India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.

Chinese President Xi Jinping set two centennial goals and a 2027 target for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation. This is in line since its founding in 1927, when the PLA has undergone continuous technological, doctrinal, and manpower transformation. Guided by Xi’s goals, it is adapting to evolving warfare trends drawn from experience and observation. For India, the implications arise not only from the PLA’s modernisation but also from emerging military and geopolitical dynamics.

In China’s White Paper on national security, the country congratulates itself for maintaining peace and development and bringing “stability in a tempestuous world.” It also pats itself on the back for “creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South” thus leading to an adjustment of the international balance of power. Worth studying are its global initiatives – a new governance order.

The 46th ASEAN Summit led by Malaysia in the chair, concluded in May. Malaysia is one of the founding members of the ASEAN, and is fully cognisant of its prolonged challenges, but as chair it has not addressed the issues. It raises questions on whether the stated deliverable of “inclusivity and sustainability” is merely a diversion from the country’s weakening leadership in the region.

Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.

The Quad foreign ministers meeting, held in Tokyo on July 29, took a clear position against China’s coercive actions in the East and South China seas. The four ministers have done their bit by reviewing the progress of the grouping’s many initiatives and reiterating its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. For continued progress, the Quad now needs solid initiative from the top leadership – and a summit at the earliest.

The recent ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summits stressed the region's centrality and unity while also revealing its principal challenge: managing strategic contestation between the U.S. and China. The outcomes of both summits are reflective of ASEAN's diplomatic and strategic dilemmas in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

The 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Jakarta reflected the grouping’s resilience amidst transformative geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific. Striving for unity and centrality, ASEAN tackled challenges posed by COVID-19, economic slowdown, climate change, and U.S.-China competition. However, internal differences on sensitive issues like Myanmar have tested its credibility.

A new maritime law in China allows it to supervise all foreign vessels which appear in the country's "territorial waters" - many parts of which are internationally disputed. Nationalistic maritime actions such as China’s aggression in the South China Sea and Russia’s actions in the Black Sea, has revived international focus on maritime law. In this podcast, Dr Stefan Talmon, professor and co-director at the Institute of International Law, University of Bonn, interprets maritime law in the two hotly contested seas.

The global world order is witnessing a substantial shift. Part of the greater tussle for strategic and geopolitical dominance is the military rivalry between the U.S. and China. The two countries together now account for over one-half of the world’s defense spending.