Nearly 30 months after the military coup derailed Myanmar’s experiment with limited democracy in February 2021, that nation continues to pose a serious challenge to ASEAN’s unity, centrality and credibility. This was evident at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM), held in Jakarta from 11–12 July 2023. While endeavouring to help restore democratic transition and political normalcy in Myanmar, ASEAN has enjoyed international support but has failed in achieving its goal due to the obduracy of Myanmar generals and serious differences within the grouping. What does it signify for regional diplomacy and the future of the strife-torn ASEAN member?
At first, there seemed hope. In April, a few weeks after the coup, when the resistance movement was still non-violent and uncertain, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, the regime’s strong man, flew to Jakarta and accepted the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) formula crafted by ASEAN’s top leaders. Its five elements were: an immediate cessation of all violence, constructive dialogue for a peaceful solution, mediation by a special envoy of ASEAN, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the stipulation that the ASEAN delegation would “meet with all parties concerned.”
But the situation began to deteriorate, with the authorities unleashing an endless cycle of violence, and the protesters continuing their resistance. ASEAN ran into a wall of non-cooperation. The military regime resiled from the 5PC, rejecting national dialogue with the opposition forces, and branding them as terrorists. The opposition returned the compliment and opposed reconciliation with the junta, except on its own terms. There were serious difficulties in delivering humanitarian assistance to much of the country. The UN/ASEAN demand for releasing political prisoners such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was also rejected. Despite efforts by three annual chairs of ASEAN – Brunei, Cambodia and Indonesia – it was clear that the mediation had failed.
ASEAN barred Myanmar from attending its political level meetings (of foreign ministers and heads of state and government), leaving an empty seat, thereby symbolizing that while the nation retained its membership of ASEAN, its present government was not welcome to participate in discussions.
In recent months, ASEAN’s work has become complicated with Thailand, a member state, conducting its unilateral policy towards Myanmar. As an immediate neighbour, Thailand, argued its government, has had to face multiple challenges. The refugee influx into border towns from Myanmar and a sharp increase in drug and human trafficking and cross-border crime were reported. Regular bilateral trade was disrupted due to violent clashes in eastern Myanmar. All this necessitated Thailand to adopt a more pragmatic opening and nurturing of ties with Myanmar’s military government. It has helped that the Thai government has enjoyed a long-held relationship with Myanmar’s generals.
In recent weeks, the Thai government convened meetings of the representatives of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and later under the Track 1.5 Track format, with these and other neighbouring countries including India, China and Bangladesh. The objective was to craft a modus vivendi with the military regime, without paying too much attention to the views of the opposition operating under the flag of the unrecognized National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar. These discussions were clearly in defiance of ASEAN’s official line.
Thai diplomacy reached a significant milestone when, in appreciation of its labours, the Myanmar junta allowed Don Pramudwinai, the Thai deputy prime minister and foreign minister, to have an informal meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on 9 July. She has been in custody since the 2021 coup and was sentenced to 33 years of imprisonment. Pramudwinai claimed that Suu Kyi favoured dialogue with the military, implying that the latter was either unaware or indifferent to the NUG line of rejecting any discussions with the military. The Thai dignitary took the message to the ASEAN FMM, causing embarrassment to the Indonesian chair, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, and confirming that the ASEAN now had two policy lines – one favoured by the grouping and the other pursued by Thailand and its supporters.
In this context, the joint communique of the FMM merits close scrutiny. Four key points are noteworthy. First, it stressed that the 5PC remained ASEAN’s “main reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar.” Second, it expressed appreciation for Indonesia as chair, which intensified engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar in order to arrange “an inclusive dialogue” for “a comprehensive political solution.” Third, the foreign ministers were briefed by Thailand “on its recent activities on Myanmar, which several ASEAN Member States viewed as a positive development.” This was a clear confirmation of the schism within ASEAN. Yet, the communique went on to add, “We reaffirmed ASEAN unity and reiterated that any effort should support, in line with 5PC and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN.”
Finally, the FMM called for “continued support of the External Partners” including the UN and neighbouring countries of Myanmar (which includes India), “to work with ASEAN for concrete implementation of 5PC.” Whether Thailand’s unilateral activities and diplomacy will continue for long remains to be seen. The present government is on its way out, following the recent elections and the complexion of the next government and its Myanmar policy are yet to be made visible.
How has India been handling the Myanmar file, particularly given the disunity in ASEAN? India has correctly and consistently supported ASEAN centrality and 5PC. But New Delhi has also demonstrated an understanding of the Thai approach. India participated in the Track 1.5 Track dialogue in Bangkok and hosted its next session in Delhi. Like Thailand, India has vital national interests at stake, which are jeopardized by instability in Myanmar. The adverse impact is more acute following the recent ethnic clashes in Manipur.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar participated in the ASEAN-India ministerial meeting in Jakarta and related regional conferences. Thereafter, he proceeded to Bangkok for other meetings, including the BIMSTEC foreign ministers’ meeting. On the sidelines, a bilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of India and Myanmar took place where both sides shared their perspectives and concerns. This was the first political-level interaction since the coup. It reflected the urgency for India to seek Myanmar’s cooperation on a range of security and development issues. Significantly, it also indicated an assessment in New Delhi that the tide of pragmatic diplomacy was turning in favour of the military government.
The next ASEAN summit is in September, in Indonesia. The two months leading up to it may witness an intensification of Myanmar-centred diplomacy. Only if ASEAN and the major neighbours are united and the Myanmar military shows flexibility, can a breakthrough materialize. Otherwise, ‘the sick man of Southeast Asia’ will continue to cause hardships to its people and serious anxiety to the region.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in WIONews.