Quid pro quo for Myanmar's humanitarian corridor

On March 15, 2025, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, during his visit to Bangladesh, proposed a humanitarian corridor to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Rakhine is affected by the compounding impacts of mass atrocities, civil war, repeated cyclones and inadequate access to humanitarian relief. The unprecedented disaster is resulting in an imminent threat of famine,[1] with over 2 million people at risk of starvation.[2] A humanitarian corridor is the need of the hour.

However, Bangladesh chief advisor Muhammad Yunus wants a quid pro quo: the repatriation of Rohingya refugees in return for the proposed corridor to Myanmar. On April 4, at the sixth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Bangkok, Yunus said the repatriation of Rohingya refugees is necessary to contain a regional humanitarian crisis. This position has intensified domestic political tensions in Bangladesh and has geopolitical implications for the neighbourhood.

Humanitarian corridors for aid and refugee repatriation should not be treated as mutually dependent mechanisms. Humanitarian corridors are a logistical mechanism through which aid is channelised. Although the Additional Protocol II (1977) of the Geneva Conventions lays down an obligation to provide relief action for affected civilians, as a non-signatory of the APII no such obligation rests on Myanmar. An additional challenge is to negotiate the corridor’s operational viability, duration and conditions with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) and the Arakan Army (AA) who have administrative control of various parts of Rakhine. Additionally, while the Tatmadaw controls the state in Myanmar, the AA is a non-state actor and is not recognised by Bangladesh.

For Bangladesh’s Rohingya repatriation, the Convention Against Torture (1984) establishes the principle of non-refoulement (or non-expulsion), prohibiting it from extraditing them to Rakhine state[3] pending individual reviews. In this case, the Rohingya refugees also do not want to return to Rakhine without Myanmar granting them citizenship rights, revoked under the country’s Citizenship Law in 1982, and are keen on remaining in Bangladesh. Myanmar’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for past systematic persecution of Rohingyas creates additional challenges of repatriation for Dhaka.

Therefore, the humanitarian corridor and refugee repatriation issues need to be addressed separately, and not as part of the same negotiation. Yunus, however, favours the proposed UN humanitarian corridor along with Rohingya repatriation for one reason: it will prolong the life of the transition government which he helms, allowing his alliance, the student-led Jatiya Nagorik Party (National Citizen Party) to consolidate power.

Since his swearing-in as interim leader in August 2024, Yunus has played the youthful rebels with the expertise of a maestro. His goal is to leave no stone unturned to extend and legitimise his government through their support. The postponement of the general elections is one such stratagem. Elections were initially proposed to be held within a period of 18 months of the regime change in August; nearly a year later, no clear deadline has been set. His domestic challenges are piling up: sluggish economic growth and a drop in the country’s foreign direct investment. Meantime, new alliances are being formed in Bangladesh, mounting pressure for elections and threatening the longevity of his government, which does not have enough experience or on-the-ground work to win a national vote. Agreeing to an international request for a humanitarian corridor is a good distraction.

Accordingly, on April 28, his government’s Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain agreed ‘in spirit’ to the UN proposed corridor. It immediately sparked debate from Bangladesh’s political parties. Yunus’ opponents like the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Khelafat Majlish want the Rohingya to be repatriated but do not want the corridor as it may impinge on Bangladesh’s sovereignty. They argue that the Yunus government lacks a popular mandate and therefore does not have the authority to facilitate it. Other opponents, like the Communist Party of Bangladesh and the Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh, prioritise power consolidation ahead of the country’s proposed elections, over the regional humanitarian concern. They believe the humanitarian corridor and the Rohingya crisis are long-drawn-out affairs and would rather focus on tangible outcomes they can control, such as the country’s election. Most significantly, Yunus does not have the support of Bangladesh’s army, which would oversee and maintain order and security in facilitating a humanitarian corridor.

Calls for humanitarian corridors to address the multiple crises in Myanmar are not new. In 2008, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, UN agencies called for an air and sea corridor to Myanmar, through which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) facilitated relief disbursement in partnership with international and local aid agencies. Again, in December 2011, China facilitated a similar corridor for UN agencies to Laiza, in the Kachin state at the China-Myanmar border, to provide relief to civilians displaced by armed conflict. By making a corridor conditional on refugee repatriation, Yunus is intensifying the humanitarian issue.

Can Yunus navigate consultation with domestic political parties and the army in Bangladesh, and keep his country’s commitment to international humanitarian law by observing the principle of non-refoulement? Can Bangladesh credibly initiate multilateral engagement with stakeholders in Myanmar? While the transitional government may express support for the corridor in principle, it must first address its own internal political challenges to move forward meaningfully.

Dipannita Maria Bagh is a Researcher, International Law Studies Programme, Gateway House.

Ashutosh Ghag is an intern, Gateway House.

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References:

[1] Patel, Purvi, and Charuta Ghadyalpatil. “India-Myanmar: Borderland Dynamics.” Gateway House. Accessed May 28, 2025. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-myanmar-borderland-dynamics/.

[2] “Rakhine: A Famine in the Making.” UNDP, November 2024. https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/rakhine-a-famine-in-the-making.

[3] Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prevents the transfer or removal of people from a state’s territory to states where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be ‘in danger of being subjected to torture’. Rohingyas in Myanmar have, in the past, been tortured, see: “Myanmar: Security Forces Torture Rohingya Returnees.” Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/21/myanmar-security-forces-torture-rohingya-returnees.