“Sovereign AI” has gone from a phrase coined by chipmakers to a working assumption in national policy. France backs Mistral, Saudi Arabia is building HUMAIN, and India has its India AI Mission. Across these efforts, the prevailing definition of sovereignty rests on a now-familiar checklist: own your chips, own your compute, own your data, and own your models, with talent as the connective tissue running through all four. ^[1]

Energy barely registers in this checklist, usually a footnote for utilities to resolve once policy and capital are in place. This article argues the ordering may be backwards. As the electricity bill for AI climbs into the hundreds of terawatt-hours worldwide, the ability to generate and reliably deliver power is becoming a hard constraint on what any country can do with AI. The question is not whether a country needs more electricity for its AI ambitions, but whether energy security deserves treatment as a core pillar of sovereign AI, rather than infrastructure beneath it.

The scale of AI’s electricity appetite is no longer speculative. Global data centre electricity use rose 17 per cent in 2025, and AI-focused facilities grew three times faster, against a 3 per cent rise in overall electricity demand. ^[2] The IEA projects data-centre electricity demand will more than double by 2030, reaching around 945 terawatt-hours, slightly more than Japan consumes today. ^[3] Five large technology companies directed over $400 billion in 2025 capital spending, projected to rise 75 per cent further in 2026, overwhelmingly toward compute and power. ^[4]

Training frontier models and serving inference at scale requires power that is concentrated, continuous and largely non-negotiable: a single large AI campus can draw as much electricity as a mid-sized city. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates the United States alone may need 40 to 90 additional gigawatts by 2030 for its AI build-out. ^[5] A country can hold the chips, the models and the data and still be unable to run AI at scale without power behind it.

This checklist was popularised in large part by Nvidia, whose business depends on governments believing they need exactly this. ^[6] It says almost nothing about the electricity that makes any of the five operable. Brookings Institution analysis this year argues full-stack AI sovereignty is out of reach for almost any country, since AI depends on a transnational web of inputs, minerals, chips, networks, data, talent and energy concentrated among a handful of suppliers. ^[7] Energy belongs on that list not as infrastructure beneath the “real” stack but as a resource a country must secure before exercising autonomy over the rest.

Washington has begun acting on this logic, if not in name: a July 2025 executive order fast-tracked federal permitting for AI-linked data centres, treating power access as core AI infrastructure policy. ^[8]

The United Kingdom has formalised the link institutionally through its AI Energy Council, co-chaired by the technology and energy secretaries since April 2025, ensuring the UK’s energy system is ready for AI infrastructure. ^[9] Its AI Growth Zones require candidate sites to demonstrate access to at least 500 megawatts of power. ^[10]

China’s experience is the most instructive, though not one India should simply replicate. For more than two decades, Beijing treated energy generation, hydropower, solar and wind manufacturing, and nuclear capacity as a strategic industrial capability rather than a supplementary layer, years before AI created any demand for it. By the time generative AI began consuming power at scale, China already possessed abundant, low-cost electricity in its resource-rich western provinces. The “Eastern Data, Western Computing” programme launched in 2022, backed by over 200 billion yuan (roughly $27 billion), relocated data-centre capacity west rather than building that abundance from scratch. ^[11] The 2025 plan binding data-centre approvals to electricity-supply planning reads as a second stage of a strategy laid down earlier. ^[12] The lesson generalises well beyond China’s model: a country’s capacity to scale AI a decade from now may already be fixed by decisions it makes, or fails to make, today.

AI’s energy efficiency is improving at a genuinely impressive rate; the IEA notes a single text query today can use less electricity than a television running for the same few seconds.² But aggregate demand is growing faster than efficiency gains can offset, as AI workloads multiply. Progress and consumption are pulling in opposite directions, and consumption is winning.

Renewables are expected to meet roughly half of the additional electricity data centres will need by 2030 in the IEA’s base case, but dispatchable power, generation available regardless of weather, remains essential where interruption cannot be tolerated, and nuclear, geothermal and storage-backed solar have deployment timelines longer than typical AI investment cycles. ^[13] None of this makes AI leadership and climate goals incompatible, but reconciling both depends on deliberate, early planning.

India’s own sovereign AI programme illustrates the problem precisely. The IndiaAI Mission, backed by roughly Rs 10,372 crore ($1.25 billion), has built a national shared compute pool that crossed 34,000 GPUs by mid-2025, targeting 100,000 by end-2026, alongside pillars for models, data, safety and talent. ^[14]

Its energy foundation has not kept pace. Data centre capacity is projected to grow from roughly 1.2 GW today to between 4.5 and 10 GW by 2030, with annual electricity demand reaching 40 to 57 terawatt-hours, on top of overall demand the IEA expects to grow 6.4 per cent a year through 2030, among the world’s fastest. ^{[15] [16]} This growth is geographically concentrated: Mumbai and Chennai account for roughly three-fifths of operational capacity, straining grids least able to absorb new load. ^[17] Renewable capacity often cannot reach where needed either: IEEFA estimates over 50 gigawatts stood stranded as of mid-2025 for want of transmission, with FY25 additions running 42 per cent behind target. ^{[18] [19]}

India does hold real advantages, having crossed its COP26 target of 50 per cent installed capacity from non-fossil sources roughly five years early, in 2025. ^{[20] [21]} But headline renewable capacity is not the same as the firm, round-the-clock electricity AI infrastructure requires, and China’s experience suggests that closing that gap is what sustained, early planning is for, not a case for copying Beijing’s playbook wholesale. Some of that planning has begun: the Central Electricity Authority’s national resource adequacy plan for 2026-27 to 2035-36 has, for the first time, folded data-centre demand into the assumptions behind the country’s generation and storage build-out, alongside electric vehicles and green hydrogen. ^[22] That is a start, not yet a solution.

India is not alone in this bind. China keeps adding coal capacity even as it scales renewables and nuclear, commissioning 78 GW of new coal power in 2025, its highest annual total in a decade. ^[23] Europe leans on similar firm power as AI-driven demand rises, with the IEA expecting EU electricity consumption to grow through 2030 on a mix that includes gas-fired generation and a nuclear sector regaining policy support across advanced economies. ^[24] None of this argues for India to lean further on fossil fuels or to copy Beijing’s model. It is a reminder that AI readiness needs reliable, dispatchable electricity alongside, not instead of, a longer decarbonisation path.

