Ethiopia is in a new crisis that could possibly reorder the Horn of Africa, already fractured by several conflicts. The current catastrophe is not merely a resurgence of the civil war in Tigray. The renewed insurgency of this September has brought together seven varied ethnic militias that were often at loggerheads but which have now come together under the name Alliance for Survival with the stated aim of ousting the elected government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa.^[1] They challenge the government’s efforts at centralisation and complain of the lack of resolution of their political, territorial and ethnic rivalries within the Ethiopian state.

The impact of this conflict, which Ethiopians describe as existential,^[2] could extend well beyond Ethiopia. Sudan is already in the midst of a civil war. Somalia faces continuing insecurity and is pleading with Ethiopia not to withdraw its troops from the African Union (AU) mission. Relations between Eritrea and Addis Ababa have deteriorated, while the longstanding Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry over the waters of the Nile could take on a new dimension. All these could be affected by renewed armed conflict in Ethiopia.^[3]

The domestic and international issues are interconnected knots. Unresolved issues from the 2020–22 Tigray civil war remain, despite the Pretoria Agreement,^[4] which created a tenuous peace but failed to adjudicate some basic political questions. Western Tigray remains contested between Tigray and Amhara in northern Ethiopia, while displaced Tigrayans cannot return home. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has abandoned its earlier posture of accommodation and is again challenging the Abiy Ahmed government by assuming control in the region’s capital of Mekelle.

Eritrea, which joined Ethiopia in fighting the TPLF during the earlier civil war, was not part of the Pretoria process and felt ignored by Addis Ababa. It is now hostile to the Ethiopian government, which fears that Eritrea is working towards the Balkanisation of Ethiopia. The TPLF, in turn, finds itself aligned, at least indirectly, with its former arch-enemy Eritrea because it believes Addis Ababa seeks to weaken or even eliminate it after the civil war.

The 2026 general elections did little to resolve these political tensions. Elections could not be held in Tigray and parts of Oromia and Amhara because of a lack of security. The TPLF had been denied party status and therefore could not contest. The Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, now in the Alliance for Survival, faced splits and restrictions. In Amhara, the militia that had fought alongside the government against the TPLF disrupted elections and has now joined the Alliance forces.^[5]

The AU noted that voting did not take place in Tigray and parts of Amhara and Oromia, casting a shadow over the ruling Prosperity Party’s massive victory elsewhere in the country. Consequently, the election could not provide the political space that Ethiopia so urgently required. Instead, it further cemented the perception among politically mobilised groups in Tigray, Oromia and Amhara that their political voices were being militarily curtailed.^[6]

These grievances are now embedded in the renewed TPLF control of Tigray and in the wider debate over Ethiopia’s system of ethno-federalism, which many of its opponents feel has run its course.

September has therefore been a significant month. The emergence of the Alliance^[7]has brought together s bitter enemies despite their very different objectives, competing conceptions of nationalism and divergent ideas about Ethiopia’s future. These could make the Alliance difficult to sustain, but for now, their shared objective is to open multiple fronts and disrupt state control, including connectivity to the main port of Djibouti.^[8]

The deeper problem is that unresolved political issues were pushed towards military solutions. The determination of both Addis Ababa and its opponents to seek military rather than political answers represents a failure of preventive diplomacy, despite the efforts of AU special envoy Olusegun Obasanjo and the engagement of the UN, EU, and U.S., all of which have their own competing preoccupations in this region.

The regional implications of this emerging situation are considerable. Eritrea and access to the Red Sea are the first major issues.

Although Ethiopia aligned with its old enemy, Eritrea, to suppress the TPLF between 2020 and 2022, subsequent Ethiopian statements about seeking access to the Red Sea have complicated relations with Eritrea, which believes Ethiopia has designs on its port of Assab on the Red Sea. Somalia, meanwhile, sees Ethiopian efforts to engage Somaliland for access to the port of Berbera as detrimental to its sovereignty.

Landlocked Ethiopia is dependent on Djibouti for most of its external trade, and believes that, for a country of its size and ambition, it must have its own access to the sea. Somalia and Eritrea are apprehensive about Ethiopia’s ambitions and want them curtailed if Ethiopia gains sea access at their expense.

The partnership between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki, which followed the extraordinary rapprochement of 2018 and led to Abiy’s Nobel Peace Prize, is now in a deep cleft. Egypt has consequently developed a closer partnership with Eritrea, including around the Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa.

This leads to the second major issue: the Nile waters. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has severely strained Ethiopia’s relationship with Egypt and Sudan.^[9] Ethiopia sees the dam primarily as a developmental project. Egypt sees the Nile as an existential issue. The unresolved GERD dispute^[2], particularly over the dam’s filling and operation, has contributed to closer Egyptian-Eritrean ties and could make both more assertive in countering Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions.

The third uncertainty is Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan have always had a tenuous relationship because of their porous border, and both are now increasingly enmeshed in each other’s civil wars. The Sudanese army in Khartoum believes that Ethiopia supports the Rapid Support Forces, while Ethiopia believes Sudan is helping the TPLF. Both sides use logistical networks through western Ethiopia.

The rivalries within Ethiopia could now easily acquire a Sudanese dimension. The border areas of Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea could transform into adjoining conflicts that begin to overrun one another.

South Sudan, comparatively less central to the immediate crisis but itself vulnerable, is again experiencing civil conflict and a surge in internally displaced people. Many refugees cross into Gambella in southern Ethiopia. Instability in Ethiopia could therefore transform Gambella from a refugee centre into a contested borderland. Gambellan rebels have not, for the moment, joined the TPLF-led alliance. The situation could widen the humanitarian consequences of the growing conflict.

Somalia remains another critical part of this strategic conundrum. It has been unable to resolve its internal problems despite the presence of an AU mission. The question of Somaliland’s independence, with support from the UAE, Taiwan and Ethiopia, among others, remains a major distraction. At the same time, Egypt has enhanced its security partnership with Somalia, even though Ethiopia has been Somalia’s principal security partner through AU missions against the jihadist group al-Shabab. The U.S. accuses al-Shabab of linking with the Houthis in Yemen, thus aggravating the Gulf crisis.

Any reduction in the Ethiopian military presence in Somalia could create additional space for al-Shabab. Somalia is therefore walking a tightrope between confronting al-Shabab and managing its difficult relationship with Ethiopia. Its president’s recent visit to Addis Ababa, followed by one to Egypt, illustrates the delicacy of that balancing act.

At the same time, Somalia sits at the intersection of a wider Red Sea rivalry involving Egypt, Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and to some extent Qatar. The Horn of Africa is consequently beginning to look less like a collage of separate conflicts and more like an intermeshed strategic conundrum.

In this simmering conflagration, four BRICS members are involved. Ethiopia is a direct participant; Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are indirect but influential participants.^[10]

The humanitarian consequences of a renewed Ethiopian civil war are particularly frightening. Ethiopia is home to more than 130 million people, with about 4.2 million internally displaced people and more than 800,000 refugees and asylum seekers. UNICEF has warned that further conflict and displacement could greatly increase disease and destruction, particularly affecting women and children. An estimated 6.3 million children would require humanitarian assistance in 2026.

The last Tigray war had devastating consequences. Estimates that around 600,000 people perished include those who died from famine, disease, and the lack of health services, as well as those killed directly in the conflict. Sexual violence against women and the displacement of children created additional humanitarian crises. These problems have not disappeared with the Pretoria Agreement. Gender-based violence and malnutrition remain serious problems in conflict-affected areas.

A renewed war could therefore multiply this tragedy, not only within Ethiopia but across the region. The UN Secretary-General has cautioned that the Tigray crisis could lead to an even more devastating humanitarian crisis across the Horn.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing competing interests in the Red Sea.^[11] Saudi Arabia is working with the Khartoum government and supports Eritrea, while the UAE has sought access and influence through different Red Sea and Horn partners, including Somaliland. Egypt is also playing a role, essentially seeking to counter Ethiopian influence in Somalia, Eritrea, and elsewhere.

These alliances are fluid and often shift with the crisis and the geography involved. That makes the present situation particularly difficult to fathom.

The larger point is clear. Ethiopia’s internal conflict can no longer be viewed in isolation.^[12] The country sits at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Nile, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, while Gulf powers and other external actors pursue their own strategic interests. What begins as an internal Ethiopian struggle could therefore become a regional conflict system. The Horn of Africa may be approaching a point where its discrete crises cease to be so.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

[1] “Seven Ethiopian armed groups formally announce formation of a coalition,” Addis Standard, 20 September 2026, https://addisstandard.com/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-formally-announce-formation-of-a-coalition/.

[2] Andrea Korybko, “Top Ethiopian Officials Confirmed the Existential Stakes of Their Country’s Latest Conflict,” The AltWorld, 29 September 2026. https://thealtworld.com/andrew_korybko/top-ethiopian-officials-confirmed-the-existential-stakes-of-their-countrys-latest-conflict.

[3] “Ethiopia’s army promises restraint amid fears of new civil war,” Hiiraan Online, 27 September 2026. https://www.hiiraan.com/world4/2026/Sep/206370/ethiopias_army_promises_restraint_amid_fears_of_new_civil_war.aspx.

[4] “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), “African Union, 2 November 2022. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-tplf.

[5] Tigray has allied itself with six other movements that are pledged to remove Prime Minister Abiy and form a new Ethiopian government. The allies are: Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), Oromo Liberation Army (OLF-OLA), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front (Ugugumo), Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM)

[6] “AUC Chairperson Calls for Utmost Restraint and Immediate De-Escalation in Northern Ethiopia,” African Union, 26 September 2026. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260923/chairperson-calls-restraint-and-immediate-de-escalation-northern-ethiopia.

[7] The Alliance for Survival comprises seven armed militias, including the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army and representatives from the Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali regions. Their stated aim is to remove the government in Addis Ababa and establish transitional arrangements for a new political consensus.

[8] “Afar Regional President: The Ongoing War in the Region Aims to Cut Ethiopia Off from the Red Sea,” Al Jazeera Arabic, 29 September 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EcAUFi8SWX8.

[9] Gurjit Singh, “The politics of the Ethiopian dam,” Gateway House, 26 July 2021. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-politics-of-the-ethiopian-dam/.

[10] Gurjit Singh, “The changing face of Ethiopia,” ORF, 25 January 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-changing-face-of-ethiopia.

[11] Gurjit Singh, “Crisis in Sudan: Current trigger, old fault lines, and the human cost,” Indian Express, 7 November 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/expert-explains-l-global-crisis-in-sudan-current-trigger-old-faultlines-and-the-human-cost-10350457/.

[12] Martin Plaut, A brief update on Ethiopia’s 2026 war, 28 September 2026. https://martinplaut.com/2026/09/28/a-brief-summary-of-ethiopias-2026-war/.

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During August and September, the Houthis, the armed militant group in Yemen, hit several ships, ports, and oil installations in Saudi Arabia, disrupting oil traffic from the Red Sea. In early September, drones launched from Iraq hit and shut down the Saudi East-West pipeline, which moves part of Saudi Arabia’s oil output to Red Sea ports. Since the start of the U.S.-Iran war, which has disrupted oil flows from the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has relied on the Red Sea route for a part of its oil output. The hits on the Saudis’ Red Sea oil infrastructure indicate that the back-up route is vulnerable to the same factors that make the Strait of Hormuz a risky highway for energy.

These developments may also mean a fresh impetus to IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor proposed by India in 2023, which has not developed much beyond the initial announcements and stalled due to Saudi Arabia’s objections to Israel amid the Gaza war.

Indicative map showing locations of key oil and gas fields in the Persian Gulf, and the existing pipelines to bypass the Persian Gulf.

Figure Source: Gateway House

The productive oil and gas fields of the West Asian countries – the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Qatar – are either in the Persian Gulf or clustered around it. The most economical and natural outlet for them, therefore, is via ships from the Persian Gulf. While the risks of the Hormuz Straits becoming a choke point were well known and discussed since Iran’s 1979 revolution, these risks finally materialized in 2026 after nearly half a century. Little was done on the ground to create viable alternatives to the Hormuz chokepoint.

There is some backup oil capacity in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq. The biggest is Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline that can carry up to 7 million barrels per day of oil to the Red Sea^[1], which can transport almost 70% of the kingdom’s pre-war oil production. A second pipeline, the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline,  connects Abu Dhabi’s oil fields to the port of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman, which can transport up to 1.5 million barrels per day of oil^[2]. The third pipeline, Kirkuk-Ceyhan, connects Kirkuk in Northern Iraq to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey.  But this is not connected to the bigger oil fields of Iraq. It has left most of Iraq’s oil production, which moved on ship, stranded. Meanwhile, Iran’s oil exports are being blockaded by the U.S. as a part of its war against the Islamic Republic.

Consequently, the total oil output of the six energy-rich West Asian states has fallen by 11-12 million barrels per day – a whopping 11%-12% of the pre-conflict global oil production, which was over100 million barrels per day.

Table 1: Daily oil output of key West Asian Producers (million barrels/day)

Table Source: Energy Institute, OPEC

The true cost of this disruption is the extra $30 per/barrel or so that the entire world has paid for oil since March 2026. It amounts to over $1 trillion per year. Shocks in energy prices are usually followed by food price shocks, as natural gas is an ingredient in the manufacture of urea fertilizer. Many lower-income countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan in India’s neighbourhood are also facing electricity shortages as a result of the crisis. Disruptions in energy supplies take time to work their way through supply chains, and are primarily felt in the form of higher prices.

But for other industries, disruptions are felt immediately, and have no easy workarounds. The global optic fibre cable network, which carries much of the world’s internet traffic, is one such vulnerability. The optic fibre cables connecting India with Europe pass through the Red Sea,  and can be cut by something as simple as a ship dragging its anchor along the seabed.

The submarine optic-fibre cable network that carries much of global data traffic.

Figure Source: TeleGeography. Submarine Cable Map. 

