Manifestos of political parties in India are dominated by policy statements on domestic issues, with foreign policy receiving only marginal mention. A long-established view that issues like roti, kapada aur makan (food, clothing and housing) and now roads, bridges, inflation, and jobs are the issues of primary concern to voters. But this has been changing, particularly in the past decade.
The Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), at the helm since 2014, has focused on five themes: assertive nationalism, civilizational legacy, India’s growing profile on the world stage, the notion that Viksit Bharat or a developed India needs more, not fewer, linkages with the international community, and finally the G20 presidency theme of “The World is one Family” in which India has a special and unique place. Consequently, foreign policy issues attract greater attention today than in the pre-2014 era.
This is reinforced by the emergence of Narendra Modi as a real “foreign policy PM” after Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. Modi’s penchant for summit diplomacy and success in forging a vast network of friends and contacts at the highest political levels around the world have significantly contributed to his image as a proactive and popular leader.
Regional parties have not caught up with their counterparts in the mainstream. Despite being coastal states like Tamil Nadu, Odisha and Bengal or border states with large migrant communities like Punjab, they have been local in their outlook, lacking a worldview. Therefore, the main analysis here is of foreign policy contained in the manifestos of the BJP, Congress and some regional political parties.
Against this backdrop, the BJP’s manifesto (“Sankalp Patra”) needs to be assessed holistically, with a special reference to its foreign policy agenda. Being in power for 10 years means the agenda is less vision now and more resolve or sankalp for a continuum. It is also a foreign policy that emanates from India’s domestic environment and aspirations.
The BJP now prefers to call India “Bharat,” stressing its strong inclination to highlight the nation’s pre-colonial, pre-medieval period of history. The party did not go with its more enthusiastic supporters who project the nation as Vishvaguru or the teacher of the world or the choice of ministers and officials of Vishvamitra or the friend of the world. The manifesto chose a more benign appellation – Vishvabandhu, or the brother of the world – but a brother for whom the nation comes first, under the overarching heading of “A Bharat First Foreign Policy.”
This policy’s 10 components are:
1. Leading the Global South
2. First responder Bharat
3. Becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council
4. Creating a global consensus on the fight against terrorism
5. Following the “Neighbourhood First policy”
6. Expanding Bharat’s diplomatic network
7. Bharatiya diaspora for growth and development
8. Strengthening maritime vision (SAGAR)
9. Establishment of IMEC to promote Bharat’s trade interests
10. Developing strategic partnerships for Bharat’s mineral security
These are all unexceptionable goals and conform to the BJP government’s pursuit since 2014. The first seven are under active implementation; the last three – expanding SAGAR, IMEC, and mineral security will be put into action over the next five years as India’s growth trajectory and geopolitical positioning become attainable. Aligned with this are India’s diplomatic missions, which are adding an economic dimension to their goals in a way that they have perhaps not done before.
There is little to criticize in these broad goals. Some question the inclusion of the quest for UN Security Council membership in the list. This objection is misplaced. The party has carefully stated it is “committed to seeking” UNSC membership, not a promise of it as an achievement in the next five years. Others quibble about India’s aspiration to be a teacher, friend, or brother of the world. Yet others point to an apparent contradiction between the concept of “Bharat First” and “Neighbourhood First.” Party supporters reject such criticism as unfair and born of anti-BJP bias. More broadly, the manifesto is in line with the administration’s ongoing foreign policy.
The Congress party is a contrast. It is essentially concerned with the lack of justice in India, calling its manifesto the Nyaya Patra. It states: “The gravest danger is that India may no longer be a truly free and democratic republic.” It frames the voters’ choice not as Congress or BJP but as a choice between “a democratic government or an authoritarian rule.” There is no formal reference to external relations, but there is a separate section on National Security where a sub-section deals with specific foreign policy matters.
The manifesto states that in the place of a formal National Security Strategy, there is “ad-hoc and personalized policy handling.” If elected to power, it promises to issue “a comprehensive National Security Strategy.” This concept of defense, national security and foreign policy has been presented in detail in 12 paragraphs.
