Egypt’s foreign policy reflects the country’s strategic position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the timeless waters of the Nile River. Its strategic posture has been shaped by an interplay of domestic priorities, mainly related to economic headwinds, institutional reinforcement, and regional unrest, such as the humanitarian emergency in Palestine[1] or the fragile ceasefire after the “Twelve-Day War” escalation between Israel and Iran. Scenarios have shape-shifted in the region, first in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Lebanon and Libya[2] and of late in Sudan, Israel and Palestine.
Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Egyptian Expatriates, explained last October that President Abdel Fattah El Sisi has adopted a fundamental principle governing Egyptian foreign policy: “not being drawn into the current state of global polarisation”.[3] Under this dome, Cairo has pursued a three-track foreign policy doctrine from a historical perspective, even as events have been unfolding in several timelines simultaneously.
First, maintaining a dual dynamic of cooperation and contention with the U.S. and Israel. The Camp David Accords and the Oslo Accords were milestones in the context of Arab-Israeli rapprochement. More recently, shuttle diplomacy has facilitated de-escalation options and humanitarian arrangements in Palestine.[4][5] Within Egypt, the advocates for a calibrated civil and military equilibrium, one that contains extremism while preserving institutional continuity in the wake of the post-Arab Spring transitions and the COVID-19 aftermath.
The second is regional stabilisation. Egypt is backing United Nations efforts in Libya, hosting the 5+5 Joint Military Commission,[6] engaging with regional frameworks such as the Horn of Africa dialogues,[7] and addressing the Sudanese crisis, which has so far resulted in the influx of 1.2 million refugees into Egypt.[8] Egypt is coordinating counterterrorism and maritime security operations with European partners, including Greece and Italy, as well as a reset of ties with Ankara. Cairo continues to engage in African Union–brokered negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)[9]– a development with the potential to escalate regional tensions related to water supply and even endanger national viability in the coming moments[10] if unresolved.
The third is economic and sustainable statecraft—through an in medio stat virtus[11] policy of diversification and a “Nile realism politic,” Egypt participates actively in the Red Sea Council, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and diversifying partners beyond the U.S., EU, Gulf countries, China, and Russia, as well as the BRICS+, while pursuing active multilateralism, particularly through the COP27.[12] With China, cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative is evident in the TEDA–Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation’s work on the New Administrative Capital, and emerging green hydrogen projects in the Suez Canal.
Since Anwar El-Sadat linked peace to prosperity,[13] Cairo treats foreign policy as economic statecraft. The Ministry of International Cooperation works with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and partners from the Gulf, the U.S., and China to align financing with national priorities—mobilising Foreign Direct Investment across key sectors, including energy, logistics, telecommunications, and real estate.[14] The Suez Canal Zone is at the forefront of supply-chain reshoring. At the same time, green hydrogen, digital infrastructure, and renewables form the next frontier, supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. The IMF has stated that Egypt’s macroeconomic firmness is taking root, but it’s time to accelerate and deepen the reform efforts to reduce the state’s footprint.[15] Like the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Ozymandias,[16] ambition endures amidst Egypt’s shifting sands, timelessly.
After inflation peaked at 38% in September 2023, Egypt saw a notable decline to 14.9% by June 2025, indicating a tentative macroeconomic stability. Projected GDP growth of 4.2% for 2025 and a more stable Egyptian pound reflect the impact of the March 2024 $8 billion IMF programme, strengthened by Gulf investment—particularly the UAE’s $35 billion Ras El-Hikma deal—as well as improved tourism revenues and remittance inflows.[17] Liquidity has improved, enabling expanded credit to industry and services. For Cairo’s diplomacy, macroeconomic calm underwrites social resilience and strategic bandwidth, while sustaining reform momentum and investor confidence. Investment in connectivity—transport, digital, and energy networks—has been a hallmark of development and should remain a strategic priority in the years ahead.
The IMF has supported Egyptian reforms, welcomed Gulf nations’ investments, and commended the Suez Canal Zone’s resilience amid a decline in tourism and Red Sea disruptions,[18] particularly in the Gulf of Aden. On the other hand, projects that may alter supply chain routes and behaviours are a geopolitical medium-term consideration for Egypt. Projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (from Mumbai to Haifa through the Arab Peninsula) and the International North-South Transport Corridor (from Mumbai to Saint Petersburg through Iran and Azerbaijan) may cause uncertainty for the long-term competitiveness of the Suez Canal.
Under President Sisi, Vision 2030[19] aligns these tracks toward state consolidation and national interest-led diversification, while keeping in mind the geopolitical risks and acknowledging that equilibrium requires synergies between East and West. Together, these vectors define a pragmatic, sovereignty-focused diplomacy and economic national project.
From Bandung to today’s multipolar order, Egypt grounds its diplomacy in regional priorities and strategic partnerships,[20] focusing on the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, while advocating for governance reforms that elevate the Global South priorities and its role within BRICS+. Camp David’s legacy has shaped a doctrine of deterrence with de-escalation, as evident in sustained Gaza mediation efforts involving the U.S. and Qatar, as well as relevant diplomatic initiatives in Libya and Sudan. Although the nature of intelligence cooperation and military outreach remains unclear, both are actively involved in sub-regional conflicts. Defence interoperability deepens with the U.S.—a new edition of the biennial multilateral tri-service Exercise Bright Star, now featuring 8,000 troops from 34 nations (including India),[21] is expected to take place this year.
