According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, a middle power can be defined as ʻa state that holds a position in the international power spectrum that is in the middle – below that of a superpower which wields vastly superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with significant ability to shape international events.ʼ Brazil, Germany and South Africa fit this definition well. But, today, India’s geostrategic positioning, economic trajectory and global role set it apart.
‘ The traditional label of middle power fails to capture India’s growing status.’
As the world’s most populous country and the fifth-largest economy (rapidly advancing towards becoming the third-largest), India is a unique case. It is the largest democracy, a major technological force and an active global player with diversified interests across all continents. The traditional label of middle power fails to capture India’s growing status. It may be, as External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has said, ʻa leading powerʼ or, as many in the country see it, ʻan emerging great powerʼ guided by its expansive worldview.
India has successfully adopted a balanced approach towards the great powers, its neighbours in South Asia, players in the extended neighbourhood, and other Global South countries. The effectiveness of its foreign policy machine in recent years is mainly due to the government’s success in developing an integrated and well-coordinated approach and the deep personal interest Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken in this domain. The second Körber Emerging Middle Powers survey reveals that India has one fundamental thing in common with Brazil, Germany, and South Africa: each country’s respondents rate their foreign ministry as looming large over various stakeholders in the formulation of foreign policy.
Public diplomacy has begun to prosper over the past 15 years. Indian think tanks supported this with their proactive role in shaping, influencing and articulating foreign policy. The extension of events and inclusion of people from around the country during India’s G20 Presidency in 2023 was an important factor in enhancing the popularity of its foreign policy.
In the geopolitical triangulation with China and the United States, India attaches much higher importance to the latter. This trend gained further momentum after the Galwan clash between Chinese and Indian troops in the Himalayas in 2020. After 30 sessions of border talks over four years, in October 2024 at the BRICS meeting in Kazan, Russia, the two countries began a restricted thaw in their relations. But, despite this diplomatic opening, India does not expect a fundamental shift in China’s approach. It continues to view its neighbour with caution, mindful of past conflicts and of Beijing’s strategic ambitions. India prioritises diplomacy over confrontation and does not respond to provocations with military escalation. The outlook for relations with China remains one of strategic vigilance, in which India balances engagement with it while strengthening ties with the United States and other allies to safeguard its national interests.
New Delhi and Washington, even under the new Trump administration, are set to find new economic and strategic drivers and motivations – such as energy, defence, and bilateral investments – to be mutually dependable partners, especially due to the common threat posed by China in the IndoPacific region. With regard to this threat, Modi has taken the art of summit diplomacy to a new level, as demonstrated by his successful visits to France and the United States in February 2025. Europe will retain its importance to India, with France and Germany the countries of most interest. However, Washington is certain to remain Dehli’s top partner in the foreseeable future.
‘The outlook for relations with China remains one of strategic vigilance.’
India’s global engagement is not limited to bilateral relations. It is an active participant in multiple international groupings, with each serving a different strategic purpose. Among plurilateral groupings, the Quad (because of China) and BRICS (to strengthen India’s strategic autonomy) are of utmost significance to India. It joined Brazil, China, and South Africa to form the BASIC group in 2009 to work towards common climate goals. In the G4, India campaigns alongside Brazil, Germany, and Japan to push their candidatures to become permanent members of an eventual expanded UN Security Council. Pre-dating BRICS, IBSA has been an excellent platform for South-South cooperation between Brazil, India, and South Africa.
‘Washington is certain to remain Dehli’s top partner in the foreseeable future.’
India remains optimistic and confident about its global positioning, driven by the resilience of its economy, its technological process, and its expanding diplomatic footprint. Its ability to shape international discourse is no longer in question. This is why India has moved beyond seeing itself as merely an emerging middle power, but as a key player shaping the global order.
Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in Momentum for Middle Powers: Emerging Middle Powers Report.