There are some important lessons for the world economy from the U.S.-Iran war, and the subsequent escalation between Yemen-Saudi Arabia:

• Conflicts/disruptions last much longer than initial (hopeful) projections. The U.S. had originally projected the war would be over in four to five weeks^[3]. Instead, it is now in its seventh month and is currently projected to last beyond the U.S. mid-term polls in November.
• Disruptions rarely stay confined in boxes. The war in Hormuz has spilled over into the Saudi-Yemen theatre, causing further disruptions to global energy supply. It may be a matter of time before the disruptions also hit data flow.
• The global energy supply chain and data traffic require redundancies and bypasses to these choke points (Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb).

This is where IMEC can be useful. The Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are both confined water bodies, with hostile/unstable actors that have hurt traffic. The proposed route of IMEC, which connects the interior of Saudi Arabia to the Arabian Sea on one side, and the Mediterranean Sea on the other,  has immense value as a conduit for West Asian oil, as well as global data flows.

In its original form, IMEC was to connect the interior of the Arabian Peninsula to open water bodies via railway lines. This had limited utility. Putting containers on a ship from India to the UAE, then offloading them on a train, moving them across the Arabian Peninsula, and again putting them on a ship in Haifa, Israel, to ship forward to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, would have added immediate costs for some savings over time. It would also be a logistical nightmare: a large containership can carry over 10,000 containers, whereas a train carries a fraction of it, about 100 containers. Hundreds of trains would need to run every day to service a handful of ships. This may be one reason why few details of the project have been released to date.

However, as a conduit for oil and data, IMEC’s value is visible now. Oil pipelines and optic fibre cables laid along this route can reduce the threat arising from the existing choke points of , and potential mischief in, the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.

The northern leg of IMEC can connect Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean via Haifa in Israel. The lack of response to the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia from the latter’s partners, Turkiye and Pakistan, in the new Mecca Accord, has forced Riyadh to seek assistance from others, even Israel. This has made the IMEC plan viable again, with the U.S. persuading Saudi Arabia to normalise its ties with Israel, and has made a civilian nuclear agreement with the Kingdom conditional on such a normalisation^[4].

Apart from the nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia has another major incentive – direct access to the Mediterranean will cut down the demonstrated risk to its energy exports from Iran and its various proxies. Given this economic incentive, IMEC seems to be a better prospect now than earlier.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Hartley, Richard. “Aramco East-West Pipeline Hits 7m bpd as Hormuz Shuts.” Oil & Gas Storage News, May 11, 2026. https://oilgasstoragenews.com/aramco-east-west-pipeline/.

[2] Essaid, Salim A. “UAE’s West-East Pipeline Expansion to Become Operational in 2027, Doubling Oil Export Capacity.” The National, May 15, 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/05/15/uaes-west-east-pipeline-expansion-to-become-operational-in-2027-doubling-oil-export-capacity/.

[3] Associated Press. “Trump says Iran war could be over soon, but oil disruption would trigger harsher US strikes.” AP News, March 9, 2026. https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-us-march-9-2026-b2aa51ef51d4b57103ffee0c95bc2ff7

[4] “Trump Says US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Conditional on Country Joining Abraham Accords.” Reuters, July 23, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-us-saudi-nuclear-deal-conditional-country-joining-abraham-accords-2026-07-23/.

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MahaVISTAAR is an agricultural advisory service run by the Department of Agriculture in Maharashtra, India’s most industrialised state. A farmer can ask a question by voice or text about crops, pests, weather, market prices, or government schemes and receive a response in an accessible language. The system searches trusted agricultural and government sources, returns a short location-aware answer, and identifies where the information came from.^[1]

The platform builds on an extension system that already has substantial institutional infrastructure. Maharashtra’s 2025–2029 MahaAgri-AI Policy records more than 13,000 field technical staff, 49 Krishi Vigyan Kendras – district agriculture centres linked to local research institutes – four state agricultural universities, and existing digital systems for weather, pest surveillance, markets, farmer benefits and agricultural data. All this is mapped across a cropped area of 24.6 million hectares, equivalent to more than 1,800 hectares for each member of the department’s field extension staff, on average.^[2] MahaVISTAAR brings these sources together to extend real-time, multilingual advice to farmers. In practice, that means the digital service complements an existing extension network.

The service has already reached substantial scale. An August 2026 World Bank account reported more than 3 million downloads within a few months and described farmers using the platform in local languages for questions about pests, weather and market conditions.^[3] What downloads show is reach, not agricultural impact. Downloads do not establish whether farmers earned more, reduced input costs, or avoided crop losses.

India’s national picture is now changing as well. On 17 February 2026, the Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare launched Phase 1 of Bharat-VISTAAR as a nationwide AI-powered agricultural platform. At its launch, it operated in Hindi and English through a telephone number, voice chatbot, ministry web portal, and mobile application, integrating ten major central schemes with ICAR knowledge and information on weather, markets, pests, crop management, and soil health.^[4]

The two platforms are linked. The Ministry’s launch material connected Maharashtra and two other states, Bihar and Gujarat, in Phase 1 through Maharashtra’s Vasudha digital service, Bihar Krishi App and AmulAI’s Sarlaben respectively, and described Bharat-VISTAAR as a framework into which state schemes and services would be added over time.^[5]

MahaVISTAAR was the pioneer and launched in May 2025 around Maharashtra’s own agricultural systems. It provides an early example of the practical issues a national system will encounter. The central government initially targeted four additional languages within three months and 11 in all within six months.^[6]

Central to the success of these is the use of voice versus the written word. Language is one of those issues where voice becomes important because typing assumes literacy, a suitable device, and familiarity with digital interfaces. MahaVISTAAR takes a farmer’s question in a local language, translates as necessary, searches trusted sources such as research institutes and the Department of Agriculture, and returns a short answer tailored to the farmer’s village or district.^[7]

The Nandurbar district, a tribal area in northwestern Maharashtra, is a case study in the complexity of creating such services – and the necessity of them. Bhili language has an estimated 10 million speakers across western and central India, but Dehwali Bhili, the variety spoken in Nandurbar, has had almost no digital representation of its own. Through Project Astitva, Karya, a social enterprise that organises paid data work, worked with the Nandurbar district administration and more than 400 native Bhili speakers to create the data needed for a usable language system. The project produced more than 30,000 translation pairs, 120 hours of speech data and 6,500 glossary terms. The resulting Dehwali Bhili capability is now used through MahaVISTAAR and BHASHINI, the Government of India’s national language-translation mission.^[8]

This is an important moment because it shows that the recordings are not an end in themselves. They become speech, translation, and vocabulary resources that allow digital services to recognise and respond in a language they previously could not handle. The Nandurbar example also shows how many institutions can sit behind a seemingly simple AI interaction. The district administration and Karya organised the community data effort; Maharashtra’s Department of Agriculture provides the public-service setting through MahaVISTAAR; EkStep Foundation, which focuses on literacy, numeracy, and digital public infrastructure, works with the state on the voice and deployment layer; AI4Bharat at IIT Madras contributes open-source Indic-language models and tools to the wider voice-AI ecosystem; and BHASHINI supplies national language infrastructure.^[9] The specific roles differ across deployments, but the wider point holds: agricultural AI at this scale depends on coordination across public authorities, communities, data organisations, research groups and digital infrastructure. Copying the interface alone would have reproduced only the visible layer.

There is also an evidence question. Maharashtra’s own policy anticipates it. Its implementation roadmap provides for independent impact evaluation and cost-effectiveness analysis, followed by documented outcomes, cost-benefit ratios and policy learning.^[10] Public evidence already shows substantial reach, advice delivered in Marathi and Dehwali Bhili, and a system designed to draw on trusted agricultural sources and provide location-specific guidance. What it does not yet establish is whether that advice is consistently accurate, or whether it translates into higher farmer incomes, improved yields, lower input costs or greater resilience.

The economics need similar care. Maharashtra’s policy proposes an initial ₹500 crore (about $52 million) allocation for its broader Agri-AI programme, including ₹10 crore (about $1 million) for VISTAAR.^[11] That is a programme allocation, not a cost per farmer or proof of savings. A serious economic assessment will have to compare the full cost of digital advisory, including data, integration, evaluation and human oversight, with the costs and limitations of the extension channels it supplements.

However, the wider relevance is already visible outside India, although institutional settings differ. Ethiopia launched Ethiopia OpenAgriNet in February 2026 as a national digital backbone for agriculture, with voice-first access, local-language advisory, location-specific recommendations and shared infrastructure connecting public and private agricultural services.^[12] It is not a copy of MahaVISTAAR; it has used India’s AgriStack as a model, with Ekstep Foundation as a collaborator, and it reflects a similar recognition – that agricultural AI has to fit the language, connectivity, and institutional conditions in which farmers operate.

Maharashtra’s experience therefore offers more than an application to replicate. It shows that agricultural AI at population scale depends on the public systems around it: trusted knowledge, local-language capability, interoperable data, institutional responsibility and evaluation of outcomes. If those assets accumulate with each deployment, the next system does not have to begin from zero.

Serish Gandikota is an Honorary Fellow at the Centre for India & Global Business, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, and co-founder and co-lead of the Frugal AI Hub. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] World Bank. “Small AI Transforms Farming in India.” August 27, 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2026/08/27/small-ai-transforms-farming-in-india.

[2] Agriculture Department, Government of Maharashtra. MahaAgri-AI Policy 2025–2029, p. 6 (cropped area of 246 lakh hectares, 2023–24); pp. 7–8 (field technical staff, Krishi Vigyan Kendras, state agricultural universities); p. 17 (VISTAAR). https://krishi.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/Pdf/MahaAgri%20AI%20Policy%202025%20-%202029%20English.pdf.

[3] Ibid. Note 1.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers’ Welfare, Government of India. “AI farmer revolution to begin from Jaipur…” Press Information Bureau, February 16, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2228842&reg=3&lang=2; and “Rollout of BHARAT-VISTAAR Platform.” Press Information Bureau, March 13, 2026 (written reply, Rajya Sabha). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2239788&reg=3&lang=1.

[5] Ibid. Note 4, Press Information Bureau release of February 16, 2026 (“Services and language capabilities available at launch”).

[6] Ibid. Note 4, Press Information Bureau release of February 16, 2026 (“Services and languages to be added phase-wise”).

[7] Ibid. Note 1.

[8] Karya. “Building a Tribal Language Voice Assistant Co-built with Communities.” Accessed September 2026. https://www.karya.in/case-studies/bhili-tribal-language-voice-assistant/; and IndiaAI, AIKosh. “Dehwali Bhili Conversational Dataset” (Project Astitva). https://aikosh.indiaai.gov.in/home/datasets/details/dehwali_bhili_conversational_dataset.html

[9] EkStep Foundation. “Voice AI.” Accessed September 2026. https://voiceai.ekstep.org/.

[10] Ibid. Note 2, Part C, Phase IV (independent impact evaluation and cost-effectiveness analysis).

[11] Ibid. Note 2, Part E (Budget Allocation).

[12] Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Institute, Center for Open Societal Systems and Protean eGov Technologies. Press release on the launch of Ethiopia OpenAgriNet. Addis Ababa, February 3, 2026. https://cms.proteantech.in/sites/default/files/2026-02/Press%20Release%2011.pdf.pdf.

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The Group of Twenty (G20), a consequential plurilateral grouping, is the creation of 21st-century diplomacy. So far, it has commanded much space in international discourse. It has also facilitated regular annual interactions among key world leaders on global issues, serving as an indicator of their willingness to collaborate to address shared challenges. The G20 comprises 19 countries, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). As the premier forum for international cooperation, it accounts for approximately 85 per cent of global GDP, over 75 per cent of global trade and around two-thirds of the world’s population.

In this broader context, South Africa’s G20 presidency from December 2024 to November 2025 was exceptional in several respects. First, it was the last presidency in the first cycle of G20 members hosting the annual summit between 2008 and 2025. Second, the Johannesburg Summit was historic, as it marked the first G20 summit held on African soil. Third, this presidency was the fourth consecutive time a country from the Global South had the opportunity to lead the G20, following the presidencies of Indonesia, India and Brazil during 2021–24. Fourth, it was the third summit at which the AU participated as a full member rather than as a guest. Finally, it was a presidency that began well and was conducted with much thought, care and vision by the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and his team, despite numerous challenges. Yet his term ended with a mixed outcome: while it delivered a successful summit, it also led to a serious crisis in U.S.-South Africa relations, ultimately symbolised by the U.S. decision to bar South Africa from participating in all G20 activities during the U.S. presidency in 2025-26. Thus, it became a story of triumph tinged with a sad end.

This essay proposes tracking and assessing the trajectory of South Africa’s G20 presidency before, during and after the Johannesburg Summit. It then offers a critical assessment of the summit’s outcomes, the G20’s current position and its immediate prospects.

Pathway to the Summit

At the G20 closing and handover ceremony of the Leaders’ summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 19, 2024, President Ramaphosa delivered substantive remarks, thanking Brazil ‘on a most successful G20 Presidency’ and commending the host nation for ‘elevating the participation of social and civil society groups in the work of the G20 by convening the first ever Social Summit’.^[1] He also used the occasion to outline the approach of South Africa’s presidency, which was due to commence in a few days.

