India-Canada on a positive reset

Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand’s visit to Pakistan last month, followed by delegation visits of senior Canadian officials and diplomats to Mumbai and Delhi, presents an opportunity to evaluate the reset in Canada-India relations. A bilateral relationship already strained by the issue of Khalistan plunged to its lowest during the September 2023 visit to India by former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. However, the down curve inverted almost immediately after the invitation by current Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend and meet on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June 2025. The momentum from that meeting has blossomed into a comprehensive strategic understanding and a mutually beneficial reset in relations, cemented by Carney’s visit to India in February-March 2026.

Quiet, calibrated efforts to advance the relationship have progressed so well that Anand’s one-day trip to Islamabad – the first by a Canadian foreign minister to Pakistan in nearly two decades – caused few ripples in New Delhi. Pakistan’s attempts to raise controversial issues regarding Kashmir and the Indus Waters Treaty with her seem to have been adroitly finessed by the Canadian side. Much is at stake for Canada in its relationship with India, and vice versa. Understanding what is now the exact nature of the bilateral and what is at the core of its progress will show how the two governments succeed in overcoming the inherent challenges and constraints in the relationship.

Canadians view India and Canada as “natural partners”, both being pluralist democracies governed by the rule of law, respect for international law, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and are fellow members of the Commonwealth family. Indians generally agree that the North American nation is a well-intentioned global player. Economic considerations tend to bring them closer together, given the clear complementarities across the economy, energy, technology, agriculture, and education.

The two nations are also riding the Indo-Pacific wave, believing that this strategic concept – advanced in the first decade of the 21st century – shortens the geographical distance between the world’s two hemispheres. It unites them as strategic partners who share the vision of a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific, spanning the continuity of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Finally, the impact of the Trump 2.0 administration in bringing Canada and India closer should not be minimised. The rough geopolitical treatment meted out by Washington, first to Canada and then to India, has convinced both recipients that their salvation lies in deepening bilateral relations.

The India-Canada relationship stands on three vital pillars: security, trade and people-to-people ties.

First, security cooperation, defence dialogue, and strategic convergence have demonstrated rapid, visible progress over the past year. The Trudeau administration’s patent mishandling of the “K-factor” to secure narrow, domestic political goals ultimately backfired. In contrast, Prime Minister Carney’s instruction to his security establishment was to recognise India’s strong record and commitment to countering terrorism and radicalisation. This directive helped forge a partnership of trust between authorities on both sides – a process that is currently in full flow, sustained by regular discussions at the level of National Security Advisers.

This breakthrough has cleared the way for a long-term, institutionalised dialogue on defence cooperation. Both governments share a desire “to deepen defence relations through cooperative activities, joint training opportunities, and professional military exchanges”.^[1] Firming up this stance, the two prime ministers have directed their officials to forge “a new maritime security partnership in areas such as defence materiel cooperation, supply chain resilience, and training and exercises”.^[1] An important Track 1.5 Dialogue recently renewed these shared interests and concluded that significant achievements are within reach in the domains of defence-industrial cooperation, maritime security, critical materials, artificial intelligence, emerging technology, and cybersecurity.^[2]

Among the recommendations is the urgent need to prioritise negotiating and concluding a General Security Protection Agreement, which it labelled as “the most important enabler of defence-industrial and technology-led cooperation”.

On the strategic side, Canada seems increasingly interested in the evolution of the Quad – the grouping comprising India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. Carney visited all the first three countries during his Asia safari early this year. When asked during a recent podcast whether Canada wished to join the Quad, Canadian High Commissioner in Delhi Christopher Cooter replied, “We are not there yet.”^[3] On its part, India supports Canada’s bid to join the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an observer, to upgrade its participation in the International Solar Alliance (ISA), and to join the Global Biofuels Alliance as a full member.

Second, trade, investment, technology, and energy flows constitute the central pillar of the relationship. Bilateral trade comprising merchandise and services stood at $14 billion in 2024. The announced goal to raise it to $21 billion by 2030 seems realistic, provided that both governments and relevant stakeholders play a proactive role. Success hinges on the governments’ conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by the end of 2026. Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal’s visit to Canada in May 2026 – accompanied by a delegation of over 120 companies, the largest ever sent abroad – was a good omen. However, industry insiders point out that completing CEPA by year-end requires meeting a tight deadline. Should these efforts succeed, a visit by PM Modi to Canada by year-end is a distinct possibility.

The investment scene is equally substantial, with total Canadian institutional exposure in India standing at $100 billion.^[4] Canadian pension funds have been consistent supporters of India’s infrastructural development. Additionally, over 600 Canadian companies maintain a physical presence in India, and more than 1,000 companies are actively pursuing business opportunities in the Indian market.^[5]

Energy, both renewable and non-renewable, offers immense potential for collaboration. The current focus is on expanding bilateral energy trade, including increased exports of oil and LNG from Canada to India and the supply of refined petroleum products from India to Canada. The signing of a long-term commercial contract valued at $1.8 billion between India’s Department of Atomic Energy and Canada’s Cameco for the supply of 22 million pounds of uranium concentrates is significant.

Thirdly, the people-to-people connection and cooperation sustained through education, culture, creative industries, tourism, and other segments of society remain an important asset for the partnership. The presence of 1.8 million Indo-Canadians and an estimated 1 million non-resident Indians in Canada needs to be fully leveraged to strengthen bilateral ties. Yet, within this diaspora lie certain deep-seated challenges that derailed the relationship just three years ago. It remains to be seen whether both countries have drawn appropriate lessons from that painful experience.

India and Canada stand to gain considerable bilateral, regional, and global advantages through a more rejuvenated partnership. The two PMs are said to share excellent personal chemistry. It is their political will and ability to advance relations that will shape the future of the partnership.