The talks between the U.S. and Russian officials on February 18 in Riyadh marked the beginning of an abrupt pivot by President Donald Trump towards Russia in an attempt to reset ties between the two Cold War adversaries. Events have moved quickly since then—Russia and the U.S. have designated a high-level team to start the talks to end the Ukraine war, while agreeing to restore the strength of personnel in their respective embassies and to work towards closer economic cooperation. Trump has desired to meet President Vladimir Putin to work towards securing a deal on Ukraine. This rapprochement is in marked contrast to the policies followed by the Joe Biden administration, which resulted in a wave of sanctions on Russia supplemented by substantial financial and military aid to Ukraine.
Analysts suggest that the shift has happened because Trump does not see the war ending in favour of Ukraine, and sees China as the main rival of the U.S. in military and technological superiority, as opposed to a depleted Russia. A predictable relationship with Russia, the argument goes, will enable the U.S.—already straining to keep up with an assertive China—to use all its resources for prolonging, and perhaps preventing China’s march towards the numero uno status in the world in times to come. Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is off the table as far as the U.S. and Russia are concerned, even as it smarts under the loss of 20 per cent of its territory in the war with Russia. The U.S. has ruled out specific security guarantees to Ukraine, asserting that if Ukraine signs a mineral extraction deal with the U.S., its security will be automatically ensured.
In another dramatic shift in transatlantic relations, the U.S. split with its European allies and sided with Russia while voting in the United Nations to mark the third anniversary of the Ukraine war. The U.S. then drafted and voted for a resolution in the UN Security Council, which called for “a swift end to the conflict” but contained no criticism of Russia.
When the U.S. and Russian officials talked, Ukraine did not have a seat at the table—neither did the European Union (EU). Following a disastrous meeting at the Oval Office in Washington between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Trump and his aides, a proposed minerals extraction agreement could not be signed, and the U.S. suspended aid and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine. Despite the EU putting up a brave face and announcing 50 million euros to fund the Ukraine war for a month more, and promising to raise eight billion Euros for European defence, Ukraine sees the writing on the wall. A cornered Zelenskyy has returned to Riyadh for a resumption of talks on a peace deal and the promise of signing a resource extraction and profit-sharing agreement with the U.S., even though no security guarantees are still forthcoming from the U.S.
Reports suggest that Nord Stream 2—the Russian gas pipeline to Europe—may be resurrected, and U.S. investors could stake a claim in its operations, paving the way for Russian gas to flow if sanctions are eased following a ceasefire in Ukraine. Trump, who once led efforts to kill the project, now sees a chance for the U.S. to gain leverage over the German energy market. The U.S. State and Treasury Departments have been directed to prepare a list of sanctions on Russia that could be eased, and Russian entities and oligarchs benefit as part of this broader reset.
These resets between the U.S. and Russia have happened before. Under George H. W. Bush, cooperation under START I and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ended when the first Chechen conflict flared up and Russia started a war in Transnistria. The second Chechen war followed after Bill Clinton agreed to changes in the START II treaty and NATO-Russia initiatives. Russia also became a member of G-8 and the Council of Europe. George W. Bush sought a reset in relations with Russia as well—emphasising cooperation in the fight against terror and pursuing dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council and the G-20. However, Russia accused the European countries and the U.S. of interference again, resulting in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech and the 2008 war in Georgia. Barack Obama’s “reset” in 2009 resulted in the new START Treaty and collaboration on blocking the Iranian nuclear programme. The Russians were blamed for election interference, and military intervention in Syria. Trump also sought rapprochement in his first term, even as there were concerns raised in the U.S. over Russian cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and meddling in elections.
There is a strong opinion in the U.S. that the Trump administration is under an illusion that it can drive a wedge between Russia and China, and that the Russia-China partnership is here to stay. It may seem unlikely that Trump’s reset could prise apart Russia’s flourishing partnership with China, but some US administration officials believe that Russia’s dependence on China will automatically be mitigated; and if nothing else, the U.S. will be able to tamper with the quality and the level of cooperation within the Russia-China relationship. The difference in governance structures in the US and Russia means that while the U.S. Presidents have just two clear years to forge a new policy, the Russian President and the other officials have long tenures. Developing a comprehensive strategy towards Russia is, therefore, seen as more complex than dealing with other countries since traditional models and playbooks never work. Successive attempts to reset relations with Russia have not measured up to the satisfaction of the U.S. Like U.S. Presidents before him, Trump seems to be working within a tight framework. One of his main election promises was to end wars. He has an ambitious domestic agenda. Trump needs a deal with Russia to leave behind a legacy and to focus on other pressing issues.
So, what of the future? Russia will seek a peace deal in Ukraine that safeguards its own long-term security and will not retreat from the gains it has made in the conflict, except for some token gestures. As of 2024, Russia occupies Crimea (since 2014) and parts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast (since 2022). On September 30, 2022, Russia announced that Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson are part of Russian territory. Ukraine’s peace proposal calls for Russia to leave all the territories it occupies. Russia says it will keep all the land it occupies and wants all the provinces it claims its own, but does not have full control. The EU holds the view that allowing Russia to keep the land it seized would reward the aggressor and punish the victim, which would encourage further Russian expansion. Russia has so far rejected Ukraine’s pronouncements that it will put forward a peace plan which will propose to halt missile and drone strikes, as well as suspension of military activity in the Black Sea. There is also little interest from Russia in the ceasefire proposal since it enjoys the upper hand in the air and sea, besides being the dominant protagonist on land. There will be no giveaway on the Ukrainian demand of joining NATO—and in any case Europe is divided on this issue. Initially, the U.S. was not averse to Europeans providing guarantees by stationing troops on the ground, but this proposal has since been rejected by Russia.
Offers from France and the UK to urge Ukraine to fight on with an unsure Europe behind them, as well as the desperate gesture of extending the French nuclear umbrella to Ukraine, have been shrugged off by Putin. It will probably be met with similar disdain by Trump officials. It seems the U.S.-Russia reset will be taken to its logical conclusion, at the expense of Ukraine and Europe. Whether this reset will affect Russia-China ties is unclear. All indications currently point to a U.S.-China rapprochement on the trade and investment front. Politically, however, the U.S. sees China as a systemic rival, which will eat its lunch if it does not step up. Trump seems to be well aware of this challenge, but so far, has kept his cards close to his chest.
Amb. Anil Wadhwa is the Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and Former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
This article was first published in Outlook India.