In the history of its fifteen summits, the BRICS – a consequential grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – summit just held in Johannesburg on 22-24 August has drawn an exceptionally high quantum of global attention. It was a milestone that probably outshone the first founding summit in Yekaterinburg, 2009 (Russia) and the third summit in Sanya, 2011 (China) when South Africa joined the grouping. The decision last week to invite six states – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – to join BRICS as full members as also to keep its doors open for further expansion, has opened a new era. BRICS 2.0 will have truly global repercussions: on the role of the US-led western alliance centred around G7, the Emerging Economies and Developing Countries (EMDCs), and the engagements between these two worlds.
Johannesburg was the ‘expansion summit’ where the grouping’s institutional development touched a new high. In the name of “inclusive multilateralism” – an unexceptional goal – BRICS increased its membership to represent a larger share of world population, global GDP, and international trade. This was initially driven by China with the backing of Russia and South Africa. But once India and Brazil accepted the principle of expansion, the choice of six new members was based on consensus. The accommodation was important, given that at least 23 countries of the Global South had conveyed interest in seeking BRICS membership. This was a recognition of the value and significance of the grouping, notwithstanding the negative view taken by the West and its advocates.
Two questions then need answers. First, will the expansion be good for BRICS? Its leaders think so. The new BRICS-XI will certainly have more political clout, but the extent to which it can wield increased influence will depend on building inner coherence and unity.
Second, why were these six countries chosen and which other countries may be welcomed in the future? The choice has been governed by different motivations. Argentina was brought in to expand the Latin American representation. Egypt, given its excellent ties with both China and India, was a natural choice. Ethiopia was a surprise, the result of a compromise between the rival claims of Nigeria and Kenya. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and the UAE will help in re-capitalisation of the New Development Bank, thereby enhancing its capacity to finance development projects. Iran’s entry reaffirms its strategic location as a bridge between West, Central and South Asia. BRICS 2.0 will also have six of the top ten oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, UAE, Brazil, and Iran – a definite global power shift and one not defined by the West.
At Johannesburg, the leaders decided to direct the foreign ministers to “further develop the BRICS partner country model and a list of prospective partner countries”. In line for admission are Indonesia and Vietnam from Southeast Asia, Bangladesh and Mauritius from India’s neighbourhood, Nigeria and Kenya from the African continent, and another from Latin America. While they will present their report at the next summit, the New Six will join the grouping in January 2024 and thus will have a say in the next phase of expansion.
The immediate rebalancing focus is UNSC membership for the original three BRICS members – the IBSA three of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Paragraph 7 of the Johannesburg Declaration articulates support for “a comprehensive reform of the UN, including of the Security. Council”; for increased representation of developing countries in the Security Council’s memberships; and for “legitimate aspirations” of EMDCs from Africa, Asia, and Latin America specifically Brazil, India, and South Africa to play a greater role in international affairs, in particular the United Nations Security Council. This requires the support of permanent members China and Russia both, or it will further expose their doublespeak on this vital issue.
Apart from expansion, the question of having a common BRICS currency dominated the pre-summit headlines, despite the BRICS itself not seeking to create it. Instead, paragraph 44 of the joint statement makes clear that the grouping will encourage local currencies in trade and financial transactions “between BRICS as well as their trading partners” and for “fast, inexpensive, transparent, safe and inclusive payment systems.” Should it contribute to de-dollarisation, the outcome may not be unwelcome to a large segment of the international community. Finance ministers and Central Bank governors will now examine the use of local currencies, payments instruments and platforms and present their findings at the next summit.
Both UNSC membership and local currency trade are welcome to India, and two other possibilities discussed are favourable too. First, it was reiterated that G20 is the premier multilateral forum for “international economic and financial cooperation”, and China and Russia conveyed their support for the successful hosting of successive G20 presidencies by India, Brazil, and South Africa. This generates hope that these two states may become a little more conciliatory, and a consensus-based Delhi Declaration is delivered at the G20 summit in September.
Second, the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the summit’s sidelines, may offer fresh impetus for expediting a workable resolution of the border issues in the western sector of Ladakh. This also improves the atmospherics and prospects of the Delhi Summit.
After the triad of COVID, Galwan, and Ukraine, BRICS faces a new, changed world in which its two members – Russia and China – are heavily involved in confrontation and contestation with the U.S.-led West. The inclination of the former two is naturally to adopt anti-western positions. The other BRICS members do have differences with the existing global order, but they prefer reform through dialogue and reconciliation. As the six new members join BRICS, these inner dynamics will evolve further in shaping their future trajectory. India will have a seminal but challenging role to play, given its growing cooperation with the West on the one hand and its active articulation and pursuit of the interests of the Global South on the other. New Delhi is determined to leverage its strategic autonomy and unique diplomatic dexterity to connect with diverse players in different geographies.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in the Indian Express.