After the Belt and Road Initiative, a 10-year plan for China’s global infrastructure dominance, Beijing has begun to release its other plans for engagement with the world. Amongst the many initiatives that China has proposed is the Global Security Initiative (GSI) which follows the Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS) and Global Development Initiative. This initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2022. However, the roots of this initiative lie in Xi’s speech at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) on 21 May 2014 wherein he outlined the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia. In that, he advocated a regional security architecture and indivisible security. The term ‘indivisible security’ originated in the Helsinki Final Accords in 1975 and meant that the security of one nation is inseparable from that of other countries in its region. China would like to be that one nation.
When Xi proposed GSI, it contained six commitments: maintaining common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; respecting purposes and principles of UN charter; peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries; maintaining security in traditional & non-traditional domains and upholding indivisible security. Thus, there is a continuity in China’s approach to security. The difference in both the articulations by Xi is that the earlier 2014 articulation was regional in nature, and the GSI is global.
China’s foreign office mandarins explained GSI soon after it was announced. It was followed by a concept paper on GSI, the then foreign minister Qin Gang’s speech at the Lanting Forum titled The Global Security Initiative: China’s Proposal for Solving Security Challenges on 21st February 2023 and Chinese Communist Party director of foreign affairs Wang Yi’s keynote address during the Munich Security conference the same month. . At the 10th Xiangshan Forum held in Beijing in October 2023, Nong Rong, Assistant Foreign Minister, mentioned that more than 100 countries and international organisations have expressed support for GSI and it has been written into a large number of documents between China and them. The reason for mentioning all these iterations is to highlight the vigour with which China pursues its initiatives.
The concept paper proposed 20 priorities for cooperation and also made “suggestions” for platforms and mechanisms of cooperation. The priorities included measures in traditional and non-traditional security domains. The concept paper also suggested action plans.
China has claimed to have worked on four broad lines of action towards implementation of GSI. First is active participation in and promoting multilateral security cooperation. Under this, China’s contribution to UN Peacekeeping, arms control and demining operations are cited. Second is China’s efforts at mediation between various countries and in conflict situations. Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement, China’s positions on Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action, Russia-Ukraine and Hamas-Israel conflicts are quoted as its contributions. Third is China’s action and cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as counterterrorism, cybersecurity, food security and climate change. Under this, many initiatives by China are mentioned that include GIDS and Global Initiative on Artificial Intelligence Governance. Lastly, China facilitating the improvement of international security dialogue and exchange platforms and mechanisms. The China-Horn of Africa Conference, Middle East Security Forum, discussions under SCO and CICA and other forums that are claimed to working in this direction.
As per Nong Rong, China is likely to focus on expanding international consensus on common security, forging an effective paradigm for international security cooperation, exploring peaceful solutions to hotspot issues, and promoting the reform of the global security governance system, so as to ensure the steady and long-term progress of the GSI. Under those four headings the following are expected: A GSI Forum on the lines of the Belt and Road Initiative Forums may be in the offing. China may encourage partners in GSI to carry out bilateral and multilateral discussions under multilateral mechanisms like the UN, BRICS and SCO. China’s efforts in Hamas-Israel and Russia-Ukraine conflicts are likely to continue. China may also strive to make GSI serve as a platform for advancing the reform of the global security governance system.
From the explanations of GSI, a few elements stand out. One, GSI is highlighted as Xi’s vision by almost all of them. Two, this initiative is part of “building a community with shared future”, an overarching concept under which all the initiatives that China has announced in quick succession fit in. Three, indivisible security is given importance. Four, China is looking for an alternative security architecture. Five, GSI complements GDI which in turn subsumes One Belt One Road Initiative. Lastly, it appears that China is keen on leveraging the present United Nations system to its advantage.
GSI like other initiatives proposed by China, is prescriptive with China assuming a superior aura. That fits into its second centenary goal of becoming a global power by 2049. It also looks as if China is trying to justify some of its actions through this initiative. There are many dichotomies in what China is proposing in this initiative and what it practices eg its actions in the South China Sea and along the line of actual control with India.
India should closely monitor the progress that China is making on this initiative as it will have direct security concerns for her. Though China officially supports a multipolar world, indications are that it prefers to be the singular pole. It does not seem to be willing to accept a multipolar Asia. Therefore, its exertions towards the GSI will impinge on India’s efforts to become a major power. India needs to think of multiple alternative initiative(s) to ensure its place in the international domain, as it has done with the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) which seems to be gaining momentum.
Lt General SL Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for National Security and China Studies, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.
This article was first published in The Tribune.
Support our work here.