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14 April 2014, Gateway House

Australia’s submarine choice

Australia is the second largest naval power among the Indian Ocean states and its submarine fleet represents its principal strategic force. Australia will be replacing its fleet with some of the largest and most capable conventional submarines in the world. Its decisions could hold important lessons for India

Former Visiting Fellow, Maritime Studies

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The debate in Australia over the future of its submarine fleet is heating up. The Australian government is now considering various options including the acquisition of a new fleet and its choices will have a major impact on Australia’s defence capabilities into the middle of this century.

Many in India too will be watching Australia’s submarine choice with keen interest. Australia is a major naval power in the Indian Ocean with a growing strategic relationship with India. Australia’s decisions about its future submarine fleet will likely have a significant impact on the naval balance in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia in the coming decades.

In the years ahead, India too will be making its own choices about the expansion of its ageing submarine fleet. Like Australia, India will need to balance questions of cost, capability, the suitability of foreign designs for Indian Ocean conditions, and the value of indigenous design and construction. Australia’s experiences in this will therefore be of significant interest to decision-makers in Delhi.

Balancing factors of cost and capability: Australia’s submarine choice is a big one. According to Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper, over the next two decades Australia will acquire some 12 new submarines at a projected total cost of more than A$40 billion (US$38 billion). But little else has yet been decided. The choice of submarine design type will need to be made soon if the first of the new class is to become operational by 2030 (and this date is already looking ambitious).

But this is not merely a debate over a very, very large equipment acquisition. Australia’s submarine fleet represents its principal independent strategic deterrent and one of its key means of power projection. The shape and size of its new submarine fleet will therefore be a major factor in Australia’s strategic weight in the region for several decades to come.

Constraints on Australia’s submarine choice: Australia’s submarine choice is limited by several geographic and political factors.  First, Australia’s unique operating environment means that its submarines must be capable of operating over vast distances – from the South Pacific to Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf – and must therefore also be capable of independent deployment for long time periods.

Second, for reasons noted below, Australia’s submarines must almost certainly be non-nuclear powered. But conventionally powered submarines are much slower than nuclear-powered submarines, significantly increasing travel time and decreasing loiter time. Having regard to the distances involved, this means that Australian submarines must be among the largest and have the longest range among conventional submarines in the world.

Third, for political reasons, the submarines must be built in Australia, which means that they will almost inevitably be more expensive than some overseas built options. The naval shipbuilding industry is a big economic factor for the state of South Australia. Many (but not all) analysts also believe that a sophisticated naval shipbuilding capability is an essential defence capability.

 Lessons from the Collins class: Australia has operated submarines on and off for more than a century. Australia’s submarine fleet currently consists of 6 Australian-built Collins class submarines, based in Western Australia, which until recently were expected to reach end of life beginning in the mid 2020s.

The Collins class has been quite controversial. They were the first Australian-built submarines and for a long time suffered many reliability problems, which according to Australian Navy Chief Ray Griggs, reflected some poor choices in components and very poor planning in logistics. According to Griggs, many of the problems with the Collins class reflected the Australian Navy’s inexperience in acting as the parent navy to a class of major warships. He acknowledges that it has been a steep learning curve for the Royal Australian Navy.

But a recent report has concluded that most of the reliability problems with the Collins class submarines have now been resolved and that there has been a dramatic increase in fleet availability compared with 4 years ago.

On top of this, Australia’s recent mining boom has been like a huge vacuum-cleaner, sucking away large portions of Australia’s submarine crew with promises of much higher wages, leaving many submarines tied up at the dock.

However, the navy has managed to resolve many of the crewing problems. This means that the Collins submarines are now available as well as being among the most capable conventional submarines anywhere in the world.

Griggs argues that the navy’s ability to address these problems should give Australia much greater confidence in a new class of Australian-built submarines.

The nuclear option: Some analysts have argued that many of the issues relating to the new submarine fleet could be resolved by simply purchasing off-the-shelf nuclear powered Virginia class submarines from the United States. These would have a relatively low unit price and would resolve many of the operational constraints faced by relatively slow moving conventional submarines.

