In the days just before the G20 summit opened in New Delhi, ASEAN was the focus of high-level international diplomacy. Holding a series of summits — its own main annual summit, the East Asia Summit, and ASEAN conferences with its key partners such as China, India, the U.S. and others, the ASEAN diplomatic establishment had much to say, if we go by the sheer number of joint declarations, statements and press releases issued within the week. What is the substance of the week’s deliberations among the world leaders, and what is the ASEAN hoping to get out of it all?
But first, the basics: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in August 1967, is a 56-year-old regional inter-governmental organisation. After the European Union (EU), ASEAN is considered one of the most successful models of regional cooperation in the world.
Over the decades, it has learnt to navigate through internal differences and external challenges, developing common programmes in various domains, as also a common voice and the panache to insist that the grouping play a central role in its region, Southeast Asia — and now increasingly in the wider Indo-Pacific. With its ten members stretching from Myanmar to the Philippines, ASEAN represents 664 million people or 8% of the world population, and it accounts for 3.5% of the global GDP (at US$ 3.3 trillion). It has accepted Timor-Leste as an Observer, which will become the 11th member in due course.
The top priority of ASEAN is to concentrate on faster economic development, bringing political stability and socio-cultural progress to its people. Hence the principal theme of its latest summit — ‘ASEAN Matters: The Epicentrum of Growth.’ In striving to achieve this key goal, ASEAN’s principal concern and challenge, of late, has been the sharpening strategic contestation between the U.S. and China, the two great powers in the region. This is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon that compels ASEAN to try playing a balancing role, thus adopting cautious positions on China’s aggressive behaviour. It creates internal differences within the grouping, requiring delicate diplomacy both internally and externally. The latest series of summits was an index to ASEAN’s dilemmas and challenges.
Of the several outcome documents of the 43rd Summit held on 5th September, the leaders’ declaration on ‘ASEAN As An Epicentrum of Growth’ was of particular significance. Using just a few paragraphs, it spells out the ASEAN vision to be “the centre and driver of economic growth in the region and beyond.” Aiming at a faster growth rate than the present rate, it is keen to strengthen the group’s resilience in all identified areas: health, climate and disaster, food and energy systems, supply chain connectivity, and macroeconomic and financial stability.
For this purpose, ASEAN’s preferred path is to leverage supply chains, digital transformation, and green and blue economy as the “new growth drivers.” The annexure to this declaration lists specific ongoing and potential projects that will be pursued for forging cooperation between the grouping and its external partners. Those managing India-ASEAN cooperation will do well by scrutinising this list and taking steps to initiate and sustain timely action.
On the strategic and political side, ASEAN members have been deeply concerned about China’s coercive behaviour and unhelpful activities, including the recent issuance of a new map, which drew sharp negative reactions from several of them such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. The grouping’s remedy is to call for restraint, implementation of the old arrangements anchored around the Declaration of Code (DOC) relating to the South China Sea and calling for the expeditious conclusion of negotiations for a new Code of Conduct (COC). However, these negotiations between China and ASEAN states continue to move at a snail’s pace.
In fact, at the latest discussions with China in Jakarta, ASEAN members publicly received rather crude advice from Beijing. Chinese Premier Li Qiang told his interlocutors that disagreements may arise between the nations “due to misperceptions, diverging interests or external interference.” His advice: “To keep differences under control, what is essential is to oppose picking sides, to opposing block confrontation, and to oppose a new Cold War.” In simple terms, China is anxious to discourage ASEAN’s growing convergence on the Indo-Pacific with the perspectives of the democratic states such as India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. that form the Quad.
At the 18th all-encompassing East Asia Summit (EAS) that groups together ASEAN and its key eight partners (India, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S.), the region’s rivalries and tensions came into a sharp focus. Joko Widodo, President of Indonesia and the Chair of EAS, spoke in a sombre tone, cautioning the region that “if we are not able to manage differences, we will be destroyed.” Listeners took note of what he added: “If we join the currents of rivalry, we will be destroyed.” Clearly, ASEAN is worried about the possibility of kinetic conflicts in any of the region’s flash points — the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan issue.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted the importance of EAS, which has played “a pivotal role as the primary confidence-building mechanism” and is “the key to the success of ASEAN centrality.” Among various points he made, two are particularly noteworthy here. First, with the Chinese Premier and the U.S. Vice President listening, Modi stressed that it was “imperative” to adhere to international laws, especially to respect “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.” Second, he pointed out that in the entire Indo-Pacific international law, “including UNCLOS” must apply equally to “all states.” He added, for good measure, that the COC under negotiation should take into consideration “the interests of countries (such as India) that are not directly involved in the discussions.” This was a potent message to China as much as to ASEAN. Indian diplomacy will need to pursue this objective, with vigour and creativity.
The 20th ASEAN- India Summit took place in a cordial atmosphere and ended on a constructive note. ASEAN leaders were appreciative of PM Modi’s visit to Jakarta (6-7th September), even though he was fully occupied with hosting the G20 summit commencing on 9th September. “ASEAN is the central pillar of India’s Act East Policy”, he noted. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) between India and ASEAN began showing some progress. While in Jakarta, he also spoke of India’s Myanmar policy, which “takes into account ASEAN’s views.” At the same time, it aims to ensure peace and security on the borders as India is the next-door neighbour of Myanmar.
India has presented a 12-point proposal to strengthen ASEAN-India cooperation. This includes diverse measures such as promoting multi-modal connectivity, sharing of Digital Public Infrastructure stack, cooperation for the Mission LiFE, and collective fight against terrorism, terror funding and cyber-disinformation. This comprehensive proposal may become a useful yardstick to measure future progress. The two sides signed two joint statements on Maritime Cooperation and Food Security.
PM Modi’s observation — “The 21st century is Asia’s century. It is our century” — may have sent his audience to the early years of this century when there was much enthusiasm and excitement about this concept. Strategic polarisation in the Indo-Pacific, deteriorating U.S.-China equation, fractures within ASEAN, and now the new low in China-India ties are serious challenges for the region’s geopolitics. Leaders and other stakeholders will need to reflect and craft a safe pathway to the lofty vision of a strong, united Asia which is at peace with itself and the rest of the world.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published by WION.