‘We will work to ensure that no one is left behind’, he asserted.^[2] Disclosing that the theme for South Africa’s presidency would be ‘Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability’, he added that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 would be one of his priorities. Another important task would be to ‘bring the development priorities of the African continent and the Global South more firmly onto the agenda of the G20’.^[3] Among the top priorities, he listed the following: Economic Growth; Industrialisation, Employment and Inequality; Food Security; and Artificial Intelligence and Innovation for Sustainable Development. He also announced plans to hold approximately 130 meetings across South Africa, inviting all members and guests. ^[4]

Several features of the pre-summit activities drew attention. First, South Africa engaged other African countries in G20 activities. A successful dialogue on ‘Debt Sustainability’ was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and outreach meetings on ‘Food Security’ and ‘Industrialisation’ were convened in Cairo (Egypt) and Abuja (Nigeria), respectively. Second, a novel endeavour was the launch of a new 10-year Compact with Africa (CwA), co-chaired by South Africa and Germany, to secure higher inclusive growth, employment and reduced inequality across the African continent. Third, the G20 Africa Expert Panel, chaired by the former South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, presented its report, offering practical strategies to advance Africa’s collective developmental interests.^[5]

Fourth, the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality, led by economist Joseph E. Stiglitz, highlighted the ill effects of rising inequality. It noted, ‘Globally between 2000 and 2024, the richest 1% captured 41% of all new wealth, in contrast to just 1% being captured by the bottom half of humanity.’^[6] It recommended establishing an International Panel on Inequality (IPI), modelled on the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with a mandate to support governments and multilateral agencies across the G20 countries.^[7]

In accordance with G20 tradition, South Africa hosted a series of preparatory meetings that brought together non-official institutions and think tanks, as well as officials and ministers. The G20 Foreign Ministers held their second meeting in New York on 25 September 2025. The meeting articulated a renewed commitment to the UN and multilateralism, and to strengthening the global trading system, ‘with the World Trade Organization at its core’.^[8] There was also a clear consensus that Africa must occupy its rightful place in shaping the future of the world economy. The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors met in Washington, DC, on October 15 and 16 and noted the global economy’s resilience despite ongoing uncertainty and challenges. A concrete outcome was the ‘Ministerial Declaration on Debt Sustainability’, which set out a series of tangible measures. G20 governments may take steps to comprehensively address the debt and vulnerabilities of low- and middle-income countries.^[9]

Just before the Leaders’ Summit, and in line with Brazil’s model, the G20 Social Summit was held in Johannesburg from November 18 to 20. It drew on Africa’s tradition of inclusive dialogue and consensus-building and, more specifically, on a year-long outreach programme under the South African presidency, including over 230 community dialogues held under the banner of a ‘people’s G20’.^[10]  The conference’s final declaration reflects the collective voice and agency of international organisations, engagement groups, civil society networks, communities and social partners in shaping a people-centred contribution to the G20 Leaders Track.^[11]  The declaration strongly advocated digital inclusion and equitable transformation; trade, resilience and inclusive value chains; inclusive climate justice, a just transition and energy democracy; fair, sustainable finance and an international financial architecture; and building momentum to achieve the SDGs. It called for urgent, measurable action to find inclusive and sustainable solutions, with progress measured not only by economic growth but also by dignity, equality, opportunities, and the well-being of all people and the environment.^[12]

However, a worrying aspect of the prelude to the Johannesburg Summit was the escalating differences and tensions between South Africa, the host nation, and the U.S., the most powerful member of the G20. At government-level meetings, the U.S. did not send representatives, leaving its Embassy in Pretoria to represent the U.S. government. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in February 2025 that he would abstain from G20 deliberations, a pattern followed by his other ministerial colleagues throughout the year. The U.S. was critical of South Africa’s policy towards its white farmers and dissatisfied with several aspects of the G20 agenda under South Africa’s leadership.

Against this backdrop, the U.S.’s absence from the G20 Troika was a handicap for the G20 presidency. As the summit approached, U.S. President Donald Trump first announced that Vice President J. D. Vance would represent the country. Subsequently, he decided that the U.S .would not attend the Johannesburg conference. In response, President Ramaphosa stated that ‘boycott politics does not work’ as the summit was set to take substantive decisions, adding that the US’s absence would be ‘their loss’ (Ngcobo, 2025). A South African diplomat observed in New Delhi that the absence of the U.S. constituted a rebuff to Africa, the Global South and the G20 itself.

Eventually, the highest leaders from several member states were absent from the G20 summit. This, together with the U.S. boycott, cast a dark shadow over the summit. Yet all those who attended contributed to the conference’s success.

Highlights of the Summit

In his opening remarks, President Ramaphosa highlighted the essence of the G20 deliberations, emphasising that they ‘have an impact on the lives of all members of the global community’.^[13] The grouping’s focus has expanded from broad macroeconomic issues to a wide array of global concerns, including trade, sustainable development, health, education, science and technology, agriculture, energy, the environment, climate change and more. G20 members understood that progress on ‘each and all of these issues is a necessary condition for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth’.^[14] He emphasised the historic significance of the G20 holding its first summit in Africa. He added, ‘We should not allow anything to diminish the value, the stature or the impact of the first African G20 Presidency’.^[15]

The Leaders’ Summit ran for two days, during which, at the outset, the Leaders’ Declaration, negotiated over the preceding months, was adopted by consensus of all present. This was rightly presented as a major achievement, given the constraints under which South Africans had to operate. The Johannesburg Declaration focussed on the need to respond to global calls regarding the major imperatives of our time: ending poverty in all its forms, reducing inequality within and among countries, and taking urgent action to combat climate change. How these aims could be achieved was detailed in 122 paragraphs of the declaration. At the conclusion of the summit, President Ramaphosa offered a sober report card, providing a robust response to sceptics and critics questioning the summit’s achievements. He stressed that it represented not mere words but a commitment to concrete action, enabling joint efforts on issues of shared concern. The host government also published a document listing the successes and highlights of the South African presidency.^[16]

Accentuated by the absence of many of the G20 member states’ top leaders, the conference provided an opportunity for the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) leaders—the President of Brazil, the Prime Minister of India and the host—to guide and shape the deliberations. In addition, European leaders and others played their due role.

From the Indian perspective, it is important to note that several themes pursued during India’s presidency were subsequently taken up by Brazil and then by South Africa. Prime Minister Modi actively participated in several sessions and highlighted shortcomings in global economic development. He called for redefining the parameters of development, which could be achieved by adopting the ‘Integral Humanism’ pathway.^[17] Specifically, he presented six proposals for his fellow leaders’ consideration and acceptance. These were: the creation of a global traditional knowledge repository; the G20 Africa skills multiplier initiative; the G20 global healthcare response team; the G20 initiative to combat the drug-terror nexus; the G20 critical minerals circularity initiative; and the G20 open satellite data partnership.^[18] He also called for a greater role for the Global South in global governance. In effect, his message to the G20 was to pursue sustainable development, trusted trade, fair finance and inclusive prosperity.^[19]

Aftermath of the Summit

The closing ceremony of the Leaders’ Summit was somewhat marred by ‘the gavel controversy’. The absence of the U.S. President or Vice President at the summit posed a challenge for the outgoing presidency in arranging the handover of the conference gavel to the incoming presidency. Washington urged South African officials to have President Ramaphosa hand it over to a senior representative of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. This was unacceptable to the South African side. Instead, the President placed the gavel on the table at the end of his closing remarks. Later, the South African State Protocol handed it over to a U.S. diplomat.

This episode prompted the U.S. President to make a statement on social media on 26 November 2025. He stated:

The U.S. did not attend the G20 in South Africa because the South African Government refuses to acknowledge or address the horrific human rights abuses endured by Afrikaners and other descendants of Dutch, French, and German settlers. To put it more bluntly, they are killing white people and randomly allowing their farms to be taken from them… At the conclusion of the G20, South Africa refused to hand off the G20 Presidency to a Senior Representative from our U.S. Embassy, who attended the Closing Ceremony. Therefore, at my direction, South Africa will NOT be receiving an invitation to the 2026 G20, which will be hosted in the Great City of Miami, Florida, next year. South Africa has demonstrated to the world they are not a country worthy of membership anywhere, and we are going to stop all payments and subsidies to them, effective immediately. Thank you for your attention to this matter!^[20]

In response, the South African government issued a statement on November 27, clarifying its position:

South Africa is a member of the G20 in its own name and right…. South Africa will continue to participate as a full, active and constructive member of the G20. We call on members of the G20 to reaffirm its continued operation in the spirit of multilateralism, based on consensus, with all members participating on an equal footing in all of its structures.^[21]

Despite protests by the South African government and considerable unease among G20 members, South Africa’s absence from G20 activities hosted under the US presidency was expected to remain unchanged.

Whither the G20?

President Ramaphosa highlighted the successes of his country’s stewardship of the G20 during his address to the nation on the last day of South Africa’s presidency. He cited the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative in South Africa, who said, ‘South Africa delivered a G20 that showed the world what African leadership looks like – dignified, strategic, and people centred’.^[22] The President also listed the following important decisions: agreements and actions to improve the lives of people in South Africa and around the world; agreement on mechanisms to provide relief to countries with unsustainable debt levels; increased funding and support to countries facing climate disasters, for climate action and a just energy transition; appropriate action concerning critical minerals to help the countries from where they are extracted; and on artificial intelligence. He added that the G20 would work with willing partners to establish an ‘International Panel on Inequality’.^[23]

Three days later, on December 3, Secretary of State Rubio issued a statement welcoming ‘a New G20’ (2025). He illustrated three priorities for the U.S. presidency: removing regulatory burdens, unblocking affordable and secure energy supply chains, and pioneering new technologies and innovation. He stated that Poland, one of the world’s 20 largest economies, would take its rightful place in the G20, and stressed, ‘The contrast with South Africa, host of this year’s G20, is stark’. Listing the U.S. grievances against Pretoria, Rubio observed that ‘the radical ANC-led South African government has sought to scapegoat its own citizens and the U.S.’ Further, he provided ample justification for not extending an invitation to the South African government to participate in the G20 ‘during our presidency’ (ibid.).

Seasoned observers described the Johannesburg Summit as ‘lacklustre’ or ‘a partial success’. Huang Tran wrote, ‘One memorable impression left by the 2025 G20 Summit under South Africa’s presidency was the empty chairs: six leaders—from the U.S., China, Russia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Argentina—were absent’ (2025). In fact, the top leaders of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia were also absent. Thus, ‘only 67% of G20 members sent their leaders, the lowest portion ever’ (Kirton, 2025). According to John Kirton of the G20 Research Group, the 20th summit in November 2025 produced ‘a substantial performance’. He presented this assessment after examining the South African record through the lens of ‘six major dimensions’, namely domestic political management, deliberation, direction- setting, decision-making, delivery and the development of global governance. He noted, ‘Thus, for the Johannesburg Summit, the G20 faced its most severe stress test from within or without and both survived and thrived’ (Kirton, 2025).

Despite this positive assessment, it is difficult to conclude that the G20 is heading in the right direction, given the public display of disunity. The undisputed fact was that South Africa—its outgoing president—would not participate in the forum’s activities the following year. There were indications that the G20 might revert to its original mandate of promoting only macroeconomic stability measures and avoiding the Global South’s agenda, which centres on assisting developing countries and addressing their concerns. It was also evident that the Johannesburg Declaration lacked the support or concurrence of the U.S. government. In fact, it was known to have raised objections to several of its key elements. Hence, serious disunity within the G20 emerged as a major challenge. This was certain to weaken the political resolve of other G20 members to implement the decisions emanating from this declaration. Thus, the G20’s tilt towards developing economies, secured after strenuous endeavours by the past four presidencies, may prove ineffective, after all.

The coming months of 2026 are expected to reveal its true trajectory, culminating in the Miami Summit in December 2026. By then, it should be clear whether the G20 has become stronger or weaker than it was at the end of 2025.

A critical parameter for judging the G20’s future performance may be the attention it pays to an in-depth assessment of the forum, which stemmed from within, titled G20@20 Review: Final Report.^[24] This was ordered by the Leaders’ Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 2024, driven by the desire to identify lessons from the first cycle of summits. The review revealed several important findings: first, the G20 has helped drive progress on shared global challenges, but its effectiveness has declined; second, members agreed that the G20 agenda must focus on promoting strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth; and third, consensus that the forum needs significant changes and reforms to fulfil its expectations in the future.

The above-cited report has presented recommendations on the agenda and structure, working methods, and outreach and engagement. It is now for the U.S. presidency to process them and guide the G20 on the right path.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was first published as: Rajiv Bhatia. 2026. ‘South Africa’s G20 Presidency: An Objective Balance Sheet’, in the IIC Quarterly, Volume 53, No. 1, Summer, pp. 15–25.

References:

[1] ‘Remarks By President Cyril Ramaphosa at the G20 Closing and Handover Ceremony of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil’, The Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 19 November 2024, https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-g20-closing-and-handover-ceremony-g20-leaders-summit-rio-de (accessed 10 July 2026).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership, Report of the South Africa G20 Africa Expert Panel for the G20 Leaders’ Summit, November 2025, https://g7g20-documents.org/fileadmin/G7G20_documents/2025/G20/South%20Africa/Leaders/3%20Miscellaneous/Report%20of%20the%20South%20Africa%20G20%20Africa%20Expert%20Panel%20for%20the%20G20%20Leaders%E2%80%99%20Summit_20251118.pdf (accessed 11 June2026).

[6] Led by Joseph E. Stiglitz, G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality: Summary and Full Report, Commissioned by the G20 South Africa Presidency, November 2025, https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202511/g20-global-inequality-report-full-and-summary.pdf (accessed 10 July 2026).

[7] Ibid.

[8] ‘Chair’s Summary: Second G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, 25 September 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/250925-foreign.html (accessed 14 February 2026).

[9] ‘Ministerial Declaration on Debt Sustainability’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group , 16 October 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251016-debt.html (accessed 14 February 2026).

[10] ‘From People to Policy: The Role of Civil Society in the G20 Beyond 2025’, https://t20southafrica.org/commentaries/from-people-to-policy-the-role-of-civil-society-in-the-g20-beyond-2025/ (accessed 10 July 2026).

[11] ‘G20 Social Summit: Declaration’, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/G20-Social-Summit-2025-Declaration.pdf (accessed 11 June 2026).

[12] Ibid.

[13] ‘Statement By President Cyril Ramaphosa at the Opening of the G20 Leaders Summit’, Republic of South Africa, 22 November 2025, https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-opening-g20-leaders-summit (accessed 10 July 2026).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16]  ‘G20 South Africa Summit: Leaders’ Declaration’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group. 22 November 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251122-declaration.html (accessed 11 June 2026).

[17] ‘Prime Minister participates in G20 Summit in Johannesburg’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 22 November 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/40322/Prime_Minister_participates_in_G20_Summit_in_Johannesburg (accessed 15 February 2026).

[18] Ibid.

[19]  ‘English Translation of Prime Minister’s statement during the G20 Summit: Session 3’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 23 November 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/40328/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_statement_during_the_G20_Summit_Session_3_November_23_2025 (accessed 15 February 2026).

[20] ‘Statement by US President Donald Trump on Truth Social’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, 26 November 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251126-trump.html (accessed February 15 2026).

[21] ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa Notes US statement on South Africa’s G20 Participation’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, 27 November 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251127-ramaphosa.html (accessed 15 February 2026).