Energy security deserves formal recognition as a core pillar of India’s sovereign AI strategy, integrated into the IndiaAI Mission itself rather than left as a separate infrastructure matter. AI demand should also be tracked as its own category in electricity planning, with IndiaAI Mission targets and the National Electricity Plan drawn into closer alignment. Transmission deserves the same priority as compute, given how much renewable capacity already sits stranded for want of it. ^[25] Dispatchable power needs a realistic mix rather than a single bet: the nuclear sector’s opening to private participation under the SHANTI Act, aiming for 100 gigawatts by 2047, was framed explicitly around supporting AI alongside storage and renewables. ^[26] New AI clusters could also be sited partly on power availability rather than the reverse. ^[27] A standing mechanism bringing MeitY, the Ministry of Power, the CEA, NITI Aayog and the IndiaAI Mission together, echoing the UK’s technology-energy council, could help close that gap.

Sovereign AI has typically been understood as a contest over chips, compute, data and foundation models. That framing captures what is most visible and easily funded, but not what is most decisive. As electricity rather than silicon increasingly sets the pace of AI at a national scale, energy security looks less like supporting infrastructure and more like a precondition for technological sovereignty, and Washington, London and Beijing already treat it that way in practice.

For India, the lesson from China is not to replicate a state-led model built for different conditions but to recognise that Beijing’s advantage was decades in the making, laid down before AI created the demand now exploiting it. The choices India makes on transmission, dispatchable capacity and institutional coordination over the next few years will likely decide how much of its AI ambition its grid can carry a decade out. The next race in artificial intelligence may not be won solely by the countries that build the best models but by those that build the energy systems capable of sustaining them.

Ashish Bharadwaj is the Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education, Gateway House.

Sairah Zahoor is a student at BITS Law School.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

^[1] Center for a New American Security (2026): “CNAS Sovereign AI Index.” Maps the compute/data/talent/capital framing of sovereign AI used by governments worldwide. (https://interactives.cnas.org/reports/sovereign-ai-index/)

^[2] International Energy Agency (April 2026): “Key Questions on Energy and AI.” Source for global data-centre electricity-demand figures and the AI-efficiency comparison cited in Sections II and IV. (https://www.iea.org/reports/key-questions-on-energy-and-ai)

^[3] International Energy Agency (2025): “Energy and AI Report.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/executive-summary)

^[4] International Energy Agency (April 2026): “Key Questions on Energy and AI.” Source for global data-centre electricity-demand figures and the AI-efficiency comparison cited in Sections II and IV. (https://www.iea.org/reports/key-questions-on-energy-and-ai)

^[5] Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 2025): “Securing Full Stack U.S. Leadership in AI.” Source of the 40–90 GW additional U.S. energy-demand estimate. (https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-full-stack-us-leadership-ai

^[6] NVIDIA Corporation (2025): “What Is Sovereign AI?” Note: Nvidia has a direct commercial interest in government adoption of this framing. (https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/what-is-sovereign-ai/)

^[7]Brookings Institution (February 2026): “Is AI Sovereignty Possible? Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence.” (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-ai-sovereignty-possible-balancing-autonomy-and-interdependence/).

^[8] The White House (23 July 2025): “Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure” (Executive Order). (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/accelerating-federal-permitting-of-data-center-infrastructure/)

^[9] UK Government, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (8 April 2025): “Technology and Energy Secretaries chair first meeting of AI Energy Council.” (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/technology-and-energy-secretaries-chair-first-meeting-of-ai-energy-council)

^[10] UK Government, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology: “Delivering AI Growth Zones” (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-ai-growth-zones/delivering-ai-growth-zones)

^[11] Jamestown Foundation (2026): “Energy and AI Coordination in the ‘Eastern Data Western Computing’ Plan.”  (https://jamestown.org/energy-and-ai-coordination-in-the-eastern-data-western-computing-plan/)

^[12] State Council, People’s Republic of China (September 2025): “China unveils plan on AI-energy integration to drive green transition.” (https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202509/08/content_WS68be8c3ec6d0868f4e8f566d.html)

^[13] International Energy Agency (April 2025): “Energy and AI – Energy Supply for AI.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/energy-supply-for-ai)

^[14] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India (May 2025): “India’s Common Compute Capacity Crosses 34,000 GPUs.” (https://indiaai.gov.in|   https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2132817)

^[15] International Energy Agency (January 2026): “Electricity 2026 – Demand.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/demand)

^[16] Deloitte India and S&P Global Commodity Insights, as reported in Outlook Business (January 2026) (https://www.outlookbusiness.com/planet/industry/india-ai-data-centre-energy-sustainability-2030)

^[17] Business Standard (October 2025) “India’s Data Centre Capacity to Double by 2027, Rise 5x by 2030: Macquarie” (https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-s-data-centre-capacity-to-double-by-2027-rise-5x-by-2030-macquarie-125102801409_1.html)

^[18] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) and JMK Research & Analytics (October 2025): “Green power transmission: The invisible barrier in India’s clean energy growth.” (https://ieefa.org/resources/green-power-transmission-invisible-barrier-indias-clean-energy-growth)

^[19] IEEFA (September 2025): “Transmission expansion trails renewable energy growth in India.” (https://ieefa.org/articles/transmission-expansion-trails-renewable-energy-growth-india)

^[20] Ministry of Power, Government of India, Press Information Bureau (September 2025). (https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2223720)

^[21] Enerdata (October 2025): “India hits 500 GW in installed power, over 50% from non-fossil sources,” (https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/india-hits-500-gw-installed-power-over-50-non-fossil-sources.html)

^[22] Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India (March 2026): “National Generation Adequacy Plan (2026-27 to 2035-36).” (https://jmkresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Generation-Adequacy-Plan-2035-36.pdf)

^[23] OilPrice.com (February 2026): “China Hits Renewable Milestone, But Coal Isn’t Going Anywhere.”(https://oilprice.com/Energy/Coal/China-Hits-Renewable-Milestone-But-Coal-Isnt-Going-Anywhere.html)

^[24] International Energy Agency (January 2026): “Electricity 2026 – Supply.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/supply)

^[25] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) and JMK Research & Analytics (October 2025): “Green power transmission: The invisible barrier in India’s clean energy growth.” (https://ieefa.org/resources/green-power-transmission-invisible-barrier-indias-clean-energy-growth)

^[26] Press Information Bureau, Government of India (December 2025): “The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025.” (https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2206598&reg=3&lang=1)

^[27] Business Standard (October 2025) “India’s Data Centre Capacity to Double by 2027, Rise 5x by 2030: Macquarie” (https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-s-data-centre-capacity-to-double-by-2027-rise-5x-by-2030-macquarie-125102801409_1.html).

