While International Relations (IR) theorists are busy coining catchy phrases to explain the shifting sands of geopolitics of today, such as ‘fluid multipolarity’, multiplexity’, ‘tripolarity’, and ‘bipolarity with multipolar characteristics, ordinary citizens are anxious to know: what is driving the world today? And how does India plan to protect its vital interests in the current age of polycrisis, with the dramatic “capture” of the sitting Venezuelan president by U.S. forces as the latest episode?
It is less complex than it sounds.
Because the world has already been in a churn since the beginning of the current decade, with a succession of crises – Covid-19, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, the Myanmar coup, and humanitarian catastrophes. The arrival of Trump 2.0, with its drastically different worldview, has compounded and confounded perceptions and alignments. As a result, Great Power relations are in flux. The principal players yearn for the old, familiar landmarks as they ponder over the shape and timing of a new world order that may take years to emerge.
India is no exception. With its firm commitment to an independent foreign policy, multi-alignment strategy, and strategic autonomy, it seemed to be faring quite well until the end of 2024. But the challenges of 2025 – the series of setbacks to India-U.S. relations, the threat to New Delhi‘s Indo-Pacific convictions and relevance of the Quad, the U.S. reverting to using Pakistan as a weapon to obstruct India’s natural rise, and the likely consolidation of a G2 composed of the U.S. and China – have sent the mandarins of South Block back to the design board, with the mandate to craft a new diplomatic rulebook for the changing times.
Among the key diplomatic challenges confronting India, reintroducing stability and cordiality in its relations with Washington is of the highest priority. How is the question, how to secure it? Making up is no longer about closing a trade agreement. It is about political and strategic perceptions of each other’s place in the world. Using all available levers, New Delhi must persist in its endeavour to persuade Washington, particularly the White House, that complementary strategic, economic, and technological interests require the two nations to collaborate closely.
While doing so, Indian diplomats will need to monitor the trajectory of U.S.-China relations this year, particularly the likely visits by U.S. President Donald Trump to China and by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the U.S. They must find a reliable answer to the riddle: what, in the U.S. view, is India’s position in the U.S.-China-India triangle?
While working on the U.S. file, India must also prepare carefully for a Plan B. If, indeed, U.S.-China ties consolidate over the next three years to the detriment of India and other global players, India will have no option but to deepen its own strategic collaboration across as many domains as possible. That task needs to begin now rather than a year or two later.
India has plenty of options. It has already begun deepening and diversifying its longstanding cooperation with Russia. This year, the priority must be delivery – on trade expansion, building connectivity, expanding energy cooperation, and strengthening defence-related exchanges.
Worth pursuing is assigning a higher importance to relations with Europe – both the EU and select European powers, like France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Poland, and Sweden. The visit of the EU’s top two leaders to Delhi in January, possibly followed by the conclusion of the long-pending India-EU FTA, presents a historic opportunity. Being conscious of Europe’s contribution to world culture, civilisation, and progress, and yet being skeptical of its colonial past, India must overcome its outdated reservations and realise that Europe has a vital role to play in a world where the U.S. dominates the Western hemisphere and leaves China with ample autonomy to shape Asia or the Indo-Pacific in accordance with its own interests.
Even within the Indo-Pacific region, India will find natural partners: cohorts such as Japan and Australia, and nations that are on guard vis-à-vis China, namely Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Thailand.
Beyond Asia, India must seriously rethink and rejuvenate its Africa policy. The rhetoric of the Global South may have value, but it is insufficient. It requires substantial financial commitments and novel ideas. Whether the Fourth India-Africa Summit takes place in 2026 is immaterial. The challenge is a) whether India can focus on deepening tangible cooperation with select African nations, and b) whether it can qualitatively lift the nature of dialogue and concrete cooperation with a few carefully chosen Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, such as EAC, SADC, and COMESA.
Another suggestion: the ambitious maritime initiative, MAHASAGAR, is welcome, but the government must develop a blueprint to translate Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision into a concrete program of action. The think tank community has been generating ideas that can be tapped and effectively projected before it is too late.
A critical look at the regions important to India is also essential. The ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy has produced mixed results. It has worked reasonably well for the smaller neighbours. But on the prickliest issue of Pakistan, it has not worked optimally. There is a case for a calibrated revision of our Pakistan Policy, considering the lessons of ‘Op Sindoor’ and recognising that two nuclear powers must maintain bilateral channels for strategic communication in their mutual and global interests.
Bangladesh requires an unemotional and pragmatic approach. This was reflected in PM Modi’s well-crafted letter of condolence to Tariq Rahman on the demise of his mother, Begum Khaleda Zia, former Prime Minister, and in the visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Dhaka to attend her funeral. India must work on every possible avenue to fashion at least ‘a silver chapter’ of normalised relations between India and Bangladesh, after the ‘golden chapter’ composed during the long tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Geopolitics in West Asia has been changing rapidly. Israel, with unquestioned U.S. backing, has emerged as the dominant power. However, other players, including Türkiye, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, remain active. India has vital interests and human assets in the region. It should pursue and possess immense capacity to understand the nature of change and demonstrate high resilience to protect its core interests.
Disenchanted with the ineffective UN-style multilateralism, India has invested heavily in 21st-century plurilateralism. This was on full display in 2022-23, during India’s G20 presidency. Those that preceded and succeeded it (Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa) collaborated to advance the priorities of the Global South. But that era has ended. The U.S., as the current president, is committed to restoring the G20 to its original mandate of international economic governance alone. It faced zero opposition when it arbitrarily barred South Africa from participation in the G20 through 2026.
Several important lessons, such as the need to deepen solidarity among leaders of the Global South and to keep political rhetoric at a credible level, are embedded in the G20 experience for India’s BRICS presidency, which began on January 1. Ignoring them now will undoubtedly lead to regrets later.
The road ahead will be challenging, marked by risks and uncertainty. Navigation requires a firm hand, substantial behind-the-scenes work, creative diplomacy, and purposeful narratives for the home base and external audiences. A calmer domestic political environment will be immensely helpful and offer the opportunity to make a difference.
Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.
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