India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.

Chinese President Xi Jinping set two centennial goals and a 2027 target for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation. This is in line since its founding in 1927, when the PLA has undergone continuous technological, doctrinal, and manpower transformation. Guided by Xi’s goals, it is adapting to evolving warfare trends drawn from experience and observation. For India, the implications arise not only from the PLA’s modernisation but also from emerging military and geopolitical dynamics.

On October 22, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Russia’s oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil. The move has clear geopolitical motives—to remove a major supplier from an oversupplied oil market. Indian oil companies, key buyers of Russian crude, now face pressure to cut imports, undermining India’s energy diversification and shaking global oil markets, including the U.S. economy.

The Quad summit is expected to be hosted by India in the second half of 2025, possibly in November. However, the grouping faces turbulence that transcends the current flow of India-U.S. relations. The relevance of Australia and Japan, too, needs to be factored in. Beijing considers the Quad as “the Asian NATO” that aims to contain China. Since the commencement of Trump 2.0, the grouping has been struggling to redefine its role and mandate.

The world is facing multiple crises which are shaking the foundations of multilateralism. The West’s structures are faltering, and the need for effective and equitable cooperation is greater than ever. Seventy years after the 1955 Bandung Conference, its principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, cooperation and solidarity remain vital. This report revisits Bandung’s relevance for today’s reform efforts, urging renewed Global South–Europe collaboration for a sustainable global future.

Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi will visit India on October 10, marking the first high-level Taliban visit since the group took over Kabul in 2021. Nayanima Basu discusses the purpose of this visit and the importance of engagement with Afghanistan. She explains the roles of China, which seeks business; Pakistan, which pursues political interests; and the U.S., which has a renewed interest in Bagram Air Base and its return to the country it abandoned.

In China’s White Paper on national security, the country congratulates itself for maintaining peace and development and bringing “stability in a tempestuous world.” It also pats itself on the back for “creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South” thus leading to an adjustment of the international balance of power. Worth studying are its global initiatives – a new governance order.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan is significant for India domestically and its extended Asian influence. His visit, just prior to the SCO Summit in China, represents a shrewd endeavour at balancing the several priorities of Indian foreign policy

The G20’s current cycle is unique, with four Global South nations presiding consecutively: Indonesia, India, Brazil, and now South Africa. Brazil’s 2023-24 presidency exhibited both achievements and struggles, prioritising social inclusion, hunger, energy transition, and governance reform. The handover to South Africa marks a significant milestone in G20 history. Will the momentum be followed by the U.S., the next G20 president but also a G20 sceptic?

There was much at stake for the U.S.-Russia summit at Alaska – more than just the future of Ukraine. It will put the world back on economic track, and ease East-West relations, under stress for an on-going tariff war. For now, diplomacy has played a successful hand.