Raveena Shivashankar (RS): Good afternoon, Nayanima. We are very happy to welcome you to the 23rd episode of our podcast ‘Unfolding Geopolitics’. Nayanima Basu is our adjunct fellow. She has two decades of newsroom experience. She has worked extensively in journalism. She was on the ground reporting in Afghanistan during the takeover by the Taliban in August in the year of 2021. Her recent publication, The Fall of Kabul, Dispatches from Chaos, has received several accolades globally. Today, we will be discussing the upcoming visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi, who will be received by our Foreign Ministry. Nayanima, you’re the right analyst for this visit. Thank you for joining in and let’s get started.
Nayanima Basu (NB): Thank you, Raveena. It’s a complete pleasure and please, all yours.
RS: The Taliban Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, is visiting India on October 10th. This will be the first high-level Taliban visit to India since 2021. What is the purpose of this visit and what do you expect will be on the agenda?
NB: See, the very fact that the Afghan Foreign Minister—and they are no more an interim government, so to say, because there issued a decree on August 15th this year, declaring themselves a full-fledged government, and they now control the entire country. So, the fact that Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi is planning to come to India sends a strong message. Although we’re still waiting for an official announcement from the government, all indications suggest that he will be arriving later this week.
So, this visit really gives out a larger message to the world that India is ready to engage the Taliban for several reasons. Firstly, they are in our neighbourhood, and India-Afghanistan always had a robust relationship, especially people-to-people linkages. We had several projects running there, and the fact that before this Taliban takeover happened, in the South Asian subcontinent, India was the largest aid giver in terms of humanitarian aid and assistance.
Therefore, I would not know, and I would not like to pre-empt what will be the outcome, but of course, I’m sure there will be more talks on having greater people-to-people linkages. The resumption of visas has been ongoing, and this is expected to receive a boost, along with an anticipated increase in trade. The Afghan government currently needs to ramp up its economy, which requires increasing business activities with India.
RS: Correct. So, could you elaborate on why India is choosing to engage with Kabul now? What do we want from Afghanistan right now?
NB: Look, there are several aspects to it. Firstly, as I mentioned, trade is a major factor — we have the Chabahar Port in Iran, although it has come under question now due to American sanctions. But keeping that aside, there is a massive people-to-people linkage we share. Over the decades, Afghan students have been coming to study across universities in India. When I was there myself, I saw how ambitious the youngsters were to go to India and study in Indian universities. They see it as reaching a milestone in their lives. While we might take it for granted in our daily lives, it is a very big achievement for them. Getting admission to Indian colleges is like a dream come true.
I’m sure the Taliban government has realised this as well. They now have several diplomats among their ranks who were educated and trained in India, so they understand this importance.
In terms of what India stands to gain in defence and security, it is going to be significant, especially given our ongoing tensions with Pakistan. Afghanistan, too, has its own tensions with Pakistan. We should also not overlook how India has gradually been engaging with the Taliban over the past four years. It’s not that we never had a dialogue this will be the first ministerial-level visit, which is unprecedented, which we’ve never done, even last time when the Taliban was in power in 1996 till 2001, till the Americans came in and invaded for their own reasons.
This visit sends a larger message to our neighbourhood — that India is a country willing to engage even with the Taliban when it comes to business, people-to-people linkages, and shared interests.
RS: As you mentioned, Afghanistan is facing tensions with Pakistan, but China and Pakistan are fully engaged with the Taliban regime. They held trilateral talks with Afghanistan twice this year. What are their roles and intentions in Afghanistan?
NB: Clearly, Pakistan is doing this for its own reasons. They are dealing with issues related to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistan Taliban, as well as several other border issues — the Durand Line, for instance — which I’m sure everyone is well aware of. Of course, back in 2021, when Pakistan was under the former Imran Khan government, we kept hearing how the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Pakistan allegedly installed the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Taliban rejects this, but we know very well how the dynamics work in that region. So, of course, tensions are high in that segment.
