaichi Summit will extend well beyond the bilateral. It demonstrates that middle powers, through responsible and sustained action, are capable of shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific through strategic intent and the resilient economic networks that back it up to promote regional stability. For India and Japan, economic security is the foundation upon which the next generation of the bilateral will be built.

India signed on to two deals on critical minerals in May: one was the launch of the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative and the other a new bilateral India–U.S. framework on critical minerals. Both highlight the deep concerns over China’s dominance of global supply chains. For India, specifically, these initiatives will advance its ambitions in green energy. Collectively, the QUAD members have differing priorities. Can those be sustained long-term, for success?

As India readies for the India-Africa Summit, it is worth understanding the realism present at the recent Africa Forward summit in Nairobi with France. Paris acknowledges Africa’s geographic shift beyond Francophone Africa, its economic and technological aspirations, and African agency. However the ambitions of the Summit are still constrained by structural legacies, credibility challenges, and intensifying global competition.

Africa has been increasingly drawn into conflicts and faces difficulty in preventing or managing them. At the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit to be held on May 28-31, India can announce assistance to the continent in capacity-building in training, logistics, and technology. India-Africa defence industrial cooperation, particularly in affordable equipment and maintenance capabilities tailored to African conditions, will align with its evolving needs.

South Korea and India have much in common – both are Indo-Pacific players, oil importers and business-oriented economies. Yet, despite the ubiquitious and successful presence of Korean companies in India’s markets, the political relationship has been weak, and underperformed. The recent state visit by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to India along with a slew of economic and strategic agreements signed, is an effort to recalibrate the relationship.

The West Asia conflict has disrupted global stability, impacting ASEAN economies and diplomacy. As chair, the Philippines balances its alliance with the U.S. and regional neutrality, while Indonesia and Malaysia reflect domestic support for Arab states. With energy shocks, remittance risks, and inflation rising, ASEAN’s limited influence is evident. Has ASEAN once again been drawn into a vortex of crises beyond its control?

The war in West Asia is crowded with armaments and players, but there is one presence that is LOB, or Left Out of the Battle: that of Europe. The Continent is peripheral in the current crisis. Structural constraints, strategic dependence on the U.S., internal political divisions, and a shift in Europe’s geopolitical priorities since the war in Ukraine, has reduced its strategic weight.