EU’s new India strategy

The European Union’s new India strategy, the New Strategic EU-India Agenda, released on Oct 20, marks a significant attempt to elevate the partnership to a higher level, positioning India as a central pillar in Europe’s vision for a multipolar, rules-based international order.[1]

The document emphasises cooperation in trade, digital technologies, green transition, connectivity, security collaboration, and Indo-Pacific engagement. It seeks to revitalise the long-stalled negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), deepen institutional mechanisms through the Trade and Technology Council, and expand cooperation in critical and emerging technologies such as semiconductors, renewable energy, cyber governance, artificial intelligence, and resilient supply chains. It underscores India’s importance as a democratic partner capable of enabling Europe’s strategic diversification away from over-dependence on China.

At its core, the strategy highlights shared democratic values and multilateralism, positioning India not only as a regional power but as a global strategic actor. Initiatives such as the Global Gateway and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor are presented as platforms to enhance sustainable infrastructure and connectivity between Europe and Asia. Yet the paper also outlines the EU’s expectations regarding environmental standards, human rights, carbon taxation mechanisms such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, as well as regulatory convergence. The strategy acknowledges existing disagreements over market access, investment protection, and labour mobility, but expresses a long-term vision of building a comprehensive strategic partnership founded on trust, resilience, and mutual benefit.^[1]

‘The Council welcomes in particular efforts to conclude a balanced, ambitious, mutually beneficial and economically meaningful FTA, which the European Commission and the Indian government aim to finalise by the end of the year. Such an agreement must include enhanced market access, removal of trade barriers, and provisions on sustainable development, the paper states. This clearly puts the long-pending FTA as the fulcrum around which the New Strategy could revolve. The key to trust building lies in this, and despite fulsome political statements of intent, the FTA is still stuck. It requires the EU to step out of its historical context and view the FTA in a modern 2025 context with a focus on current rather than legacy issues.

Economically, the EU presents itself as India’s largest trading bloc partner, but the numbers do not reflect overwhelming leverage. India’s trade with the EU at $138 billion^[2] is only marginally ahead of its trade with ASEAN, which stands at $122 billion.[2] This reflects India’s successful diversification of economic partnerships, reducing dependence on any single region. ASEAN countries collectively invest $122 billion to the EUs $160 billion in India, challenging Europe’s assumption of its centrality in India’s economic rise. While the EU remains a valuable economic partner, India ought to negotiate from a position of strength, using its growing economy, large market, and strategic geopolitical position as leverage.^[3]

This mismatch is reflected in the Strategic Agenda. While it is remarkable in objective, scope, and rhetoric, it reveals limitations that stem from structural, institutional, and geopolitical contradictions within the European Union and India. It lacks the delivery mechanisms, coherence, and strategic clarity necessary to translate vision into outcomes. The strategy is aspirational, but in key areas, it does not go beyond declaratory diplomacy.^[3]

Institutions like the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), designed to be the flagship mechanism for EU-India cooperation on strategic technologies, have produced limited outcomes^[4] in contrast to India’s technology partnership with the U.S. under the iCET framework, which has already advanced semiconductor manufacturing, critical mineral supply chains, and defence innovation. The TTC has been hampered by regulatory rigidity, internal EU divisions, and an overly procedural approach, resulting in announcements rather than actionable projects.^[4] Rather than catalysing transformative cooperation, it risks becoming a forum for managed dialogue without measurable results.

The limitations of the TTC reflect the wider challenges in the India–EU economic relationship. Despite more than a decade of negotiating, the FTA remains stalled on fundamental disagreements over agricultural market access, investor protection, data governance, and intellectual property, which is once again repeated in the Strategic Agenda. India views EU regulatory instruments such as the CBAM as protectionist tools that disproportionately penalise emerging economies by imposing Western environmental standards without adequate recognition of differentiated responsibilities. This asymmetry in regulatory philosophy risks derailing trade negotiations unless Europe is willing to adopt a more flexible and development-sensitive approach that aligns with India’s economic priorities and energy transition timelines.^[5]

