Transcript
Gateway House (GH): Good afternoon. We are very happy to welcome Dr. Thanachate Wisaijorn to our 21st episode of Unfolding Geopolitics.
There are two contesting narratives in the current conflict. One is historical, about the sovereignty, the territorial rights of the archaeological sites. The other is more modern. It’s on the interests of the power elites of both countries.
What, according to you, are the roots of the present Thai-Cambodia border contestation?
Dr. Thanachate Wisaijorn (TW): In my opinion, the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, especially around archaeological sites like Preah Vihear or Ta Muen Thom, is emblematic of a deeper and layered contestation rooted in three key issues.
(Source: UNESCO)
(Source: The Nation)
Firstly, colonial cartography remains the bedrock of the dispute and the French-drawn maps, accepted at times under the pressure of ambiguity, have left both sides with different interpretations of sovereignty. These maps continue to be politically instrumentalised, used not just to defy land but also ignite nationalism.
Secondly, it’s about the political use of history and heritage, which is to strike the other side of the land and the temples become more than just spiritual or archaeological sites. They are powerful nationalist symbols. When domestic legitimacy of governments of either side reigns, these symbols are used or reignited to rally support domestically.
Thirdly, we cannot ignore the interests of the military and political elites. The border is not only the line of the map but also a lucrative space for timber, informal trade, underground trade, and patronage networks. The elites, not only the elites in the central government, but I mean the elites along the border provinces, have historically benefited from the trade, the smuggling, and control over cross-border flows.
So the conflict is not purely about territory. It’s also about who controls access, movement, and memory. And that’s the background, the general background.
Let me be more specific in this case. I have told you that in the politics between Thailand and Cambodia, not only Thailand and Cambodia, but also in Southeast Asia, it remains very elitist. For a lot of wars in the past, the elites control the narrative.
And when there are contests, it’s the elites who have to go and cross the border to talk. If they can settle their benefits, the disputes seem to be settled. That’s always the case.
This kind of conflict can be seen clearly in the case of Thailand and Cambodia during the past 20 years, or even 30 years, or even 75 years of the decolonisation of Cambodia, it remains very elitist, elite-orientated. This time also the family of the Thai Prime Minister and the family of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and his father Hun Sen is closely connected and has a long relationship with the Shinawatra family.
GH: As you say, it’s a very complex situation with multiple threads running through it. What has happened just now is that the present ceasefire has kind of frozen the conflict, right? It stalled the conflict, but the dispute has not been resolved. What in your view are the two or three bilateral political ways or mechanisms to resolve the conflict so that it doesn’t stay frozen? Or is it more likely to be a prolonged status quo?
TW: Let me explain this way.
Since some of this audience might not be familiar with the case study of Thailand-Cambodia, I will provide the general background first.
This kind of prolonged status quo is indeed a tempting option for both sides, especially when domestic political climates are unstable. But this thesis is unsustainable.
Villagers and peoples on the ground must live amidst mines, I mean landmines, and soldiers and unresolved grievances fester. However, there are three possible political avenues that I can foresee. Firstly, is reviving of the Joint Boundary Commission, which is JBC, which is a bilateral mechanism agreed upon, but often stalled.
If depoliticised, this can be a platform for technical work, including re-surveying or determining based on shared interests. The JBC is one of the three mechanisms we have. Then we have GBC, the General Boundary Commission, and we have the RBC Regional Boundary Commission. I think these three are similar, it’s different because the state offices are at different levels.
The Joint Boundary Commission are the people who are at the provincial levels. The GBC are the military officers of both countries who go and talk. The RBC are the ministerial officers. The GBC will be held August 7 (first planned to be held in Cambodia, but now relocated to Malaysia). It’s the first mechanism.
Second, it’s about the cultural and heritage cooperation framework, which is supported by UNESCO, could allow both countries to co-manage disputed temples, even though, I must stress, even though this seems to be a long way from now. Four months ago, it would be the topic that could not be ignored, but now as the conflict continues, this has a long way to go. However, keep this in mind that this should come back in the future as it’s about the cultural and heritage cooperation framework, and even though it doesn’t solve the sovereignty issue per se, it still builds trust and shifts the discourse from the rivalry to shared stewardship, if it’s used in the right way and right direction.
Because now, during the past years, it has been used in the wrong, I mean, seem to be conflictual ways of perceiving cultural heritage.
Thirdly – and this is important because, in my opinion, because I have been in the border provinces – local actors and local cross-border dialogues have been very strong during the past 10 years. There have been talks and borderland communities are often more pragmatic than capital elites.
I used to believe that allowing local leaders, traders, and monks, even monks and people, patrons from Cambodia across the border, used to cross the border to the hospital in the provincial hospital in Thailand. Sadly, when the conflicts broke out, despite the close relationship between the local governors and local state officers, all the cross-border routes had to be shut down by the decision of the central government by this time. And, yeah, this is what I think about the general background of the conflict.
More specifically, during the past two days, even though last week, we had ASEAN as a mediator – the prime minister of Cambodia and the acting prime minister of Thailand went to Cambodia to call for a ceasefire – and even though the ceasefire was announced, still violations continued for a few hours, for half a day.
