Italy does not possess overseas territories in the Indian Ocean region, the way France does; it is not a naval power with a global posture like the United States; and it is not a part of a Commonwealth that brings together some of the states overlooking the waters of the vast Indian Ocean, like the UK. Italy is not a ‘resident power’ in the Indian Ocean.
However, Italy is a global actor with a vital interest in the security and stability of the maritime order. Politically and economically, Italy is an active member of the G7 and of the European Union, using these memberships to ensure the respect for the rule of law in the maritime domain. It is also one of the main promoters of international peace and stability through other international organizations, from the UN to the IMO, and a firm believer of forms of collective security as its affiliation to NATO attests.
Above all, Italy, due to its “Mediterranean” nature, is very clear about the vital importance of cooperation in maritime spaces in which connectivity shapes prosperity, and with it, the growth of civilisations. The Italian Navy proves this point every day, through its work in ensuring stable and safe seas, in which resources and goods travel at sea without disruption, and the rule of law underwrites how constabulary functions are conducted in its territorial waters, EEZ, and beyond those confines.
Based on the above, what does the Indian Ocean mean to Italy? The historian Michel Mollat has offered a description that is a good starting point:
«An area of encounter and contact, crossed in all directions by multidirectional circulation axes, a harbinger of changes of all kinds and sensitive to the most varied and most distant influences, the Indian Ocean, more than other seas, constitutes a privileged cultural intersection.
From the most distant antiquity to today, the Indian Ocean has always played this role of “cultural mediator” even if it should be noted that, over the centuries, it has not played this role continuously or with the same intensity»[1].
In this respect, therefore, the Indian Ocean, is from an Italian perspective very similar to the Mediterranean: it is a connecting fabric that has enabled civilizations to flourish and prosper through connectivity throughout the centuries. As such, the Indian Ocean is – for a country like Italy – a space that naturally appeals to the Mediterranean appreciation of the role of the sea in the advancement of international affairs.
In this respect, however, for the Italian Navy the Indian Ocean stands also as a space of key strategic value.
Looking at global geopolitics from a “European” point of view, the Indian Ocean took on a real strategic value – from a very Western-centric point of view – only with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.
Despite the importance it assumed during the Second World War, the Indian Ocean became a pivotal area with the closure of the Suez Canal (Six Day War, 1967), the appearance of the Soviet fleet in these waters and the settling of the US base in Diego Garcia.
In the war’s aftermath, events during the Cold War progressively brought the significance of the Indian Ocean back into the Italian strategic calculus. The Iran and Iraq war, the international intervention for the liberation of Kuwait and the anti-piracy operations off the coast of the Horn of Africa represented key moments changing the Western perception of this maritime space – and Italy’s too.
However, Italian strategists had already started to reflect upon the significance of the Indian Ocean during the inter-war period. The Italian Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo was one such leading example. Fioravanzo emphasized the centrality of the Red Sea as a connecting element between the Latin Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. As he wrote: «…the Mediterranean does not end at Suez or even at Bab-el-Mandeb, but […] strategically it ends to the east of the Persian Gulf encompassing it all in its vital space»[2].
Fioravanzo understood the strategic value of connectivity between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. In doing so, he also conceptually started to draw the contours of a geopolitical concept which, from the first half of the 1980s, constitutes the fundamental reference of the Marina Militare, the Italian Navy. A geopolitical, strategic concept born within the classrooms of the Naval Staff College which represents today not merely a naval notion, but which informs Italian foreign policy as a whole: the idea of the “Wider Mediterranean”.
This is a space centered on the traditional “Mediterranean” but it is meant not to emphasize its natural boundaries. Rather, it is designed to highlight the importance of the region’s links through the Red Sea and its two openings (Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait) –to the west, down to the Gulf of Guinea and the Namibian coasts, and to the north, to the Arctic region. Italy’s foreign and military policy are increasingly active in these areas and the Navy is the instrument with which Italy protects its vital strategic interests.
Yet, in the east, the concept of the “Wider Mediterranean” has been consolidated to include the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf and along the eastern coasts of the African continent, up to Mozambique whereby it includes also the western-most portion of the Indian Ocean.
These are areas in which the Italian Navy has regularly operated missions of presence and surveillance, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, anti-piracy, maritime interdiction, etc. with progressively more active profiles and protagonists. Economically, from this region – and, in particular, from the Gulf area – about a quarter of the total imported crude arrives in Italy and, from Qatar alone, the European Union imports about 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year.
