A ceasefire between Israel and Iran was temporarily accepted on June 24 after 12 days of war, in an existential Hamlet momentum. Although the broader crisis remains unresolved, its geopolitical repercussions include Tehran needing to adjust its strategic calculus, which requires long-term recalibration. However, continued operations in non-conventional domains and grey-zone tactics – such as kinetic strikes, proxy engagement, cyber operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and hybrid deterrence—have resulted in a fragile distention. These forms of confrontation were part of the regional environment prior to this escalation, and they will likely persist, accompanied by a new understanding of the limits of airstrikes on urban areas and the deployment of advanced weaponry, including long-range ballistic missiles. While overt conflict may be temporarily restrained, strategic competition will endure through indirect and adaptive means.
Tehran’s diplomatic engagement will require reconfiguration. The objective is beyond the preservation of the ceasefire; it is a reassessment of bilateral and multilateral political frameworks based on observed behaviours, including the willingness to escalate or de-escalate, the deployment of grey zone tactics or diplomatic pressure. The conflict was also a test for Iran’s alliances and potential partnerships, particularly with Russia and China. As Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “Post-war diplomacy will differ from the pre-war period, and the methods of interaction will be adjusted in accordance with other countries’ attitudes during the crisis.”[1] Past assumptions are longer applicable, and decisions will be adjusted according to how each actor responded during the war, revealing their priorities or strategic calculations.
Instead of reflection, however, Iran is likely to dig in, urgently rebuilding its deterrence capabilities, and having differentiated engagement with regional actors, such as the Gulf countries, based on reciprocal conduct. The interest-based strategic orientation prevails, but now with a direct conflict exposure experience. This is a change from 1979, since when Iran’s strategy has often been anchored in revolutionary identity; Direct conflict could recalibrate that thinking, compelling Tehran to weigh its ideological commitments against the strategic costs of escalation.
So far, Iran’s foreign policymaking has involved its in-state actors—the Supreme Leader, the President, the Cabinet, Parliament, and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)—and non-constitutional bodies, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority, while the IRGC exerts operational and strategic influence through its Quds Force.[2] The Foreign Ministry manages formal diplomacy but is often subordinated to security priorities.[3] The SNSC has reasserted its management of strategic topics, including the nuclear talks. Recent shifts emphasise security over diplomacy.
Iran’s foreign policy is therefore dual, one run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another by the security and intelligence agencies.[4] This results in internal strains and inconsistencies.[5]
The 12-day war[6] reflects a triangular structure of leanings: i) reinforcing Iran’s centralised institutional nature, ii) A deepening diplomatic pattern of alignment with Eastern powers, particularly in Asia , and iii) increased securitisation policies in governance and foreign policy.
These changing dynamics may alter the Iranian authorities’ responses across various institutions. In foreign policy, they can enable coordinated inter-agency alignment and operational coherence but also pose hazardous confrontational policies. Tehran faced a degraded operational environment across multiple fronts—including Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—due to cumulative attrition and significant infrastructure losses. This was further compounded by the collapse of the Al-Assad government in Syria and Hezbollah’s responses that reflect constraints under mounting pressure in Lebanon. Economically, its hydrocarbon exports were compromised.
This has accelerated a shift in decision-making in Tehran’s compass of geopolitical priorities. Reports of Iran negotiating with China to acquire the top-performing Chengdu J-10C fighter jet[7] and advanced AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)[8] are examples of the state’s haste to overhaul its military response capabilities. The prior strategic dilemma – between immediate retaliation and long-term deterrence – has been overtaken by the need to restore operational credibility and learn the lessons from multi-theatre engagements.. Conflict scenarios are no longer hypothetical; they have materialised and are on the brink of resurfacing.
Iranian foreign policy is expected to become increasingly reactive, navigating trade-offs across its nuclear and missile programs, military partnerships, and the durability of regional alliances with non-state actors or adversaries. Israel’s June 13 strike disrupted the sixth round of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Oman. While negotiation channels remain open, Iran faces intensifying socio-economic constraints, including inflation (43% as per the IMF) and a decline in welfare payments domestically. At this stage, the nuclear file continues to serve less as a non-proliferation mechanism and more as a political and economic brokering instrument, as well as a backchannel for exchanging messages.
