India-U.S. trade negotiations have faltered. India stepped outside its comfort zone to offer zero tariffs on industrial goods that form 40% of U.S. exports to India, but the additional 25% tariffs have rendered most Indian exports noncompetitive. Only a carefully balanced, incremental negotiating framework blending economic pragmatism with protection of core domestic interests backed by political will, stands a realistic chance of bridging the current impasse.

Who makes, imposes, administers and collects U.S. tariffs? The U.S. Congress, but for the last several decades, it has been at the discretion of the U.S. President, who has been given tariff-setting authority. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1977, U.S. President Donald Trump has imposed reciprocal and universal tariffs on over 60 countries.

The India-Maldives bilateral, so fraught till recently, has seen a positive reset. This was evident in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 25-26 visit to Male. Using patience, quiet diplomacy and a consultative process with the Maldivians, India is now on the path to achieving its bilateral and regional goals in tandem with its strategically critical neighbour in the Indian Ocean.

All eyes are on the July 25-26 visit of Prime Minister Modi to Maldives as chief guest for the Maldivian Independence Day celebrations. It’s a remarkable turnaround by Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, who won the 2023 election on an “India Out” campaign. What caused the change? Proximity and geopolitics, says Rajiv Bhatia transformed Maldivian view.

India is strategically expanding its influence across the Indo-Pacific region, positioning itself as a key player in regional affairs. Three elements anchor the effort: development aid, trade and the diaspora. The country now has 20 Free Trade Agreement partners in the Indo-Pacific. The 21.8 million-strong Indian diaspora across the region is a significant source of soft power for India.

The political setback by the ruling coalition in Japan in the July 20 Upper House elections reflects growing frustration with the mainstream political parties. Young people frustrated with high costs have resulted in a fragmentation of Japan’s political landscape, and the rise of the right. The “Trump effect” has found fertile ground in Japan’s political soil.

The embargo on rare-earth magnets by China reflects a gap in India’s critical mineral supply chain. India should reduce the need for these minerals by promoting green hydrogen.

The Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington on 1 July, 2025, underscored the importance of diversified and reliable global supply chains, especially for critical minerals. A Gateway House report shows how to strengthen supply chains for rare earths by creating deep financial markets similar to those that exist for bullion and oil.

A slowdown of the Chinese economy, and the shift, particularly by MNCs, from China to other more competitive locations has opened up business opportunities for latecomers to supply chains in the developing world. Evidence suggests that Southeast Asia and some South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, could be beneficiaries of the supply chain shift, particularly in labour-intensive segments.

Most multilateral and plurilateral institutions have lost their significance and ability to shape the trajectory of international relations today. The G7 is no exception. It is impacted by the shift of power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and an intra-Atlantic rift. The G7 discussions reflected this. More positive were the sideline discussions on repairing the India-Canada bilateral.