India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.

The Quad summit is expected to be hosted by India in the second half of 2025, possibly in November. However, the grouping faces turbulence that transcends the current flow of India-U.S. relations. The relevance of Australia and Japan, too, needs to be factored in. Beijing considers the Quad as “the Asian NATO” that aims to contain China. Since the commencement of Trump 2.0, the grouping has been struggling to redefine its role and mandate.

The first plurilateral meeting attended by new U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was the Quad, a day after assuming office. The meeting reinforced the commitment to the Indo-Pacific but with the change in government, the Quad's trajectory in 2025 remains a question. Part of the answer lies in its past interactions, while the rest depends on how the U.S. and India will approach China.

On December 18, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing. This came two months after Prime Minister Modi’s bilateral meet with President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Russia. Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, Adjunct Distinguished Fellow, National Security and China Studies, discusses recent developments in India-China ties and how New Delhi can manage its complex relationship with Beijing.

The foreign policy of the new government in India will likely be a continuum from previous years. But as election outcomes in other parts of the democratic world witness a transformation, India should prepare for flexibility in its policy – and keep up its guard.