Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, 2025, marks a significant geopolitical inflection point in the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region.[i]
For over three decades, Somaliland has existed as a de facto state, possessing territory, population, a functioning government, and relative internal stability, yet without international recognition. Israel’s move, therefore, is not merely a diplomatic gesture toward a long-marginalised polity; it is a strategic act with implications for Somalia’s territorial integrity, regional security dynamics, great-power competition, and the evolving politics of recognition in a fractured international order.
Somaliland’s claim to independence is rooted in history, identity, and governance outcomes. Formerly British Somaliland, the territory voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland in 1960 to form the Somali Republic. That union, however, proved deeply asymmetric. Political power became concentrated in Mogadishu, while northern grievances, especially among the Isaaq clan, which predominates in Somaliland and is one of the original tribes of the region,[ii] went unaddressed.[iii]
The situation deteriorated dramatically under the military dictatorship of Siad Barre. During the late 1980s, the regime pursued a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Somaliland-based rebels, flattening cities such as Hargeisa and Berbera, and killing thousands. The trauma of this period remains central to Somaliland’s collective memory. When Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence, framing it not as secession but as the dissolution of a failed union.[iv]
Since then, Somaliland has built functioning political institutions, conducted multiple elections, maintained internal security, and issued its own currency. In contrast to Federal Somalia, plagued by state collapse, clan conflict, and Islamist militancy, Somaliland projected itself as a rare example of endogenous stability in the Horn of Africa. Its argument is straightforward: it should not be indefinitely shackled to a state that cannot govern itself.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is best understood through a strategic rather than normative lens. Officially, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the move as support for Somaliland’s “right of self-determination” and an opportunity to expand cooperation in agriculture, health, technology, and economic development. In practice, however, the decision aligns closely with Israel’s evolving Red Sea and Iran-containment strategy.
The Red Sea has emerged as a critical theatre in Israel’s security thinking, especially since the Gaza war of October 2023 and subsequent Houthi attacks on Israeli-linked shipping. Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have demonstrated both intent and capability to disrupt maritime routes vital to Israeli and global commerce. Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab El-Mandeb chokepoint, offers potential access for intelligence, surveillance, logistics, and maritime security cooperation.
Israeli strategic analysts have explicitly noted Somaliland’s value as an “operational area” close to Yemen. From Israel’s perspective, cultivating partners along the Red Sea rim, from Eritrea to Somaliland, creates a forward security architecture to monitor Iranian supply routes and militant activity.[v] The Houthis’ warning that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would constitute a military target only reinforces the perception that Israel’s move has genuine strategic bite.
For Somalia, Israel’s recognition constitutes a direct challenge to sovereignty and territorial unity. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s description of the move as an “existential threat”[vi] reflects not only legal concerns but also political fragility. Mogadishu fears that recognition of Somaliland could embolden other autonomous regions, weaken the federal project, and undermine international support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Ethiopia has goals similar to Israel’s. On January 1, 2024, the leaders of Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding granting Addis Ababa 50-year access to a strip of coastline on the Gulf of Aden for a naval base, better access to Berbera port and Ethiopian recognition. This has resulted in criticism from the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (an economic bloc of eight countries in the horn of Africa, IGAD) and all regional powers. It reflects Ethiopia’s effort to seek direct access to the Red Sea, Berbera and possibly through Assab in Eritrea. In both endeavours, the UAE is of one mind with Ethiopia as the UAE has the same objective to access the Red Sea – much to Saudi chagrin, leading to their rivalry in the Horn.
Ethiopia has since made up with Somalia. But for Somaliland, while recognition may be in abeyance, the economic engagement, rise of Berbera with the development of a multipurpose port by Dubai’s DP World to challenge Djibouti, and better connectivity, are on the cards.
