Why bother with emerging middle powers when most of the international discussion since Donald Trump took office for the second time is dominated by the great-power politics of the United States and its global implications? Because the world is undergoing profound transformations that are not being driven only by the United States, China or Russia. Small and medium-sized states no longer participate in global affairs at the whim of great powers: they are carving out a legitimate place for themselves in the emerging new order. This second edition of our annual Emerging Middle Powers Report is a reminder that the signs of the times must be read accordingly; that is, as showing a new momentum for middle powers. A closer look at the geopolitical situation and experts’ opinions in India, Brazil, South Africa,and Germany, helps to describe this dynamic.
From India’s point of view, the United States’ focus on domestic renewal and retreat from acting as the world’s police officer opens up the opportunity to expand its relationships and understandings with great and middle powers, as well as with its emerging middle power peers and developing countries. A multipolar order is beneficial for India, as it is for most emerging middle powers. The country no longer needs to tie itself to the giant trade pacts signed by powers that have shaped the global trade regimes so far and whose practices Indian respondents to our second Emerging Middle Power expert survey consider unfair. Nor does it need to form military alliances or to take geopolitical sides. Instead, India has the confidence and capacity to reinforce or to reassess its vision of strategic autonomy, which it is now doing.
Brazil hosted the G20 Summit in late 2024 and it will also play a significant role in 2025 with its BRICS presidency and hosting of COP 30. This year again, responses from the country in our expert survey show fatigue regarding its relationships with Europe and with the United States. If Brazil’s policy options are constrained by a potential rejection by the EU of the long-negotiated trade agreement with Mercosur and by the unilateral behaviour of the Trump administration, it is expected to seek to intensify and diversify its other partnerships, including within BRICS. One example is its aim to develop ‘complementary, voluntary, accessible, transparent and secure payment platforms’ during its BRICS presidency. As it is for India, autonomy is a crucial aspect of Brazil’s foreign policy. A multipolar system is seen as a way to diversify and to balance its relationships and interactions with major powers while broadening its foreign policy space.
From South Africa’s perspective, the desire for multilateral cooperation in a much-divided world has assumed greater importance than ever. It has a major task in 2025 in presiding over the G20, amid deteriorating relations with the United States – only 40 per cent of South African experts in our survey see Washington’s global influence as positive – and growing distrust between Western states (although not Donald Trump’s administration) and Russia. Like India and Brazil when they held this G20 role in the past two years, South Africa will see its diplomatic skills put to the test in trying to find common ground between often opposing viewpoints, as it steers a gathering of states that our expert survey respondents say will be even more important in the years to come.
In Germany, too, there are signs of a fundamental rethink regarding its relations with the great powers, especially with its traditional ally, the United States. The term ‘de-risking’ has become standard vocabulary on many fronts. First, it is used regarding Russian oil and gas and, then, increasingly with regard to dependence on China for its market and supply of critical minerals. The speech of US Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference and the Trump administration’s rapprochement with Russia have accelerated this rethink, also with regard to the United States, even if involuntarily. These developments force Berlin in a direction where balance by strengthening partnerships, especially with emerging middle powers, with their unique access to the Global South, becomes inevitable. In Germany, a country that has highlighted the transatlantic alliance whenever possible, the share of respondents who say they prefer neutrality or non-alignment over siding with the United States or China has increased from 19 per cent to 29 per cent in just one year.
It is easy to explain why the world is in the midst of a new middle-power moment, but it is more difficult to say how this moment should be shaped. With the United Nations stuck without a meaningful reform process in sight, the question is how middle-power cooperation can be effectively organized to ensure reform towards a responsive multilateral system that works for all, as well as to update international norms and principles to make them fit for today’s world. Two dimensions can provide some answers: First, a look back at a key moment in the history of multilateralism and South-South cooperation from 70 years ago. Second, how experts from the three surveyed emerging middle powers and Germany think about the most challenging issues, partnerships and the international system.
You can download the 2025 Emerging Middle Powers Report here.
Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director, Gateway House.
Paulo Esteves is a member of the Academic Council, BRICS Policy Center.
Carlos Frederico de Souza Coelho is a researcher, BRICS Policy Center.
Julia Ganter is the Programme Director International Affairs, Körber-Stiftung.
Jonathan Lehrer is the Programme Manager, Körber-Stiftung.
Leona Harting is the Programme Manager, Körber-Stiftung.
Steven Gruzd is the Head of African Governance and Diplomacy Programme,
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
Support our work here.
For interview requests or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.