Myanmar heads to the polls in December amidst a festering conflict, now running on five years. At home, the balance of power is constantly shifting between the military and the anti-junta forces. Internationally, there is a growing fatigue with resolving the conflict. However, for the ruling military this election is strictly about putting the derailed train of ‘limited democracy’ back on track.

After a remarkable recovery from a very deep crisis in 2022, Sri Lanka’s recent budget for 2026 consolidates economic stabilisation and introduces a few markers for further growth. But more needs to be done to embed a growth strategy and transform its economy to avoid further IMF austerity programmes.

India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.

Chinese President Xi Jinping set two centennial goals and a 2027 target for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation. This is in line since its founding in 1927, when the PLA has undergone continuous technological, doctrinal, and manpower transformation. Guided by Xi’s goals, it is adapting to evolving warfare trends drawn from experience and observation. For India, the implications arise not only from the PLA’s modernisation but also from emerging military and geopolitical dynamics.

On October 22, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Russia’s oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil. The move has clear geopolitical motives—to remove a major supplier from an oversupplied oil market. Indian oil companies, key buyers of Russian crude, now face pressure to cut imports, undermining India’s energy diversification and shaking global oil markets, including the U.S. economy.

The Thai–Cambodia border dispute, which erupted anew in July, is 70 years old, and there’s no resolution in sight. Both nations have differing political ambitions: Thailand seeks to reclaim former territories while Cambodia aims to retain its sovereign rights. This contestation requires a regional political resolution, but Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship failed to forge consensus. Can the new chair, the Philippines, resolve it?

The Quad summit is expected to be hosted by India in the second half of 2025, possibly in November. However, the grouping faces turbulence that transcends the current flow of India-U.S. relations. The relevance of Australia and Japan, too, needs to be factored in. Beijing considers the Quad as “the Asian NATO” that aims to contain China. Since the commencement of Trump 2.0, the grouping has been struggling to redefine its role and mandate.

The world is undergoing a profound transformation - not driven by the U.S., China, or Russia, but by small and medium states carving out their rightful space in the emerging order. With UN reform stalled, middle-power cooperation must organise effectively to push for a responsive multilateral system that works for all, ensuring institutions are reformed and made fit for today’s world.

In China’s White Paper on national security, the country congratulates itself for maintaining peace and development and bringing “stability in a tempestuous world.” It also pats itself on the back for “creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South” thus leading to an adjustment of the international balance of power. Worth studying are its global initiatives – a new governance order.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan is significant for India domestically and its extended Asian influence. His visit, just prior to the SCO Summit in China, represents a shrewd endeavour at balancing the several priorities of Indian foreign policy