Partnerships with the U.S., European countries, Gulf states, China, France, Italy, and Russia are hedged for autonomy, linking investment to security and regional integration. Egypt’s location at the intersection of many routes of exchange, including the ancient Silk Road, made it one of the world’s most critical geo-strategic spots. Almost every civilisation in the Mediterranean and European regions, Greeks, Persians, Romans, Ottomans, British, and French, envied Egypt’s pivotal placing.[22] Today is not so different.
As the Arab world’s most populous state—and a cradle of Arab nationalism and non‑alignment—Egypt has repeatedly translated demography, geography, and culture into strategic leverage. Perhaps the expected inauguration of the Grand Egyptian Museum[23] later this year might be the most significant cultural event of the decade. Understanding Egypt’s current constraints—from macroeconomic conditions to institutional and military strength—is essential to anticipating shifts in the regional equilibrium and, by extension, the repercussions in the wider international order.
Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References:
[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). “Reported Impact Snapshot | Gaza Strip (23 July 2025).” OCHA, July 2025. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-23-july-2025
[2] European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). Egypt’s Foreign Policy within a Challenging Regional Context. Brussels: European Parliament, July 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698062/EPRS_BRI(2021)698062_EN.pdf
[3] Egypt State Information Service (SIS). “FM: Egypt’s Foreign Policy Aims to Serve Region’s Interests, Stability.” October 2024. https://sis.gov.eg/Story/197466/FM-Egypt’s-foreign-policy-aims-to-serve-region%27s-interests%2C-stability?lang=en-us
[4] The Times of Israel. “Egyptian News Outlet: Gaza Ceasefire Talks Expected to Resume Next Week.” n.d. July 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/egyptian-news-outlet-gaza-ceasefire-talks-expected-to-resume-next-week/
[5] Egypt State Information Service (SIS). “Egypt, Qatar Continue Mediation Efforts to Reach Ceasefire Deal in Gaza.” SIS, July 2025. https://us.sis.gov.eg/Story/211048/Egypt%2C-Qatar-continue-mediation-efforts-to-reach-ceasefire-deal-in-Gaza?lang=en-us
[6] UN Support Mission in Libya, “Libya’s 5+5 JMC and liaison committees approve a coordination mechanism for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya [EN/AR]”, ReliefWeb, February, 2025. (https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libyas-55-jmc-and-liaison-committees-approve-coordination-mechanism-withdrawal-mercenaries-and-foreign-fighters-libya-enar)
[7] Maher Abu al-Majd, “Egypt Maneuvers in the Horn of Africa”, SANAA-Center For Strategic Studies. October 2024. (https://sanaacenter.org/files/Egypt_Maneuvers_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_en.pdf)
[8] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Sudan: Global Report 2024 — Situation Summary. June 2025. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/Sudan%20GR2024%20Situation%20Summary%20FINAL%20v3.pdf
[9] Gurjit Singh, “The politics of the Ethiopian dam”, Gateway House, July, 2021. (https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-politics-of-the-ethiopian-dam/)
[10] Egypt Independent. “Ethiopia Declares Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ‘Just the Beginning’; More Nile Dams Planned for Development.” n.d. https://www.egyptindependent.com/ethiopia-declares-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-just-the-beginning-more-nile-dams-planned-for-development/
[11] Latin for “Virtue is to be found in the middle”
[12] ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale). Navigating Turbulence: Egyptian Foreign Policy under el‑Sisi’s Third Term. n.d. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/navigating-turbulence-egyptian-foreign-policy-under-el-sisis-third-term-156470
[13] The New York Times. “Prosperity, War May Be Tougher for Sadat Than Autonomy Talks: Ali.” The New York Times, May 19, 1980. https://www.nytimes.com/1980/05/19/archives/prosperity-war-may-be-tougher-for-sadat-than-autonomy-talks-ali.html
[14] Africa Newsroom. “Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation Receives Her German Counterpart on Her First Visit to Egypt to Discuss Strengthening the Strategic Economic Partnership between the Two Countries.” n.d. https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/minister-of-planning-economic-development-and-international-cooperation-receives-her-german-counterpart-on-her-first-visit-to-egypt-to-discuss-strengthening-the-strategic-economic-partnership-between-the-two-countries?lang=en
[15] International Monetary Fund (IMF). “IMF Staff Completes Review Mission to Egypt.” Press Release No. 25/16, May 27, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/pr-2516-egypt-imf-staff-completes-review-mission-to-egypt
[16] Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Ozymandias”. (https://poets.org/poem/ozymandias)
[17] Arab Center Washington DC. “Sisi’s Foreign Policy Fails to Obscure Egypt’s Festering Economic Problems.” n.d. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/sisis-foreign-policy-fails-to-obscure-egypts-festering-economic-problems/
[18] International Monetary Fund (IMF). “IMF Staff Completes Review Mission to Egypt.” Press Release No. 25/16, May 27, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/pr-2516-egypt-imf-staff-completes-review-mission-to-egypt
[19] Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (Egypt). Egypt Vision 2030 (English ed.). Cairo: MPED, n.d. https://mped.gov.eg/Files/Egypt_Vision_2030_EnglishDigitalUse.pdf
[20] Körber‑Stiftung. “Emerging Middle Powers Initiative.” 2025. https://koerber-stiftung.de/en/projects/koe
[21] U.S. Central Command, “Bright Star 2023 highlights the long-standing Egyptian-American ties”, U.S. Central Command, 2023. (https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/3520694/bright-star-2023-highlights-the-long-standing-egyptian-american-ties/)
[22] Tarek Osman, “Egypt on the Brink, From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood”, Yale University Press, 2023.
[23] Grand Egyptian Museum, “Welcome to the official ticketing website for the Grand Egyptian Museum”, Grand Egyptian Museum, July 2025. (https://www.visit-gem.com/en/home)