The post The missing pillar of India’s sovereign AI appeared first on Gateway House.

The 29th St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) was held in St Petersburg from June 3-6, 2026. The SPIEF has been an annual fixture on the global conference circuit since 1997, when the city of St Petersburg and Russia’s foreign ministry initiated it. Since 2006, the Forum has been held under the patronage and with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, this year’s SPIEF brought together over 24,500 participants from 142 countries. The largest delegations were from China, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, the UAE and Kazakhstan, respectively, but for the first time in many years, sizeable delegations from the UK and the EU attended the Forum, along with an official U.S. delegation, also for the first time, led by the Chairman of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Rodney Mims Cook Jr.^[1] Along with him was Robert Agee, President and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Russia, who moderated a Russia-U.S. panel discussion.

Regardless, President Vladimir Putin, on his part, specifically focused on the need for Russia and members of the Global South to have technological sovereignty in order to avoid being held hostage to the West.

Russia understands this only too well. At the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022, one of the first punitive measures that the West imposed on Russia was the banning of Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments and settlement system, isolating Russia from the free movement of goods and services. It also withdrew its software suppliers. Visa and Mastercard suspended their services in Russia on March 5, 2022, halting transactions on Russian-issued cards outside the country while blocking the usage of foreign-issued cards in the country.^{[2] [3]}

The Russian domestic Mir payment system stepped up and has captured a 75% market share in the country, up from 25.7% in 2021.^[4] Since its introduction in May 2014, 493.9 million Mir cards have been issued in Russia, according to the Russian Central Bank. ^[5] A beneficiary has also been China’s UnionPay cards, which work in Russia.

Visa and Mastercard now have less than a 17% share in the Russian domestic market, Alla Bakina, head of the Central Bank’s Payments Systems Department, said^[6] at a press conference in May 2026.

At a press briefing on July 2 on the sidelines of the Russian Central Bank’s Financial Congress in St Petersburg, Governor Elvira Nabiullina told reporters^[7] that in her view, Visa and Mastercard would “gradually be phased out of circulation, and this is already happening, partly through economic measures.”

How do visitors to Russia manage? Russia has solved the “cash issue” for foreign visitors by enabling foreigners to purchase debit cards at designated banks and even airports. At Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport, a foreign visitor can buy a debit prepaid Mir card from Globus Bank by paying in hard currency. The currency is converted to rubles, and the card can be used by the holder without having a Russian bank account.

Putin punched it to the U.S. banks at SPIEF 2026 when he stated that the global development model, long anchored in a limited number of financial centres, technological providers, insurance and logistics hubs, credit rating agencies, and reserve currencies, was under fire.^[8] He said this framework, though presented as universal and supposedly neutral, has been increasingly used as a tool to exert political pressure and promote unfair competition, whereby settlements, technologies, logistics, or even access to information could be cut off at a moment’s notice in order to punish countries acting in their own national interests.”

Russia is ensuring it does not get caught off guard again by focusing on AI in finance and other areas. The Russian government has been instructed to prepare a national strategy on autonomous systems and digital platforms modelled on the National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence that was initiated in 2019. Russia has invested $6.1 billion and involved large state-owned corporations like Rostec and Sberbank to develop AI applications in healthcare, education, national security, agriculture and transportation. It aims to train 6,000 AI specialists a year by 2030. The AI strategy is seen as a model to emulate for a new strategy on autonomous systems and digital platforms.

Not far behind in Putin’s priority was the BRICS, many of whose countries were becoming technological powerhouses. China, for instance, holds the largest number of AI patents (over 183,000 in 2023, according to a Stanford University study^[9]), while India accounts for a 17.58% share^[10] in the global software market. Putin reaffirmed that Russia is open to work with BRICS partners to build digital infrastructure.

Russia holds a strong position in the pace of adoption of digital and latest technological advancements in online marketplaces, financial solutions, municipal services, healthcare and education, and these adoptions have improved the quality of life for people in Russia. The biggest success story is the unified Public Services (Gosuslugi) portal. Russian citizens see this portal for a variety of services, including applying for driver’s licence and passport applications, insurance, booking medical appointments, registering births, accessing social welfare payments and managing pensions.

Foreigners can pre-register travel details, complete mandatory registration procedures online, apply for work permits and register for university entrance exams.

Cities such as Moscow that are part of a Smart City initiative offer electronic medical cards that keep a record of prescriptions and test results. It also offers a gateway to pay for housing services and utilities.

Over 81% of Russian citizens regularly use government electronic services, a study conducted by VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) found in 2024.^[11]

Oracle and Atlassian suspended services in Russia, while Alphabet exited the country. Microsoft has suspended new sales but continues to provide access to existing clients.^[12]

With no end in sight to the Ukraine war and the sanctions continuously imposed on Russian entities, Moscow also sees India as a key partner. At the Russia-India Business Dialogue held on the sidelines of the SPIEF 2026, where a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) delegation^[13] took part, the focus was on collaboration across “innovation, technology, investment and trade”.

A report^[14] by Russia’s largest financial institution, Sberbank, said the participants at the forum were interested in digitisation and artificial intelligence being a key part of the $100 billion bilateral trade target set for 2030. India is also negotiating with Sberbank to launch its flagship AI – GIGACHAT in India, the bank said in June.^[15]

Bilateral trade between the countries in the 2024-25 fiscal year stood at $68.7 billion from $13.2 billion in 2021-22, but this is heavily dependent on Indian purchases of Russian crude that has been subject to U.S. sanctions.

