The New Delhi summit of the Group of Twenty (G20) may be remembered by historians for a variety of reasons. The summit was preceded by about 200 events held in different parts of India, thus turning the Indian presidency into the ‘People’s Presidency.’ Notably, two major leaders – President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping – were absent from the summit. Ukraine cast a dark shadow on the negotiations for consensus on the outcome document. The grouping went for its first-ever expansion to admit the African Union (AU) as a member. Finally, proving all pessimists wrong, the sherpas of the leaders, led by India, managed to pull off a diplomatic coup, drawing global admiration for a substantial New Delhi Declaration. It was backed by ‘100%’ consensus.
This short article attempts to dissect the geopolitical implications of the prelude to the summit, its deliberations and outcomes, and the future prospects of great power relations.
The U.S., the European Community (EU), China and Russia have traditionally been the key players in the multipolar world ever since America’s ‘unipolar moment’ began to give way from the early years of this century. Relations among the Big Four came under exceptional stress following the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Experts agreed that it was not only an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but it was also a conflict and confrontation between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). That China chose to play a dual role – of serving as a close ally of Russia while posing as a friendly mediator in the war, complicated matters further. Hence the Big Four approached the New Delhi summit with divergent perspectives and a shared desire to score points over each other.
It goes to the credit of the Indian leadership that the real nature of geopolitical implications was understood fully. Right from the beginning of its presidency, India consciously chose to insulate G20 from the pressures generated by the war in Ukraine. It refused to invite President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to the New Delhi summit. Not even a digital address was acceptable, despite pressures from G7 nations. India also made it clear that while it would not agree to any public condemnation of the Russian invasion, it could not deviate from a commitment to the UN principles on respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty or political independence. The ‘Bali paragraphs’ that were severely imbalanced and critical of Russia had, therefore, to be updated and expanded to eight paragraphs. They saved the New Delhi summit and showed to both sides where to get off in the larger interest of humanity. India played the ultimate card, arguing convincingly that a united and effective G20 is in everyone’s interest, not just that of the host nation.
The manner in which India-China relations unfolded, particularly at the highest political level from the SCO summit in Samarkand (September 2022) to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg (August 2023) generated much concern about a likely disruptive role by the Chinese side in the build-up to the New Delhi summit. President Xi Jinping’s absence was seen by most observers as a negative signal. But the South Block, the seat of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), took it in its stride. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar noted that choosing the level of representation was the prerogative of every country.
At the summit itself, China ended up playing a positive and constructive role, helping in the development of consensus on several delicate issues. China, said Jaishankar, was “supportive”. This author heard a senior Chinese diplomat stationed in Delhi state publicly this week that India deserved much appreciation for completing “a very difficult mission.” He added that “development” rather than “geopolitical issues” must guide the deliberations of G20. In short, despite serious bilateral issues, China showed willingness to recognise that the success of the New Delhi summit was desirable for it and for the emerging power balance in the region.
A major trend at the G20 summit and in previous months was the steady emergence of the Global South as a significant factor in international politics. India played a crucial role in shaping this trend, which began last year in Bali when Indian diplomats helped Indonesia in crafting consensus on the Ukraine issue. Noting the success of India’s contribution as the voice of the Global South, which was highlighted by the conference of the same name hosted by New Delhi in January 2023, Indonesia and other developing countries in G20 came forward when their valuable help was required. India fully acknowledged that Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa helped in removing the bottlenecks in drafting the New Delhi Declaration. Later, they were joined by other countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
While there remained uncertainty until the end, the External Affairs Minister had told this author publicly, five days before the summit began, that he was “very, very confident” about the inclusion of AU as a member of the G20. In normal course, this decision would have been included in the joint communique, and then the AU representative may have joined the grouping at the next summit in 2024. Instead, a brilliant strategy was adopted. In the very first few minutes of the opening session, the G20 president invited the Chairperson of AU to come forward and take his seat at the main table. This was truly decisive and purposeful action at the right time, demonstrating the significance of Africa and the Global South. India struck when the iron was hot!
Several experts noted that the West chose to go along with the proposed compromise concerning Ukraine because it did not want to lose the Global South. The latter has been suffering from the adverse consequences of the war and was keen on G20 to focus on its real agenda of economic development. New Delhi projected this perception convincingly and won the day.
Much also happened outside the main G20 conference hall. On the sidelines, the Global Biofuels Alliance (GBA) was announced, grouping nine countries together including the U.S., India and Brazil, on 9 September. It is an initiative by India as “the G20 Chair.” Another major development was the announcement of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This is backed by the U.S., India, EU, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others. On IMEC, PM Modi observed that it would help promote the “economic integration between India and Europe.” These developments will have long term impact of geoeconomic and geopolitical nature. Besides, PM Modi held bilateral meetings with over a dozen G20 leaders, but not the Chinese Premier. These apart, the state visit of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and a very important interaction between the U.S. President and the Indian PM, were part of the last week’s rich package.
The full magnitude of deliberations and decisions listed above will take time to sink in. They should be assessed fully through multiple academic events which are set to be arranged in New Delhi and elsewhere.
What can be said with some confidence is this: in Narendra Modi, the nation has, after a long gap, found a real ‘foreign policy PM’. He understands how the world works and is keen to expand India’s space in it. While ultimately interests do matter, personal relations built by the PM with world leaders over the years represent an asset of considerable value. This has been backed by professional work of high quality by ministers, senior officials and a large number of people who contributed to the success of the G20 summit. They all – the Team India — deserve to be applauded and recognised for their role in ensuring that India re-emerges as a leading player on the world stage.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published by WION.