Dr S Jaishankar, India’s peripatetic external affairs minister, visited Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, from 25–26 October. He was there to represent India at the 22nd meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of Government (CHG), held under the Chairmanship of Kyrgyzstan. The visit received only limited attention in India. It is difficult to believe that the 23rd SCO Summit was hosted by New Delhi in virtual format just over three months back amid heightened media attention and some controversy. But so much has happened since then, including the G20 New Delhi Summit and the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war.
SCO is undoubtedly on the radar of India’s strategic community as a key multilateral grouping. This is a nine-member club of two major Asian states (China and India), one Eurasian state (Russia), the four ‘stan’ nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) as well as Pakistan and Iran. Established in 1996 as the ‘Shanghai Five’, it became SCO, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001. Later, it began to expand, with the entry of India and Pakistan, and subsequently Iran. Belarus will be the 10th member. SCO has two observers (Mongolia and Afghanistan) and 14 dialogue partners, many of whom would like to become its members. A grouping committed to greater political, security, and economic cooperation, it has secured slow progress because of its internal contradictions and persisting tensions.
The importance of SCO may be gauged by the fact that it represents 42% of the world population and about one-third of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It grapples with its anti-Western impulses to carve out its role as a non-Western organization. It also copes with the ever-present competition between China and Russia in a region where the latter was once the dominant partner. SCO also struggles to cope with the adversarial relations between India and Pakistan and the strained ties between China and India. The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan threw up its own challenges for the SCO.
India’s one-year-long presidency of the SCO summit ran quite well from September 2022. But the government’s sudden decision to host the 23rd meeting of SCO’s Council of Heads of State, the highest body, in a virtual format (on 4 July) rather than with the physical presence of the leaders, caused surprise and disappointment. New Delhi, of course, had compelling reasons to do so, with no confirmation forthcoming about the participation of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and China’s President, Xi Jinping. Besides, probably it had little interest in welcoming the Prime Minister of Pakistan after the controversy created by Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari at the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in Goa in May on the issues of cross-border terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir. SCO’s doublespeak on terrorism has been a matter of concern in India.
Although the Council of Heads of Government (CHG), the second highest organ, is composed of prime ministers/premiers/vice presidents, two nations i.e., India and Pakistan were represented by their foreign ministers. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar highlighted four key points in his address at the conference.
First, he suggested that SCO should focus on promoting the region’s stability and prosperity by adhering to international law, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member-states, and encouraging economic cooperation among them. This was a pointed message to China and Pakistan and veiled criticism of the way the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved during the past decade.
Second, the minister stressed India’s deep civilizational and cultural ties through history with the region’s people. “These historical relationships should now create a template for greater economic cooperation,” he added. Third, he reiterated that a high priority should be accorded to expanding connectivity between India and the region, especially given the centrality of Central Asian states. He spoke of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), along with the recently launched vision of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), as potential “prosperity enablers.”
Finally, he recalled how, with much interest and careful preparations, the Indian presidency of the SCO had focused attention on five new verticals of cooperation: Startups and Innovation, Traditional Medicine, Science and Technology, Youth Empowerment, and Shared Buddhist Heritage.
A total of 14 documents were approved by the CHG meeting at Bishkek, which shouldered an array of administrative, budgetary, and financial responsibilities of the grouping. The documents signed related to diverse matters such as regulations on salary of staff of the permanent SCO bodies and organizational charts of the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO.
To appreciate where the SCO stands today on the larger issues of political and economic cooperation, a brief look at the 11-page joint communiqué issued on 26 October should be helpful. This document places on record the member-states’ high praise for India’s leadership of the SCO in 2022–23 and advocates “active practical implementation of the decisions by the summit held in July 2023.”
It projects the SCO as “an influential and responsible participant” in the system of today’s international relations, which is committed to “strict compliance with the generally recognized principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter.” It favours efforts to upgrade and overhaul the global economic governance framework as well as an equitable multilateral trade system.
The joint communiqué also refers to “deep and large changes” taking place in the world that indicate the emergence of “a more just and multipolar world order” as well as the escalation of multi-dimensional challenges “aggravated by geopolitical tensions and conflicts.” The participating delegates agreed on the need to expand cooperation in diverse fields such as politics and security, trade, economics, finance and investment, and cultural and humanitarian ties.
The governments encouraged business leaders to deepen their mutual contacts in specific areas like investment, digital transformation, and the creation of a regional startup ecosystem. These match fully with India’s priorities.
However, on China’s BRI, India’s isolation in the SCO continued as the other seven countries once again “reaffirmed support” for it, noting the ongoing work to jointly implement the project. In particular, they supported the efforts to align the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and BRI.
The Council meeting reviewed the earlier meetings of the ministers for energy, finance, railways, health and transport, etc., and provided guidance regarding follow-up actions. The issues of climate change, development of mountain regions and glacier conservation drew special attention.
Despite its limited achievements, SCO continues to be a consequential grouping for India due to strategic, economic, and cultural factors. The nation’s engagement with its future deliberations and work will no doubt be ensured in an appropriate manner. Media and think tanks can perhaps help by closely following all relevant developments as they impact India’s national interest. This matter will now assume greater significance as the Chairmanship of the SCO Council of Heads of Government stands transferred to Pakistan, which will run from 2023–24. This development could pose a special challenge for India’s diplomacy next year. South Block will need to keep a sharp eye on the Pakistan-China axis while doing its best to strengthen the SCO, especially India’s relations with the four Central Asian states.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published by WION.