India's evolving defence doctrine

Operation Sindoor has operationalised and tested India’s new, evolving defence doctrine, whose principles primarily emphasise “jointness” and proactivity.

In the past, India’s defence posture has been defensive, emphasising strategic restraint and escalation management, particularly in the context of its relationship with Pakistan. Even though the country possesses inherent offensive capabilities, their operationalisation has been constrained, especially in response to sub-conventional threats like state-sponsored terrorism.

The Pahalgam attacks resulted in a shift in this strategic calculus. India is moving towards a more assertive posture, consolidating its strategy around an evolving doctrine of Proactive Deterrence underpinned by Calibrated Coercive Capability. Its goal is clear: to eschew the reactive past, proactively shape the security environment and impose costs on adversaries.

Analysing this shift from a strategic practitioner’s viewpoint requires looking beyond the specific operational details such as those associated with Operation Sindoor, and understand the strategic logic and its implications within the broader geopolitical and military-technical landscape.

The core tenets or principles of India’s current defence posture lie in redefining casus belli. Major terror attacks are no longer viewed solely as criminal acts by non-state actors but as acts of war orchestrated and supported by a state. Instead of relying on symbolic retribution or the threat of future punishment, the doctrine signals a default military response designed to inflict tangible costs on the enemy’s military-terrorist complex. This is a paradigm shift which treats all such attacks as a direct military challenge requiring a direct military counter-response.

A second operational tenet is autonomous escalation control i.e. seize and maintain the initiative on the escalation ladder. This means degrading terrorist infrastructure like Bahawalpur, or imposing costs on supporting military elements such as the Nur Khan air base without necessarily triggering a full-spectrum conventional conflict. This, India did, through precision attacks on high-value targets), penetrating deep into Pakistani territory and striking at will. This is a more flexible and nuanced response compared to the earlier, more rigid concepts like “Cold Start” from two decades ago, allowing for tailored actions across the spectrum of conflict.)

A pivotal element of this evolving doctrine is the explicit rejection of nuclear coercion as a shield for state-sponsored terrorism; India asserts its willingness and capability to undertake conventional punitive operations below the nuclear threshold. This is a direct challenge to Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of leveraging its nuclear arsenal to deter conventional Indian responses to asymmetric provocations. By demonstrating the resolve and capacity to act conventionally despite the nuclear backdrop, India aims to decouple Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent from its ability to employ non-state actors, effectively calling the “nuclear bluff” in the context of sub-conventional warfare.

The evolving doctrine places significant emphasis on what the Defence Ministry calls “jointness” i.e. the coordinated application of capabilities across air, sea, land, cyber, and space domains. Operation Sindoor is an example of this, involving coordinated air power (precision strikes, air defence), naval power (maritime posturing, standoff capability), and land-based assets (Army-BSF coordination, ground air defence). This goes beyond de-confliction towards genuine operational synergy, where effects in one domain amplify those in others. Institutional reforms like the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Department of Military Affairs (DMA), and the nascent Integrated Theatre Commands are crucial enablers of this multi-domain approach. When combined, the impact is significant.

Leveraging advanced technology is a critical component of this strategy, which India has been in pursuit of, in recent years. It includes the acquisition and deployment of standoff precision weapons (e.g., SCALP, HAMMER), sophisticated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, robust air defence grids, and therein, real-time capabilities in emerging domains like cyber and space. Technological superiority enhances the lethality and survivability of Indian forces and contributes significantly to enabling precise, limited actions with demonstrable effect. It strengthens India’s deterrent posture by making punitive actions effective, and potentially limiting collateral damage and unintended escalation.

The emerging doctrine blends elements of deterrence by denial with deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial aims to prevent an adversary from achieving its objectives through defensive capabilities (e.g., improved air defences against drone/missile attacks, enhanced border dominance). Deterrence by punishment, conversely, relies on the credible threat and demonstrated capability to impose unacceptable costs on the adversary for undertaking a specific action, like hitting Muridke and Bahawalpur. India’s new posture combines these, to proactively shape Pakistan’s calculus by raising the cost of terrorism.

Evaluating this evolving doctrine provides a valuable frame of reference:

a. It alters the adversary’s strategic behaviour, specifically regarding support for terrorism. In this case, it changes the cost metrics for targeting India utilising proxies.

b. It shows how integrating offensive capabilities for India gave it the upper hand to dictate the terms of engagement rather than passively absorbing attacks and reacting defensively.

c. Finally, it is a strategic response to Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of operating within the “grey zone” – i.e. between peace and conventional war, using proxies and asymmetric means without triggering a full-scale conflict. India is now signalling its intent and capability to respond kinetically within this grey zone, challenging the efficacy of this policy for Pakistan.

While holding this edge, India has to ensure that it maintains the escalation control to avoid the risk of miscalculation, keeps its military edge through upping its investment in defence modernisation, indigenous research and development, and timely acquisition of advanced technologies. Most of all, India needs to pay special attention to maintain intelligence domination, by investing in accurate, real-time intelligence – robust human intelligence, technical intelligence and an effective fusion of both.

Starting 21 May, the government of India has sent out seven groups of emissaries, to explain India’s viewpoint and to shape the global and domestic narrative and countering Pakistan’s propaganda. This is a critical step in creating and legitimising a doctrine and will play a key role in its future.

Another is a formally articulated National Security Doctrine, which India needs. This is a requirement for “jointness” and institutional buy-in across all instruments of national power – military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. It will also guide resource allocation, inter-agency coordination, and long-term strategic planning, moving India up the power stakes.

Having a clear doctrine presents a more assertive India, a nation increasingly confident in its military capabilities and willing to employ them decisively to protect its core interests in the face of persistent asymmetric threats. At home, it means all of India – diplomatic, political, military, intelligence and academic – will be woven into the fabric of the doctrine. It’s a high-stakes strategy, but one that India appears increasingly committed to pursuing in order to secure its strategic objectives and deter future provocations.

Brijesh Singh is Adjunct Distinguished Fellow, Cybersecurity Studies, and a senior IPS officer.

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