We still hope for a truce, even though a ceasefire would continue because on the Cambodian side yesterday, they invited the military attachés from 13 countries to visit the battlefield, the theatre of the war. So the ceasefire could be witnessed on the Cambodian side. Today in Thailand, I think 23 or 24, military attachés have been invited to visit the field where a grocery store and the supermarket at the petrol station have been attacked in which seven or eight people have been killed. This includes young children in the family. The hospital has been attacked as well. So the military attachés have been invited to see the real venues for themselves. I believe during the past days and a few in these days, today and maybe tomorrow, a ceasefire will be witnessed.
And this is the first step from the ASEAN attempt for the mediator, mediation attempt, and also the witness from different countries, at least could be one step, one threshold to a prolonged peace, even though that seems to be far away, in my opinion, right now.
GH: And the mediation is being done by ASEAN, of course, but who else is in the fray? Which are the other countries with a real interest in ensuring that this does not blow up? I know U.S. President Trump says that he has done some work, but apart from that, really the Asian regions, who else thinks of themselves as being an honest mediator?
TW: At the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, I believe there was a witness from the U.S. side and also from China as well. And in my opinion, I think Cambodia is trying to bring the case to the platform of international states.
So the countries, the military attachés from different countries who are invited to the site would be at least a kind of informal mediators as well, because Cambodia must try, and I think both sides try to control the narrative that they are right in this kind of gunfight exchange, and they have to present themselves as justification to use force. You have the right to protect yourself in the UN Charter, so they have to tell the world on their side, on their narrative that they have the right, and it’s justified for using force and for using weapons at the right moment, at the right amount, and at the right spots. Yeah, military targets and the amount of the gunfight and the bombs are equivalent to the scene, yet they have to provide this kind of narrative.
It’s not only ASEAN, it’s international states, international communities who should be the witnesses of this scene.
GH: To what extent does ASEAN have an impact on the current crisis? You said that Cambodia and Thailand both went to Kuala Lumpur. What role has ASEAN specifically played in this dispute resolution?
TW: As I have to recall the time of my student days, we were taught that ASEAN, even though 20 years ago ASEAN was described as a paper tiger, they could not do anything concretely, because there are two norms of ASEAN, which is first, one, non-intervention of the members’ domestic affairs, and others, there must be consensus if they want to do anything. But years past, there have been attempts to make some kind of development, if there’s violence in the domestic politics of the members, there could be some kind of constructive engagement. This kind is , a good attempt, even though I could not see a concrete, constructive engagement, at least Cambodia is trying to show the world that they really follow the direction of what has been suggested and recommended by ASEAN, even though it’s doubted that ASEAN really works or not, yeah, it’s a good step.
GH: To round it all up, Southeast Asia has seen relative peace since World War II. To what extent does this conflict, the Thai-Cambodian conflict, provide a ground for proxy contestations between the U.S. and China? And is there any chance that this could transcend into a broader Asian conflict?
TW: At present, the Thai-Cambodian conflict is not a proxy battlefield, yet. It is still rooted in local and bilateral logics. However, both the U.S. and China have deep strategic stakes in the mainland of Southeast Asia, and we are beginning to see subtle alignments. China, for example, has significant influence over Cambodia, not only economically, but also through military cooperation and infrastructure development. Thailand, while a treaty ally of the U.S., is hedging.
The U.S. has shown renewed interest in the Mekong affairs through initiatives of the Mekong-U.S. partnership. If the conflict escalates or overlaps with the broader strategic corridors such as China’s Belt and Road or U.S. naval priorities, external powers may find themselves drawn into the scene, especially through diplomatic posturing or economic leverage like we have seen in President Trump’s attempt. Still, I believe that Asia’s preference for quiet diplomacy or ambiguity will prevent a broader Asian war.
But that does not mean these small-scale conflicts are benign. They are pressure points, testing the resilience of the regional norms and the depth of major power influence in our neighbourhood as well.
GH: That is a very profound thought on which to end this discussion. You have opened some ideas, some doors, you’ve talked about pressure points. And one thing you said, which was very telling, is that it’s now time to actually take a survey.
TW: One final remark. The temples, these are Hindu devas. All Shiva temples. We’ve all visited these temples, we all feel the spiritual draw from these temples; for us it is also very important.
It’s very interesting that you’ve got these very modern battles over ancient Hindu temples in Southeast Asia.
The devas – I think it’s rooted in some way with the Prime Minister of Cambodia. He thinks that if he gains one or three temples from Thailand it’s going to improve his charisma in terms of politics.
In the past, the King of Cambodia, King Sihanouk, managed to have one temple at the border, the Preah Vihear temple from the ICJ. This time, Prime Minister Hun Sen has to pass the legacy to his son, Hun Manet. I think his son should have three. So three surpasses one of the King Sihanouk in the past of the few temples from Thailand. This is one personal observation.
Dr. Thanachate Wisaijorn is the Head of Government, Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University.
Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director, Gateway House.
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