For someone who has monitored the Myanmar file for four decades, the past week has produced exceptional insights. The 30 May-3 June visit to India by Myanmar president Min Aung Hlaing drew extensive media coverage and commentary and, for the region’s experts and stakeholders, an intensive dialogue. What was said, read, and heard?
A stand-alone visit by the president served the purpose of both governments, which was to pursue a stronger relationship that would promote their interests in a calibrated manner. India hoped to be guided by its Neighbourhood First, Act East, and Indo-Pacific policies, imparting substance and warmth to its ties with a vital neighbour. Myanmar was happy with the opportunity to arrange its president’s visit to the neighbouring democracy, with the potential to serve as a counterweight to China and as an instrument to reduce its excessive dependence on its northern neighbour. In short, a clear convergence of perspectives paved the way for this significant visit.
The visit had its share of critics, who assailed New Delhi for welcoming the general who imposed a military coup in 2021 and was held responsible for all that followed. There are weaknesses in their analyses.
First, there is the moral argument: India, the world’s largest democracy, should have no dealings with a military dictator. This emanates from ignorance, bias, or both. As a matter of policy, India deals with the government of the day, regardless of its democratic or military character. That is what most other states do as well.
Second are the arguments put forward by expatriate Myanmar NGOs that “legitimising the military junta is not pragmatism, it is self-harm.”[1] These are prejudices that do not recognise Indian policymakers’ right to decide what is and what is not in the country’s national interest.
Finally, there is the convoluted China argument. Why deal with Min Aung Hlaing when he is so close to and dependent on Beijing? In a special media briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who also served as ambassador to Myanmar and China, provided a brilliant counter-argument. He justified “sustained dialogue” and “engagement” by stating, “History has shown that disengagement does not give us any results that are better than engagement, and it certainly does not produce democratic change, if that is what we are interested in. On the other hand, disengagement only produces a vacuum that others go on to fill, to our detriment. And those others have no interest in democracy.”[2]
Given this backdrop, there were five significant gains from the Myanmar president’s visit.
One, a long dry spell in bilateral relations at the political level has ended. The visit of India’s minister of state for external affairs to attend the president’s inauguration in April tested the waters. Naypyitaw’s positive response cleared the way for this major political contact after a six-year gap. It was designed carefully, with an emphasis on the Buddhist connection and the exploration of business potential. At the official level, protocol was limited; the joint statement was briefer than usual; and signing new agreements was postponed.
Two, all issues relating to border management – security, connectivity, and development – were discussed candidly and constructively. India’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbour carried an unspoken implication: New Delhi stands for a united Myanmar. In exchange, and presumably after some serious discussion, the Myanmar side accepted Para 10 of the joint statement, which reiterated an old assurance that its territory “would not be permitted to be used against India’s security interests”.[3] New Delhi considers this reiteration valuable. Regarding the mega-infrastructure projects, the need for cooperation was recognised, but it was tempered by the realism of the prevailing security situation.
Three, defence cooperation has been registering steady progress through a mix of strategic discussions, training programmes, exercises, and naval visits.
Fourth, the visit’s thrust was on expanding and diversifying commercial and economic cooperation, especially by involving the business leadership on both sides. It was a full calendar. Stakeholders such as the Reserve Bank of India and its Myanmar counterpart, meetings of business fora in Delhi and Mumbai, and discussions with new actors in addition to the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry revealed the potential for growth in bilateral trade from the current $2 billion to reach $3 billion in the short term and $5 billion in the medium term. However, it was also clear that Indian investors and business leaders will turn their assurances into action as they see Myanmar marching toward normalcy, peace, and stability.
Five, the Indian leadership showed integrity and courage by talking with the visiting president about the need to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to his nation’s political challenges. The leaders and people of Myanmar must achieve this through their own ‘Made-in-Myanmar’ efforts. It was made clear that no outsider has any ready-made solution to offer. But India’s humanitarian assistance and experience in governance will always be made available to all in Myanmar.
The president’s visit went well from the viewpoints of both capitals. Myanmar viewed it as a strategic gain. But there is a gap. The hard reality today is that Myanmar is a fragmented nation, divided into two parts: the government and the Resistance. The latter, too, enjoys considerable strength and has stakes in the nation’s future. India’s traditional “two-track policy” demands a suitable equilibrium. Doors for dialogue with the key elements of the Resistance must be kept open, for many of them, not the military, control the Myanmar side of the critical India-Myanmar border region. It is within the realm of practical diplomacy to engage with the other side while cultivating cooperative ties with the government.
Finally, PM Modi explicitly enquired about the health and welfare of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy icon – reflecting compassion and political realism. But India needs to go further: New Delhi must establish contact with Kim Aris, her son, and assure him that it will do what it can to help her and that he is not alone in his fight to secure the freedom for his ailing, 81-year-old mother, who remains the most popular leader and the best-known name of her nation.
Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He served as India’s ambassador to Myanmar from 2002 to 2005. His book India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours won wide acclaim.
This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.
Support our work here.
For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in
©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.
References:
[1] Ro Ding, ‘The junta in Myanmar is not the partner India needs’, The Indian Express, 5 June 2026. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/junta-myanmar-is-not-the-partner-india-needs-min-aung-hlaing-modi-10723943/
[2] ‘Transcript of Special Briefing by MEA on the Visit of the President of Myanmar’, Ministry of External Affairs, 01 June, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings?dtl/41251/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_by_MEA_on_the_visit_of_President_of_Myanmar_June_01_2026
[3] India-Myanmar Joint Statement during the Official Visit of the President of Myanmar to India (May 30 – June 03, 2026), Ministry of External Affairs, 01 June 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41250/India++Myanmar+Joint+Statement+during+the+Official+Visit+of+the+President+of+Myanmar+to+India+May+30++June+03+2026