The strategic alignment envisioned in the document is further challenged by diverging geopolitical worldviews. While Europe frames the partnership around shared democratic values and a rules-based order, India pursues a doctrine of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy. India’s continued engagement with Russia, particularly in energy and defence, remains a point of persistent discomfort for Europe, especially in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict. The EU expects normative convergence, while India prioritises national interest and pragmatic engagement to preserve strategic flexibility. The strategy paper fails to reconcile these differences, instead offering aspirational language that glosses over deep structural divergences.^[5]

The EU’s own strategic predicament undermines the credibility of its India outreach. Europe is economically dependent on China for manufacturing and supply chains, yet politically confrontational in its rhetoric. It has cut off strategic energy ties with Russia, resulting in increased vulnerability and inflationary pressures. At the same time, European defence spending is rising, but slow growth and fiscal constraints limit capability development. Europe seeks to position itself as a geopolitical actor in the Indo-Pacific,^[6] yet it lacks the unified military and financial capacity necessary to make a meaningful impact. Without resolving its internal contradictions, the EU’s offer to India appears disproportionately normative and insufficiently strategic.

Institutional fragmentation poses another challenge. The strategy requires ratification and implementation across 27 member states, each with its own strategic priorities, economic interests, and domestic political pressures. This process slows responses and dilutes strategic intent, in contrast to India’s centralised policy structure, which enables rapid decision-making. Europe’s insistence on regulatory alignment and values-based diplomacy often results in prescriptive rather than partnership-based formulations, limiting India’s willingness to embrace EU frameworks that might constrain its policy autonomy.

Connectivity and infrastructure are highlighted as pillars of cooperation through initiatives such as the Global Gateway and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. However, these remain largely conceptual, with limited funding and undefined timelines. Unlike China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which deploys rapid financing and implementation models, EU connectivity projects rely on public-private partnerships and adherence to stringent sustainability metrics, resulting in delays and limited scale. Without significant financial commitment, India may interpret EU connectivity initiatives as rhetorical rather than transformative. The section on Trilateral partnerships focuses on Africa and South Asia but neglects the Indo-Pacific.

Defence cooperation, a central element of the strategic narrative, is constrained. European defence industries are fragmented and lack the depth of experience in the Indian market compared to longstanding partners such as Russia, France, or the U.S. India seeks technology transfer and co-production, while European firms are cautious due to intellectual property concerns and bureaucratic export regimes. Without addressing trust deficits and aligning defence industrial policies, cooperation in this area will be still-born.

The EU’s India strategy is a timely and ambitious recognition of India’s rising global profile and the necessity for Europe to diversify its strategic partnerships in an era of geopolitical uncertainty. However, its success will depend on the EU’s ability to match rhetoric with resources, flexibility, and strategic patience. India welcomes the EU’s renewed engagement but will approach the partnership through the lens of strategic autonomy and national interest. For the strategy to move beyond symbolic diplomacy, Europe must recognise India not merely as a normative partner but as a geopolitical actor with its own strategic imperatives. Only by embracing pragmatic cooperation over prescriptive alignment can the EU and India build a credible, resilient, and future-oriented partnership.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

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References:

[1] India-EU Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025, MEA 15 July 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-

[2] Gurjit Singh, Resetting India-ASEAN Trade in 2025, ORF, 17 September 2025 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/resetting-india-asean-trade-in-2025#:~:text=Between%20FY%202009%20and%20FY,Understanding%20the%20Trade%20Disparity

[3] Dr. Katharina Emschermann, Jochen Luckscheiter 3 Questions on the New Strategic EU-India Agenda, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 18 September 2025, https://eu.boell.org/en/2025/09/18/3-questions-new-strategic-eu-india-agenda-jochen-luckscheiter

[4] Tapping into the Momentum: The EU-India Trade and Technology Council, Heinrich Boll Stiftung. 27 May 2025, https://in.boell.org/en/2025/05/27/tapping-momentum-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council

[5] Priyanka Chaturvedi, Power without purpose: The EU-India dilemma, 25 September 2025, https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/power-without-purpose-eu-india-dilemma

[6] EU-Indo Pacific Strategy, EEAS, 30.1.2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-indo-pacific-strategy_en