[22] ‘President Cyril Ramaphosa: Address to the Nation on the Conclusion of G20 South Africa’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, 30 November 2025, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251130-ramaphosa.html (accessed 16 February 2028).

[23] Ibid.

[24] G20@20 Review: Final Report, https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/20251205_-_FINAL_VERSION_-_ G20@20_Report_with_Annexes.pdf (accessed 11 June 2026).

Kirton, John. 2025. ‘The Substantial Performance of the G20’s 2025 Johannesburg Summit’, G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, 24 November. https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/251124-kirton-performance.html (accessed 10 July 2026).

Ngcobo, Khanyisile. 2025. ‘“It’s Their Loss”: South African Leader Hits Back at Trump’s Decision to Skip G20 Summit’, BBC, 12 November. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70jy0gzp84o (accessed 15 February 2026).

Rubio, Marco. 2025. ‘America Welcomes a New G20’, G20 Information Centre, 3 December. https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2026/251203-rubio.html (accessed 21 February 2026).

Tran, Hung. 2025. ‘After a Lackluster G20 in South Africa, Trump can Take the Group “Back to Basics” in 2026’, Atlantic Council, 25 November. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/after-a-lackluster-g20-in-south-africa-trump

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The recent attacks in Saudi Arabia, allegedly carried out by non-state actors in Iraq and Yemen aligned with the Iranians, failed to trigger the much-touted “Article 5″ of the newly signed Mecca Accord and did not result in Pakistan and Türkiye coming to the aid of Saudi Arabia to defend against the outside military aggression.

Sceptics of the Mecca Accord have been quick to dismiss the Mecca Accord itself, in light of these recent developments, as being completely ineffective and worthless. The right conclusion that must be drawn at this point is more nuanced. What has been made absolutely clear now is that the scope of the Accord does not include actions of non-state actors, irrespective of their real or perceived allegiance or alignment with other state actors. The Accord is a deterrent to direct military action from state actors, and its validity has in no way been compromised by the recent events. If anything, there is more clarity on what the Accord covers and what it does not.

The Mecca Accord, or the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, represents a structural turning point in regional security. Its dimensions go beyond the boundaries of emerging traditional military alliances, expressing a deep cognitive and strategic shift among regional powers regarding the concepts of security and deterrence.

This agreement has crystallised in a security environment marked by the growing fragility of existing arrangements and the rising role of non-conventional threats — ballistic missiles, drones, and hybrid maritime threats. These have moved threats of conflict directly into the strategic depth of states, turning critical infrastructure, energy facilities, ports, and international shipping lanes into core targets in the equations of regional competition.

Amid this complex geopolitical approach, conventional defence partnerships and reliance on unilateral security guarantees from major powers have receded. This thus imposes an urgent need to re-engineer the security architecture of states through a strategy of “diversifying and managing risk” so as to free states from confining the cost of defensive deterrence to the decision of a single external party.

From this analytical perspective, the significance of the Mecca Agreement is its strategic endeavour to move from a model of centralised security guarantees to a formula of multilateral networked deterrence. This strategic shift does not entail Saudi Arabia abandoning its powerful traditional partnerships with the U.S. or strategic engagements with countries like India, nor does it mean Türkiye detaches from its Atlantic commitments, nor does it present Pakistan as a substitute for strategic axes with major powers.

Instead, this geopolitical triangle establishes a new structural layer in the architecture of regional security, resting on the internationalisation of mutual security interests and the broadening of their scope. Accordingly, the strategic value of the agreement is not measured quantitatively by the size of military mobilisation or material capabilities deployed, but is measured strategically by its capacity to maximise the adversary’s “state of uncertainty” — by obscuring the determinants of a possible response (its nature, scale, and timing).

This dynamic intersects with the deeper structural dilemma facing the concept of the “security guarantee” in the Middle East, where successive crises and security threats over the past decade, and most recently with the U.S.-Iran war, have exposed the inadequacy of traditional external protection arrangements in curbing the repercussions of regional conflicts or neutralising their fallout on partner states’ territories and vital interests.

Current data indicate that the escalating intensity of cyber threats and asymmetric attacks, alongside overlapping theatres of operations and the exposure of maritime chokepoints and critical energy networks, has reshaped the concept of regional national security into an inseparable part of the region’s overall security environment. From this standpoint, the strategic standard has shifted from merely activating traditional deterrent capabilities to managing the escalation equation and preserving strategic ambiguity regarding the limits and scope of any response. It is here that the Mecca Agreement becomes a fundamental shift in regional strategic thought — a transition from the “unilateral security umbrella” approach to a model of “solidarity-based security pluralism” aimed at diversifying risk and achieving deterrent balance through a network of mutual commitments that raise the cost of any aggression.

Yet the real test of this security structure’s success lies in its ability to give joint action a practical, field-level form — that is, moving the agreement from its symbolic diplomatic character into the realm of operational application through the drafting of clear protocols for command, control, intelligence coordination, and immediate-response mechanisms.

The changing strategic orientations of some of the U.S.’ traditional allies in the region are being notably welcomed by Moscow, particularly given these states’ efforts to shape an emerging regional security system based on an independent vision and the concept of self-sovereignty, away from structural dependence on the American security umbrella. In this context, Russian decision-makers see in these shifts a ripe opportunity to root and strengthen military and technological partnerships with the Arab Gulf states. This cooperation is evident in joint military manufacturing, missile technology, air defence systems, and electronic warfare technologies, allowing Moscow to expand its arms influence in the region.

On the other side, Beijing adopts a stance marked by cautious diplomacy. Although it has so far refrained from issuing official public positions, media circles and think tanks close to Chinese decision-making circles have devoted intensive research attention to the event. These readings oscillate between strategic endorsement and hedging, with Chinese reports attributing the emergence of this alliance to declining levels of regional confidence in American security guarantees.

This view intersects with China’s political doctrine, which emphasises that Middle Eastern states should shape their own regional security independently, away from external interference. In this framework, official media such as the Xinhua news agency have promoted the Mecca agreement as a practical model of the concept of “common and sustainable security” that Beijing champions, provided it rests on strategic balance and independent self-deterrence. Nevertheless, Chinese circles express concern about the possibility of this alliance sliding toward a direct and open regional confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This could place Beijing — which maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with Tehran — under complex political pressures, pushing it toward a forced alignment that could affect the balance of its regional relations.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement constitutes a telling indicator of a qualitative shift in regional security doctrine. The central question crystallises is this: Can this alliance craft a new security architecture in the region?

From this, several sub-questions arise, namely:

1. What are the shared strategic motives and geopolitical interests driving the three parties toward this rapprochement?

2. What added value do the military capabilities and geostrategic positions of these states bring to the regional security equation?

3. To what extent can the agreement translate political rapprochement into an operationally activatable defence commitment?

4. What are the potential repercussions of this security arrangement on the nature of the American role, the calculations of regional powers such as Iran, and the balance of power in the Gulf and Middle East regions?

5. Does the Mecca Agreement represent merely a situational response to a mounting crisis of confidence in existing security arrangements, or does it lay the groundwork for a first stage toward restructuring the region’s deterrence architecture?

Axis One: The implications of the Tripartite Alliance and the intersections of power in the Gulf and the Middle East

The signing of the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif marks a telling indicator of a strategic repositioning of three regional powers seeking innovative collective security formulas. The agreement’s provisions reveal a shift in collective security perspective, driven by shared assessments that view the Middle East’s competitive environment as a compound security dilemma that cannot be contained through traditional bilateral cooperation frameworks or singular international sponsorship. The adoption of the principle of “indivisible security” (treating an attack on any one party as an attack on all) forms the hard core of this emerging alliance. According to the official Turkish narrative, this agreement goes beyond symbolic dimensions toward tactical and operational ones, codifying structural coordination mechanisms that bring together the highest political and military levels (foreign affairs, defence, and chiefs of staff), and establishing an advanced stage of mutual dependence through intensified field exercises and developing partnerships in the defence industries sector and localising military technology.

The geopolitical significance of this agreement stems not only from its legal frameworks and contractual provisions but is also clearly manifest in its geostrategic dimensions: the three parties form a geographic triangle stretching from the Arab Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean and South Asia. In this context, Saudi Arabia represents a geoeconomic centre of gravity and a principal axis for energy and geopolitics in the Gulf region, while Türkiye lends this axis advanced military and industrial depth, as well as its strategic position as a bridge linking the Middle East, Europe, and the Black Sea basin. Pakistan, for its part, ensures the system’s extension toward the Arabian Sea and South Asia, drawing on its nuclear deterrent capabilities and accumulated military expertise.

Accordingly, the agreement does not represent a grouping of identical or resource-equivalent powers, but rests on a functional integration linking three distinct types of power: Saudi financial and geoeconomic influence, Turkish military and industrial capabilities, and Pakistani military and deterrent depth. This structural composition gives the agreement its latent strategic value as a flexible network for pooling capabilities and comparative advantages, thereby transcending the classical formulas of traditional military alliances.

Historically and institutionally, the announcement of the agreement on August 7 was not a sudden or unexpected event, but rather the culmination of a multi-stage negotiating process. On January 15, 2026, Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production, Muhammad Raza Hayat Hiraj, said that Islamabad, Riyadh, and Ankara had already drafted a trilateral defence agreement following consultations that lasted nearly a full year, stressing that this draft was structurally distinct from the Saudi-Pakistani bilateral defence agreement announced in 2025. Hiraj noted at the time that the trilateral scheme required a final consensus among the three capitals before proceeding to a formal conclusion. This information received wide media coverage, including in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper,^[1] providing proof that the agreement was not merely an ad hoc response or tactical reaction to a sudden crisis, but the product of a prior, planned political and strategic process.

The strategic significance of this approach becomes clear when unpacking Riyadh’s defence determinants: Saudi orientations do not reflect a radical shift in its traditional alliances, nor a replacement of the American partner with Turkey and Pakistan, so much as they signal a strategy of “diversifying the deterrence umbrella” and reducing the risks of unilateral security dependence. This vision is driven by current Gulf security experience, which has shown that the defence partnership with Washington does not provide an absolute guarantee of protecting critical infrastructure or shipping lanes and oil facilities from targeting.

As the fluidity of the regional scene grows and the lines between proxy and direct wars blur, the added value of this agreement lies in internationalising the security response to any threat directed at Riyadh, transforming it from a bilateral confrontation into a multilateral crisis. Ankara emerges as a pivotal actor in this equation given its weight within the European security system and its NATO membership, as well as its growing military manufacturing capabilities. Islamabad, in turn, lends the tripartite arrangement a strategic dimension as a nuclear power with field depth and a geopolitical position overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, and contiguous borders with Iran. Thus, Pakistan’s integration helps expand the scope of Saudi security calculations to extend from the Arab Gulf to South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

As for the Turkish approach, this agreement is consistent with a broader Turkish strategic orientation toward diversifying its defence and industrial partnerships and building alliances with regional powers outside traditional Western security frameworks. In an effort to dispel regional concerns, the Turkish leadership took care to give the agreement a cooperative, non-directed character: President Erdoğan affirmed and echoed the stance of the leadership of all three involved parties that the partnership does not target any specific international party, but rests on strengthening security cooperation and developing joint manufacturing capabilities, while keeping flexibility for states wishing to join in support of regional stability. Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, for his part, noted that the current arrangements integrate three main dimensions: collective security, deterrence, and military-industrial partnership.

Islamabad’s positions, by contrast, reflect a two-dimensional reading that combines strategic opportunities with geopolitical caveats. While Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif described the agreement as “historic,” Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar focused on the purely defensive character of the alliance, distancing it from any polarisation directed against other parties. The analytical significance of the Pakistani discourse lies in its positioning within three interrelated contexts: shared deterrence, mutual security, and integrative defence cooperation. This structural gradation matters because it shifts the weight of the agreement from a mere traditional commitment to mutual military intervention during crises, toward building a sustainable, proactive deterrence environment based on developing shared capabilities and defence institutions.

Geopolitically, the timing of the agreement’s conclusion is no less significant than its substantive dimensions: the signing came amid a notable escalation in regional tensions and growing threats from missile and drone attacks on the Gulf countries from Iran, which targeted energy facilities, ports, and vital shipping lanes. Saudi Arabia had security concerns over the possible spread of the conflict and its repercussions on its own territory. On August 6 — one day before the agreement was signed — press reports ^[2] relayed that Riyadh was bracing for possible coordinated attacks by Iran-aligned groups from both north and south, targeting civilian and economic infrastructure and energy and airport facilities. The signing of the Mecca Agreement the following day thus carried deterrent significance at a moment when the risks of the conflict spreading from its traditional theatres into the depth of the Arab Gulf states were rising.

Objective analysis requires avoiding exaggeration in classifying this agreement as a fully formed “Islamic NATO” system. The structural determinant of any effective defence alliance does not stop at political declarations expressing solidarity, but lies in the practical enforceability of its shared commitments. This requires examining the alliance’s institutional indicators: the availability of joint military command, the nature of decision-making mechanisms, the existence of dedicated forces or unified operational plans, as well as how divergences of interest would be managed should one of the signatory states face external aggression. These questions take on fundamental weight given the three states’ lack of an identical threat environment or unified geostrategic priorities. Accordingly, the agreement in its current phase can more accurately be approached as an emerging framework for mutual deterrence and security coordination, rather than yet being an institutional collective-defence system.

Thus, the strategic thesis put forward by the Mecca Agreement transcends the debate over establishing a regional version of “NATO,” touching instead on the essence of the transformation in the concept of collective security in the Middle East. The agreement’s making a unilateral strike against any one party and undermining a shared regional interest system is the hard core of the agreement’s geopolitical significance. It is the primary driver behind the intensive monitoring shown by international and regional decision-making capitals — including Washington, Tehran, Jerusalem, Ankara, Islamabad, New Delhi, Doha and Riyadh — since it represents a signal of the fate of the regional balance of power. The accord, it appears, is looking increasingly attractive to many other countries in the region.

Axis two: from umbrella dependence to deterrence network engineering: how Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are redrawing the regional security equation outside American monopoly

The current structural shift in the Gulf security system is no longer confined to the traditional dimensions of arms deals or expanding the network of formal alliances; it now reflects a fundamental redefinition of the very concept of “security guarantee” itself.

For decades, the stable security equation in the Arab Gulf rested on a two-part premise: the U.S., as the dominant external power, committed to translating its strategic military superiority into direct field protection for its allies when necessary, in exchange for Gulf states providing military facilities, logistical bases, funding, and shared political positioning, as well as securing energy flows. However, recent geopolitical interactions in the Middle East have exposed a growing functional gap between the superpower’s ability to deter and punish adversaries and its operational inability to repel a “first strike” or provide sustained protection for critical infrastructure.

The Mecca Accord is practically an example of the transition from a “traditional security umbrella” model to a “multilateral deterrence network” model.

The dimensions of such an agreement typically extend beyond the traditional defensive character toward institutionalising the partnership through multiple tracks, including:

1. Establishing high-level political and military coordination mechanisms involving defence and foreign ministers and chiefs of staff.

2. Launching joint training programmes and cross-domain exercises (land, sea, air, and cyber).

3. Developing a strategic partnership in defence manufacturing, technology transfer, developing artificial intelligence algorithms, autonomous systems, and electronic warfare.

This represents a flexible, modular, regionally expandable platform aimed at closing security gaps and building self-sufficient capabilities able to adapt to the new generation of warfare.

Can this agreement craft a new level of regional deterrence that helps reduce Saudi Arabia’s reliance on the security decision of a single central capital without producing a structural break with the U.S.? Riyadh does not plan to replace Washington’s security umbrella with an alliance with Ankara or Islamabad. It just wants to raise the cost of any potential aggression and complicate the strategic calculations of any regional adversary.

A chronological comparison of the alliance track reveals the depth of this shift: on September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the “Mutual Strategic Defense Agreement” in Riyadh, whose legal formula stipulated activating a joint-defence clause and treating any aggression against either state as a direct attack on the other. Arab News^[3] described this agreement in September 2025 as representing a qualitative shift in bilateral defence relations, while the Council on Foreign Relations^[4] noted that the agreement reflected the geopolitical repercussions following the Israeli attack on Doha and came amid a comprehensive regional reassessment of the reliability of traditional security arrangements. Turkey’s accession in August 2026 moved the agreement out of its bilateral framework into a three-dimensional alliance space.

The geostrategic value of this space is amplified when analysed in light of current shifts in global energy transit routes. The Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely a Gulf shipping artery but a centre of gravity for the international political economy: oil flows through it in 2025 amounted to roughly 20.9 million barrels per day according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, equivalent to about one-fifth of global seaborne oil trade. On the other side of the geopolitical picture, the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, alongside strategic ports (Jeddah, Yanbu, and Jazan), form direct pillars of Saudi security calculations. Field data observed in August 2026 show ships linked to the Kingdom disabling tracking devices to evade Houthi threats, while rerouting shipments northward through Egypt’s vital corridors (the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline). These behavioural shifts confirm that Saudi strategic security requires a complex system that cannot be reduced to protecting land borders or countering traditional air threats. It represents a “security value chain” that begins at the oil well and the port, passes through air and maritime domains, and intersects with data security and supply chains. Accordingly, diversifying partnerships and building multiple alliances has become an urgent security necessity for Riyadh to manage and neutralise risk, not merely a supplementary diplomatic manoeuvre.

This is attributable to a conceptual shift in Saudi security doctrine, from a strategy of “buying protection” to “engineering interdependence.” Statistical data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2024 show Riyadh spending about $80.3 billion on the defence sector, placing it first regionally and sixth globally, alongside a surge in Middle East military spending that reached $243 billion (a 15% increase compared to 2023). These quantitative indicators show that the Saudi security dilemma does not lie in a shortage of financial resources needed to mobilise military power, but in how to convert this spending into self-sufficient, sustainable deterrent and defensive capabilities.

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched on June 28, 2004, represents a notable historical milestone for security cooperation between the alliance and Middle Eastern states, with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE formally joining, while Saudi Arabia and Oman limited their participation to specific activities without formal membership. This historical data carries analytical significance, reflecting Riyadh’s pursuit, for more than two decades, of benefiting from Western capabilities, standards, and expertise while preserving the plurality of its strategic options and avoiding confining its national security reference to a single international institution. Accordingly, Türkiye in the Mecca Agreement cannot be considered a Saudi gateway toward NATO, but rather embodies a more complex geopolitical phenomenon: a NATO member state deploying its Atlantic expertise to craft security arrangements outside the direct Atlantic structure.

This dynamic reveals Ankara’s ability to operate flexibly within and outside Western institutions simultaneously, exploiting its geostrategic position, military capabilities, and growing defence industries. Its approach has been practically demonstrated in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, where Ankara has proven the efficiency of its operational model based on integrating drones, electronic-warfare tools, intelligence support, and local forces to achieve military and political goals at a lower strategic and economic cost than traditional intervention models.

Nevertheless, Türkiye’s comparative advantage remains constrained by structural determinants: Ankara has its own separate interests in the files of Syria, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus, as well as complex economic relations with Russia, and in its strategic calculations toward Iran, Israel, and the U.S. Accordingly, any Turkish commitment toward Riyadh or Islamabad will remain subject to the Turkish leadership’s assessment of the nature of crises and the requirements of its national interest, reinforcing a well-established fact in international relations: that alliances do not eliminate states’ national interests, but organise their strategic intersections.

As for Pakistan, it lends this triangle different dimensions related to “military depth” and the indirect nuclear determinant. However, this point requires methodological precision: describing the Mecca Agreement as a Pakistani nuclear umbrella for Saudi Arabia would exceed the agreement’s declared terms. While Pakistan’s nuclear power is a standing geostrategic fact, the agreement does not automatically include a formal nuclear commitment to defend the Kingdom.

In this context, there is a fundamental legal and strategic difference between the concepts of ‘alliance with a nuclear state’, ‘extended nuclear deterrence’, and ‘nuclear sharing’. Accordingly, the term “nuclear shadow” becomes more precise and objective than the term “nuclear umbrella”: an adversary’s mere awareness that any critical escalation against Saudi Arabia could trigger a military response from a nuclear power like Pakistan helps raise the cost of an offensive approach, even in the absence of declared mechanisms for activating defensive deterrence. By contrast, codifying this possibility and turning it into an actual security guarantee requires explicit political will, shared command-and-control channels, and precise definition of the nature of existential threats – determinants that still lack sufficient public indicators at present.

India stands out as one of the most significant structural determinants constraining the prospects of expanding Pakistan’s cross-regional military commitments, since Islamabad’s strategic and defence doctrine has historically been shaped under the weight of its security dilemma and geopolitical rivalry with New Delhi, not in the context of Arab Gulf security interactions. Accordingly, Pakistan’s engagement in new regional defence arrangements does not necessarily mean it can transfer its military weight and deploy its operational capabilities in the Middle East – as witnessed by its recent refusal to come to Riyadh’s defence against the Houthi attacks.

This refusal has come before, and offers a telling reference point for the trajectory of Saudi-Pakistani relations: the Pakistani parliament’s 2015 decision to refuse participation in the Riyadh-led military coalition in Yemen, despite the depth of bilateral ties. This episode confirms Islamabad’s ability to structurally separate “commitment to defending Saudi regional sovereignty” from involvement in “regional conflicts subject to Riyadh’s strategic choices.”

These facts necessitate refining the concept of “aggression” rather than relying on the traditional alliance formulas based on the principle of “collective security” (an attack on one member is an attack on all). A series of problematic questions touching the core of the agreement arise here: Would the targeting of critical Saudi facilities by non-state actors be classified as international aggression requiring automatic activation of the alliance? And how would the strategic response unfold if Iran-aligned groups targeted Saudi ports?

Conversely, if military conflict were to resume between Pakistan and India, would Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have a legal obligation to engage in direct confrontation with New Delhi? Similarly, would any Turkish confrontation with regional powers in the Syrian arena automatically turn into a Saudi-Pakistani security crisis? These questions are not minor procedural details but constitute the real test of the agreement’s credibility and sustainability.

In this context, the new Saudi alliance network lies within deterrence efforts aimed at preventing a slide toward comprehensive regional confrontation. Media analysis has seen some divergence, with some^[5] noting the strong symbolic dimension of the Mecca Agreement, considering that it has not yet risen to the level of a fully integrated operational system, given the absence of a precise definition of the strategic roles of the three states upon transitioning to an actual state of war. Others^[6] believe the agreement contributes to developing mechanisms of cooperation, defence coordination, and shared deterrence, based on the three parties’ affirmations of the alliance’s purely defensive nature and the exclusion of large-scale military-deployment scenarios.

According to deterrence theory literature, the success of alliances does not require their involvement in armed confrontations; rather, their success lies in entrenching adversaries’ conviction that the cost of attacking exceeds any potential strategic gains. Clearly, the arrangement with the U.S. did not fulfil its expectations in this regard, necessitating a further enhancement of the security arrangement. Consequently, any military calculations aimed at targeting Saudi Arabia would now collide with a complex network of interlocking risks, as the attacking party would have to weigh American, Turkish, and Pakistani military capabilities, as well as the possibility of international intervention (European and Asian) conditioned on protecting global energy supplies and vital maritime corridors.

This thesis represents the core of Riyadh’s new strategic doctrine, based on diversifying international partners and crafting a network of mutual interests to ensure the Kingdom’s stability, rather than being tied to traditional unilateral security arrangements. Under this approach, the U.S. retains its pivotal role as a primary military and intelligence partner, while Turkey contributes as a regional power with combat experience and an advanced defence industry, and Pakistan represents strategic and military personnel depth backed by nuclear capabilities. In parallel, the interests of major powers such as China, India, and the European Union are directly tied to the stability of global energy markets and the security of vital maritime corridors.

The structural shift moves Saudi Arabia from the concept of “a state under a protective umbrella” to a centre of gravity or “pivotal node” in a complex network of intertwined international interests.

As for Iran, the equation reshapes deterrence calculations: the cost of any targeting of the Kingdom is no longer confined to the limits of Riyadh’s direct military response, but extends to the risks of direct collision with an international and regional network of interests that includes Ankara, Islamabad, and other global powers. Accordingly, the Mecca Agreement emerges as a preventive deterrence mechanism aimed at preventing conflict from breaking out and de-escalating strategic engagement, more than being a tool for managing an active war.

On the American front, this agreement does not necessarily signal an undermining of Riyadh-Washington ties, so much as it reflects a growing tendency toward “strategic hedging” among regional partners. This strategy rests on sustaining close relations with Washington while diversifying geopolitical alternatives, aiming to enhance political manoeuvring room should American foreign-policy priorities be reshuffled. In this context, Ankara’s insistence on affirming that the Mecca Agreement does not constitute an alternative to, or intersect with, existing alliances is understandable.

Expanding the geographic and political scope of the agreement acquires great strategic importance. According to declared official positions, Türkiye has affirmed the possibility of other regional parties joining, with Egypt emerging as one of the most prominent potential actors in this expansionary track. Cairo’s future accession is likely to bring about a radical transformation in the agreement’s structural and functional nature, given Egypt’s demographic and military weight, as well as its pivotal geostrategic position linking the Arab Gulf region with the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and its direct oversight of the global shipping corridor of the Suez Canal. Bangladesh expressed a desire to join, and Saudi Arabia has since informally invited it into the Accord – a move, say some analysts^[7], that creates a Gulf-South Asia arc and an unprecedented arrangement in and beyond the Bay of Bengal.

Conversely, the possible accession of Gulf states such as the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, or Kuwait would lend this security or political arrangement a direct Gulf character. Yet this possibility remains fraught with complex sensitivities, given the divergent diplomatic approaches and external alliances of these states in managing their bilateral and multilateral relations with influential regional and international powers – specifically Türkiye, Iran, and the U.S. According to some unofficial Emirati circles, the Mecca Agreement competes directly with the Abraham Accords, with the UAE’s security and military alliance with Israel, and represents a direct threat to it. There is a reservation or unease about this alliance, and fear that it could lead to a reshaping of centres of security influence in the region away from the usual joint Gulf coordination.

On this basis, the central problem posed by the coming phase is not confined to the effectiveness of the Mecca Agreement itself, but extends to the nature of the regional security architecture forming around it. This development is confined to three possible scenarios:

1. The agreement continues as a flexible tripartite arrangement, giving Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad wider room for strategic manoeuvre.

2. The agreement gradually evolving into an expanded defence network attracting Egypt and some Gulf states.

3. An agreement serving as a complementary security layer to the American presence, such that the roles of NATO and the U.S. overlap with Asian and regional alliances within a composite structure, without excluding any other system.

Current data suggest the third scenario is more likely than the hypothesis of a break from the American umbrella, since Saudi Arabia lacks the strategic interest that would drive it to forgo superior American advantages in intelligence, early warning, air defence, and space logistics. This is matched by Turkey’s continued NATO membership, and Pakistan’s long historical, extended relationship with Washington’s security system. Accordingly, the ongoing shifts reflect a repositioning and redistribution of security guarantees, not their dismantlement.

The effectiveness of this path depends on Riyadh’s success in moving the agreement’s implications from their symbolic political context into an institutional framework, and translating them into an integrated defence and operational network encompassing intelligence-sharing, early-warning systems, missile air defence, joint military manufacturing, and unifying command, control, and training mechanisms — which would represent a qualitative shift for the Kingdom from a strategy of “arbitrary security dependence” to a pattern of “self and regional deterrence engineering.”

The sustainability of this system remains conditional on passing three structural tests:

First, the ability to place political commitments within an institutional framework, by anchoring them within a flexible vision and translating them into existing military and operational frameworks.

Second, crafting a shared security doctrine that precisely defines what constitutes “aggression,” who the enemy is, the level of threat requiring intervention, and the levels of mutual defence commitment.

Third, managing geopolitical divergences and reconciling the differing strategic interests of the three parties toward complex regional and international powers and files (such as Iran, India, Israel, Yemen, and Syria, in addition to relations with the American and Chinese poles).

Overcoming these challenges would make the Mecca Agreement a nucleus for a rising regional security architecture. Conversely, failure to move beyond symbolic approaches and diplomatic statements will keep the agreement merely a political tool that Riyadh uses to raise the cost of external threats and send crossed strategic messages to Washington, Tehran, and its regional surroundings — signalling that Saudi national security is no longer hostage to traditional bilateral security arrangements, but is moving toward diversifying risk and building a multilateral network of alliances, capabilities, and shared interests.

Axis three: the Mecca Agreement and the re-engineering of regional balances: India, Iran, and Israel testing the limits of Saudi deterrence and strategic independence

The strategic requirements of New Delhi, Tehran, and Tel Aviv each reveal the structural limits facing the Mecca Agreement in its efforts to leverage the tripartite (Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani) defence cooperation as a tool for re-engineering the balance of power in the Middle East and South Asia. Accordingly, the real test of the agreement is not tied to its success in projecting geopolitical symbolism around an emerging Islamic bloc, but lies in its ability to craft a compound strategic equation that ensures the strengthening of Saudi Arabia’s deterrent and defence capabilities without militarising the partnership and turning it into a closed ideological axis, without shackling Ankara and Islamabad with automatic commitments toward Riyadh’s regional conflicts, and while avoiding provoking counter-reactions from the regional powers mentioned that could lead to new security polarisation. From this standpoint, the Mecca Agreement emerges as an applied case study of the constrained security-pluralism model, where regional defence arrangements coexist with the American strategic umbrella within a framework of integration rather than collision.

The security structure was reinforced by the tripartite step held in Mecca on August 7, 2026, whereby Türkiye joined this defence framework. According to Reuters, reporting on the date the agreement was signed, the new arrangement establishes a joint defence-coordination mechanism among Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad. In a related context, official Turkish statements issued on August 13 clarified that this framework goes beyond traditional coordination to include establishing high-level political and military mechanisms, expanding the scope of joint exercises (land, sea, air, and cyber), as well as strengthening cooperation in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, joint military manufacturing, and technology transfer. This procedural interpretation indicates that the agreement represents a gradual establishment of a sustainable security infrastructure, not merely a transitional political declaration dictated by current circumstances.

India stands out as a pivotal test case for the effectiveness of the principle of “not importing conflicts.” Pakistan’s involvement in the Saudi defence equation lends a South Asian geopolitical dimension that cannot be overlooked, particularly in the wake of the May 2025 military confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad. The Council on Foreign Relations^[8] noted that these emerging dynamics, which followed the military escalation between the two neighbours, are forcing New Delhi into a comprehensive reassessment of its security and regional environment. Indian media reports^[9] indicate that the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi is assessing the strategic repercussions of the Mecca Agreement on Indian national security and regional stability, which could prompt India to recalibrate its geopolitical calculations. Nevertheless, the geopolitical dimensions of the Indian position go beyond the traditional scope of the Kashmir file or the bilateral rivalry with Pakistan, since the Saudi approach toward India rests on considerations of partnership and integration rather than strategic rivalry, cementing New Delhi’s status as one of the key pillars of the Saudi economy in Asia.

This partnership is reflected in economic and trade indicators: during fiscal year 2024-2025, bilateral trade volume reached about $41.88 billion, with Indian exports contributing $11.76 billion, against imports from the Kingdom worth $30.12 billion, concentrated mainly in the oil, gas, petrochemicals, and fertiliser sectors. On the investment-flow front, data from the Indian embassy in Riyadh show that Saudi investments in India – including investments by the Public Investment Fund and sovereign companies – have reached nearly $10 billion, while Indian investments in the Kingdom stood at about $3 billion, alongside the activity of more than 6,000 Indian companies in the Saudi market and an Indian expatriate community of 2.74 million.

This structural interconnection makes it unlikely that Riyadh will allow its defence ties with Islamabad to undermine its strategic relations with New Delhi. This equation gains further depth given that Saudi-Indian relations have moved beyond the traditional frameworks based on energy security and goods exchange: Just a year ago, in April 2025, the two sides agreed to strengthen joint cooperation in energy, defence, and military manufacturing. This coincided with the second meeting of the Saudi-India Strategic Partnership Council in Jeddah that same month, which resulted in expanding cooperation horizons to include vital sectors such as health, space, postal services, and mutual investment. Accordingly, India occupies an advanced position in the Saudi strategy of diversifying economic and technological partners, moving beyond its traditional role as a consumer market for energy.

The strategic effectiveness of the Mecca Agreement with respect to the Indian case depends on the skilful separation of two levels: securing Saudi defence depth, and neutralising the agreement from the India-Pakistan conflict. Riyadh’s ability to preserve its economic and strategic partnership with New Delhi, alongside diversifying its defence pillars in cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, reflects the agreement’s success as a tool for achieving strategic hedging and expanding options, not as an alliance imposing mutual commitment in regional conflicts. Conversely, if India were to sense that the security arrangements arising from the agreement give Islamabad political and military leverage in the Gulf against it, the agreement would lose its flexibility and become a catalyst for Asian geopolitical polarisation within the Gulf system.

The Iranian test is of a distinctly different nature, tied to a delicate equation between the concepts of deterrence and containment. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s direct strategic interest centres on raising the political and military cost of any Iranian attack — or one carried out through non-state actors linked to it — targeting its territory or critical facilities. However, turning the Mecca Agreement into a declared military or political alliance against Tehran could impose geopolitical constraints on Riyadh exceeding its anticipated benefits.

From this standpoint, the strategic significance of both Türkiye and Pakistan emerges given their independent and direct relations and interests with Iran. Ankara shares a land border with Tehran, as well as a complex network of commercial, security, and energy interests. Similarly, Islamabad maintains a direct border with Iran, overlapping with it in vital security and economic files linked to Balochistan, the port of Gwadar, and the Arabian Sea corridors. As a result, Ankara and Islamabad’s involvement under the umbrella of the “Mecca Agreement” necessarily places a political ceiling that prevents this strategic arrangement from turning into a strictly anti-Iran alliance.

The geopolitical developments of 2026 underscore the centrality of this thesis: the Iranian variable has grown heavier in Gulf security calculations following the 2026 military escalation, which coincided with direct threats targeting energy security and freedom of maritime navigation through successive missile strikes.

The absence of clear response scenarios from the guarantor parties (Türkiye and Pakistan) toward any aggression against Saudi Arabia would empty the joint-defence clause of its military content and keep it within a symbolic framework. Conversely, excessive precision in defining rules of engagement could carry structural risks, as it raises the likelihood of border skirmishes or proxy attacks escalating into a comprehensive regional conflict directly involving all three states. It is therefore essential that the most rational formula take shape through a gradual strategy: beginning with intelligence-sharing and early-warning programs, integrating air and missile defence systems, alongside cybersecurity and joint training, moving eventually toward drafting automatic military-intervention commitments in later stages.

The Israeli axis represents the most sensitive test in the standard of Saudi-American relations, as its weight extends beyond the military dimension to redrawing the frameworks of the strategic alliance between Riyadh and Washington. For years, American foreign policy has tried to establish an approach combining security guarantees, advanced defence and technological cooperation, and exploring normalisation prospects within the regional approaches emerging from the “Abraham Accords.” According to information from the U.S. Congress ^[10], Riyadh has continuously demanded firmer security guarantees, while American responses have been limited to defensive assurances without rising to the level of a public commitment to direct military defense along the lines of NATO’s Article 5, except during the first Gulf War. The Saudi dilemma is not tied to a lack of American military presence or a decline in its vital importance in intelligence and armaments, but stems from the risks of “unilateral dependence” on an external partner whose defensive behaviour is linked to its own political calculations and shifts in its domestic environment during crises.

Geopolitical shifts in recent years have repeatedly exposed the limits of the security-dependence approach – beginning with the targeting of the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in September 2019 by the Houthis, through the questions raised about the nature of the American response to Iranian threats, and up to the widening regional conflict in 2026. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies^[11], growing Saudi doubts about the reliability of American security guarantees, alongside concern over the limited American ability to restrain Israeli behaviour, have become decisive variables shaping Riyadh’s security and political calculations, particularly regarding the normalisation file.

This is the framework in which the bilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged in September 2025, which later developed into a tripartite cooperation framework with Türkiye’s accession in the Mecca Declaration of 2026. Objective analysis requires avoiding overstating this rapprochement as an alliance directed specifically against Israel: the documents and official literature associated with the Mecca Agreement point to its defensive nature, without classifying Israel or Iran as direct threats.

However, the indirect strategic impact of this agreement on Israel remains substantively significant beyond its direct military provisions, as it contributes to undermining the “monopolistic advantage” that potential trilateral arrangements (Saudi-American-Israeli) once represented as the sole path for reshaping the regional security architecture.

There is now a need to re-read the “Abraham Accords” and move beyond approaching them as mere normalisation arrangements, understanding them instead as a key building block in a broader regional architecture aimed at building an integrated security and economic network linking Israel with Gulf states such as the UAE and Bahrain, with the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining in the future, under American political and military sponsorship and umbrella.

Riyadh’s crafting of a parallel defence framework with regional powers such as Ankara and Islamabad will bring about a qualitative shift in its negotiating position, granting Saudi decision-makers strategic flexibility that allows them to negotiate with Washington over security guarantees, with Tel Aviv over normalisation and technological cooperation, develop regional defence dimensions with Türkiye and Pakistan, as well as strengthen the partnership with Beijing in investment and infrastructure.

Ultimately, this path is consistent with current Saudi diplomatic doctrine based on “diversifying strategic partnerships” — an approach that crystallised clearly in the Saudi-Chinese rapprochement, and the mediation led by Beijing to reformulate diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran in March 2023.

The sustainability of the Mecca Agreement is determined by its ability to respond to three geopolitical challenges represented by India, Iran, and Israel as independent test circles: the Indian test centres on preventing the export of South Asian conflicts into the Gulf environment, the Iranian test rests on institutionalising sustainable deterrence that goes beyond formulas of perpetual clash, while the Israeli axis tests the mechanisms for reshaping Saudi ties with the American security system and the future of regional normalisation.

Successful Saudi management of these three circles will lead to transcending the narrow military perspective on the agreement, in favour of establishing an “alternative regional security architecture” based on “cross-cutting partnerships.”

Ambassador Mohamed Ali Chihi is a distinguished Tunisian diplomat and senior public official with over three decades of service in international relations, diplomacy, and governance. He currently serves as Executive Director of the Global Institute for Strategic Research (GISR), Doha.

This essay was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References: 

[1] “Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye Defence Deal in Pipeline, Minister Confirms,” Dawn, January 15, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1967120.

[2] “Saudi Arabia Braces for Attacks on Ports and Airports by Iraqi Militias Working with Iran-Backed Houthis,” CNN, August 6, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/06/middleeast/saudi-houthi-iran-iraq-attack-latam-intl.

[3] Jamal Al Harbi, “New Saudi-Pakistan Defense Deal Will Have Implications for Entire Region,” Arab News Pakistan, September 18, 2025, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2615737.

[4] “Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defense Pact,” Daily News Brief, Council on Foreign Relations, September 18, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/pakistan-saudi-arabia-defense-pact.

[5] Reuters, August 12, 2026

[6] The Associated Press

[7] Rami Niranjan Desai, “If Bangladesh Joins the Mecca Pact, India Will Have More to Worry About,” ThePrint, August 31, 2026, https://theprint.in/opinion/bangladesh-joins-mecca-pact-india-more-to-worry-about/3029192/.

[8] “Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, updated August 3, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan.

[9] The Economic Times

[10] Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33533 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated October 2, 2023), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33533/RL33533.88.pdf.

[11] Michael Ratney and Abdullah Alhenaki, “How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization with Israel,” Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 6, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-iran-war-weighs-us-saudi-partnership-and-prospects-normalization-israel.

The post Essay: Mecca Accord re-engineers regional security? appeared first on Gateway House.

Through the prism of accepted parameters, the 18th Summit of BRICS, held in New Delhi on September 12-13, has been a notable success. The leaders’ attendance was at the highest level. Their participation was proactive and constructive. Protocol and logistics were excellent. Above all, the New Delhi Declaration is a comprehensive outcome document adopted unanimously on Day 1, and India’s Chairship has been praised by the BRICS family.

The question now is, where does the BRICS go from here? How does it ensure that its decisions and announcements of plans are implemented to the extent possible, and how can seamless continuity be ensured as the leadership baton is passed on to China at the year’s end?

For this, it is necessary to examine the New Delhi Declaration closely. Comprising 140 paragraphs, it is the longest when compared to the declarations of the previous three summits – Johannesburg (2023), Kazan (2024), and Rio de Janeiro (2025). The increased length is understandable, given the expansion in the grouping’s members and partners and their concerns, and the fact that the New Delhi Summit was the only annual conference of BRICS that took place when two major wars involving four BRICS members were ongoing, with disastrous consequences for the world. It has tried to insulate the grouping, its members, and the rest from its terrible costs.

The leaders were clear that they were addressing key issues that affect the entire developing world or the Global South. They kept this broader perspective in mind as they set about defining and projecting the current perspective of the Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs) on critical challenges facing the international community, of which the grouping together makes up 49 per cent.

The leaders were particularly conscious of balancing the geopolitics right and keeping the focus on expanding, deepening and diversifying intra-BRICS cooperation. Following detailed consultations at the diplomatic and political levels, they reached the conclusion that the key to addressing the conflicts in the Gulf was to express deep concern over its adverse impact, urge maximum restraint, refrain from naming countries responsible for violence, and urge dialogue and diplomacy as the only viable route to a solution. Paragraph 28 of the declaration presented a balanced formulation acceptable to Iran and the UAE (and Saudi Arabia by implication). Consensus on this difficult issue paved the way for the summit’s success. The paragraphs on the Gaza conflict and the Palestinian issue helped matters. Surprisingly, the leaders avoided any pronouncement on the Russia-Ukraine war, thereby opening themselves to serious questioning by the media.

On the original mandate of BRICS with regard to reform of global governance, both of the UN and the international financial architecture, as well as sustainable development, priorities and concerns of developing countries and especially of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the declaration sets out its position clearly. This plurilateral grouping, adopting a global orientation, came out as the principal spokesperson for the Global South. However, its key task that remains to be addressed in the future is this: how will it create a global consensus that encompasses the Global North? And how will the grouping then generate the requisite political will collectively so that the international community – South and North – can move from lofty pronouncements to a step-by-step execution of the decisions taken and pronounced with great fanfare?

