Myanmar, four years on

Four years after the military coup on February 1, 2021, Myanmar, ‘the sick man of Southeast Asia,’ continues to traverse a dismal path. The nation is fragmenting; there is no peace and stability; the economy is in ruins; the people are suffering; and the international community has other headaches to worry about. Myanmar’s deepening crisis has been forgotten or ignored by most nations, except perhaps the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbours such as China and India.

The past four years have brought armed battles to homes, villages, and cities, with government troops fighting against their own people, represented by a variety of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and people’s defence forces (PDFs) in all parts of the country — north, south, east and west, not excluding the heartland where the majority Bamar community lives. The resistance is broadly coordinated by the unrecognised National Unity Government (NUG). The costs of conflict are high. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) estimated that, as of January 29, 2025, the military arrested 28,405 people, of whom 21,683 were still detained, and that it killed 6,224 people with around 2,900 treated as “need to be verified killed persons.” Besides, over 3.3 million people are now internally displaced across the country.

Independent sources have spoken of “indiscriminate attacks” and “unlawful killings” by the junta that are “characterized by their brutality and inhumanity.” It should also be recognised that four years of continuous fighting have done untold damage to military personnel, resulting in killings, injuries, desertions, and a general loss of morale. “The junta is entering the fifth year of military rule,” wrote Professor Zachary M. Abuza of the National War College, Washington DC, “with its power rapidly slipping away”. The junta forces and the resistance are thus locked in a ceaseless war of attrition in which neither side can be a victor.

Meanwhile, the country stands divided into three zones. The central part remains broadly under military control. Peripheral areas are generally with the resistance. Armed battles with, and aerial bombardments by, the military occur in civilian regions located in both zones. Inner demons continue to haunt the people of Myanmar.

The crisis began in early 2021 when the military did not like the results of the elections held in November 2020 that gave Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy victory. The 10-year-old experiment in limited democracy was rudely terminated as tanks rolled into the streets.

Now, to end the impasse, the military’s preferred way out ironically is to hold another election. The generals tried to do this last year, but they failed. The question is, can they succeed this year? With at least half the country outside their control, elections, if held, will not represent the views of the entire populace. Besides, if they are organised under the present conditions of continuing violence and suppression, will they confer legitimacy on the next government that must necessarily be friendly to the military? Doubts exist.

Notably, United Nations experts led by Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, offered a forthright view. “You cannot hold an election when you deposed a democratic government in an unconstitutional coup and continue to arbitrarily arrest, detain, disappear, torture, and execute opposition leaders,” they warn. The notion that elections will resolve the political crisis is considered “delusional” by seasoned observers.

However, the UN has outsourced the responsibility of mediation to ASEAN. ASEAN did what it could, but its Five-Point Consensus (5PC) remains stillborn because the cessation of hostilities and the commencement of national dialogue are unacceptable to the warring parties.

Recently, ASEAN Foreign Ministers advised the military government to prioritise dialogue over holding elections, but this has been brushed aside.

The UN and ASEAN are unable to resolve matters for Myanmar. In that case, some experts argue that the nation’s neighbours, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos, must do something tangible, considering that the ongoing crisis directly threatens their interests.

But there are challenges: Myanmar’s borders with India and Bangladesh are now controlled by EAOs, not the government; there is a lack of trust between India and China; and India-Bangladesh relations are under serious stress. Therefore, the neighbours are unable to develop an internal consensus on how to persuade the government and opposition to move from conflict to peace. Thailand, the only big neighbour and an ASEAN member, is uniquely positioned to help, but it faces limitations that it cannot overcome.

Meanwhile, China has substantially increased its influence since the coup. It will continue to be a dominant player, especially as the West shows declining interest in Myanmar. China is “the only outside power with the means, capacity, and motivation to influence in Myanmar’s internal conflicts,” wrote Bertil Lintner recently.

Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that the people of Myanmar should stop hoping that help will come from the outside. If their leaders are unable to talk rather than let their guns do the talking, sadly, they, the people, will continue paying a hefty price for their leaders’ folly.