A key focus area for economic cooperation is now the connectivity of digital payment networks. Moscow and New Delhi have long discussed the integration of the Mir and RuPay. While India’s United Payments Interface (UPI) works in nine foreign countries, talks to integrate Russia into the system have not yielded any results. This is an important area that needs to be developed for Russia and India to build an infrastructure of technological sovereignty.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer with a special interest in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

^[1] Roscongress Foundation, “Results of the 29th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,” St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 8, 2026. https://forum-spb.ru/en/news/news/itogi-raboty-xxix-peterburgskogo-mezhdunarodnogo-ekonomicheskogo-foruma/

^[2] Mastercard, “Mastercard Statement on Suspension of Russian Operations,” Mastercard Newsroom, March 5, 2022. https://www.mastercard.com/us/en/news-and-trends/press/2022/march/mastercard-statement-on-suspension-of-russian-operations.html

^[3] Visa Inc., “Visa Suspends All Russia Operations,” Visa Newsroom, March 5, 2022. https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.18871.html

^[4] Kirill Kashtanov, “NSPK Proposes Gradual Withdrawal of Visa and Mastercard Cards from Circulation,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 17, 2026. https://rg.ru/2026/06/17/nspk-predlozhila-sposob-postepennogo-vyvoda-kart-visa-i-mastercard-iz-oborota.html

^[5] Central Bank of the Russian Federation, “National Payment System,” Central Bank of the Russian Federation, accessed July 9, 2026. https://www.cbr.ru/eng/psystem/

^[6] Evgeny Khodakov, “How Is It Translated? Russia’s Payment System Adapts after Visa and Mastercard,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 25, 2026. https://rg.ru/2026/05/25/kak-eto-perevoditsia.html

^[7]Bank of Russia, “Briefing by Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina”, VK Video, July 2, 2026. https://vkvideo.ru/video-165215852_456240070

^[8] resident of Russia, “Plenary session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum,” President of Russia, 2026. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79956

^[9] Hanming Fang, “China Leads the World in AI Patents, but Still Learns More from America,” Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions (SCCEI), Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, updated May 14, 2026. https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/china-leads-world-ai-patents-still-learns-more-america

^[10] India Brand Equity Foundation, “Information Technology,” India Brand Equity Foundation, accessed July 9, 2026. https://www.ibef.org/industry/information-technology-india

^[11] Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), “Our Digital Everyday Life,” VCIOM Analytical Review, May 14, 2024. https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/nasha-cifrovaja-povsednevnost

^[12] Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian, “Over 1,000 Companies Have Curtailed Operations in Russia—But Some Remain,” Yale School of Management, originally published February 28, 2022, updated January 28, 2024. https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain

^[13] Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), “A Day of Meaningful India–Russia Engagement,” December 8, 2025. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ficci_a-day-of-meaningful-indiarussia-engagement-activity-7469736346031411200-_Tdu#:~:text=A%20day%20of%20meaningful%20India%E2%80%93Russia,Cooperation%20between%20India%20and%20Russia.

^[14] Sberbank India, “Russia and India Discuss USD 100 Billion Trade Target at SPIEF 2026,” June 5, 2026. https://sber.bank.in/media/news/russia-and-india-discuss-usd-100-billion-trade-target-at-spief-2026

^[15] Sberbank India, “India Plans to Use Sber’s GigaChat Across Several Sectors,” June 8, 2026. https://sber.bank.in/media/news/india-plans-to-use-sbers-gigachat-across-several-sectors

The post Putin pushes for technological sovereignty appeared first on Gateway House.

The India-Japan Annual Summit of 2 July 2026 marked the first visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to India. She established a warm rapport with Prime Minister Modi. This summit is an important evolution in perhaps the most important strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific. Prior India-Japan summits have gradually enhanced collaboration in infrastructure, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), investment, and security.

The 2026 summit has rejuvenated the relationship with a new base principle of cooperation — economic security. This refers to, and recognises the importance of, economic resilience, technological development, and stable supply chains as integral elements of national security. The pandemic, multiple geopolitical crises, the weaponisation of technology and supply chains, and increasing rivalry over semiconductors, AI, and critical minerals clearly manifest that strategic weaknesses are often rooted in the economic agenda. For India and Japan, growth requires open markets, secure sea lanes, and technological competitiveness, making it difficult to insulate economic policy from the larger strategic outlook of the two countries.

In terms of trade, India-Japan trade remains modest at $27.48 billion. Exports from Japan to India during this period were $21.43 billion, while imports were a third of that at $6.04 billion. Today, India ranks 14th in Japan’s total trade with a 1.75% share, while Japan ranks 10th in India’s total trade with a 2.26% share. This must be enhanced. The China-Japan bilateral trade is $300 billion annually, and even Indonesia’s is $28 billion. The historic India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), implemented from August 2011, has accelerated economic and commercial relations but needs a review, which is now under consideration.

The July 2 India-Japan Summit provided this recognition through a robust set of agreements. Besides the Joint Statement, the Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation,^[1] a Fact Sheet on the same,^[2] and Joint Statements on Artificial Intelligence and Energy Resilience were part of the bouquet that has put the India-Japan relationship on a path to deeper engagement. Collectively, the outcomes of the summit represent the first effort to create a bilateral framework that meshes economic and strategic resilience.

With this, the Special Strategic and Global Partnership has entered a new period in which trusted technologies, resilient manufacturing, and secure supply chains are its defining features. It will balance economic and security strategies by diversifying trusted partners and supply chains away from concentrated production zones.

Through its Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022^[3], Japan initiated this process domestically. Its policies now consider economic security above market efficiency as part of their decision-making processes. This will entail securing supply chains from disruption due to geopolitical conflict by indigenising them or by relying on allies or partners rather than on China. Unlike Japan’s legislative approach, India has adopted a more sector-specific approach, though often with common objectives. India is working through the PLI schemes, the India Semiconductor Mission, Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the National Critical Mineral Mission, and a focus on stepping up manufacturing capabilities, which together constitute India’s response to building an economic security architecture. In some ways, the 2026 summit brings convergence between these approaches, as on AI, semiconductors, and energy security taking their impact beyond the bilateral relationship. It is a new strategic vocabulary that will determine future economic and technological cooperation.

For instance, logistics networks are seen as facilitators of resilient supply chains, digital infrastructure supports trusted technologies, and industrial corridors are intended to enhance manufacturing capabilities. The role of infrastructure as a facilitator of national resilience has therefore come to the fore.

Japanese FDI is accelerating the existing trend. Investment targets announced during earlier summits suggested that Japan would mobilise ¥5 trillion ($35 billion) in public and private investment by 2027. At the 2025 summit, this target was raised to ¥10 trillion ($70 billion) by 2035. These targets are now not linked only to the pace of ODA rather, Japanese companies have been encouraged by the Government of Japan to enhance their economic profile in India and develop new investment plans over a five-to-ten-year period.

