Reappraising QUAD post Pahalgam

The July 2 meeting of the QUAD foreign ministers in Washington, D.C., restated all the commitments of the grouping – and included a condemnation of the April 22 terrorist attacks on Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir. It called for “the perpetrators, organizers, and financiers of this reprehensible act to be brought to justice without any delay and urge all UN Member States… to cooperate actively with all relevant authorities in this regard.”

Without naming Pakistan, the implication is clear. But will the UN member states “cooperate actively” to bring the Pakistani terror state to justice? Will India press home this statement’s apparent advantage when it hosts the QUAD Leaders’ Summit in October this year, in ensuring visible punishment for Pakistan? Will it make a difference or does India stand alone on Pahalgam?

It was necessary for the QUAD to condemn the attack. Apart from India being part of the QUAD’s geography, i.e. the Indo-Pacific, countering terrorism is now specifically one of partnership’s prime objectives.^[1] In 2023, a QUAD Counter-Terrorism Working Group was created which heralded counter-terrorism as a recognised threat in the region.

The first Quad Counterterrorism Working Group meeting was held in Hawaii from 19-21 Dec, 2023, in which a “tabletop exercise focused on enhancing Quad cooperation in response to an overwhelming terrorist incident in the Indo-Pacific region” was conducted.^[2] The same was reiterated in November 2024, when the group met in Tokyo to discuss “global threats of international terrorism and countermeasures… for terrorist purposes.” The “four countries,” said the statement released thereafter, “would continue to work closely together to counter the threats of terrorism.”^[3]

So where were India’s QUAD partners immediately post Pahalgam?

Pakistan’s friends were visibly present. In the four-day, May 7-10 conflict, a third country was present strategically, geographically, militarily and unapologetically: China. The Pakistanis used Chinese J-10C fighter jets which were pitted against India’s French Rafales and the Russian S-400s. China stood resolutely behind Pakistan even after India provided proof of the role of Pakistani-backed terrorists in the Pahalgam attacks.

When India retaliated militarily against Pakistan, China came to Islamabad’s defence. In its statement on 8 May, the Chinese foreign ministry stated “China finds India’s military operation early this morning regrettable.” It expressed concern about the ongoing situation, adding: “India and Pakistan are and will always be each other’s neighbours. They’re both China’s neighbours as well,” before urging the two countries to “exercise restraint.”

China proffered strong and unequivocal support for its “iron-clad friend.”

And India’s friends? On 11 May, U.S. President Trump took credit for “brokering a full and immediate ceasefire” (denied by the Indian and Pakistani governments). Australian foreign minister Penny Wong^[4] said “many Australians are concerned by recent hostilities between India and Pakistan” and welcomed the ceasefire for “regional peace and security.” Japan’s foreign ministry^[5] “strongly urges both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and stabilise the situation through dialogue for the peace and stability in South Asia.”

None of them mentioned their partnership with India in the Indo-Pacific, much less the cooperation on counter-terrorism expressed in the Quad Counterterrorism Working Group’s Consequence Management Exercise held in Alaska in July 2023[6], which “explored the capabilities and support Quad countries could offer regional partners in response to a terrorist attack…”^[7]

Officially, the QUAD is not an alliance but a diplomatic partnership^[8], a strategic forum where four countries, democracies with similar threats and interests, support each other. The China-Pakistan bilateral is also not an alliance, but it is a strategic partnership between an authoritarian and a military state. Significantly, the response from China towards its virtual client state partner was more robust and substantial than was the response of the QUAD to its partner. Pakistan used China’s J-10C aircraft, its air defense systems, and the PL-15 missiles.

It didn’t prove to be an effective offensive or defensive set of weapons. But China will now support fifth generation aircraft, with an order already out for Pakistan. That escalates the issue and could be the beginning of an arms race in Asia.

The QUAD partners’ response to India is coloured by New Delhi’s purchase of arms from Russia, and to its multi-alignment policy. The other three members use the same weapons and systems, with interoperability. They say the QUAD partners will not come directly to India’s aid against Pakistan and China and point to this as a lesson for India not joining the Western weapons supply chain and thereby receiving their strong backing. In the absence of military compatibility, the QUAD, they shrug, is an economic and values-based group which sees China as a common threat.

This is a contradiction, particularly of U.S. policy. In 2023, when Prime Minister Modi visited Washington, he received bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. Shortly after that however, there was a sudden, extremely hostile regime change for an unelected leader in Bangladesh. Mohammad Yunus was brought in as Chief Advisor, with all his connections to the U.S. Democratic Party’s deep state. It was an unexpected security concern, making the neighbourhood exceedingly unsafe. This has provided an opening for China, which is eyeing an airfield in Lalmonirhat, very close to the Siliguri Corridor – constituting a direct threat to India.

The U.S. should be alarmed. After all, the QUAD was meant to prevent Chinese adventurism in the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Instead, Pakistan has received rewards in the form of an IMF loan, shortly after which that country’s military budget was raised by 17%, and salaries of its Parliamentarians increased by 534%, money diverted from development for its poor population. The funds will certainly be used by the Pakistani army to escalate its purchases for asymmetrical warfare against India.

Americans sometimes leave their friends in a state of bewilderment. It is necessary to be more coherent and sincere with partners. U.S. President Donald Trump can provide some clarity when he comes to India in October for the QUAD Leaders’ Summit.

Mahesh Jethmalani is Former Member of Parliament and Senior Advocate.

Manjeet Kripalani is Executive Director, Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References:

[1] “The Quad.” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed July 4, 2025. https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad

[2] United States Hosts Quad Counterterrorism Working Group in Honolulu, Hawaii, n.d.

[3] “The Second Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad Counterterrorism Working Group Meeting.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed July 4, 2025 https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00749.html

[4] X, May 2025. https://x.com/SenatorWong/status/578755239638999040

[5] “The Situation in Kashmir (Statement by Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed July 4, 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01237.html

[6] U.S. Department of State. Accessed July 4, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/united-states-hosts-a-consequence-management-exercise-under-quad-counterterrorism/

[7] Joint readout of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Accessed July 4, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37144/Joint_Readout_of_the_Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting

[8] 16th, May. “The Quad: A Backgrounder.” Asia Society, May 16, 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/quad-backgrounder