The state visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the United States from June 21-23 was closely followed by experts and the media in Russia. It was the major international topic in the news along with the June 18-19 visit of U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to China. Despite never-ending tensions in Moscow-Washington relations, and a sense of concern about the trajectory of Indo-U.S. relations prevalent in Russian political circles, Modi’s visit was viewed positively by observers in Russia. The bottom line is this: New Delhi managed to strike new deals on technologies and investments without compromising its strategic autonomy.
In the run-up to Modi’s visit to Washington, the new defence agreements and contracts, which were finalised during India’s and U.S.’ defence ministers meet in early June, were in the spotlight. Russian media outlets also kept a close eye on a prospect of New Delhi joining NATO Plus following the U.S. Congressional Committee’s recommendation to include India in the mechanism. Even as any NATO activity is viewed in Russia with suspicion, there is a general feeling in the analyst community that India will steer away from joining hands with the alliance. Moscow State University expert on South Asia Boris Volkhonsky felt that India gave “lukewarm support” to the alignment, let alone alliance, with NATO and remains committed to the principle of non-alignment to the military bloc.[1]
The major outcome of the India-U.S. negotiations of the recent months is the Memorandum of Understanding between General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited on the joint production of F414 engines for the Tejas Mk-2 fighter jets. The agreement points to an increasing U.S. readiness to share defence technologies with India, though the deal is yet to receive approval from the U.S. Congress, and the exact level of technology transfer is not specified. The Head of Centre of the Indian Ocean region at IMEMO RAS Alexey Kupriyanov says “…the more India is integrated into industrial chains, the stronger the India-U.S. bond will be.”[2]
The general upward trend in Indo-U.S. defence cooperation is without doubt, and India’s expected procurement of MQ-9B drones is a case in point. However, Russian onlookers do not overestimate the deal, pointing out that these U.S. drones have no viable alternatives and may help the Indian navy ramp up its capabilities.[3]
Interestingly, Russian officialdom has paid much attention to India’s emergence as a hub for maintenance and repair for U.S. aircraft and ships as envisaged by the Indo-U.S. Defence Industrial Roadmap. When asked about this agreement, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov expressed the hope that “Indian partners, being quite experienced and well versed in the intricacies of contemporary global politics, are fully aware of the risks that this may entail.”[4]
It appears that Russian concerns in this regard are similar to those linked with the LEMOA agreement back in 2016 allowing both Indian and U.S. navies to utilise each others’ military facilities for refuel and refurbishment. In reality, Moscow could not sign the same kind of deal with India, even though Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) has been on the table since 2018. As the conflict in Ukraine is far from a resolution and Russian naval ships are rare guests in the Indian Ocean, RELOS will unlikely be reached any time soon.
Although there is an understanding that the growing partnership with the U.S. will not affect India’s ties with Russia, officials and experts in Moscow continue to view geopolitics as a primary driver of the U.S. policy toward India. According to Ryabkov, Russia will continue to deepen its strategic partnership, including defence ties, with India, despite “U.S.’ chicanery” and “intensified attempts to bring India into its geopolitical structures”.[5] Different experts tend to believe that Washington is keen to impact India’s position on Russia and China. They point out that the U.S., on the one hand, has been seeking to involve India in the “anti-Chinese initiatives” and, on the other, expects the Indian government to halt increased imports of Russian oil and to shut the door on technologies’ reexport.[6]
Overall, Russian experts believe the India-U.S. engagement has its limits and New Delhi will not agree to turn into an ally of the U.S. New Delhi’s enduring approach toward the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and refusal to condemn Russian actions are viewed as a manifestation to that.
Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow calls Narendra Modi’s visit to the U.S. “an absolute triumph” and “a great achievement for Indian diplomacy” as it has provided New Delhi with “an excellent chance to get modern technologies and investments in the Indian economy”[7], which are badly needed for India’s development agenda.
The focus on technological cooperation is visible both in the U.S. and Indian leaders’ joint statement and the iCET initiative curated by the national security advisers. The highest level of engagement in the history of India-U.S. relations allows New Delhi to get closer to receiving American advanced technologies and solutions, such as semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, and telecom equipment.
Surprisingly, India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords and the new agreements between NASA and ISRO were largely disregarded by the Russian media. This is not an area of U.S.-Russian competition anymore with Russia’s space program facing various troubles over the last decade, resulting in a serious dwindle in Indo-Russian space cooperation. Although Indian Gaganauts received training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Centre near Moscow in 2020-2021, it is increasingly evident that India will be partnering with the U.S. for its human spaceflight programme and space research, taking advantage of various collaborations with Artemis Accords signatories and attracting investments into private space projects.
India’s engagement with the U.S.’ technological sector is a logical step to stimulate domestic development programs and to foster the digital economy. Due to the inevitable impact of sanctions, Russia may lag further behind in this domain and will be likely reliant on Chinese achievements and on the illegal imports of Western technologies.
Even as India is not turning away from Russia, it is set to expand and deepen its partnership with the U.S. in areas where Moscow can no longer take the lead.
Dr Aleksei Zakharov is a Visiting Fellow, Gateway House and Research Fellow, School of International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow.
This article was first published in The Indian Express.
References
[1] Boris Volkhonsky, “Индия «прохладно» смотрит на перспективы сближения с НАТО,” (India looks “cool” at the prospects for rapprochement with NATO,” Russian Council for International Affairs, 6 June 2023, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/indiya-prokhladno-smotrit-na-perspektivy-sblizheniya-s-nato/.
[2] Bratersky Alexander, “США и Индия – дружба чипами и двигателями,” (USA and India – friendship with chips and engines), Finam, 26 June 2023, https://www.finam.ru/publications/item/ssha-i-indiya-druzhba-chipami-i-dvigatelyami-20230626-1106/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “Senior Russian diplomat hopeful India aware of risks behind US idea to create repairs hub,” TASS, 23 June 2023, https://tass.com/politics/1637125.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Alexey Kupriyanov, “США и Индия пошли на сближение,” (USA and India are moving closer), BFM.Ru, 24 June 2023, https://www.bfm.ru/news/528222.
[7] Timofey Bordachev, “Должна ли Россия опасаться Индии,” (Should Russia be afraid of India), VZGLYAD.RU, 26 June 2023, https://vz.ru/opinions/2023/6/26/1218303.html.