Coming to China, the Taliban has already sent ambassadors to both China and Pakistan, and their diplomatic missions in each country are up and running. They are actively doing business — it’s not that they are inactive. With China, the dynamics are completely about business. The Chinese are eyeing Afghanistan’s huge mineral deposits and critical resources, many of which have been a cause of concern for India as well. India knows that in order to maintain a footprint there, it needs to start engaging actively, because we were the ones running many infrastructure projects that have now come to a standstill. I’m sure those will resume eventually.
These are the dynamics. China really wants to do business. They have placed Afghanistan under the broader map of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which they now want to extend to Afghanistan — although talks on that have been slowing, which is why the trilateral meetings are happening. That, of course, has been a concern for India. But the Taliban government also realises that they need India when it comes to trade and building broader international relationships. If a democratic country like India engages the Taliban, it signals some level of legitimacy, which the Taliban wants the world to acknowledge.
RS: So, China wants to do business with Afghanistan but what about the U.S.? They have shown renewed interest in the Bagram Air Base. Why does the U.S. seek a return to a country which it abandoned? Is there a new great game a foot?
NB: I really don’t think so. For the Donald Trump administration, doing something like a “Great Game” would require a lot of effort, and I don’t think this particular U.S. dispensation has that plan or even the capacity.
Now, yes, of course, Afghanistan, as I always say, and as I’ve mentioned in my book, is the world’s favourite battlefield. You know, whenever someone is in a mood for war, they just go into that country and fight. But we’ve also seen that Afghans have been warriors all their lives, right? From the Anglo-Afghan wars onward, they’ve never let anyone truly rule their country. That is precisely where their ethos of self-defence or defending their country, or jihad, so to speak. Whether we like it or not, it is the ideology the Taliban follows. They’ve been fighting the Americans for 20 years, and if now President Trump thinks he can just go and take Bagram Air Base tomorrow, it’s not going to happen, at least according to my research and analysis. I don’t think the Taliban is in any mood to hand over Bagram to the U.S., for any reason.
So, I think America is sending these signals to show the world that they aren’t completely out of the region, and that they will continue to keep an eye on developments. Of course, their concern remains on ISIS. So perhaps President Trump is sending the messages we hear because of that. But I don’t think anything substantial is happening on that front. Bagram Air Base is very much under Taliban control, and it will remain so.
RS: So could there be a new development between Afghanistan and the U.S.? As you said, Afghanistan does not want to engage and does not want to give away the Bagram Air Base — so could there be any new developments here?
NB: The Taliban has gone on record stating that they want business with the U.S. They’ve said, “You can come, your companies can come and invest, give us jobs, recognise us.” Let us not forget that it was this same Taliban that signed a peace deal with President Trump during his first tenure, and that is how the Americans handed the country back to them.
So it’s a very interesting dynamic. Of course they want business to go on, and the Taliban has publicly stated that whenever you want to come, open your missions, open your embassies, have full-fledged engagement with us. But of course, you cannot capture the country again, nor take strategic assets like the Bagram Air Base, we are not going to give it over to you.
Also, if the U.S. were to plan another attack, which I hope they won’t, the Taliban has very clearly stated that would be seen as an act of war. They have said they don’t mind fighting the Americans for another 20 or 30 years. So, based on what the Taliban has said, I don’t think any easy military re-entry or seizure of Bagram is going to happen.
RS: Right. So just to give a little bit of a conclusion and to summarize the topics we touched on — India’s role, China’s role, the U.S.’s role, and Pakistan’s role — on a final note, how should India view Afghanistan today? What concrete role should it be playing there over the next few years? And if you have any suggestions for the ministry when it comes to engaging with Afghanistan, what would they be?
NB: Well, to begin with what you asked at the end, I’ve written in my articles, in my reportage, for Gateway House, and in my book that it is high time India engages the Taliban. India needs to speak with the Taliban. This is not the world of 1996 or even 2001; the world has changed, and the world order is shifting. The reality is that this time, the Taliban has full control of the country. Last time, they could not control the Panjshir Valley, from where anti-Taliban forces emerged. We saw how the National Resistance Front and others fought the Taliban then. This time, even the Panjshir dynamics are resolved, the entire country is under Taliban control. That is why I think India is engaging, and why I have been constantly saying that this is the reality.