Its principal goal is to take corrective action or revert to previous positions. For instance, it states that foreign policy that has existed since independence has witnessed “marked departures,” notably on the ongoing Gaza conflict under the present government.
It pledges to uphold “the continued relevance of the established policy of peaceful coexistence, strategic autonomy in thought and action, and increased bilateral engagement” in its relations with the countries of the world. On countering terrorism, a perceived weakness of the Congress party, it says that it is “implacably opposed” to it. “We will work,” it says, “with other countries to eliminate terrorist groups, terrorist acts, and cross-border terrorism.
Given the raging debate in the Western liberal media over “the democratic backsliding” under the BJP rule, the Congress manifesto says the party “will work to repair India’s international image that has been damaged by the present government’s intolerance of dissent and suppression of human rights.”
Like the BJP, it also plans to expand India’s diplomatic corps and missions. And like the BJP, it emphasizes the neighbourhood but specifically mentions only the engagement with Pakistan, which will depend “fundamentally on its willingness and ability to end cross-terrorism.” On China, the Congress has severely criticized the BJP’s management. The manifesto claims it will handle this relationship differently. This seems usual opposition-speak as Congress governments in the past too suffered from serious constraints and setbacks on this subject.
As the new government takes over in India in June 2024, the huge power asymmetry between China and India and the former’s goal to constrain the latter’s rise as a great power remain powerful constants.
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI (M) manifesto has a specific foreign policy section. This party portrays the last five years of the Modi government as “an unmitigated disaster for the country and the people.” It is worried about “the unprecedented sharpening of communal polarisation” and wants to work for the establishment of an alternative secular government. Under Foreign Policy, it highlights the abandonment of India’s “Independent Foreign Policy,“ and true to its ideology, decries the BJP’s changed foreign policy orientation “to dovetail to US global strategy interests,“ thus turning India into a “junior partner of US imperialism.”
The CPI (M), which is in an alliance with the Congress, has a specific foreign policy agenda and differs from the BJP in some respects. For example, the party advocates an independent and non-aligned foreign policy, promoting multi-polarity, strengthening BRICS, SCO and IBSA, and reactivating SAARC. It is opposed to intervention and regime change imposed by the U.S. as is being attempted in Venezuela and other countries in Latin America.
On Pakistan, it favours the resumption of dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues, including cross-border terrorism and promote people-to-people relations between India and Pakistan. It pledges special efforts to build relations with Bangladesh and settle the Teesta water agreement. On Sri Lanka, it will engage with Colombo and persuade it to devolve powers to the Northern and Eastern regions, so the Tamil-speaking people can have autonomy within a united Sri Lanka. It also stands for reversing the pro-Israeli tilt in foreign policy.
Finally, in the U.S., the Communists want to revise various defense agreements and create a national security apparatus that “works within the framework of the parliamentary democratic system.“
The two significant regional parties are Bengal’s Trinamul Congress (TMC) and Tamil Nadu’s Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). The DMK’s 68-page manifesto is devoid of any reference to foreign policy. Much of it is a detailed listing of promises to voters on socio-economic, cultural and linguistic issues. Just two issues have foreign policy implications. On the Sri Lanka dimension, it pledges to grant citizenship to Sri Lankan Tamils living in India, reclaim Kachchatheevu island to ensure India’s security (India’s space-rocket launch site is located 200 km from Kachchatheevu) and protect the fishermen. On the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, the DMK promises to repeal it, considering it discriminatory on religious grounds.
Here the DMK keeps company with the TMC, which similarly promises to discontinue it along with the National Register of Citizens. Critics say the manifesto lacks vision and is based on a “patron-client model.”
As the opposition parties are unlikely to wrest power from the BJP in the 2024 elections, many will be inclined to dismiss those perspectives as inconsequential. However, considering the fundamental importance of an Opposition in a democracy, these parties must work harder to meaningfully develop and broaden their expertise in foreign policy and national security issues. Only then can they be a responsible and effective opposition, working in the best interests of the people of India and the future of democracy.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, and a former ambassador.
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