Japanese FDI has expanded considerably over the past decade. New investments have come from companies that have done well in India, such as Toyota, Suzuki, Hitachi, Fujifilm, and YKK, and they are expanding into newer sectors that bring strategic heft to Japanese investment. Therefore, the India-Japan FDI partnership is now going beyond individual investment projects towards the shared logic of strategic ecosystems that can operate in integrated clusters to enhance productivity and reduce vulnerabilities.

Now, these Japanese companies that have succeeded in automobiles, transport infrastructure, and consumer manufacturing are now expanding into semiconductors, electronics, renewable energy, advanced materials, financial services, logistics, digital infrastructure, and their ancillary industries. While the earlier phase of investment was driven largely by India’s domestic consumption, the current effort is to integrate India into regional production networks that could become part of diversified, non-China supply chains across the Indo-Pacific.

This trend is already visible. Toyota announced a new manufacturing facility in Maharashtra in 2024. Suzuki Motor Corporation unveiled plans in 2025 to invest about $7.3 billion (₹70,000 crore) over the next five years. MUFG completed an investment of $4.3 billion (₹40,000 crore) in Shriram Finance in 2026. Hitachi Energy is investing $24 million (₹2,000 crore) in a new facility in Vadodara. YKK announced a $150 million expansion in Chennai, while Yokohama Rubber is establishing a $130 million plant in Odisha. Mitsui Fudosan has entered India’s growing data-centre sector, Fujifilm is investing in semiconductor chemicals linked to Tata’s semiconductor ecosystem in Gujarat, and Japanese publisher Kodansha has entered India through a new partnership.

In an effort to leverage the complementary capabilities of India and Japan, Japan, as a global leader in semiconductor materials, manufacturing, and precision engineering, is seeking to invest^[4] in India, where fabrication, assembly, testing, and packaging under the India Semiconductor Mission^[5] are being promoted. Cooperation extends well beyond FDI and includes research and development, the development of a skilled workforce, and dependable manufacturing systems that could become part of Indo-Pacific supply chains.

Similarly, AI manifests the centrality it has acquired in the technological landscape. The Joint Statement on AI^[6] goes beyond research and development to embrace governance standards, applications, innovation, and the development of human capabilities. India possesses one of the world’s largest digital public infrastructure ecosystems and a growing skilled workforce. Japan’s advanced capabilities in robotics, precision engineering, and industrial automation can be combined with these Indian strengths to create stronger manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, and public administration through AI applications, while ensuring that governance standards remain consistent with the values shared by both democratic partners.

An important part of the strategic triangle is critical minerals. China’s dominance and weaponisation of mineral processing and exports have hurt both India and Japan. Japan has modern processing technologies, financing, and industrial strength, while India offers a growing overseas mineral partnership effort and plans for increasing downstream processing within India. This partnership will look at obtaining raw materials and building midstream and downstream value chains – which will also help supplier countries in Africa and elsewhere.

The Joint Statement on Energy Resilience^[7] shows that the logic of cooperation for economic security is now taking the geopolitics of the West Asia crisis on board and trying to go beyond dependence on fossil fuels. Cooperative efforts on hydrogen, ammonia, LNG, biofuels, and clean energy technologies, including financial support for biogas and ammonia plants in India that could supply their production to Japanese entities overseas, provide a strong push towards energy resilience.

Like most things, the achievement of economic security from concept to reality will be judged by its implementation. The summit has provided strategic direction, but it is research and development, financing institutions, B2B connections, and collaboration and coordination among regulators that will actually create resilient supply chains. The challenge ahead is to create an integrated industrial system out of the shared strategic vision, in which India will become part of resilient regional supply chains that could give a serious fillip to its growth and export capabilities.

Despite the efforts of important Japanese companies that have done well in India, the next phase will require the participation of a much larger number of Japanese MSMEs, which form the backbone of manufacturing supply chains by producing specialised components and precision technologies that support larger industries. The movement of such MSMEs to India is vital to the next phase of the economic partnership.

However, many of Japan’s MSMEs remain anxious about entering India. Their concerns are well documented in JETRO’s surveys.^[8] Regulatory complexity, differing procedures among Indian states, challenges relating to land acquisition and logistics, and uncertain approval timelines are issues that larger companies have largely overcome. Smaller companies, however, compare these conditions with what they receive in countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, and India fares poorly, causing concern.

These concerns are also augmented by issues relating to standards and certification. Japanese companies believe that compliance with the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) requirements is time-consuming and costly, even though their products may already be certified under Japanese or internationally accepted standards. They therefore prefer greater harmonisation between BIS and internationally recognised certification systems, particularly on technical issues of products of interest. ^[9] Mutual recognition of technical standards, where possible, would reduce costs and approval times and make India a more attractive destination for technology-led FDI.

Addressing such concerns is now understood to be part of the economic security partnership. Accordingly, the Indian side announced a Japan Business Week, under the PMO, during which such issues would be taken up for resolution. This will augment the special facilitation mechanism that already exists to address Japanese investors’ concerns.

The Modi-Takaichi Summit also elevated bilateral cooperation by placing it within larger frameworks, including the G7, the G20, the Quad, and ASEAN. The Joint Statement recognises India’s expanding engagement with ASEAN, South Asia, and Africa and links it with Japan’s revised Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. Clearly, economic resilience cannot be pursued bilaterally alone.

ASEAN, therefore, assumes greater significance, and Japan and India must be on the same page economically and strategically. The strategic side is stronger, and India and Japan have reaffirmed their support for ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as part of the effort to maintain an inclusive and rules-based regional order. The decision made during the summit to establish a trilateral India-Japan-Philippines Track 1.5 Dialogue is welcome. It demonstrates that India and Japan are pursuing the idea of engaging ASEAN member states voluntarily in ASEAN-plus initiatives. The Philippines has now become a strategic partner of both India and Japan, with a special focus on maritime security, infrastructure development, and supply-chain resilience. How this evolves could well become the basis for similar engagement with Vietnam or Indonesia.

Africa is another important dimension. Japan’s enhanced FOIP and India’s India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) process share common objectives in promoting infrastructure, digital connectivity, healthcare, clean energy, and critical minerals in Africa. Jointly developed projects in third countries in Africa could become important instruments for supporting sustainable development while also helping to diversify supply chains, particularly for critical minerals.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding the Quad, particularly with U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, India and Japan have reiterated its importance. The Joint Statement expands the Quad’s agenda beyond maritime security to include critical technologies, resilient supply chains, climate change, public health, and infrastructure development. The economic security framework provides a practical basis for implementing Quad initiatives.^[10] By working more closely together, India and Japan, along with Australia and willing ASEAN partners, can provide greater stability across the region.

