U.S. President Trump will meet Russian President Putin on August 15. A positive outcome may mean removal of punitive U.S. tariffs on India for buying Russian oil and resolving its dilemma of placating a partner country with growing commercial, geopolitical and defence ties, or pursuing strategic autonomy, keeping its old friends and take an economic hit? Is Russia the red line for India?

India-U.S. trade negotiations have faltered. India stepped outside its comfort zone to offer zero tariffs on industrial goods that form 40% of U.S. exports to India, but the additional 25% tariffs have rendered most Indian exports noncompetitive. Only a carefully balanced, incremental negotiating framework blending economic pragmatism with protection of core domestic interests backed by political will, stands a realistic chance of bridging the current impasse.

Who makes, imposes, administers and collects U.S. tariffs? The U.S. Congress, but for the last several decades, it has been at the discretion of the U.S. President, who has been given tariff-setting authority. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1977, U.S. President Donald Trump has imposed reciprocal and universal tariffs on over 60 countries.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington on 1 July, 2025, underscored the importance of diversified and reliable global supply chains, especially for critical minerals. A Gateway House report shows how to strengthen supply chains for rare earths by creating deep financial markets similar to those that exist for bullion and oil.

PM Modi's multi-country visit from 15-19 June to Cyprus, Canada, and Croatia demonstrated India's expertise in nurturing ties with great powers, middle powers and state powers.  The common thread was twofold: to represent India at the still-important summit of the Group of Seven in Alberta, and to push India’s strategic partnership with the EU, by forging closer ties with the countries of eastern and central Europe.

A slowdown of the Chinese economy, and the shift, particularly by MNCs, from China to other more competitive locations has opened up business opportunities for latecomers to supply chains in the developing world. Evidence suggests that Southeast Asia and some South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, could be beneficiaries of the supply chain shift, particularly in labour-intensive segments.

Most multilateral and plurilateral institutions have lost their significance and ability to shape the trajectory of international relations today. The G7 is no exception. It is impacted by the shift of power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and an intra-Atlantic rift. The G7 discussions reflected this. More positive were the sideline discussions on repairing the India-Canada bilateral.

The July 2 meeting of the QUAD foreign ministers in Washington, D.C., restated all the commitments of the grouping, including a condemnation of the April 22 terrorist attacks on Pahalgam. Yet, none of the QUAD countries actually came to the aid of India, despite China being a present player in the fight, in full support of its partner Pakistan.

Canadian Prime Minister Carney can use the upcoming G7 summit he is hosting to advance the North-South dialogue and cooperation and also to discuss the strained bilateral with India. India can articulate the viewpoint of the Global South, stressing its conviction that the G7 is better served by constructively working with developing and emerging economies.

Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.