The ruling coalition in Japan, comprising the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior partner, Komeito, suffered a political setback in the Upper House elections on July 20, reducing it to a minority status.[1] This follows its earlier disappointing performance in the October 2024 Lower House elections,[2] which had already cost it a majority.[3]As it stands, the coalition now finds itself in the minority, in both chambers of the National Diet, a rare and politically precarious position that may foreshadow deeper shifts in Japan’s political landscape.
Of the 125 Upper House seats contested, 124 were regular seats, while one was a by-election. The electoral system gives voters two votes: one for a candidate in their local constituency and another for a political party through proportional representation. Fifty seats were filled via proportional representation, with the remaining 75 chosen by a direct constituency vote.[4]
Prior to the election, the LDP-Komeito coalition held 75 uncontested seats. Their target was modest: secure at least 50 seats out of the 125 up for grabs, enough to maintain a slim majority. However, the results fell short. The coalition won only 47 seats, three fewer than needed, for a majority. The LDP, under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, lost 13 seats, while Komeito dropped six. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc made substantial gains, securing a total of 78 seats. Much of the disillusionment with the ruling coalition centres around economic frustrations. Inflation, long dormant in Japan, has resurfaced, now hovering above 3%. The cost of basic necessities such as rice has doubled in the past year, and a consumption tax of 10% continues to weigh heavily on consumers. Wages, by contrast, have remained stagnant, leaving many Japanese citizens struggling to maintain their standard of living.
This economic squeeze has particularly affected young voters and families, prompting questions about the government’s ability to manage the economy. Amidst rising living costs and growing inequality, the LDP’s campaign promises appeared out of touch with the daily realities of many voters.
The economic unease also intersected with cultural and social anxieties, especially regarding Japan’s increasing reliance on foreign labour. The number of foreign workers has surged from 3.7 million in 2024 to around 3.8 million in December 2024 roughly 3% of the population, driven largely by the country’s ageing demographics and labour shortages.[5] While some view this influx as a necessary adaptation, others see it as a threat to national identity and social cohesion. China, South Korea, Vietnam and Nepal are among the high immigrant countries.[6]
In this climate of dissatisfaction and uncertainty, smaller and newer political parties gained ground. One of the most striking developments was the rise of the right-wing populist party Sanseito. Founded in 2020, Sanseito increased its representation from a single seat, to 15 in the Upper House, marking a major breakthrough for Japan’s radical right.
Sanseito’s success was built on a staunchly nationalist and anti-globalist platform. Its leader, Sohei Kamiya, frequently invoked the rhetoric and political strategies of U.S. President Donald Trump. He called for a halt to immigration, restrictions on foreign workers, and an economic policy that would put “Japan First.” His campaign framed foreign labour not as a solution to economic issues but as a scapegoat for them, blaming multinational corporations and globalist elites for Japan’s domestic struggles.
In addition to opposing immigration, Kamiya has proposed a fully independent Japanese defence force, free from U.S. military dependency, and called for resisting American trade demands, especially in sensitive sectors such as rice, beef, and automobiles. Ironically, while he borrows heavily from Trump’s playbook, Kamiya positions himself as a defender of Japanese sovereignty against Trump policies that are seen as exploitative or unfair towards Japan.
The appeal of Sanseito’s messaging, particularly among younger voters, reflects growing frustration with the LDP’s perceived ineffectiveness and over-accommodation of foreign pressures. Disenchanted by stagnant wages, mounting taxes, and a sense that their voices are not being heard, many young people have turned away from the political mainstream and towards populist alternatives.
A key question arising from the election results is whether the so-called “Trump effect” played a role in undermining Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s leadership. While Ishiba has not openly opposed U.S. influence, he has had to walk a diplomatic tightrope in recent months. His government has faced increasing pressure from the Trump administration to increase Japan’s defence spending beyond 3.5% of GDP, a highly sensitive topic for many Japanese voters. Immediately thereafter, on June 21, Tokyo precipitately cancelled a “2+2” security dialogue with the U.S. scheduled for July 1. However, Japan’s Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi did attend a Quad summit held July 1 in Washington.
Although Japan has already boosted its military budget and since April 1 is up 9.4% to a record 8.7 trillion yen, the equivalent of $55.1 billion[7] purchased American defence equipment, and increased its contributions to U.S. bases on Japanese soil, the Trump administration has continued to impose punitive trade tariffs. Japan, alongside South Korea, is subject to a 25% tariff bracket based on claims that Japan has not sufficiently opened its domestic markets, particularly in agriculture and automobiles.