The Suez Canal in 2020 – the year of the pandemic and, therefore, a period of contraction in maritime traffic – still saw the passage of 1 billion tons of goods and totaled a number of transits equal to 18,829 ships. Thanks to Suez, 12% of world traffic and 7%-8% of oil traffic continue to pass through the Mediterranean. Italy – 33% of whose trade is absorbed by the sea – therefore has strong economic interests in the area of the “Wider Mediterranean”, from Suez to the Strait of Malacca: through these choke points, 21% arrives in our ports of all Italian imports by sea, with China ranking as our top Asian supplier.
This data is sufficient to make the point of how and why Italy – despite not possessing overseas territories or major bases in the Indian Ocean – understands its strategic importance.
However, the geopolitical and geostrategic value of the Indian Ocean is not only linked to the fact that it is part of something – the Indo-Pacific – but also to its nature as an autonomous geostrategic entity.
This represents a crucial point that I wish to emphasize today.
The nature of the Indian Ocean as a geopolitical space with its own autonomy but also as a geopolitical space to be analyzed in connection with the Pacific, is recognised. This is the singular element on which the idea of “complexity” of the region is based, a complexity that brings this geopolitical space closer to Italy’s Mediterranean which is the sea of extreme complexity.
Herein lies the central point of the “Mediterranean nature” of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean, like Italy’s Mediterranean, is a reality endowed with its own autonomy, with its own features, with its own enormous geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic potential.
From the Persian Gulf to the coasts of African states, passing through Malaysia, the Australian coasts and finally reaching Antarctica, the Indian Ocean extends for more than 70 million km. It is a gigantic “Mediterranean” hugged by about 30 countries and on whose coasts live about a third of the world’s population. It is a space that cannot be classified as a simple “transit route” or that of a space whose impact on international relations is not valued.
Admiral Fioravanzo and his theorization of a Mediterranean which extended to the westernmost part of the Indian Ocean reflected the complexity of this latter maritime space, which can be defined as a “gigantic Mediterranean”. A reminder: Fioravanzo is also the father of the theory of the “four Mediterraneans”: the Latin Mediterranean, the Meso-American Mediterranean, the Japanese Mediterranean (East China Sea and the Sea of Japan) and the Australasian Mediterranean (South China Sea and Indonesian seas)[3]. Fioravanzo insisted on the nature of the Mediterranean as “seas of connection”, as seas of encounter and clash between civilizations, as seas within which the great global challenges are played out.
Like all “Mediterraneans”, the richness of identities, cultures, civilizations, histories and economies make the Indian Ocean “an ocean of complexity” and increase its value (not only economic). As in all the “Mediterraneans”, it is important to ensure that order, peace and cooperation reign in this maritime space: these are riches that can only derive from the collaboration between the actors who overlook or pass through it.
As in all the “Mediterraneans”, here too, the delimitation of water spaces must respect the rule of law and should not be determined by the power or desires of individual states.
As with all the other “Mediterraneans”, in particular, the stability of the coastal areas in the Indian Ocean must be looked after. Italy and the Italian Navy, with their culture of a Mediterranean nation and seafaring people are ready to contribute to peace, stability and cooperation with all the geopolitical subjects of the area.
The approach just described seeks to engage with the Indian Ocean as a complex space in which managing stability as the result of better governance and cooperation is an objective of paramount significance. This does of mean that addressing the concerns and priorities of many local players who draw their livelihood from the resources within the Indian Ocean and the safety and stability of its shipping lanes and undersea cables is a core priority, a priority which needs the collaboration of all the actors interested in the stability of this crucial area. Navies are one of the tools to do so.
Against this background, the Italian Navy stands at a critical inflection point. The Italian Navy is today a medium size navy but in a position to deliver a globally postured fleet to meet the challenges to the maritime order in a complex and contested age. The fleet features cutting-edge capabilities and advanced and innovative solutions enhancing performance, both through the distributed versatility and modularity of individual ships and the combined effects of its carrier and expeditionary groups.
The Italian Navy, therefore, now sails into the Indian Ocean with an apparently reduced but resolute aim: it takes its traditional vocation for peace and international cooperation to work together with countries like India to ensure that the Indian Ocean prospers for the nations drawing from its connectivity and for all others who rely on maritime connectivity for their own prosperity. The capabilities attest to the professionalism, the technological sophistication, and the expertise of the Italian Navy as a credible and desirable partner.
Nave Morosini’s cruise in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Nave Vespucci’s campaign – a biennial round-the-world tour that will sail through these waters and those of the Pacific – are the best calling cards and the most concrete testimony of this desire to cooperate and exchange with the states of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. They capture the advanced nature of Italian capabilities, and the professional traditions upon which these are developed. They showcase the navy’s desire to support collaborative efforts[4] around fundamental pieces of maritime governance, from maritime domain and picture-building awareness to capacity building.
