In May of 2017 at the inception of the first Donald Trump administration, Riyadh was the first foreign presidential destination,[1] signalling a shift in U.S. foreign policy away from prioritising G7 countries as first stops. The Riyadh visit included a blueprint of the normalisation of ties with Israel, reinforced regional counter terrorism coordination and investment announcements, amongst other targets.
Three years later the Abraham Accords were signed by Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain—and later in 2020 and 2021, by Morocco and Sudan. The Israel-Gulf cooperation matured, and expanded cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established. In those moments, high-level diplomatic efforts realigned the regional balance and transformed the perception of the U.S. globally
While the operational landscape —geopolitical alignments, actors, institutional capabilities, influences in the regional policies—has evolved significantly over the years-, the strategic imperatives remain unchanged: to define and implement a Middle East policy that builds alliance credibility, and maintains readiness for potential risks through contingency preparation to anticipate humanitarian, military, economic or military crisis and preparing responses. Such a posture is essential for ensuring regional stability and assuming an adaptive role within an increasingly multipolar international system. The I2U2 multilateral initiative—India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S.— and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor[2] are the hard infrastructure execution of the strategy, to continue regional cooperation development.
Richard Nixon’s visit to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria[3] in June 1974 aimed to reinforce the U.S. role as a mediator after the October War of 1973, to open communication channels in a bipolar world and set the groundwork for a regional order reached in 1978 with The Camp David Accords. Five decades later—and following numerous high-level visits, including President George H. W. Bush’s 1990 trip to Egypt and Saudi Arabia amid Operation Desert Storm and President George W. Bush’s 2008 tour to Iraq and Afghanistan in the “post-conflict” context —presidential diplomacy in the Middle East continues to be about advancing priorities. President Donald Trump has understood the regional dynamics, and his recent visit reflects a deal-oriented diplomacy, with arms sales, economic agreements, AI partnerships, and regional security arrangements.
Saudi Arabia made a $600 billion commitment to investing in the U.S. to strengthen energy security, space capabilities, defence industry, technology, global infrastructure and critical minerals, along with the world’s largest defence sale agreement worth $142 billion.[4] In Qatar, an exchange of $1.2 trillion along with economic deals worth more than $243.5 billion were announced, including the sale of Boeing and GE Aerospace engines to Qatar Airways.[5] President Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE confirmed a $1.4 trillion investment in artificial intelligence (AI),[6] positioning his country as a significant player in AI development. Overall, economic deals were the crux of the itinerary.
Trump had an additional agenda: “I want to make a deal with Iran […]”,[7] [8] he said. It marked a shift in foreign policy towards Iran and negotiations around the nuclear agreement, remarkably when expert-level talks have progressed in Oman and the next round of talks is likely to be announced soon.[9] [10] The pivotal communiqué was Trump’s meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh and announcing the lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria, while also leaving the door of the Abraham Accords open to Damascus—an unlikely scenario—.[11] [12] Finally, Trump expressed concern for Gaza’s humanitarian crisis,[13] revealing a U.S. desire to ease instability. Regardless of the presidential visit results, it is vital to not forget that diplomatic achievements, by nature, are rarely absolute—neither permanent nor irreversible[14].
The strategic targets of U.S. Middle East diplomacy are now well-defined: a) Reinforce strategic alliances, particularly with Gulf countries; b) Facilitate peace agreements and de-escalate tensions, mainly with Iran, stabilise the Red Sea and Hormuz, and facilitating negotiation on normalisation with Israel ; c) Involve as many actors as possible in security pacts; and d) Avow global policy pivots and red lines for risk scenarios.
The strategic level involves communication amongst the intelligence community, diplomats, military, and private actors. These considerations will make it easier to sustain bipartisan support for these moves at home. Although negotiation or planning manuals suggest, “We are not supposed to tell what we are going to do in advance”,—a degree of tactical unpredictability will remain then.
Nothing compensates for lack of trust. Therefore, the U.S. will present a high-level engagement in the Middle East to maintain dialogue and oversee the evolution of agreements with its counterparts. The country will leverage symbolic visits to reinforce U.S.’s commitment at times of geopolitical shifts and future high-level commissions as platforms to advance multilateral or bilateral frameworks. This is due to the growing echoes of the multipolar narrative on the global stage, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, and Qatar have particularly moved on towards economic diversification and an independent foreign policy. This makes the bilateral engagements more relevant than ever.
The visit delivered a message of priorities, shrewdly assessing responses to the region’s multi-vector reality and acknowledging the potential consequences of the U.S.’s diplomacy on regional stability and global perceptions.
Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References:
[1] “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit.” National Archives and Records Administration, May 21, 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/.
[2] “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi of India in Joint Press Statement.” National Archives and Records Administration, February 25, 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-modi-india-joint-press-statement-2/.
[3] “Travels of the President: Richard M. Nixon.” Office of the Historian. Accessed May 27, 2025. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/nixon-richard-m.
[4] “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic $600 Billion Investment Commitment in Saudi Arabia.” The White House, May 13, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-600-billion-investment-commitment-in-saudi-arabia/.
[5] “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic $1.2 Trillion Economic Commitment in Qatar”, The White House, May 13, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-1-2-trillion-economic-commitment-in-qatar/.
[6] McCready, Alastair, Kevin Doyle, John Power, Urooba Jamal, and Jillian Kestler-D’Amours. “Donald Trump Updates: US President Touts Strong Relations, AI Deal in UAE.” Al Jazeera, May 15, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/15/donald-trump-live-us-president-signs-multibillion-dollar-deals-with-qatar.
[7] Erlanger, Steven. “Trump Wants a Deal With Iran, but It May Be Weaker Than His Supporters Demand; Iran rejects any deal that would ban it from any nuclear enrichment, long a demand of U.S. conservatives.”, The New York Times, May 17, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/world/europe/trump-iran-nuclear-talks.html.
[8] “Sayyid Badr, Iranian counterpart discuss developments of Iran-US negotiations”, The Times of Oman, May 18, 2025. (https://timesofoman.com/article/158216-sayyid-badr-iranian-counterpart-discuss-developments-of-iran-us-negotiations)
[9] “President Pezeshkian: Iran-U.S. indirect talks could lead to fair deal”, IRNA, May 18, 2025. (https://en.irna.ir/news/85837009/President-Pezeshkian-Iran-U-S-indirect-talks-could-lead-to)
[10] “Next Round of Iran-U.S. Indirect Talks to Be Scheduled Soon”, West Asia News Agency, May 18, 2025. https://wanaen.com/next-round-of-iran-u-s-indirect-talks-to-be-scheduled-soon/
[11] Ravid, Barak, “Trump meets Syrian president al-Sharaa, ex-jihadist who toppled Assad”, AXIOS, May 14, 2025. https://www.axios.com/2025/05/14/trump-meets-syria-president-sharaa.
[12] Slattery, Gram, Magid, Pesha and Mills, Andrew. “Trump meets Syrian president, urges him to establish ties with Israel”, Reuters, May 14, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-meet-syrian-president-saudi-before-heading-qatar-2025-05-14/.
[13] Broadwater, Luke and Solomon, Erika. “Trump Says ‘a Lot of People Are Starving’ in Gaza and the U.S. Wants to Help”, The New York Times, May 16, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/16/world/europe/trump-gaza-starvation-famine-us-israel-aid.html.
[14] Mahan, Alfred, “The Influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783”, Twelfth edition, Boston Little, Brown And Company, 1890. (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm)