India is today the largest importer of arms in the world, comprising 10% of global arms imports from 2007 to 2011. It has overtaken China, the largest importer of arms during 2002–2006, which fell to fourth place in 2007-11. The decline in the volume of Chinese imports coincides with improvements in China’s arms industry and its growing ability to export arms.
Can we assume, then, that India too will follow China’s path, reducing its imports of arms while improving and building indigenous capacity so that it can become an eventual exporter?
Judging by the present context, this seems to be a remote possibility. India lacks a significant defence manufacturing capability and spends precious foreign exchange on importing defence items that could easily be made within India. The money spent in importing arms is enormous. India’s defence budget for 2012-13 of Rs. 193407.29 crores has increased by 17.63% from 2011. The ratio of imports to domestic production is abysmal – over 50% and by some estimates even 70%, of our defence goods are imported. So being the largest global arms importer only reflects the malaise—that our internal arms production must truly be ailing on all counts.
It is worthwhile to examine how we reached this juncture.
Several players are involved in the expensive transactions of the arms industry—the Indian government, research and development agencies, the manufacturers and the users—the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces.
The most important of these players, the government, has been remiss on three major counts: the first and most critical is the lack of a clear national policy on the use of arms in diplomacy—a policy that would cover when, where and under what circumstances the nation would use force, and the possible contours of future conflicts. Such a policy is vital for the armed forces to develop a strategy and balanced tri-force structure. Without such a policy, arms acquisitions devolve into turf wars over fancy equipment and budgets.