An important element was Para 116, which presents the BRICS’ view on the G20 and its key role as the premier global forum for international economic cooperation. It yearns for the G20 of the pre-2026 era, praising the legacy of the previous four presidencies held by Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa, recalling the admission of the African Union (AU), and belatedly supporting South Africa’s indispensable place in the G20 as a founding member – a position which cannot be altered, except through consensus.

With the complexities of geopolitics out of the way, it was a relatively smooth run for India, as the Chair, to steer BRICS in the direction of practical cooperation, driven by the ‘Humanity First’ approach. “The strength of BRICS,” observed PM Narendra Modi, “lies in our diversity and cooperation.”

Four verticals were identified by the Chair right at the beginning of the year. Under resilience and security, there was an unqualified condemnation of cross-border terrorism and a focus on disaster resistance and robust public health frameworks. Innovation related to the deployment of digital public infrastructure sharing models, a network on digital agriculture, and scaling AI-driven decision-support systems. Economic and financial cooperation encompasses faster action on cross-border payment systems, the launch of an MSME cooperation portal, and further strengthening of the New Development Bank (NDB). Sustainability covers, inter alia, advances in smart grids, energy storage, sustainable urban mobility, and collaboration to secure critical mineral supply chains.

Adequate attention was also paid to the traditional three pillars of BRICS involving political and security, financial and economic, and cultural and people-to-people operations. On the latter, a long series of discussions were arranged in various fora consisting of representatives of business, think tanks, civil society, youth and women. India’s Sherpa Sudhakar Dalela underlined that “our endeavour has been to make BRICS cooperation more practical, forward-looking and responsive to the priorities of the people.” The over 350 pre-summit activities reflected, he added, “a whole-of-India, a whole-of-nation’s efforts.”

Two additional points to note.

First, the declaration is highly critical of U.S. policy, especially of its “unilateral measures” such as sanctions against Russia and others. Likewise, American unilateral trade tariffs came under criticism. Even on the Gulf conflict, while the language is couched in neutral terms, the indictment of Washington is clear. Yet, care was taken not to overly annoy the U.S. Interestingly, there has been no official reaction by the U.S. government to the summit declaration. Observers consider it surprising, considering that harsh anti-BRICS rhetoric had emerged from top U.S. leaders in the preceding months.

Second, recalling the differences within BRICS over the grouping’s expansion, the leaders agreed to portray their decisions on this issue as reflecting “the influence, credibility and appeal” of BRICS and to stress the need for enhanced coordination in the future. But the apprehension in Delhi is that China, as the next Chair, may be keen to drive the group to admit more members. Surely, each of the 10 partner states will first want to be elevated to the status of full members. How the grouping handles this intricate issue will be watched with interest.

At the intellectual and policy plane, BRICS is a conclave of new concepts and ideas for redefining the contours of its internal cooperation. For example, PM Modi offered several ideas for his fellow leaders’ consideration, particularly the crafting of a BRICS Reform Roadmap by the next summit. President Xi Jinping, on the other hand, proposed a five-point initiative aimed at strengthening cooperation in trade, manufacturing, investment and technology, especially AI. These and other proposals presented at the summit will shape its future trajectory.

Facing a highly fractured and polarised geopolitical situation with its direct impact on intra-BRICS dynamics, this consequential grouping gave a promising account of its collective determination, at the New Delhi summit, to move forward in a constructive manner. If its diversity continues to fold into positive collaboration, BRICS may surprise the horde of its critics and sceptics who have been throwing bricks at it as a matter of professional pleasure, camouflaged as political or ideological conviction.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

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© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

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Ganesh Chaturthi festivities have begun in Mumbai and will continue until 25^th September, when Ganesha, the Divine Remover of Obstacles and Mumbai’s favourite God, is immersed in the sea. The festival, promoted by freedom fighter Bal Gangadhar Tilak, is traditionally strongly associated with Mumbai and Maharashtra, but has now become a pan-India celebration.

This year, Ganesh Chaturthi coincides with the 170th birth anniversary of Tilak, one of the foundational figures in the Indian freedom movement against the British Raj^[1] and the promoter of the Ganesh festival as a social event with political messaging. Tilak was born in 1856, a year before the Indian Freedom Movement’s First War of Independence.

Tilak’s greatest contribution is the promotion of Swaraj, or self-rule. He famously said, “Swaraj is my birthright, and I shall have it,” in 1916, beginning the movement for Home Rule in India. This was done through the Home Rule League, along with Dr Annie Besant, an Irish woman and supporter of Irish Home Rule, who was also the first woman president of the Indian National Congress.^[2]

Swaraj is derived from Sanskrit, with swa meaning self and raj meaning governance or rule. Three exceptional Indians worked to popularise and propagate the term Swaraj in the public consciousness. Dadabhai Naoroji, who first used the word in 1906 in Calcutta, in his presidential address to the Indian National Congress, delivered in the wake of the territorial reorganisation of the Bengal Presidency^[3]. Mahatma Gandhi described it in his 1909 book Hind Swaraj. Finally came Lokmanya Tilak in 1916, who used it in his speech in Belgaum, which launched the Home Rule Movement.

Swaraj has three meanings: political, economic, and individual. Within it is the right to political self-rule, for a nation to be free of foreign rule and to decide its own future. There is the right to economic rule, the right to be self-sufficient or, as it is expressed today, atmanirbhar. Finally, most importantly, it means the ability to control one’s impulses, exercise self-restraint, and take personal responsibility for one’s actions.

Between 1893 and 1894, Tilak used his Marathi newspaper Kesari and English newspaper The Mahratta to advocate transforming the privately celebrated Ganesh festival into a public, community-organised event. The Ganesh pavilions or pandals^[4] provided a platform to propagate political messaging and awaken cultural and community consciousness. Tilak used the crowds gathered at these pandals as an audience for patriotic poems, public speeches, plays and songs, through which he spread the nationalist message. Ganesh Chaturthi also brought together members of different castes and classes under the umbrella of a shared religious identity, breaking down barriers that had hampered the independence movement.^[5]

A sarvajanik community organised Ganesh pavilion, 1905

Image Credits: Ministry of Culture India

What level of swaraj has India achieved today?

Politically, India has matured as a nation, with the ability to overcome external and internal challenges. Wars in 1947, 1962, 1971, and 1999 presented external challenges, with implications for India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 1975 Emergency, the 1979 institution of the Mandal Commission, the 1984 assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the 2011 India Against Corruption Movement introduced internal challenges that India successfully overcame, strengthening its polity and society. India is less Delhi-centric and is now slowly turning into a federation of states. Soviet-style five-year plans have been abolished for the more ambitious Viksit Bharat 2047 vision, in line with the global norm.

Economic self-rule, however, has been slower in coming. India’s socialist model aimed for economic equity, but it only resulted in shortages. The socialist model could not carry the weight of a largely entrepreneurial country, collapsing in 1991, when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh liberalised the economy and allowed companies to compete internationally with the best in the world. Indian competitiveness created a new study of industrialisation called frugal engineering, with robust products at the most affordable prices. This was followed by the digital revolution of the 2000s, which brought Indian information technology companies to the global forefront, highlighting the talent and potential underlying new sectors of the economy. In 2016, India had its own fintech revolution, driven primarily by the launch of the Aadhaar card in 2010, aligned with the India Stack architecture, which delivered state subsidies directly to the beneficiaries and democratised financial access for entrepreneurs.

What about individual Swaraj? Moral and personal Swaraj, explains Gandhian author Rajni Bakshi, “[is] an expanded sense of self, one that includes a concern for the needs of others”.^[6] Tilak personified it. His pursuit of Independence for India therefore took precedence over the discomfort of two rigorous prison terms, underlining how the attainment of Swaraj cannot be achieved without effort and sacrifice.

Each year, Mumbai’s grandest Ganpati idols converge on Chowpatty, along the same shore where Tilak was cremated.^[7] Tilak’s endeavours have ensured that India’s youth inherit political and economic Swaraj as the norm. Moral Swaraj, the quieter, more demanding third of his vision, is different: it cannot simply be handed down. It must be exercised afresh in every generation, through restraint, civic responsibility, and a willingness to serve something larger than personal ambition. Tilak’s long fight against British rule demonstrates that such freedom does not come without a cost; India’s Independence is now 80 years old. Many in the younger generation do not remember the contributions and sacrifices of freedom fighters like Tilak, whose great endurance enables the Swaraj of today.

The immersion of Ganesha on the same beach where Tilak’s statue stands demonstrates that just as the idol is welcomed, honoured, and immersed each year anew, Swaraj asks the same of every generation – not to just inherit it, but to assimilate it anew.

Karthik Narayan Venkataraman is a Research Assistant at Gateway House. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Prime Minister Pays Tributes to Lokmanya Tilak on His Birth Anniversary,” July 23, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2288113&reg=48&lang=2.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Home Rule League,” The Leader, September 6, 1917, in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, First Series, vol. 1, 108, The Nehru Archive.

[3] Indian National Congress, Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Indian National Congress, Held at Calcutta on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th December 1906 (Calcutta: Indian National Congress, 1906), 19, https://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/handle/10973/17959.

[4] A temporary decorated stage or pavilion housing the Ganesh idol during the annual festivities of Ganesh Chaturthi.

[5] Barnouw, Victor. “The Changing Character of a Hindu Festival.” American Anthropologist 56, no. 1 (1954): 74–86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/664633.

[6] Gateway House. “Swaraj as Journey – Gateway House.” Gateway House, December 11, 2017. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/swaraj-as-journey/

[7] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, “Lokmanya Tilak Samadhi, Girgaon,” Mumbai Legacy Project, D Ward, accessed September 4, 2026, https://www.mcgm.gov.in/irj/go/km/docs/documents/D%20Ward/Heritage-Sites/62_Legacy%20of%20D%20Ward_Article_Lokmanya%20Tilak%20Samadhi,%20Girgaon.pdf.

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After much suspense over the impending visit to India, Chinese President Xi Jinping finally arrived in New Delhi on Saturday, September 12, after a gap of seven years. He last visited India in October 2019 for an informal bilateral summit. Although that visit was only for 24 hours, it sent a strong signal that despite a deeply adversarial relationship, New Delhi and Beijing were keeping all channels of communication open to discuss the contentious issue of a disputed border. The 2026 visit comes almost a year after PM Modi’s visit to Tianjin, China, in August 2025.

The visit by Xi to attend the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, as well as a bilateral meeting with Modi, can be called a success. Both sides reiterated the basic foundation of the relationship: to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border. Bringing about a solution to the dispute will be a long and arduous process, but the fact that both sides continue to stand, although shakily, on the same ground on maintaining peace in the border region can be considered a success. This is especially crucial now after both countries fought a major border clash in April 2020 in the Galwan region of the eastern Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and suspended aviation links, thereby severely restricting cross-border travel. They also disagree on the issue of the succession of the Dalai Lama.

Today, India and China are now discussing an “early and substantial harvest” under an eight-point outcome and consensus^[1] which emerged from the dialogue between the Special Representatives of India and China on the boundary question. The SRs for India and China are, respectively, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, Special Representative of China, Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs.

Simultaneously, during his talks with President Xi in New Delhi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit on September 12, PM Modi asked China to “observe existing agreements and understandings on border-related issues.” He was ostensibly referring to the 2005 India-China border agreement titled ‘Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question.’ The agreement, signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005, continues to serve as the foundational roadmap for political negotiations. It provided a three-step resolution process: first agreeing on guiding principles, then establishing a structural framework, and finally delineating and demarcating the border on maps and on the ground. The agreement was signed between then Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Dai Bingguo, Chinese Special Representative.

Just days before the September 12 bilateral, on September 6-7, both sides held a historic and first-of-its-kind Corps Commander-level flag meeting. This was enabled by the brief August 31 meeting between Modi and Xi in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting. For the first time ever, the Corps Commander-level talks, usually held in the Ladakh (Western) sector, were held in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh). A two-day session took place across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The first session was at Wacha (Indian side) on September 6, and the second, on September 7, was at Damai (Chinese side).

The discussions were primarily aimed at managing recent operational sensitivities and localised tensions in the Taksing area of Arunachal Pradesh’s Upper Subansiri district. But it can also be seen as the first step towards an early harvest agreement.

The process to normalise ties began in 2024 when people-to-people links began easing, with journalists, think-tankers, scholars and tourists travelling from India to China. In March this year, India partially relaxed Press Note 3 for foreign direct investment from all countries that share a land border with India – most significantly China.

In October 2024, India and China reached patrolling and disengagement agreements for flashpoints like Depsang and Demchok, and created no-patrol zones in some areas, known as de-militarised zones.

The holy Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage route was officially revived, border trade via designated Himalayan passes like Nathu La in Sikkim was reopened, and China resumed sharing crucial hydrological flood data for the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers.

According to the annual report from the Indian Ministry of Defence released in September 2026, there was a notable decrease in the deployment of China’s People’s Liberation Army forces along India’s northern border in 2025. Nevertheless, the Indian Army maintains that the border situation remains “stable yet sensitive”. The number of troops on the frontlines has diminished. Both nations have spent the past six years building permanent infrastructure, including roads and airfields. This development ensures that heavy reinforcements can be quickly mobilised if tensions escalate once more.

Under the early harvest concept that China had been pushing for years, Beijing has proposed that instead of seeking a solution for the entire 3,488-kilometre-long de facto border, both sides can resolve one sector at a time of the Line of Actual Control. The 2005 pact, on the other hand, which India had been unrelenting on, stands on the premise that nothing will be deemed resolved unless the entire border issue is resolved.

The key compromise now is whether India will agree to settle the boundary dispute as a package deal, as laid out in the 2005 pact, or whether it will agree to the formulation that China is pushing for. Can the current détente between India and China pave the way for a long-term modus vivendi?

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus for the 25th Round of Talks between Special Representatives of India and China on the Boundary Question,” press release, August 26, 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/41700/Eight_Points_of_Outcomes_and_Consensus_for_the_25th_round_of_Talks_between_Special_Representatives_of_India_and_China_on_the_Boundary_Question.