The Modi-Takaichi Summit is more than merely another diplomatic event. It clearly demonstrated the desire to establish economic security as the defining principle of the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership. This partnership has evolved through several phases. Initially, it was led by ODA and infrastructure development. Subsequently, FDI, industrial corridors, and manufacturing cooperation came to the fore. With this summit, the next phase—centred on resilient supply chains, trusted technologies, AI, critical minerals, and energy resilience—has emerged.

India and Japan have articulated a clear vision, and the India-Japan Economic Summit demonstrated significant opportunities through the 129 MoUs that were concluded. What lies ahead is the need for sustained implementation through a faster pace of regulatory reform, stronger institutional coordination, and greater facilitation of innovation and investment.

Such achievements will enable the legacy of the Modi-Takaichi Summit to extend well beyond the bilateral relationship. They will demonstrate that middle powers, through responsible and sustained action, are capable of shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific through strategic intent and the resilient economic networks that back it up to promote regional stability. Economic security is therefore no longer simply another area of cooperation between India and Japan. It has become the foundation upon which the next generation of the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership will be built.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India–Japan Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, Ministry of External Affairs, July 2, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41395/IndiaJapan_Joint_Declaration_on_Economic_Security_Cooperation

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Fact Sheet 2.0: India–Japan Economic Security Cooperation,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 2, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41396/Fact_Sheet_20_IndiaJapan_Economic_Security_Cooperation

[3] Ministry of Justice, Japan, Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security Through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures. https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4716/en

[4] The agreements reached at the summit identify semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and energy resilience as priority areas because they influence both national security and economic competitiveness. Semiconductors perhaps illustrate this best. Modern production lines depend upon supply chains that are, however, geographically concentrated. The chips produced are vital for a variety of sectors, from consumer electronics to telecommunications, defence, automobiles, industrial automation, and AI. Disruptions in their supply therefore have far-reaching commercial consequences.

[5] Indian Strategic Minerals Foundation (ISM), “Home,” n.d. (accessed July 9, 2026). https://ism.gov.in/

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan–India Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World, December 12, 2015. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/101054202.pdf

[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement between Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan on Energy Resilience.” February 19, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41389/Joint_Statement_between_Ministry_of_Petroleum_and_Natural_Gas_of_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Ministry_of_Economy_Trade_and_Industry_of_Japan_on_Energy_Resilience

[8] Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). “India–Japan Industry Co-Creation, Co-Innovation Initiative Launched to Strengthen Bilateral Business Cooperation.” February 19, 2025. https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/2025/04461099867183d4.html

[9] Bureau of Indian Standards published 21,890 standards for products, process specifications, service sectors, codes of practice and methods of test terminology, PIB, 23 December 2022. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1886025&reg=48&lang=2

[10] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “16th India–Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement.” February 19, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41391/16th_IndiaJapan_Annual_Summit_Joint_Statement

The post India-Japan Economic Security Pillar appeared first on Gateway House.

Beneath this rhythm of annual crises, a pattern has emerged. What links the five countries surveyed here is a shared posture: non-alignment as the preferred response to a fragmenting order. Non-alignment here is more the seeking of autonomy and less a position of neutrality. From Brasília to Pretoria, Jakarta and New Delhi, and more quietly Berlin, experts say their country increasingly resists having to choose sides. This is a pragmatic recalibration to a global order marked by an unpredictable U.S., an assertive China and institutions built for an earlier world. The practice of non-alignment still varies (read more on page 45) – Germany’s version is not India’s, and Indonesia’s is not Brazil’s – but the underlying drive is similar. This posture is no longer confined to the Global South.

You can download the 2026 Emerging Middle Powers Report here.

Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director of Gateway House.  

Dr Sarah Pagung is the Executive Director of International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung.

Florian Bigge is the Programme Director of International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung. 

Paulo Esteves is a member of the Academic Council, BRICS Policy Center. 

Carlos Frederico de Souza Coelho is a researcher at BRICS Policy Center.

Gustavo de Carvalho is the Acting Head, African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg. 

Steven Gruzd is the former Head of African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Dr Dino Patti Djalal is the Founder and Chairman of Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI). 

Jenny Sari Winata is the Programme and Research Manager at Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI).

Jonathan Lehrer is the Programme Manager, Körber-Stiftung.

Leona Harting is the Programme Manager, Körber-Stiftung.

Lisa Salzwedel is the Programme Manager at Körber-Stiftung.

Raveena Shivashankar is the Digital Media Associate at Gateway House.

Support our work here.

For interview requests or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.

The post Tested, Trusted, Torn? Emerging Middle Powers Report 2026 appeared first on Gateway House.

Following decades of close relations, estrangement, mutual indifference, and underperformance, India and Indonesia – bound by a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership since 2018 – have been working to give their relationship new meaning and strong momentum, especially after President Prabowo Subianto’s successful visit to India in January 2025.

What the past 18 months have achieved and how the bilateral may blossom further will become clear when Prime Minister Narendra Modi lands in Jakarta in the first week of July as part of a three-country tour that will take him to Australia and New Zealand, too. This voyage of relationship-building is preceded by the visit to India by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Hence, the Indo-Pacific dimension of Modi’s dialogue with leaders of four important democracies in the region, at a time when the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the Quad seems to be weakening, will be of wider significance and interest.

The current India-Indonesia bilateral is free from disputes and irritants. The two leaders connect very well, with Prabowo coming across as an admirer of PM Modi’s domestic policies and Modi appreciating that the current Indonesian president holds a more calibrated and nuanced view of China’s role in the Indo-Pacific.

In this light, it may be left to the leaders to use their vantage position to motivate officials, business leaders, and others to do more – and with greater speed – to increase substance to cooperation. This kind of practical approach was visible on June 7 when the two foreign ministers – S Jaishankar and Sugiono – co-chaired the 8th India-Indonesia Joint Commission meeting. After “a full spectrum” review of ties, they identified avenues for further strengthening collaboration in a slew of diverse areas: political, defence and security, maritime, trade and investment, pharma and healthcare, digital, energy, connectivity, space, education, consular, culture, and people-to-people exchange. It is reasonable to expect that several new MOUs may be signed, and a clear roadmap may emerge to nurture and deepen this vital relationship in the coming years.

