The formation of a new coalition government between the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) (centre right) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (centre left) on 9 April, 2025 marks a significant turning point in German politics. Friedrich Merz, the new chancellor, announced the alliance with bold optimism, declaring, “Germany is back on track.” After years of governmental instability, the coalition seeks to project unity and renewal, both at home and on the international stage.
Despite early challenges in the Bundestag where he won only in the second round of balloting, Merz quickly outlined his foreign policy priorities. His first official act was a diplomatic tour of European capitals Paris and Warsaw, signalling an European focused chancellorship. The new government’s foreign policy blueprint is articulated in a 144-page coalition agreement titled Responsibility for Germany (Verantwortung für Deutschland).[1] The document emphasies a strong commitment to strategic resilience, and a revitalised European partnership.
German foreign policy has long emphasised continuity within the European framework security and foreign policy. However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine prompted a significant strategic shift. Under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany made the historic decision of allocating €100 billion to military modernisation—reversing decades of post-war military restraint.[2] Merz continues this.
Building on this momentum, the Merz coalition aspires to position Germany as a “leading medium-sized power” with the ability to act decisively on the global stage. Central to this vision is a substantial investment in defence and security. The coalition agreement underscores the importance of deterrence and resilience—not only militarily, but also economically, politically, and socially. Its guiding principle is clear: “We want to be able to defend ourselves so that we don’t have to defend ourselves.”[3]
A key structural shift includes the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) (Bundessicherheitsrat) within the chancellery, centralising foreign and security policy decision-making. This is a first for Germany. This move enhances the chancellor’s authority and streamlines Germany’s response to international crises. Notably, the appointment of Johann Wadephul—a CDU loyalist—as the foreign minister breaks with tradition, as the role was typically assigned to a junior coalition partner. With both the chancellor and foreign minister from the CDU and the establishment of a NSC, foreign policy power is now firmly anchored in the chancellery.
The coalition agreement reaffirms Germany’s enduring commitment to the EU, portraying it as a “guarantor of freedom, peace, security and prosperity.” Merz, a former Member of the European Parliament (1989–1994), brings both experience and a strong pro-integrationist stance. His initial visits to Paris and Warsaw signalled a revival of the “Weimar Triangle”—a trilateral alliance among Germany, France, and Poland—aimed at strengthening regional leadership and coordination.
While core commitments to the EU and NATO remain intact, the renewed focus on defence and strategic autonomy reflects a growing awareness that Europe must prepare for a more volatile geopolitical landscape. EU partners increasingly look to Berlin not just for stability, but for leadership amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, evolving transatlantic ties, and rising global tensions.
Beyond Europe, the Merz coalition is navigating a complex and sometimes contradictory international environment. Relations with the U.S. remain central. A firm trans-Atlanticist, Merz and his team began engaging with the Biden administration even before taking office. However, the unpredictability of the Trump presidency and uncertainties over future U.S. commitments to European security have prompted Berlin to diversify its strategic partnerships. Strengthening ties with the UK and bolstering EU-wide defence coordination are essential hedges in case U.S. support diminishes—particularly regarding Ukraine.
Russia is now enemy number one despite the U.S. overtures to Moscow. Merz is publicly committed to Ukraine and a fair peace. However, German participation in a potential ‘coalition of the willing’ military deployment to Ukraine in case of a ceasefire could be tricky, as it would be controversial in Germany and require the approval of the Bundestag. [4]
Perhaps the coalition’s most controversial foreign policy position involves Israel. Upholding Germany’s long-standing Staatsräson—the principle that Israel’s right to exist is a core national interest—Merz has expressed willingness to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Berlin. This offer comes despite an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu, raising questions about Germany’s adherence to international legal norms. The proposal has sparked domestic and European debate over Berlin’s commitment to the rule of law and multilateral institutions.
The coalition will continue Germany’s foreign policy towards Asia. While the 2018 CDU/CSU-SPD agreement prioritised EU and NATO commitments, and the 2021 SPD-Greens-FDP pact emphasised climate diplomacy and Indo-Pacific engagement, the 2025 agreement integrates these themes with strategic urgency. Rising tensions with China, India’s growing global stature, and the need for a more assertive European defence posture all feature prominently in the policy.[5]
The coalition places high priority on India, recognising it as a key partner in addressing global challenges.
“We want to deepen the strategic partnership with India and intensify our cooperation on foreign and security policy, as well as on climate protection, energy, and technology.” (Coalition Agreement, p. 144)
This reflects Berlin’s intent to strengthen bilateral ties across critical sectors, including regional security, sustainable development, and technological innovation.
The agreement adopts a tripartite framework for Sino-German relations:
“We want and will have to define our relations with China in the dimensions of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry.” (Coalition Agreement p. 156)
It balances economic cooperation with principled engagement on governance and human rights. The agreement has clear expectations for China’s role in promoting regional peace, “that it will play a responsible role for peace and stability in its neighbourhood.” (Coalition Agreement p. 157)
The agreement supports Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and highlights ongoing human rights issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, signalling Germany’s commitment to democratic values and international norms.[6]
The coalition’s intention to “intensify our engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen our cooperation with democratic partners.” (Coalition Agreement p. 144) aligns with Germany’s 2020 Indo-Pacific Guidelines, which call for diversification of partnerships and support for multilateralism. It continues its support for a “rules-based international order” and emphasises collaboration with like-minded countries for addressing regional and global challenges.
Friedrich Merz’s early decisions suggest that foreign and security policy will be defining features of his chancellorship. The coalition agreement reflects a conservative yet pragmatic response to changing global dynamics. The CDU/CSU’s strong standing within the European People’s Party, along with Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership of the European Commission, positions Germany to influence European and global policy from within.
Ultimately, Merz’ success will depend on his ability to navigate internal coalition politics while maintaining credibility on the world stage. His government signals a more assertive Germany—ready to lead in Europe, defend its interests globally, and offer stability amid growing international uncertainty.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.
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References:
[1] “Coalition Agreement.” The Federal Government. Accessed May 27, 2025. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/coalition-agreement-482268.
[2] Singh, Gurjit. “Germany’s New National Security Strategy .” Observer Research Foundation, April 12, 2022. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/germanys-new-national-security-strategy.
[3] Friedrich Merz First government statement: “Responsibility for Germany.” The Federal Government, May 14, 2025. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/first-government-statement-chancellor-merz-2347710.
[4] Ondarza, Nicolai von. “No Honeymoon for Merz as the New German Government Already Faces Domestic Constraints.” Chatham House, May 16, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/no-honeymoon-merz-new-german-government-already-faces-domestic-constraints.
[5] “India as a Key Partner in the Indo-Pacific: The German Government Adopts Focus on India Paper.” German Federal Foreign Office, October 16, 2024. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/focus-on-india-2680284.
[6] Barkin, Noah, and Gregor Sebastian. “Wind of Change: German China Policy after the Election.” Rhodium Group, February 12, 2025. https://rhg.com/research/wind-of-change-german-china-policy-after-the-election/.