A central plurilateral grouping in the Indo-Pacific region, Quad–comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia–is making headlines for not playing its due role at this time. The expectation was that the Quad summit would be hosted by India in the second half of 2025, possibly in November. On September 26, 2025, India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that “diplomatic consultations” would determine the timing of the summit.[1]
This is interpreted as a signal that the summit is unlikely to take place this year. For those familiar with the grouping’s past trajectory and the crisis that has recently afflicted India-U.S. relations, it is not a surprise.
The Quad’s see it as a welcome development. But its advocates and champions are disappointed, because much is riding on the success of this grouping, especially in the high geopolitical and geo-economic stakes in the Indo-Pacific. This vast region is stamped by the ongoing rivalry and strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Beijing considers the Quad as ’the Asian NATO’ that aims to contain China and operate on the logic of the Cold War. On its part, the Quad projected itself, at least until the last year, as the vehicle for ‘the global good’ contributing to order, security, and economic prosperity. Since the commencement of Trump 2.0, however, the grouping has been struggling to redefine its role and mandate.
The Quad gathered momentum during U.S. President Donald Trump‘s first presidency starting 2016. Its first-ever meeting of the foreign ministers took place in September 2019. As Joe Biden handed over the presidential baton to Trump on January 20, 2025, the initial message from Washington was that the Quad, anchored in bipartisan support, is here to stay. Notably, the first meeting of foreign ministers in Trump’s second presidency took place on January 20 itself, committing the four nations to a proactive role and giving further impetus to a coalition of democracies committed to the philosophy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Following the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump in Washington in February, the joint statement indicated that the former looked forward to hosting President Trump in New Delhi for the leaders’ summit. Prior to it, the leaders were to “activate new Quad initiatives on shared airlift capacity to support civilian response to natural disasters and maritime patrols to improve interoperability.” Some of this was reiterated and emphasised in the subsequent July meeting of the foreign ministers in Washington. But at the U.S.’s insistence, the Quad’s agenda was restricted to a few specific items, such as maritime security, disaster relief, critical technology, and a new initiative focused on critical minerals. Clearly, a trimming of Quad was under way.
Much water has flowed down the Yamuna and the Potomac over the past six months, as geopolitics has undergone radical transformation. India, the only non-treaty partner in Quad, received a series of unexpected jolts from Washington: 50% tariffs; no bilateral trade deal finalised; serious acrimony on the U.S. role as a mediator in India-Pakistan hostilities; U.S.-Pakistan bromance; revocation of waiver of sanctions targeting India’s participation in the Chabahar Port project; Washington’s public demand that India, ‘a funder of Russia’s war in Ukraine’, end its purchases of Russian oil; adverse measures against H-1B visa beneficiaries; and the U.S. negativity towards BRICS. Simultaneously, some form of trade negotiations has continued; President Trump and PM Modi spoke to each other on the telephone on 17th September, the letter’s birthday; and the Indian PM issued two statements backing Trump’s Gaza peace plan. But the bilateral political situation has not improved adequately for the planners to agree on the dates for the next Quad summit.
However, the problem is deeper as it transcends the current flow of India-U.S. relations.
The silence in Washington regarding U.S. participation in the Quad summit is also due to the Trump administration’s delay in finalising its China policy and announcing its new defence strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. Washington remains undecided on whether to view China as a challenge or an opportunity. U.S. experts say Trump sees China as an economic and not geopolitical rival; in that context, India is not a priority. Ashley Tellis, a noted scholar, observed in a recent interview that President Trump regards China as an economic rival, but not as a geopolitical rival. “In this vision, India loses priority,” Tellis stressed.[2] In other words, a comprehensive U.S.-China deal can still be secured. The much-talked-about Trump visit to China in 2025 has not materialised, and now the U.S. must be content with a meeting between the presidents of the U.S. and China on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Gyeongju, South Korea. In this backdrop, it is not surprising that the U.S. side has placed an orange light on the Quad summit.
The relevance of Australia and Japan, the other two partners, too, needs to be factored in. Australians feel that they have not received the treatment they deserve from their American allies. Australian PM Anthony Albanese is yet to have his first formal meeting with President Trump in the White House. This has been weighing on Canberra, although it may now be relieved to note that a meeting is likely to take place later this month. Japan has changed its prime minister once again, with Sanae Takaichi is the new PM. Observers describe her as “a hardline ultra-conservative and China hawk” known also for her criticism of the recent U.S.-Japan agreement on trade and investment. Whether she meets with Trump soon and succeeds in securing a revised agreement will be closely watched.
Speaking at a public event in Delhi on October 5, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar observed: “Quad is a sort of a bureaucratic set-up at different levels in different dimensions, people engage with each other, and this continues.” He added, “Quad is alive, and Quad is well.”
His analysis leads to two obvious conclusions:
One, a plurilateral grouping cannot function and grow effectively if bilateral relationships among its member states are under stress. Members must always endeavour to expand their convergences and reduce their divergences. Two, in this age of hyperactive summit diplomacy, only those groupings can be effective and command media attention that hold annual summits. Hence, it is for the leaders to decide how much time and political capital they are prepared to invest in the Quad. Its immediate future hinges on the answer to this question.
Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in Hindustan Times.
References:
[1] https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/40165/Transcript_of_Weekly_Media_Briefing_by_the_Official_Spokesperson_September_26_2025
[2] https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/interview-tellis-trump-china-economic-rival-geopolitical-india-10269244/