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31 August 2023, Gateway House

India’s rising star in contested space

The Chandrayaan’s successful landing on the lunar south pole gives India some momentum to think ‘astro-strategically’ about space – independently and with its partners. Science and national prestige alone aren’t the only factors driving human space endeavors. Commercial gain, and intense military contestation are likely to be a feature in future decades.

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The recent success of the Chandrayaan 3 mission, which successfully landed the Vikram lander on the lunar south pole, clearly establishes India’s technological prowess in space exploration. The lander deployed the Pragyan rover, which will explore the surface and undertake analysis of the nature of the lunar regolith.

It is now important for India to use the momentum gained by the success of the landing. India should embrace an ambitious agenda for robotic and ultimately, human space exploration, focused on the Moon. Ideally this should be done in partnership with other key space powers, and India’s decision to sign the U.S. led Artemis Accords suggests a path forward. This will offer great benefits to New Delhi, given that astrostrategic competition is set to intensify on and around the Moon, especially because of China’s decision to bring forward its plan to land Taikonauts on the lunar surface by 2030.[1]

There is clear benefit for India to embrace a moon-centric space program.[2] Chandrayaan 3’s mission to seek out water ice in the lunar soil, as well as other precious metals, highlights the value of the Moon as a key location for space resource utilisation. That will create the opportunity to sustain a human presence on the lunar surface and utilise lunar resources for a range of commercial activities including for space manufacturing.[3] Already, the Pragyan rover has detected a number of vital elements suitable to support a human presence, including oxygen, and further investigation to search for hydrogen is underway.[4] It has also determined changing temperatures below the surface of the moon that suggests greater potential for water ice under the surface.

Water ice is H20 – the components of which break down into hydrogen and oxygen. Oxygen is critical for supporting astronauts living in moon bases, and if combined with hydrogen is the basis for liquid rocket fuel. With the Moon’s one-sixth gravity resulting in a shallow gravity well when compared to the Earth, the Moon becomes a stepping-stone to Mars and other celestial bodies, such as near-earth asteroids, which may also be resource-rich.

The benefits of a moon-centric space program also clear to China, which seeks to establish its dominance in Cislunar space to manage a space economy that will enhance its comprehensive national power on Earth. Leading space policy analyst Dr. Namrata Goswami notes that China “aims to establish a permanent base on the Moon by 2036, demonstrate a gigawatt-level power generation capability via its space-based solar power project by 2050, conduct a human Mars mission between 2033-2049, and an asteroid exploration mission by 2025.”[5] China has signed an agreement with the Russian Federation to establish an international lunar research station on the south pole of the Moon, which whilst initially unmanned, will quickly be expanded to become a major lunar base. [6]

Likewise, the U.S. and its partners, under the Artemis Accords seek a permanent presence on the lunar surface in the second half of this decade and into the 2030s, following the successful landing of astronauts on the surface with Artemis III, currently scheduled for 2025.[7] The U.S. Space Force is also increasingly focused on Cislunar space as an area of operational responsibility, in terms of assuring space domain awareness, as well as access, and if necessary, an ability to respond to threats from an adversary in this region through space control..[8] Its proposed Cislunar Highway Patrol System will see the US have a greater degree of space domain awareness in Cislunar space. [9]

Michael Byers and Aaron Boley in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists argue that a security dilemma is emerging in relation to Cislunar space and the Moon, centered on a space arms race between China and the U.S.[10] The potential for misperception and a lack of space domain awareness of that area reinforces the risk of conflict. The authors argue that it is the U.S. that should step back from any military use of Cislunar space, whilst at the same time dismissing any suggestion that Chinese ambitions should be of concern.

Yet it would be unwise for the U.S. and its partners, including India, to assume that China and Russia won’t see the opportunity to gain astrostrategic advantage in the Cislunar environment, even if reaping the full benefit of lunar resources for in-space manufacturing is a longer-term process. The nature of security dilemmas is inherently bidirectional, and the U.S. and its allies are hardly likely to cede this important region to Beijing, given the potential astrostrategic and geopolitical benefits that exploiting lunar resources can deliver.

India is now entering this increasingly contested region, both in an independent capacity as demonstrated with Chandrayaan 3, and as a partner of the U.S. under the Artemis Accords. It is a positive step that India and the U.S. have deepened space cooperation, notably with a joint Indian-U.S. mission to the International Space Station scheduled for 2024.[11] As with other partners supporting the U.S. in space, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, India has the opportunity to work with Artemis Accords states to establish a presence on and around the Moon, to exploit the benefits of this important environment in a sustainable and responsible manner. But India, like its prospective partners, are also likely to be increasingly challenged by Chinese space activities, particularly once China manages to establish a permanent presence on the surface of the Moon from the middle of the next decade.

As with the debate now growing in the U.S. over space power in the 21st century, and the role of new domains such as Cislunar space, India will need to think ‘astro-strategically’ about space. It is becoming clear that science, and national prestige alone won’t be the only factors driving human space endeavors. Commercial gain, and military competition, are likely to be a feature in future decades. The region of space between low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) is already contested, and from now, so will Cislunar space and the lunar surface.

Dr. Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, Australia.

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References

[1] William Zheng, ‘To the moon and back: China reveals first details of crewed lunar landing mission by 2030’, South China Morning Post, 13th July 2023, at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3227448/moon-and-back-china-reveals-first-details-crewed-lunar-landing-mission-2030

[2] Malcolm Davis, ‘India explores the next space frontier’, The Strategist, 25th August, 2023, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-explores-the-next-space-frontier/

[3] Elizabeth Howell, ‘Off earth Manufacturing Could Help Astronauts Explore the Moon and Mars’, Space.com, November 5th, 2019, at https://www.space.com/made-in-space-manufacturing-moon-mars-exploration.html

[4] Rahul Rao, ‘India’s Chandrayaan 3 moon rover reveals surprising sulfur find in lunar south pole’, Space.com, 30th August 2023, at https://www.space.com/chandrayaan-3-sulfur-surprising-composition-lunar-south-pole-soil

[5] Namrata Goswami, ‘China Prioritizes 3 Strategic Technologies in its Great Power Competition’, The Diplomat, April 22nd, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-prioritizes-3-strategic-technologies-in-its-great-power-competition/

[6] China National Space Administration, international Lunar Research Station – ILRS Guide for Partnership, June 2021, https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html

[7] NASA, The Artemis Accords – Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes, October 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf

[8] Laura Duffy, James Lake, ‘Cislunar Spacepower – The New Frontier’, Space Force Journal, December 31st, 2021, at https://spaceforcejournal.org/3859-2/

[9] David Dickinson, ‘US Space Force Cislunar High Patrol System to patrol around the moon’, Phys Org, March 24th, 2022, at https://phys.org/news/2022-03-space-cis-lunar-highway-patrol-moon.html

[10] Michael Byers, Aaron Boley, Cislunar space and the security dilemma’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17th, 2022, at https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-01/cis-lunar-space-and-the-security-dilemma/

[11] Tribune News Service, ‘India, US to launch joint mission to space in 2024’, The Tribune, June 23rd, 2023, at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-us-to-launch-joint-mission-to-space-in-2024-519429

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