The July 25 elections for Japan’s Upper House of Councillors was an electoral setback for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, Komeito[1], led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. In this election 125 of the 248 total seats in the House of Councillors were contested. The ruling coalition lost its previously held majority, ending up with 147 total seats, three short of the 150 required to have a 60% control over the House (75 seats were not up for election). The primary opposition, the centre-left Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), managed to retain its 22 seats.[2]
The major shift in the electoral landscape can be traced to the surprising rise of fringe right-wing parties that siphoned conservative votes away from the LDP. Among the notable winners in this election was the Sanseito[3] party, led by the dynamic Sohei Kamiya. Sanseito capitalised on a “Japan First” theme that resonated with nationalist sentiments and addressed growing concerns regarding immigration in Japan.[4] The party’s performance was noteworthy as it captured 14 seats, a remarkable increase from the single seat it held in 2022 during the previous Upper House election.
Sanseito’s surge in popularity is predominantly attributed to its appeal to economically marginalised voters, especially men in their 40s and 50s who have suffered from stagnant job prospects due to Japan’s prolonged economic malaise.[5]The so-called “Ice Age” generation, which graduated into a lacklustre job market in the 1990s and early 2000s, have found their concerns echoed in Sanseito’s messages. The party effectively utilised digital platforms and social media to reach potential voters, and Asahi Shimbun exit polls indicated that an astounding 73% of Sanseito’s proportional representation voters cited social media outreach as a significant influence on their voting decisions. This was notably higher than outreach efforts from other competing parties.
This is not new for Sanseito. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Sanseito used social media to promote vaccine scepticism and foster distrust of government institutions. What once seemed like fringe outspokenness now finds a place within the mainstream political discourse, with over 60% of Sanseito supporters identifying as males from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. This illustrates how the right-wing cause garners support from segments of the population experiencing economic insecurity.
While Sanseito’s electoral gains generated considerable headlines, the centre-right Democratic Party for the People (DPP) also made substantial strides. The DPP increased its presence in the Upper House from four to 17 seats, marking its ascendance to the fourth-largest party, with 22 seats (five seats were not up for election). This gives the DPP considerable leverage to propose budget-related legislation independently, which is a significant achievement in a polarised political environment.
The DPP’s campaign focused on pressing issues such as inflation and rising living costs, themes that resonated with voters who are increasingly concerned about their financial stability. Their success was notable in Tokyo, where two of their candidates secured victory among a total of seven contested seats.[6]
Historically, the DPP has fluctuated between supporting the ruling coalition and positioning itself as opposition. For instance, it previously backed the 2024 budget, reflecting a complicated role as an umbrella party for various political perspectives. However, the DPP’s recent electoral success positions it as a critical swing party within a fragmented political landscape, appealing to centrist voters while also seeking to make its influence felt over economic policy discussions.
The rise of Sanseito and the DPP can be attributed to two critical factors: surging inflation and concerns over immigration. After several years marked by deflation and stagnant prices, Japan experienced inflation rates surpassing 3%, a striking increase that alarmed voters who had become accustomed to stability. Therapid inflation affected the prices of essential goods, such as rice, a staple in Japanese diets. Opposition parties campaigned vigorously for substantial tax cuts aimed at alleviating financial burdens on citizens, while the ruling coalition proposed focused subsidies for low-income families and children.[7] Despite the coalition’s intentions, many voters perceived these measures as misguided rather than alleviation.[8]
Demographic shifts within Japan are impacting the political landscape as well. As the country grapples with an aging populace, it has expanded its foreign labour force to include about 3.8 million foreign residents, reflecting a 30% increase since 2022.[9] While this figure may not seem large in a nation of 124 million, it has generated cultural and political anxieties, particularly when amplified by Sanseito’s appeals for stricter immigration controls and reductions in welfare provisions for foreigners. Other political entities have echoed this sentiment, advocating for tighter restrictions on foreign land ownership, often interpreted as a manoeuvre to specifically target investments from Chinese companies.
Other opposition parties have also gained at the expense of the ruling coalition. The Japan Innovation Party[10] won seven seats. Still, it faces tough times, despite having once emerged as a notable right-wing challenger, and has adopted a more conventional parliamentary role over time. It currently holds 38 seats in the Lower House and 19 in the Upper House, positioning it as the third-largest leaning conservative party. The evolution of this party indicates a potential pathway for Sanseito; it may also transition into a more structured political entity as it matures.[11]
Reflecting on the historical context of right-wing sentiments in Japan, the current atmosphere is markedly different from the past. In the 1980s, the ultra right-wing groups or uyoku dantai engaged in public demonstrations, utilising loudspeaker trucks or gaisensha to vocalise their messages against communism and promote nationalist causes, which included the return of the Northern Territories and protesting against Soviet influence. Homage to the Emperor was important for them.