In fact, just to give a little anecdote: when I was traveling to Mazar-e-Sharif in 2021, two days before the city also came under Taliban control, people there were telling me that they didn’t mind the Taliban coming to power because the Russians had invaded them and never gave them anything, and the Americans came but also didn’t deliver. The Taliban, at least, understands their culture and their way of life. They consider themselves as “one of us,” as brothers. That is the context, and I think India has also understood the ethnic and cultural diversities in Afghanistan. It’s such a huge country, with significant business potential, trade opportunities, and mineral resources.
India had been engaging with the former republic government, and I’m sure it will do the same with the Taliban government, albeit in a slow and gradual process. As we have seen, in May, External Affairs Minister Dr. Jaishankar had a telephone conversation with Muttaqi, the Foreign Minister, who is now visiting India. Before that, our Foreign Secretary met Foreign Minister Muttaqi in Dubai. Even earlier, our former Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, Mr. J.P. Singh, now our ambassador to Israel went to Kabul to meet Taliban representatives. This bridge-building has been paving the way, and today we are seeing it culminate in this visit.
Let’s see what the outcome will be. I’m sure visas will be a priority for the Taliban. Maybe six months or a year down the line, we’ll also see our ambassadors taking positions of course, not formal recognition, because that requires a longer process, as the Russians have done. But we could likely establish a setup similar to what China or Pakistan has, with ambassadors in each other’s capitals, which would smoothen the process and facilitate cooperation between the two countries.
RS: According to you, what would success look like for India and Afghanistan in the next two or three years? As you mentioned, it would take around six months to establish an embassy or full-fledged diplomatic talks. So, in the next two or three years, how do you see our position in Afghanistan?
NB: Well, we already have our embassy up and running, though it’s a technical team, the same in Delhi and in Mumbai. I’m hoping that there will be more movement of people, of course, Afghans coming here for education, medical purposes, and trade or business. A small amount of that has already started happening, trickling in, but I’m sure it will grow significantly, like seven, eight, or ten years back when we saw so many Afghans coming for treatment and education.
In two or three years, I expect that trend to expand further. But let us not forget trade. That’s something Afghanistan has always wanted, though there are issues with the Chabahar Port now. There may also be challenges depending on how the Americans allow us to conduct that business. But at the end of the day, Afghanistan is our neighbour. I’ve constantly said in my articles, my book, and elsewhere that you cannot deny the reality of geography. You may not like it, but geography is geography — you can’t change it. So, you have to engage.
India has always been seen as a major democratic country that has carried forward the South Asia project, so to speak. I’m hinting, of course, towards a revival of SAARC, though that is difficult due to India-Pakistan tensions. Nevertheless, we can engage with our neighbours bilaterally, and I think that will help establish a strong relationship between India and Afghanistan.
I also believe that, at a later stage, India will need to address some difficult issues, such as the Taliban’s stance on women’s education and related matters, given their different ideology and ethos. I’m sure those conversations are ongoing. But for now, it’s more important for Afghans to be able to travel to India and for things to be smoothed out. The more complex issues can be addressed gradually over time.
RS: That’s right, that’s correct. Would you like to say something on India-Afghanistan relations on a final note?
NB: Well, my final note would be that India will have to engage with the Taliban dispensation there and ensure that the region does not turn against India. We used to have a significant presence there such as our four consulates across Afghanistan, and I hope all those consulates reopen in Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar, along with the embassy in Kabul.
So, that will be my final note will be to understand the changing reality, not just in Afghanistan, but even in Nepal and Bangladesh, India needs to learn to accommodate its neighbourhood. This is your region, and as I said, you have to engage with it.
RS: That’s great. We really hope that this meeting between the Afghan Foreign Minister and India will be a success, and let’s see what the outcomes are. Thank you so much, Nayanima, for joining us.
Nayanima Basu is a journalist who writes on issues of foreign policy and is the author of “The Fall of Kabul: Despatches from Chaos”.
Raveena Shivashankar is the website and digital media associate at Gateway House.
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