[2] “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question,” India–China, April 11, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/6534/Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+Political+Parameters+and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+Boundary+Question.

[3] Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China], “Xi Jinping huijian Yindu zongli Modi” [Xi Jinping Meets with Indian Prime Minister Modi], September 12, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202609/t20260912_12021195.shtml

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At the Sept. 1-4 annual Eastern Economic Forum in the Russian Pacific port of Vladivostok, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov announced^[1] that Russia-China bilateral trade grew by 22% in the first half of 2026 and exceeded $135 billion^[2]. Bilateral trade had fallen by 6.9% in 2025 after a record high of $245 billion a year earlier, on account of a reduction in the value of Chinese crude imports from Russia and a fall in Russian imports of Chinese cars. Judging by the latest numbers, bilateral trade between Moscow and Beijing in 2026 is set to touch an all-time high. The trendline has been climbing over the last 25 years, with bilateral trade between the countries having grown more than thirty-fold.

The trade relationship between the two countries mirrors the diplomatic one, which deepened after the signing of the Treaty^[3] of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. The 20-year treaty, which was extended for five years in 2021 and for another five in May 2026, identified trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and aviation, and information technology as major areas of cooperation between the countries.

At the beginning of the 20th century, China’s share in Russia’s foreign trade stood at less than 5%; now the Asian powerhouse is Moscow’s largest trading partner, accounting for 27% of its total exports and 36% of total imports,^[4] according to the Geidar Institute for Economic Policy. The economic relationship has been fortified since the Ukraine war began in February 2022.

In a report^[5] published in August 2026, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which was set up by the U.S. Congress to monitor and investigate the national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship, said China has become “indispensable” for Russia. “China and Russia have built an increasingly sanctions-resistant financial and economic relationship that has reduced but not eliminated Western leverage,” said the commission’s report. It added that China’s “layered sanctions-evasion networks” have reduced Russia’s isolation and increased Moscow’s dependence on Beijing.

One of the key factors in evading sanctions and reducing Western leverage has been the use of the ruble and renminbi in bilateral trade. Addressing the Russia-China Energy Business Forum in Vladivostok, Rosneft Chief Executive Igor Sechin said^[6] mutual settlements between the countries were “handled almost entirely” in national currencies, bypassing the U.S. dollar altogether. “To consolidate the use of national currencies, it is required to fine-tune the relevant infrastructure and instruments supporting clearing operations and open the correspondent accounts,” he added.

While this payment arrangement entirely suits Russia, which faces over 30,000 active international sanctions, Chinese banks are being increasingly cautious in their dealings with Russian entities in order to avoid secondary sanctions from the U.S.

Speaking ahead of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2026, Alexander Vedyakhin, first deputy chairman of the executive board of Sberbank, said^[7] there were “persistent gaps within the payment infrastructure” when it came to settlements in rubles and yuan. “Payment routes become significantly more complex, requiring the inclusion of additional intermediary banks – which often reject payments without providing detailed explanations,” he added.

The threat of secondary sanctions continues to loom for China. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which has been passed by the U.S. Congress, threatens Beijing with up to 100% tariffs for importing Russian oil.^[8] China imported 67 million tonnes of Russian oil in the first seven months of 2026, Rosneft’s Sechin said^[9] in Vladivostok in September.

China is heavily dependent on Russia to power its economy. In 2025, Beijing imported^[10] 38.8 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia through the Gazprom-operated 3,000-km Power of Siberia pipeline. The countries are holding negotiations for the construction of the 2,600-km Power of Siberia-2 pipeline that will deliver 50 billion cubic metres of gas from the Yamal fields in the Russian Arctic to China via Mongolia.

Russia is China’s leading supplier of enriched uranium, accounting for 90% of China’s purchases in 2025.^[11] Moscow also supplied 90 million tonnes of coal to China, about 20% of its imports. Rosneft CEO Sechin said the share of coal in China’s power generation is expected to stay at 40% over the next ten years.

With Russian natural resources playing a key role in firing the Chinese economy, it is unlikely that Beijing will allow U.S. sanctions to interrupt its energy trade with Moscow.

However, Russia accounts for just 4% of China’s total foreign trade, and the question of Moscow’s overall economic dependence on Beijing once again arises. Despite their global geopolitical rivalry, the U.S. remains China’s top trade partner, with bilateral trade^[12] between the countries standing at $494.6 billion in 2025.

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s August 2026 report claimed that Beijing is “converting Moscow’s dependence into lasting military, technological, economic and geopolitical advantages, while avoiding the obligations of a formal alliance.”

Such criticism that comes from the West and some in India has been shrugged off by Moscow. In an August 2026 article for the Kommersant newspaper, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said^[13] the 2001 treaty offered both countries “necessary flexibility and, consequently, clear advantages over ‘classical alliances’.” He added that the economies of the two countries were “intrinsically complementary,” and that the “relations between Russia and China are built on an equal footing, are free from ideological dogma, are not directed against third countries, and remain resilient to the influence of external circumstances.”

Apart from cars, China has captured a substantial share in Russia’s electrical and electronic equipment market. The value of smartphone exports from China increased by 14.7% to $943.4 million in the first seven months of 2026, according to TASS data.^[14]

Polling organisations like Levada do not specifically conduct research on economic and trade policies, so it is difficult to understand how ordinary Russians feel about the growing economic dependence of their country on China. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that there is discontent with the withdrawal of Western products and brands from the country and their replacement with Chinese substitutes. This, however, has little to no impact on government policy.

Policymakers in Moscow are clearly aware of the dangers of too much dependency on China and have, since 2022, expanded their so-called pivot to Asia by increasing engagement with partners like India and African countries. Setting a $100 billion trade target with India, Innoprom, a large-scale industrial exhibition that is held in Yekaterinburg, held its inaugural India edition ^[15] in New Delhi just before the 2026 BRICS summit. Over 200 exhibitors took part in the exhibition at the Bharat Mandapam.

Russia continues to increase its engagement with other major economies of the Global South, but those will be unable to replace its trade relationship with China, which is only set to grow. Foreign Minister Lavrov’s views on intrinsic complementarity are echoed in the corridors of power in Beijing – a mutually beneficial arrangement.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer with a special interest in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (@MIDRussia), “Government of the Russian Federation: On September 3, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov…,” Facebook, September 2026, https://www.facebook.com/MIDRussia/posts/government-of-the-russian-federation-on-september-3-russias-first-deputy-prime-m/1428702176119505/.

[2] In 2022, China had a trade deficit of $38 billion. This narrowed to less than $1 billion in 2025. The growth in exports has been mainly powered by heavy machinery and automobiles. Since 2022, there has been a massive increase in automobile exports from China to Russia. According to Russian research firm Autostat, automobile exports from China to Russia rose by 21% in the first seven months of 2026 to 161,200 units.  There is a visible increase in Haval (Great Wall), Chery, and JAC models on Russian roads. Imports fell in 2025 as Russia increased recycling fees (meant for end-of-life disposal) for cars by 85%. Chinese manufacturers are now increasingly looking at production in Russia. There is also a thriving grey market where European car brands are finding their way to Russia through China.

[3] “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation,” signed July 16, 2001, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 24, 2001, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng./zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367098.html.

[4] Aleksandr Knobel and Aleksandr Firanchuk, “Itogi vneshnei torgovli v 2025 godu” [Results of Foreign Trade in 2025], Monitoring ekonomicheskoi situatsii v Rossii (Moscow: Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, March 2, 2026), https://www.iep.ru/ru/monitoring/itogi-vneshney-torgovli-v-2025-godu.html.

[5] Joseph Federici and Morgan Peirce, “China-Russia Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 20, 2026, https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-russia-fact-sheet-short-primer-relationship.

[6] Rosneft, “Sechin: Settlements Between Russia and China Are Being Conducted in National Currencies; Central Bank Support Is Needed,” news release, September 4, 2026, https://www.rosneft.com/press/news/item/224681/.

[7] Sberbank, “Sber: RUB and CNY transactions between Russia and China are ongoing, but the infrastructure needs fine‑tuning,” June 2, 2026, https://www.sberbank.ru/en/press_center/all/article?newsID=e5a885af-fc9e-4205-8799-400d3eb262a7&blockID=1539&regionID=77&lang=en&type=N.

[8] Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, S. 5025, 119th Cong. (2026), https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5025?hl=Lindsey+o+graham&s=1&r=2.

[9] Rosneft, “Sechin: The Position of Russia and China in the Global Economy and Energy Sector Creates the Foundation for Synergy,” news release, September 4, 2026, https://www.rosneft.com/press/news/item/224680/.

[10] Gazprom, “In 2025, Gazprom supplied more gas to China than to Europe for the first time,” 13 January 2026, https://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2026/january/article583408/

[11] Rosneft, “Sechin: China Is an ‘Electrostate’ That Has Surpassed the U.S. and the EU in Energy Consumption,” news release, September 4, 2026, https://www.rosneft.com/press/news/item/224676/.

[12] Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.

[13] Sergey Lavrov, “A Constant in an Era of Radical Change: On the 25th Anniversary of the Russian-Chinese Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation,” Kommersant, July 16, 2026, reproduced by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2126964/.

[14] TASS, “China increased its export of integrated circuits to Russia by 183.4%,” July 20, 2026, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/27932749.

[15] “INNOPROM. India 2026,” International Industrial Trade Fair, New Delhi, September 9–11, 2026, accessed September 17, 2026, https://india.biwexpo.com/en.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation in the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, held in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of this influential coalition of Eurasian nations, was a significant display of India’s commitment to upholding its strategic autonomy on the global stage. This gathering offered a vital opportunity for Modi to reconnect with his regional allies, especially in the light of the ongoing tensions resulting from the war in the Gulf which have profoundly disrupted the stability of the global economy.

The Bishkek Declaration emerged as a pivotal statement, denouncing the military interventions by the U.S. and Israel (without naming the two countries) against Iran while simultaneously voicing solidarity with Tehran’s aspirations for peaceful nuclear technology under the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This sentiment is sure to provoke unease in Washington, as the declaration explicitly articulated a strong position against military aggression.

Additionally, the document extended formal condolences for the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a targeted airstrike in February 2026, marking a singular moment in the region’s tumultuous landscape.

India’s signing on to the statement signals that New Delhi is once again emphasising its foreign policy principle of strategic balancing. India has begun to put a greater focus and gravitas on the China-led SCO, even as its bilateral relationship with the U.S. continues to be strained, with the Donald Trump administration pinning India down with continuous tariff increases. That has led to the slowdown of negotiations on the important India-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA).^[1]

The new leaning toward Eurasia is a change from just six years ago. Then, tensions between India and China increased due to the 2020 military clash in Galwan Valley, and New Delhi began aligning more with the West while distancing itself from regional groupings like the SCO and BRICS. In 2022, during Uzbekistan’s chairmanship of the SCO, PM Modi chose to skip the pre-summit informal dinner in Samarkand to maintain a diplomatic distance from Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. India aimed to avoid any false impressions of normalcy through informal gatherings or group photos.

In 2023, despite being the chair of the SCO for the first time since India became a full-time member in 2017, the Modi government chose to host the SCO Summit virtually^[2] in order to avoid sharing a common platform with Xi.^[3]

In 2024, India chose to dispatch External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar to attend the SCO Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. PM Modi skipped that meeting due to several factors, one being India’s growing alliance with the U.S. and greater focus on the Quad and Indo-Pacific, then also high on Washington’s foreign policy agenda.

Witnessing India’s changing stance, many Central Asian countries expressed their concerns, suggesting that India had neglected the SCO in favour of a greater engagement with the U.S. and the European Union. The shift in focus led to discontent among these nations, who felt sidelined by India’s changing diplomatic priorities.

These were interpreted as strategic moves aimed at distancing India from any anti-U.S. rhetoric or resolutions that emerged from the discussions within the organisation. It underscored India’s careful navigation of international relationships, balancing its commitment to regional alliances while also aligning itself more closely with Western powers.

However, this dynamic changed in 2025 when Modi travelled to the Tianjin summit in China for the 2025 SCO summit, and also for the recently concluded 2026 Bishkek summit on August 31-September 1. The signal was clear: India was back, with an active, in-person engagement with Eurasia.

India signed and fully endorsed the Bishkek Declaration, which represented a shift in its public diplomatic stance regarding the conflict in Iran. Previously, India walked a fine line to protect its deep defence and strategic ties with Israel and the U.S. For instance, New Delhi had distanced itself from an SCO defence ministers’ statement in June 2025 that explicitly condemned Israeli strikes, clarifying that it did not take part in the discussions leading to the statement and that it did not reflect India’s position.^[3]

In Bishkek, PM Modi had a bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the SCO Summit as well as with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. In both cases he urged dialogue and diplomacy in ending the wars their respective countries are fighting. The U.S. has not yet reacted to the SCO meeting, unlike last time when U.S. President Trump expressed indignation at seeing the Russian, Chinese and Indian leaders sharing a light moment in Tianjin in September 2025.

However, India’s real challenge now lies in carrying forward this delicate balance and developing a strong agenda for the upcoming BRICS Summit and aiming for a comprehensive joint statement. Four SCO countries – India, China, Russia and Iran – are also members of the BRICS. Therefore, like the SCO, the upcoming BRICS Summit will surely be watched closely by the U.S.

India, along with its BRICS partners, has worked diligently towards the group’s expansion while maintaining a regional focus and preventing it from becoming an “anti-West” platform. Unlike China and Russia, which have suggested a shared currency to bypass the U.S. dollar, India has firmly opposed the idea of a common BRICS currency. Drawing on the success of the recent SCO Summit, India has the potential to build on this momentum and successfully walk the tightrope between east and west.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References:

[1] Nayanima Basu, “New Tariffs Complicate India-U.S. Trade Negotiations,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, August 27, 2026, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/new-tariffs-complicate-india-u-s-trade-negotiations/.

[2] During both times the government pointed out to “scheduling difficulties”.

[3] “SCO Summit under India’s Chairmanship,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 30, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/36622/SCO_Summit_under_Indias_Chairmanship.

[4] “Statement on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 14, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/39670/Statement+on+the+Shanghai+Cooperation+Organization+SCO.

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