Today, however, that vocal right-wing presence seems to have diminished, replaced by a more structured electoral movement. The noticeable decline in LDP dominance, particularly following Shinzo Abe’s resignation and subsequent assassination, has paved the way for fringe groups to articulate their discontent and reshape political discourse more robustly.
Political analysts in Asia express concern that a shift toward xenophobic rhetoric could have grave long-term consequences. Such a trajectory risks undermining Japan’s demographic recovery and overall economic competitiveness, especially as the global landscape has grown increasingly volatile.
The House of Councillors comprises 248 members elected for six-year terms, with half of the seats contested every three years. In this election cycle, 124 seats were up for election, along with one additional vacancy.[12] Voter turnout reached 58.51%, reflecting a significant increase of 6.5% compared to the 2022 elections.[13] This uptick in participation is especially striking in 12 prefectures where turnout exceeded 60%, indicating a heightened level of public engagement during challenging times, which ultimately contributed to the electoral struggles faced by the ruling coalition.[14]
The implications of the recent elections extend beyond mere seat counts; they suggest that Ishiba’s government now must navigate a more precarious political environment. With the coalition holding minority status in both Houses of Parliament, the necessity for increased negotiations with opposition parties is evident. This presents substantial risks, particularly as right-wing factions increasingly encroach upon the LDP’s traditional conservative base. To maintain cohesion within his coalition, Ishiba must articulate a compelling and nuanced political message that centres around economic relief, a distinct national identity, and a more thoughtful approach to immigration policies.[15]
The current electoral climate is a pivotal moment for Japanese politics, revealing fractures within the ruling coalition while simultaneously amplifying populist and right-wing sentiments. As economic discontent, cultural anxieties, and effective digital mobilisation converge, Japan finds itself at a crossroads, questioning whether this transformation is merely a fleeting flashpoint or the beginning of a deeper, more profound change in its political landscape.
To move ahead, citizen engagement and responsiveness to socio-economic challenges will be necessary in order to fittingly shape the narrative of Japanese politics in the coming years.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.
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References:
[1] “Komeito Official Website” 2025. https://www.komei.or.jp/en/
[2] Lipscy, Phillip. “Japan’s Upper House Election Delivers Political Uncertainty with Big Implications.” East Asia Forum, July 27, 2025. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/07/27/japans-upper-house-election-delivers-mixed-results-with-big-implications/
[3] “Sanseito Official Website.” 2020. https://sanseito.jp/2020/english/
[4] Wakaba Oto, Sanseito, Explained, Tokyo weekender, 18 July 2025, https://www.tokyoweekender.com/japan-life/news-and-opinion/sanseito-explained-japans-
[5] “Right-Wing Populist Sanseito Party Shakes Japan with Election Surge.” The Conversation, 2025. https://theconversation.com/rightwing-populist-sanseito-party-shakes-japan-with-election-surge-261303
[6] Inoue, Yukana. “In Upper House Race, Younger Voters in Tokyo Turn to DPP for New Direction.” The Japan Times, July 18, 2025. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/18/japan/politics/upper-house-election-tokyo-district/
[7] Fujioka, Toru. “Japan’s Inflation Quickens as Rice Prices Gain the Most in over 50 Years.” The Japan Times, April 18, 2025. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2025/04/18/economy/cpi-march/
[8] “Voter Survey: 67% Disapprove of Ishiba’s Plan for Cash Payouts.” Asahi Shimbun, June 16, 2025. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15844814
[9] “Japan’s Foreign Population Hits 3.8 Million.” Japan Data, Nippon.com, March 28, 2025. https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02350/
[10] Japan Innovation Party. “Official Website.” Accessed August 21, 2025. https://o-ishin.jp/en/
[11] Japan Innovation Party Leader Says Situation after Upper House Race ‘Tough.’” Mainichi Shimbun, July 20, 2025. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20250720/p2a/00m/0na/013000c
[12] “Japan’s House of Councillors Election System.” Kyodo News, July 10, 2025. https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/35037
[13] “Voter Turnout Rises to 58 Pct in Japan Upper House Election.” Nippon.com, July 21, 2025. https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2025072100290/
[14] “LDP-Komeito Coalition More Precarious after Drubbing at Polls.” Asahi Shimbun, July 21, 2025. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15918813
[15] “Japan’s Post-Upper-House Election Crisis.” East Asia Forum, July 28, 2025. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/07/28/japans-post-upper-house-election-crisis/