Israel’s move is unlikely to trigger an immediate cascade of recognitions. The two secessions earlier in the region, Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011 have not been encouraging examples of successful states. Most states remain deeply cautious about endorsing secessionist entities, fearing precedents for their own internal divisions. The African Union doctrine, in particular, privileges colonial borders and Somali territorial integrity, making mass African recognition improbable in the short term. The British interest in its former colony has been consistent, but they have baulked at formalising recognition while continuing all other contacts.
However, Israel’s move does lower the diplomatic threshold. A small number of states, particularly those with limited exposure to Somali politics or strong strategic alignment with Israel, may quietly engage Somaliland more openly. The Gulf states, already economically active in Somaliland’s ports and logistics sector, could deepen quasi-diplomatic ties without formal recognition. Western democracies are likely to remain ambivalent. While many acknowledge Somaliland’s governance success, they fear destabilising Somalia at a time when Islamist militancy remains a regional threat. Thus, recognition may proceed incrementally, through functional cooperation rather than formal diplomatic endorsement.
Beyond Israel, the Somaliland question intersects with broader great-power competition. The Red Sea corridor has become a crowded strategic space, drawing in the U.S., China, Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran. China, which prioritises state sovereignty and has strong ties with Mogadishu, is unlikely to support Somaliland’s independence. Turkey, deeply invested in Somalia’s security sector, also opposes recognition.
The U.S. occupies a middle position: sympathetic to Somaliland’s democratic credentials yet reluctant to fracture Somalia’s fragile federal system. There are lobbies in Washington and in London, seeking recognition. Washington may tolerate Israel’s engagement while avoiding endorsement itself, using Somaliland as a quiet security partner rather than a recognised ally.
Taiwan offers an instructive parallel, and a strategic undercurrent. Somaliland and Taiwan established representative offices in 2020,[vii] forging ties based on shared diplomatic isolation and functional statehood without widespread recognition. For Somaliland, Taiwan represents a model: international engagement without formal UN membership. For Taiwan, Somaliland offers a foothold in Africa outside Beijing’s orbit.
Israel’s recognition indirectly strengthens this alternative diplomacy ecosystem. While Taiwan is not driving the recognition push, its presence underscores Somaliland’s ability to attract partners willing to defy conventional diplomatic constraints. Beijing, however, will remain hostile to any arrangement that normalises recognition without UN approval, reinforcing the geopolitical fault lines around Somaliland.
For Somaliland, Israel’s recognition is symbolically powerful but diplomatically incomplete: an opening rather than a breakthrough.
Whether others follow in earnest will depend on how recognition reshapes regional stability rather than disrupts it. If Somaliland continues to project itself as a net security provider rather than a source of fragmentation, incremental acceptance may grow. Yet the resistance of Somalia, the caution of major powers, and the sensitivities of precedent ensure that Somaliland’s quest for full recognition remains a long, contested journey, unmistakably entwined with global strategic competition.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.
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References:
[i] FM Sa’ar on official visit to Somaliland, Israel MFA, 6 January 2026, https://www.gov.il/en/pages/fm-sa-ar-on-official-visit-to-somaliland-6-jan-2026
[ii] The Borgen Project, 10 facts about the Isaaq Genocide. https://borgenproject.org/10-facts-about-isaaq-genocide/
[iii] Jethro Norman, Conflict in Las Anod and Crisis in Somaliland ,DIIS, 9 March 2023, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/conflict-in-las-anod-and-crisis-in-somaliland
[iv]Peace In Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building, Burao Conference,Interpeace, p. 90Annex 1: Resolution from Burao Elders’ Meeting http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Burao_Conference_Elders_Signed_Resolution_050591.pdf
[v] Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos, India, Israel, and the Rewiring of the Horn of Africa, BESA Centre Perspectives Paper No. 2,361, January 7, 2026,https://besacenter.org/india-israel-and-the-rewiring-of-the-horn-of-africa/
[vi] Somali president warns Israel-linked Somaliland moves threaten sovereignty , Saudi Gazette, 10 January 2026, https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/658005
[vii] Somaliland and Taiwan History, Republic of Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan, https://somaliland.tw/somaliland-taiwan-history/