But the significance of Modi’s visit goes beyond this. The two leaders are expected to achieve a closer, more aligned worldview, especially in the aftermath of the wars in Ukraine and the Gulf and amid the emerging entente cordiale between the U.S. and China. The latter, if it materialises fully, will have a significant impact on the region, where India and Indonesia are leading players. The Indo-Pacific is their shared home, as it is for other fellow democracies such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea. These six nations value security and stability, which are crucial to the well-being and prosperity of their people. They need to create a new forum for consultation and political-diplomatic partnership as other groupings – such as the Quad – reveal inner cracks due to American indifference. This is a key strategic aspect worth watching while Modi is in Jakarta.

A renewed expectation is that the two countries may finally agree on a deal for India to sell BrahMos missiles to Indonesia. India’s defence secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently disclosed, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, that terms of the deal were close to finalisation. Gradual intensification of defence cooperation may also be on the cards. The shared goal of increasing bilateral trade from $30 billion to $50 billion has run behind schedule but is extremely important, tying up the two countries in productive commercial engagements. Cooperation in critical minerals and digital commerce will hopefully be accorded special salience. Statements by the leaders, and perhaps a joint statement, may provide clues about the governments’ thinking on how to achieve this goal.

In the news era of proactive plurilateral diplomacy, India and Indonesia are certain to discuss and devise ways and means to enhance collaboration in fora such as the G20, BRICS, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Indonesia is a new member of BRICS and can gain much from close collaboration with a founding member like India. The latter will need Jakarta’s valuable support to ensure that the forthcoming BRICS summit in Delhi is a success.

Closer home, India will no doubt highlight its burgeoning cooperation with ASEAN, of which Indonesia has been a leading light. The two leaders may discuss their conceptions of the unfolding change in Myanmar. A visible gulf exists between ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus formula and India’s policy of embracing the new power reality, visible during the official visit of general-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing to New Delhi recently.

India’s May 1 announcement of the Great Nicobar Project,^[1] which seeks to transform the Andaman and Nicobar Islands into a strategic maritime and economic hub, gives Indonesia especial importance due to its geographic proximity to the islands. For the same regional space are ongoing discussions on connectivity and the imperative need to strengthen BIMSTEC – an area where the two sides should actively exchange views on how to involve Indonesia in the endeavour to make the Bay of Bengal Community a reality.

Several of these issues were on the discussion table at the two rounds of the Track 1.5 Dialogue between Mumbai’s Gateway House: Indian Council of Global Relations and Jakarta’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Mumbai and Jakarta between the thought leaders of the two countries. The seriousness of the dialogues, held in September 2024 and September 2025, and their recommendations were acknowledged by and found mention in their joint statement of January 2025. Both capitals now have future-orientated and pragmatic policy suggestions in their respective briefcases. They need now only to activate the ideas within and expedite the plans to bring the two countries and, thereby, the two regions, together.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He is a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Great Nicobar Project” Press Information Bureau, May 1, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?id=158406&NoteId=158406&ModuleId=3&reg=3&lang=2

The post The Asian significance of Modi in Indonesia appeared first on Gateway House.

On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order to remove birthright citizenship, with individuals born within the borders of the U.S. no longer automatically becoming citizens^[1]. The door for dual citizenship, at least with the U.S. has closed. But several other countries do still permit dual citizenship.

Citizenship is a legal bond between an individual and a state granting rights and privileges in return for adherence to its laws, regulations, and civic obligations.^[2] Dual citizenship has increased over time, especially after the Second World War due to growing economic opportunities, technological progress, ease of travel, trade and cultural connections across the globe, creating the option of dual citizenship. This attractive option allowed individuals to acquire a new citizenship suited to their priorities without giving up their original one. This infographic maps which countries allow it, which do not, and which do so conditionally.

Figure 1: Global overview of dual citizenship

Source: Global Citizenship Observatory

A striking feature of the map is the prevalence of dual citizenship across the Americas, in contrast to its rarity in Asia. This is largely because nationhood in the Americas is not tied to a dominant ethnic identity, and large-scale migration has encouraged countries in the Americas to embrace dual citizenship.

In Asia, however, stronger linkages between ethnicity and nationality have made dual citizenship less common. East Asian countries like Japan, which are largely monoethnic, and China, where the dominant Han Chinese comprise more than 91% of the population,^[3] strictly do not allow dual citizenship.

Similarly, strong linkages between ethnicity, linguistic identity and culture have prevented India from recognising dual citizenship, with the Overseas Citizenship of India card (OCI) being introduced in 2007 to provide foreign nationals the benefits of dual nationality without giving them access to political rights.

Figure 2: Dual citizens – with conditions

All information on dual citizenship and nationality, its conditions and restrictions, has been sourced from each respective country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The table above details the conditions under which select countries permit dual citizenship These conditions serve to protect the national identity and security, as dual citizens may carry divided loyalties or sentiments that conflict with a country’s political, economic and cultural interests. For instance, European countries with mandatory military conscription, such as Austria and Switzerland, restrict dual citizenship with non-EU countries, out of concern that divided allegiances could pose a risk to national security.

The Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia restrict dual citizenship with non-EU countries, primarily to prevent their ethnic Russian populations acquiring dual Estonian-Russian or Latvian-Russian citizenship. Countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), such as Tajikistan, allow for dual citizenship under highly specific conditions. Tajikistan only allows for dual citizenship with Russia, due to shared historical and people-to-people ties, most significantly, the large number of Tajik migrant workers in Russia. As of late 2024, the number of Tajik migrants working in Russia was 618,097,^[4] making up 98% of Tajikistan’s migrant labour force.

As the popularity and global acceptance of dual citizenship have increased, several personalities across various professions have acquired a second citizenship alongside their primary one. In the political sphere, individuals such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Governor of California, holds dual Austrian and American citizenship. David Lammy, deputy Prime Minister of the UK, holds dual British and Guyanese citizenship.  Boris Johnson, the former Prime Minister of the UK was a dual British-American citizen, as he was born in the U.S. However, he renounced his American citizenship after being elected Prime Minister. Mark Carney, the current Prime Minister of Canada, was a triple citizen of Canada, Ireland and the UK. He began the process of renouncing his Irish and British citizenship only after being elected Prime Minister.