The Ishiba administration had hoped that a strong showing in the Upper House elections would enhance its leverage in the ongoing trade negotiations with the U.S. and also the European Union.[8] This hope has now been dashed. Post elections, Ishiba said he wanted to talk in person with the U.S. President Donald Trump on the tariff negotiations at the earliest, to finalise a mutually beneficial agreement.[9]
Public confidence in Ishiba’s ability to manage relations with the U.S. and restore Japan’s economic vitality has deteriorated. A recent national poll revealed that 70% of Japanese citizens lack faith in Tokyo’s ability to secure favourable outcomes in its negotiations with Washington. Only 22% remain optimistic.
This broader sense of unease has translated into declining approval ratings for the Prime Minister. Ishiba’s approval dropped by 6.2 percentage points in July to just 20.8%, the lowest since he assumed office in October. Meanwhile, his disapproval rating climbed to 55%, the highest during his tenure.
Political analysts argue that the rise of Sanseito, and other, more moderately nationalist parties, is part of a larger shift in Japanese politics. Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe three years ago, Japan’s nationalist right has lacked a unifying figure. Abe had long acted as a buffer between Japan’s pragmatic conservatism and its more radical nationalist fringes. In his absence, political space has opened up for new actors to challenge the traditional dominance of the LDP.
These parties, while varying in extremity, often focus on a similar set of grievances: inflation, declining real incomes, tax burdens on the young to support an ageing population, and an increasingly lopsided alliance with the U.S. Sanseito, in particular, has captured this mood of discontent and used it to craft a narrative that resonates with disillusioned voters.
The party’s momentum appears to be growing. Last month, it gained an additional seat when a member of another opposition party defected. It had also won three Lower House seats in a by-election in Tokyo last year, further solidifying its presence on the national stage.
While the ruling coalition lost its majority, the LDP remains the largest political force with a total of 101 seats. “We must understand the responsibility as the leading party and the one we have to fulfil for the nation,” Ishiba said.[10]He also signalled his intention to keep his position after the election, saying, “I am keenly aware of [my] responsibilities.”[11]
Japan’s political future is now uncertain. The ruling coalition’s dual minority status will complicate legislative efforts and make it harder to implement any coherent agenda. Ishiba’s government will likely face increasing internal dissent, coalition instability, and challenges from both the left and right.
Whether this leads to early elections, leadership change, or further fragmentation of Japan’s political landscape, remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: the “Trump effect”—embodied in both American policy and its global ideological footprint—has found fertile ground in Japan’s political soil.
Ishiba was partly correct when his government succeeded in striking a face-saving deal with the U.S. The U.S. and Japan reached an agreement to reduce the steep tariffs that had threatened imports from Japan. As part of the deal, Tokyo committed to a $550 billion package of investments and loans toward the U.S. economy. The agreement delivers immediate relief to Japan’s crucial automotive industry, with existing tariffs slashed from 25% to 15%. Proposed duties on other Japanese goods, originally scheduled to take effect on August 1, were reduced too.
As Japan moves forward, the electorate’s shift toward populism, nationalism, and economic protectionism may redefine the country’s political trajectory—and its place in the world.[12]
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.
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References:
[1] List of the Members Sorted by Political Groups in the House (As of July 22,2025), House of Councillors, National Diet of Japan, https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/index.htm
[2] Strength of the In-House Groups in the House of Representatives, House of Representatives, Japan, 14 May 2025. https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/strength.htm
[3] LDP Losses: October 2024 Japanese Election Ends the “Neo-1955 Setup”, Nippon.com, 30 October 2024, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01068/
[4] The Government of Modern Japan: Elections, Asia for Educators, Columbia University, https://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1900_elections.htm
[5] Sourced from the Immigration Agency of Japan by Nippon.com Japan’s Foreign Population Hits 3.8 million, Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02350/
[6] Ibid
[7] Progress and Budget in Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities – Overview of FY2025 Budget, Défense Budget, Japan MOD, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html
[8] Gurjit Singh, The emerging divide in U.S.-Japan relations, First Post 29 June 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/the-emerging-divide-in-us-japan-relations-13901451.html
[9] Trump Tariff Deal with U.S. Ally Takes Late Blow, Newsweek, 21 July 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-tariffs-japan-election-deal-2101537
[10] Citing pressing issues, Ishiba vows to remain in office, Asahi Shinbun, 231 July 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15918824
[11] Upper House Election: Ishiba Vows to Stay on Despite Ruling Bloc’s Loss in Upper House Election; ‘Stagnation Must Not Be Allowed’, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 July 2025, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20250721-270805/
[12] Philip Carter, Japan’s Political Turn, AInvest, 20 July 2025,https://www.ainvest.com/news/japan-political-turn-assessing-economic-risks-nationalism-anti-immigration-policies-2507/