Iran’s post-conflict diplomacy will prioritise regional de-escalation and coalition management, amidst distancing by Lebanon and Syria and their U.S.-induced overtures to Israel. Domestically, the economic response will be crucial in asserting governance capacity, mitigating risks of unrest, and restoring social stability. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s initial statements aimed to recalibrate ties with Europe and reopen indirect channels with the U.S..[9] However, Germany[10] and the UK’s[11] support for Israel among other European countries will keep the situation on the boil.
To the east, Iran is actively consolidating a strategic realignment, through the expansion of partnerships. The Iran-China 25-year Cooperation Program, the Iran-Russia 20 Year Strategic Cooperation Agreement, and India’s operational role at the Chabahar Port highlight a multidimensional connectivity agenda via the International North-South Transport Corridor. Accession to the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union reinforces Iran’s eastward pivot, moving away from the West and closer to the Indo-Pacific, the Pacific itself, and the multipolar order. The primary goal is to focus on technological exchanges, connectivity infrastructure, sanctions circumvention, and strategic hedging. While ideological alignment with the Islamic Revolution remains relevant, perhaps some post-conflict pragmatism and quick decisions may prevail, with foreign policy being the instrument for providing sanctions relief and credible economic recovery pathways. Recent re-engagement in nuclear negotiations and the utilisation of third-party mediators and multilateral forums remain essential tools for de-escalation, but, they no longer guarantee peace.
Iranian foreign policy must navigate toward strategic autonomy and internal concord. As witnessed following the 1988 ceasefire with Iraq, such moments can mark an inflexion point – one that prioritises national reconstruction, resilience, and domestic welfare; strategic recalibration, strengthening confidence – and finding a geopolitical identity.
Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References:
[1] Russian News Agency (TASS), “Iran to adjust foreign policy after conflict with Israel — top diplomat Post-war diplomacy will differ from the pre-war period, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said”, TASS, June, 2025. (https://tass.com/world/1981769)
[2] Ward, Steven, “Iran´s Ministry of Intelligence, a concise history”, Georgestown University Press, 2024.
[3] Zarif, Javad, “One is the foreign policy of the Foreign Ministry, and the other is the foreign policy of the armed forces”, Asriran, March, 2024. .https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/948624/%C2%A0ظریف-هر-وزارتخانه%E2%80%8Cای-برای-خودش-یک-وزارت-خارجه-دارد-سیاست-خارجی-کشور-دوتاست-یکی-سیاست-خارجی-وزارت-خارجه-است-و-یکی-سیاست-خارجی-نیروهای-مسلح
[4] Ídem.
[5] Beehner, Lionel, “Iran’s Multifaceted Foreign Policy”, Council on Foreign Relations, April, 2006.( https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-multifaceted-foreign-policy)
[6] Atwood, Richar, at all, “A Twelve-Day War, A New Middle East?”, International Crisis Group, June, 2025. (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran-israelpalestine/twelve-day-war-new-middle)
[7] Nikolov, Boyko, “Iran bets on China’s J-10C to counter Israel’s F-35I might”, BulgarianMilitary.Com, June 2025. (https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/06/27/iran-bets-on-chinas-j-10c-to-counter-israels-f-35i-might/#google_vignette)
[8] Defense News Aerospace 2025, “Intelligence: Iran Seeks to Acquire Chinese J-10C Fighter Jets to Counter Israeli F-35I Superiority”, Global Defense News, June, 2025. (https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/intelligence-iran-seeks-to-acquire-chinese-j-10c-fighter-jets-to-counter-israeli-f-35i-superiority#google_vignette)
[9] Zweiri, Mahjoob, “Iran’s Foreign Policy Under Masoud Pezeshkian: Tendencies and Challenges”, Middle Easy Council of Foreign Affairs, March, 2025. (https://mecouncil.org/publication/irans-foreign-policy-under-masoud-pezeshkian-tendencies-and-challenges/)
[10] APF, “Germany backs Israel after Iran war in first high-level visit”, L´Orient Today, June 2025. (https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1467030/germany-backs-israel-after-iran-war-in-first-high-level-visit.html)
[11] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Oral statement to Parliament Iran-Israel conflict: Foreign Secretary’s statement”, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, June, 2025. (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iran-israel-conflict-foreign-secretary-statement)