Print This Post
14 April 2011, Gateway House

South Africa’s human rights dilemma

As the newest entrant of the BRICS group, South Africa's unpredictability in upholding the human rights dimension of its foreign policy agenda, by its stance to impose a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya, has brought about an incoherency between the BRIC countries and South Africa.

SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE

post image

On the 14th April 2011, China will host the third Summit of the BRICS group. This Summit will be held in Sanya, located in the south of the tropical province of Hainan. The Summit will be significant for a variety of reasons. Not only will the Summit welcome its fifth member South Africa into its ranks, but it will also try and garner confidence that BRICS is more than just a club of the South’s prima donnas.

It is interesting to see how South Africa’s admission into BRIC will actually transform South Africa or vice versa. Already Pretoria’s entry into the Forum comes on the back of some sensitivity regarding the human rights dimension of South Africa’s foreign policy agenda.

That South Africa’s admission into BRIC entails a complete abandonment of Pretoria’s human rights dimension in its foreign policy agenda since China and Russia are viewed less favourably in this regard needs to be examined in the context of recent events. The case in point is the UN resolution 1973, which imposed a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya, called for an immediate cease-fire and enforced a freeze on funds, and other financial and economic assets controlled and/or owned by Libyan authorities, including those of the Gadaffi family.

The authorization of Resolution 1973 illustrates a significant set of issues for South Africa’s position in BRIC as it relates to how common geo-strategic interests intersect amongst the BRIC members. Alongside Germany, Brazil, Russia, China and India abstained from voting for Resolution 1973. While all members of the Security Council have condemned the actions of the Gadaffi regime against its own people who are demanding peaceful change and political reform, the interpretation and implementation of Resolution 1973 has raised a set of sensitivities and ambivalence. This is not only evident amongst the Security Council members but it has revealed an incoherency between the BRIC countries and South Africa, with Pretoria throwing its support behind the US, UK and France by voting in favour of the Resolution.

As much as the Zuma Presidency perhaps wanted to demonstrate an independent foreign policy voice and probably assert that it has not lost its moral responsibility, the military intervention under Resolution 1973 has definitely posed a dilemma for Pretoria with its BRIC partners.

Already the other BRIC members have criticized the military intervention as an act of aggression against the people of Libya even though it falls within the ambit of the UN’s ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine especially where citizens are at political risk and threat by the government in power. This was because the actual operation was not only disproportionate but more civilian lives became precarious through the air strikes.

Moreover, there was an underlying reproach and suspicion that the UN mandate was being manipulated by the allied force, which had less to do with a humanitarian intervention and more about a pending regime change in Libya that is suitable to Western powers interests.

And then, of course, there was the oil factor, especially the price volatility that this posed to the forward oil market index; notwithstanding the detrimental impact on the global supply and demand chains, production outputs, and the profits of International Oil companies. All of which must have informed the deliberations around the military intervention.

What the Libyan crisis represents is perhaps the first real test of whether BRICS can, indeed, speak with one voice over issues affecting the global governance architecture. Even more compelling is whether Pretoria and the Zuma Presidency had committed a diplomatic faux pas by voting with the Western powers without measuring the costs and the recourse to force that the military intervention actually entailed.

It seems less clear what motivated the Zuma Administration to align itself with the allied intervention. But it does seem like an ordinary but controversial decision to announce to the world that South Africa’s human rights agenda remains a cornerstone of Pretoria’s foreign policy decisions. Not to mention the negative PR for South Africa’s global image, confusing stance on human rights and being out of sync with the AU’s position against the ‘no fly zone’.

Furthermore, the impact of the decision actually highlights the wavering nature of the debate on the human rights issue within BRICS. While China and Russia are seen as antithetical to the human rights debate, Brazil, India and South Africa, on the other hand, are suppose to represent the strengthened democracy bloc that upholds the principles of the global democratic order and should ideally promote the human rights agenda within the club. Yet, the decision taken by South Africa on Libya poses a complex set of questions, which curiously draws attention to the ambiguity of Pretoria’s human rights dilemma.

By throwing its lot in with France, UK and the USA, South Africa has sent mixed messages about the human rights agenda that the Zuma Presidency wants to uphold. This demonstrates that while Pretoria may have been influenced by the ‘responsibility to protect’ argument where a dictatorship is committing human rights abuses against its own citizens, it does not offset the reality that the military intervention has its own human right consequences, which ordinary Libyan people bear the brunt of.

Essentially, President Zuma’s subsequent U-turn in condemning the military intervention marks the predicament that confronts South Africa’s diplomacy and foreign policy agenda. In short what is the nature of this foreign policy agenda? And, more importantly how is it defined through the mechanisms of BRIC, G20, IBSA, and the UNSC? And how does this reconcile with Pretoria’s Africa policy, which incidentally is highlighted as the underlying thrust of its current UNSC membership?

Hence the uncertainty associated with whether South Africa’s human rights agenda has finally slipped off the radar as a result of its formal admission into BRIC because Pretoria has got into bed with Russia and China whose governments are seen as undemocratic is a parochial interpretation and one that must be viewed with caution.

What must be recognized is that South Africa has shown that it is unpredictable when it comes to consistency in upholding the human rights dimension of its foreign policy agenda. This is evident by a set of contradictory positions that the Zuma Administration has demonstrated since taking office in 2009. On the one hand, President Zuma seeks to maintain the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, but, on the other hand, he tends to advocate that his presidency is committed to the ‘primary objectives’ of ensuring that the ideals of democracy, human rights, and justice are upheld.

This has led to a mixed bag of foreign policy responses.

While President Zuma aligned with the international community calling for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, in the face of the post electoral crisis in the Ivory Coast, the Zuma Presidency sat on the fence and pushed for a government of unity to resolve the stalemate, thereby indicating that it did not recognize that Alassane Ouattara’s legitimate victory in the November 2010 elections. And only changed its position in early March 2011 when it endorsed a call of the peace and security committee of the AU that requested for the defeated incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo to step down.

Similarly, while The Zuma Presidency had condemn the rigged elections in Myanmar, November 2010 and supported the international call for the release of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, Pretoria remains silent in reply to the suppression by the state security forces of the pro-democracy movements demands for change and political reform by pro democracy movements in Swaziland, which still remains under control of an absolute monarchy

Therefore by joining BRIC this does not mean that Pretoria has finally renounced the human rights dimension of its foreign policy. In fact indications are that South Africa’s foreign policy remains ambiguous when it comes to taking a consistent position on the human rights agenda.

Sanusha Naidu is a senior researcher in the African and Global South Unit based attached to the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Unit based with the Human Sciences Research Council in Cape Town. She can be contacted at snaidu@hsrc.ac.za.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For interview requests with the author, or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.

© Copyright 2011 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

TAGGED UNDER: ,