Adjunct Distinguished Fellow, National Security and China Studies
Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, PVSM, AVSM*, VSM is an Infantry Officer who served in the Indian Army for 40 years and worked extensively on the India-China border. He served as the Defence Attaché in the Embassy of India in China for three years. Before going to China, he qualified in the Chinese language with distinction. His expertise on China spans its international relations, internal issues, economy, defence and science & technology developments in China. Narasimhan is a former Member of the National Security Advisory Board. And, during his three tenures on the board, he worked on China and India’s national security issues pertaining to defence. Narasimhan was the first Director General of the Centre for Contemporary China Studies, a policy-oriented inter-ministerial think tank of the Government of India for five years. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies, India and Emeritus Resource Faculty with Rashtriya Raksha University, India. He has graduated in Mathematics, is a post-graduate in Defence Studies and has a PhD in India-China Relations.
It is customary for every U.S. president to release a National Security Strategy (NSS) early in their tenure. President Trump published the NSS for his second term in November 2025. It’s a contrast from his 2017 NSS, which addressed broad threats. The 2025 version is narrower, emphasising trade over security, with the Western Hemisphere being the primary area of focus. Is the U.S.’s global role shrinking?
India-China relations move in waves of hostility and stability. The bilateral may be re-entering a period of stability, last seen in 2018. If the caveats of security, mutual sensitivity and a level playing field are respected, then much can be achieved by reviving the initiatives begun after PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015 and two informal summits in Wuhan in 2018, and Mahabalipuram in 2019.
Chinese President Xi Jinping set two centennial goals and a 2027 target for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation. This is in line since its founding in 1927, when the PLA has undergone continuous technological, doctrinal, and manpower transformation. Guided by Xi’s goals, it is adapting to evolving warfare trends drawn from experience and observation. For India, the implications arise not only from the PLA’s modernisation but also from emerging military and geopolitical dynamics.
In China’s White Paper on national security, the country congratulates itself for maintaining peace and development and bringing “stability in a tempestuous world.” It also pats itself on the back for “creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South” thus leading to an adjustment of the international balance of power. Worth studying are its global initiatives – a new governance order.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India comes after three years, and the outcomes from it throw up interesting issues. Three read-outs issued from this visit. One from the Chinese side and two from the Indian side. The diverse nature of the India and Chinese read-outs is striking. Certainly the visit yielded benefits; the test lies in the deliverables.
Warfare is changing its character, and drones are playing a big role in it. Technology that was first extensively used in the Vietnam war is a current conflict staple. With the increasing use of artificial intelligence, drones are becoming more powerful and useful.
Operation Sindoor conveyed three messages: First, to Pakistan that it will have to bear the consequences of continuing to support terrorism. Second, to terrorists, that Bharat will inflict the same pain, if not more, than they inflict on Indian citizens. Third, to the world, that Bharat is resolute in responding to terrorism in a “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible” manner.
India-China relations, undergoing a thaw since October 2024, have been slow to mend. In this scenario it is worth examining what assistance China can give Pakistan in case of military action by India, post Pahalgam. The state of play on the India-China border will also have a major implication for this.
India’s new Agnipath scheme was launched in 2022, which offered young Indians a chance to qualify for four-year military service with 25% possibly being retained for a full service job. How have the ‘Agniveers’ fared now? In this time of multiple wars, how does the Agnipath scheme compare to ones offered globally?
The allocation for defence in India’s annual budget for 2024-25 was, for the first time, not included in the budget speech. The country is upgrading its military, with new programmes and schemes, encouraging a start-up domestic defence industry, and reforming the defence research establishment. The separation will allay fears that India’s defence budget is never adequate.
Courtesy: US Embassy & Consulates in Italy
Courtesy: Gateway House
Courtesy: Global Times
Courtesy: Gateway House
Courtesy: PIB
Courtesy: Defense News
Courtesy: PTI
Courtesy: Agence France-Presse
Courtesy: India Today
Courtesy: Times of India