Will Rouhani plough a reformist furrow in Iran?

The landslide victory of the reluctant moderate Hassan Rohani, who got 50.7% of the 36 million votes cast in Iran’s eleventh presidential elections on June 14, heralds testing times for the country. The victory was the result of a late surge of support by liberals and reformists, who gave up a planned boycott to coalesce around Rohani’s candidature. None of the hard-line candidates favoured by the all-powerful Guardian Council and the Revolutionary Guard could come close.

With only six of the eight Guardian Council-approved candidates in the fray, it was only after the withdrawal of Mohammad Reza Aref, the only reform-minded candidate, that Rohani by default got the support of the reformists. Having himself been the national security adviser and nuclear negotiator nearly a decade ago, Rohani is not entirely out with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, although his reformist credentials are still to be proven. The extent of political change he can engender is still to be seen.

It is reported that 72.7% of the 50 million eligible voters cast their vote, attesting to a huge turnout of liberals, youth and others who would like to see a more open political system in which their views get an airing. They transformed the election into a showdown across the Islamic Republic’s political divide. While groups opposed to the establishment appear too intimidated and disparate to revive street demonstrations, these cannot be entirely ruled out if their aspirations are thwarted. The aftermath of this election has the potential to become an Iranian version of the political protests in the Arab world during the last two years.

At his election rallies Rohani supported the release of political prisoners “in consultation with the leaders,” including Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi-Karroubi, arrested in 2011 for their role in the 2009 protests. He also put forward a formula for re-counting the 2009 votes in order to get past the charge of rigging.

In contrast with the widespread violence after the fervid protests following the 2009 elections in Iran, this time the Guardian Council and the all-powerful Revolutionary Guards were determined to narrow the field in favour of a hard-line candidate while working to ensure that there is no repeat of protests by reformist youth, for which repressive measures have been put in place since 2009. In this sense, Hassan Rohani’s victory is a clear defeat for them.

The relatively low votes polled by the favourites of the Council and the Revolutionary Guard like Saeed Jalili, the top nuclear negotiator; Ali Akbar Velayati, the well-known former foreign minister; and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the Mayor of Tehran, demonstrates the deep-seated popular sentiment for greater democracy. These differences are bound to come out in the open if, and when, Rohani’s takes steps towards ploughing a reformist furrow. In that event, although he is a cleric, he will be perceived as a threat.

Iran appears to be headed for political change, although its extent and intensity remain debatable. Rohani’s victory could allow more moderate voices to speak in the Iranian political dialogue and display their resilience. Yet, it could well be a limited victory and not a deep shake-up.

Rohani’s first priority will have to be tackling the broken economy. The long-festering hostility between Iran and the United States, presently manifested in the crippling economic, trade and oil sanctions to pressure a cessation of Iran’s nuclear programme, has hit the economy hard. Western sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme have shrunk vital oil sales and isolated the country from international banking systems. New U.S. measures to take effect from July will further target Iran’s currency, the rial, which has lost half its foreign exchange value in the past year, driving prices of food and consumer goods sharply higher.

The election result now brings onto the world stage an Iranian president who has publicly endorsed more outreach, but no compromise, toward the West and improving friendly relations with other countries to mitigate the effect of the sanctions. But Iran’s establishment still holds all the real power and sets the agenda on all major decisions, such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Syria, and Iran’s dealings with the West. Quite apart from the conservative-religious direction set to Iran’s foreign policy, Rohani well understands that with the huge domestic and external challenges which the country faces, changing course will not be easy.

Iran is providing unstinting support to the Assad regime in Syria, both directly and through the Hezbollah. It also continues to support the Iraqi regime to mitigate the increasingly volatile situation in Syria with the entry of hard-line militant Sunni groups like the Al-Nusra Front, a situation which now involves both Israel and the U.S, after the U.S.’ decision to supply lethal weapons to the opposition.

Rohani has already been accused of being soft on the nuclear enrichment issue – its suspension was agreed when he was the top nuclear negotiator. It is moot whether he will be able to make a significant dent in the nuclear policy. At the same time, the face-off between Iran and the U.S has multiple dimensions: Iran has important levers in Afghanistan, which it can bring into play as the U.S. starts its withdrawal in 2014; its participation is vital for any political solution to the fast-regionalising Syrian situation; the long-standing stand-off between Israel and Iran drags in the U.S in the event of a conflagration; Iran’s command of the Strait of Hormuz threatens 60% of the world’s oil flow and the security of the Gulf States, which have become a major hub of U.S. naval and ground forces in the Middle East.

None of these issues can have easy or piecemeal solutions. What is needed after over a decade of uncertainty and instability in West Asia is a “grand bargain” between the two protagonists. It could be a major pillar in the present U.S. strategy to “pivot” towards Asia. Will President Rohani and President Obama be up to the challenge?

For India, its relations with Iran could well get a boost, at least in the economic dimension. Rohani knows India well and was responsible for initiating a bilateral strategic dialogue when he led Iran’s national Security Council. The U.S. is well aware of India’s constraints on changing its oil import policy from Iran or its vibrant trade relations. Iran remains India’s secure gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and an important interlocutor in assessing the evolving situation in that country and Pakistan. As two large countries in the region, India and Iran have epitomised resilience in hard times. It is likely that this bond will be strengthened.

Ambassador Rajendra Abhyankar, former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, is Chairman Kunzru Centre for Defence Studies and Research, Pune.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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