But, even assuming that Virginia class submarines are available for purchase, this option is extremely unlikely for several reasons:  First, the current government shows absolutely no inclination to venture into the political minefield of nuclear powered submarines. This decision would involve overturning the decades long taboo against the use of nuclear power in Australia and the current government is unlikely to venture into this debate. Second, as Admiral Griggs has pointed out, nuclear powered submarines would need to be supported by very large onshore nuclear power logistical capabilities – and in the absence of a civilian nuclear-power industry, Australia simply does not have these capabilities. Previous suggestions that Australia could largely rely on U.S.-based nuclear logistics (such as in Guam) have apparently been rejected. The nuclear option, it seems, is dead in the water.

Australia’s conventional options: Unfortunately, Australia’s options for conventional submarines are relatively limited. There are few conventional submarines – anywhere in the world – that have the capabilities that Australia requires. This means that the new submarines will not only need to be Australian built, but also designed or significantly modified for Australian conditions.

Under the previous Labour government, some assumed that the most likely option would be an Australian-designed ‘evolved’ version of the Collins class – but bigger and more capable.

But Australia’s new conservative government is reportedly concerned about the fact that an Australian-based designed effort would significantly increase costs and timing of the project. The frontrunners for the design then shifted to Germany’s TKMS, and Sweden’s Saab has also now joined the fray. These options are not without significant risk themselves: neither TKMS nor Saab have designed submarines of the size that Australia will require.

But, the signing of a defence technology agreement between Australia and Japan on April 7 this year has thrown another wildcard into the mix. Indeed, the agreement represents a breakthrough for Australia (and, indeed, Japan’s other security partners who may want access to Japanese defence technology) and substantially opens up Australia’s submarine options.

Japan’s submarine technology is among the world’s most advanced and its conventional submarines are among the largest and most capable. Japan has long prohibited the export of defence technology but this policy has been changing over the last few years, including last year’s agreement to sell ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious planes to India.

Australia is very interested in what Japan may have to offer below the water. In particular, the drive train used in Japan’s Soryu-class submarines, potentially mated with Swedish air independent propulsion technology, is seen as ideal for Australian requirements. According to one senior official, Australia was even considering the possibility of acquiring an off-the-shelf 4200 tonne Soryu class design (which is a little larger than the current Collins class design), although more likely it would include an evolved Soryu design. But Japanese domestic politics and national security concerns about the sale of such strategic technology may preclude the acquisition of the their design.

The $40 billion plus question: Where does that leave Australia’s submarine choice?  The A$40 billion price tag (let’s be realistic and make it A$50 billion) was always going to be a big stretch. The 2013 Defence White Paper basically left its funding unanswered without a major increase in defence spending or big cuts in other defence programs (or both).

The new government under Prime Minister Tony Abbott is working on a new Defence White Paper which is supposed to answer these questions. One of the answers will likely be extending the life of the Collins class submarines past the previously assumed class life. This is looking increasingly feasible in light of the resolution of most of the reliability problems, which may allow an extension of the Collins class maintenance cycle from an assumed 8 years on + 2 years maintenance to one of 10 + 2 years. With 3 cycles, this would now imply a class life of some 34 years. Access to Japanese technology, particularly drive train technology, may also be an important part of extending the Collins submarines’ life.

The other answer to the $40 billion plus question will likely involve cutting down the size of the fleet, perhaps bring it to as low as 6 submarines. Fleet numbers will likely become more evident in the next Defence White Paper, due to be completed next year. Of course, this could have major repercussions for Australia’s strategic weight in the region.

But the question may not ultimately be just about the number and capabilities of the manned submarine fleet. In the longer term, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will likely represent an important option for Australia. Although they are now relatively less technologically developed than unmanned air and land vehicles, it is likely that UUVs will soon catch up. Provided that Australia does not spend all of its money on manned submarines, in the long run UUVs would address many of Australia’s requirements. If used in conjunction with the manned submarine fleet, they could potentially fill the capability gap.

David Brewster is Senior Visiting Fellow, Maritime Studies Programme, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

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