Next year Venice will host the 14th edition of the Trans-Regional Sea Power Symposium, an appointment that has become particularly significant on naval calendars over time as an opportunity for dialogue and cooperation between navies on topics regarding maritime strategic issues.
Italy and India have national and common interests to protect, and Italy is a reliable partner. The Indian Ocean is contiguous and inescapably linked to Italy’s “Wider Mediterranean”. It is an area which, due to its nature as a space that allows access to the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and Antarctica, is a global pivot, and one in which stability and security are essential for world peace.
Rear Admiral Giuseppe Schivardi is the Director of the Strategic Studies Centre, Italian Naval Staff College, Venice. He was in Mumbai for the commemoration of the Port Call to the city by ITS Francesco Morosini on August 11, and the Maritime Security Seminar that was part of the proceedings.
The essay was written for this visit. It is part of the continuing research at the Centre, led by the author and directed by Senior Researcher Francesco Zampieri, on “rediscovering and analysing the complexity of narrow seas and semi-enclosed seas. The purpose is to demonstrate the deep connection between oceanic spaces and “Mediterraneans”, using a modern interpretation of Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo, one of Italy’s most important strategic thinkers in the first half of the 20th century.
The research focuses on the connection between land and maritime spaces, particularly evident in the Mediterraneans. The “Mediterraneans” are regarded as a geopolitical and geostrategic concept and are referred to as ‘the seas of complexity’. This complexity derives from the role of the “Mediterraneans” as a crossing point of civilizations, and of economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic interests. This is where the global challenges of today are and will be primarily centred on these seas.
References
[1] Michel Mollat, “Voies maritimes des contacts culturels dans l’océan Indien” (Table ronde UNESCOCIPSH, New-Delhi, 1980) in Diogène, n° 111, 1981, p. 6.
[2] G. Fioravanzo, Panorama strategico dell’Oceano Indiano e dell’Oceano Pacifico, Roma 1941, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, p. 7.
[3] G. Fioravanzo, «I quattro Mediterranei», Parte II, Capitolo I in Basi navali nel mondo, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, Milano 1936, pp 129-156.
A modern analysis of the Fioravanzo’s theory is available in the F. Zampieri, «Dai quattro “Mediterranei” di Fioravanzo all’importanza dei mari interni», in M. Marconi-P. Sellari (Edited by), Geopolitica e spazi marittimi, Roma 2021, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, pp. 161-173.
[4] The Italian Naval Fleet is assigned the duty to ensure the compilation, validation and dissemination of the MDA shared at a multidimensional level, merging all the information coming from different capabilities of C2.
This is proved by the daily effort in terms of presence and surveillance in the basin of primary interest (18 units, 2 submarines, 14 aircrafts, 6 operation centres, 10 radar coastal stations, 2600 personnel) but also by the deployment, for eight months a year, of two naval units on the high seas for maritime security activities with particular attention to the fight against piracy, one in the Gulf of Guinea for the national operation GABINIA and one in the Indian Ocean as part of the ATALANTA Operation of the European Union, areas where the capacity to intervene against illegal activities must be developed, including drug trafficking and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU).
But also, by the deployment, up to eight months a year, of an additional offshore naval unit in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, as part of the AGENOR coalition operation resulting from the European EMASOH initiative, for maritime-oriented security activities to protect energy supply lines and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and cooperation with other regional initiatives.
But there is also the prospect of starting a routine presence of a newly built offshore naval unit (or a dedicated Task Group) in the Indo-Pacific, a region of growing importance for global balance as well as of interest for supporting competitiveness national aspect, however consolidated and transferable in other areas of interest.
Another front of cooperation in terms of enhancing MDA is offered by the V-RMTC and the T-RMN, as tools for strengthening the Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and for promoting dialogue and cooperation between the most relevant actors in the maritime domain. The V-RMTC is a system based on commercial hardware and software developed within the Italian Navy to share selected unclassified information related to merchant shipping among participants. The community of the V-RMTC which is at present made of 36 countries evolved over the years in the form of the T-RMN in order to link the V-RMTC to the existing similar projects (Brazil, Singapore, India) and the link with the Indian MSA system is one of those.
In this regard India is already part of the T-RMN and with its MSA system managed by the IFC-IOR (Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region) is connected with our V-RMTC since 2010 as Technical Leading Nation together with Italy, Brazil and Singapore. Through the wider community of the V-RMTC two million contacts are exchanged every month.