In South Asia, several Pakistani politicians hold dual citizenship. Shahbaz Gill, former Special Assistant to Prime Minister Imran Khan, is a dual Pakistani American citizen. Shaukat Aziz, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, is a dual Pakistani-British citizen. Tulip Siddiq, niece of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hassina, is a dual British-Bangladeshi national and served in the House of Commons. Several journalists, businesspersons and other personalities are dual citizens.

Figure 3: Famous global personalities with dual citizenship-pictorial representation
Figure 4: Personalities with dual citizenship

Source: Gateway House Research

Do dual citizens have voting rights? Only in very few cases. In the U.S., dual citizens possess the same fundamental political rights as U.S.-only citizens. They can vote in all U.S. federal, state and local elections, and can vote in foreign elections without jeopardising their U.S. status. They must, however, be natural-born U.S. citizens to run for Presidential office.

In Australia, dual citizens can vote in federal, state and local elections though they are not obligated to vote. To be eligible for elections in Australia, a dual citizen must renounce their foreign citizenship. There are also time-restrictive non-resident voting rights, as in the UK and Canada, for 15 years (with exceptions) and 5 years, respectively, after leaving.

Political rights, taxation and perceptions of allegiance raise anxieties about dual nationals, hampering global acceptance of dual citizenship. As these anxieties continue to rise, a larger number of countries may introduce conditionalities or restrictions to dual nationality, while some may do away with the programme entirely.

Jia Gopani, Roshini Ramesh and Karthik Narayan Venkataraman are Interns, Gateway House.

This infographic was exclusively designed for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2025 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

^[1] The White House. “EXECUTIVE ORDER 14160 – PROTECTING THE MEANING AND VALUE OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP.” Federal Register, January 20, 2025. https://public-inspection.federalregister.

gov/2025-02007

^[2] Britannica Editors. “citizenship.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 18, 202dual citizenship in blue, countries that allow conditional dual citizenship in a checkered blue-and-white6. https://www.britannica.com/led countries in the Americas to embrace dual citizenship, as there are no dominant ethnic groups and nationhood is not tied to a single topic/citizenship

[3] “Main Data of the Seventh National Population Census,” n.d. https://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ PressRelease/202105/t20210510_1817185.html

[4] “Restrictions, Discrimination Do Not Significantly Stem Tajik Migration Flow to Russia,” Eurasianet, May 13, 2025, https://eurasianet.org/restrictions-discrimination-do-not-significantly-stem-tajik-migration-flow-to-russia.

The post Dual Citizenships: fine or fraught? appeared first on Gateway House.

The G7 is a prestigious, 50-year-old plurilateral institution of the West, or the Global North, whereas BRICS is viewed as a grouping of the Global South. With some of the world’s most advanced economies as its members, the G7 annual summit, usually held in May or June, is billed as a major event on the international calendar.

Dispersal of economic power is a reality. From the mid-1970s, when the G7 accounted for about 65% of the global GDP, its share declined to 43% in 2025. The G7 has lost some of its salience, but it is hard to ignore it. Its members – the U.S., Canada, Japan, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the European Union (EU) – still matter greatly in terms of economic, military, and technological achievements. The list of the 10 largest economies today features six from the G7.

The fifty-second G7 summit was held in Évian-les-Bains, France, from 15–17 June. The ‘partner’ countries present were Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya, and South Korea. Besides, Ukraine, the UAE, and Qatar were invited to take part in the specified discussions.

The latest summit produced better outcomes than the previous year’s summit in Canada, which the U.S. president, the most important participant, left a day earlier. That summit’s host, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, fully aware of the internal divisions and rifts, abandoned the traditional leaders’ communiqué in favour of a short Chair’s summary to reflect its less ambitious outcomes. Against this backdrop, the Evian summit under the French presidency produced nine negotiated statements on specific themes, based on consensus among the G7 members and agreement from a few partner countries on several of the G7 documents.

The central challenge for G7 members was to articulate and project a common view on major global issues at a time when U.S.-Europe relations have been fractured on a host of issues since the commencement of Trump 2.0. They managed to do quite well. In this task, the U.S.-Iran deal announced just hours before the summit’s opening helped. Yet it is worth noting that the public spat between President Trump and Italian PM Georgia Meloni soon after the summit’s end showed that the G7’s solidarity stands on fragile foundations at present. President Trump blamed Italy and “the so-called” NATO allies for not helping the U.S. in the war against Iran, while the U.S. had spent billions of dollars on Europe’s defence.

Taking the long-term view, it is difficult to disagree with the assertion in last year’s G7 Chair’s summary. It stated: “Five decades after its founding in 1975, the G7 continues to demonstrate its value as a platform for advanced economies to coordinate financial and economic policy, address issues of peace and security, and cooperate with international partners in response to global challenges.”

In this light, a critical examination of the Evian summit’s outcome documents shows that, on vital issues, the G7 remains united and determined to make a difference. Of the nine documents, three were more significant than the others.

One, the leader’s statement on balanced, durable, and resilient growth outlines the needs and risks facing the global economy and stresses the imperative to strengthen engagement with international partners. Noting that global economic uncertainty has heightened risks to growth, it calls on all countries to avoid arbitrary export restrictions and strengthen the resilience of economies through a diversified, reliable supply chain and efficient energy systems. It expects G7 finance ministers, international financial institutions, and other mechanisms to work towards durable global growth by reducing global imbalances.

Two partner countries – Egypt and South Korea – agreed to this statement, but India and the other partners did not.

Two, the declaration on mutually beneficial international partnerships seeks “to update” or modify the international development system by shifting from concessional finance to partner countries’ ability to mobilise domestic resources and attract private capital. “Self-finance” is the name of the new game, though it was added that concessional resources will be used “strategically” for the least developed and most vulnerable countries and their specific needs. Ending fragmentation in the development system and improving its efficiency and effectiveness through better coordination and collaboration will also be implemented. Again, Kenya and South Korea agreed to this declaration, but India and other partners did not.

Three, the leaders’ statement on geopolitical issues dealt with only three subjects: Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. The largest section dealing with Ukraine spoke of the G7’s united stand and unwavering support for defending Ukraine’s freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The G7 plans to increase the delivery of air defence systems and enhance the pressure on the Russian war economy. Concerning the Middle East, the grouping welcomed the U.S.-Israel deal, “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump”, while affirming the right of passage “without restrictions or tolls” through the Strait of Hormuz. The para on the Indo-Pacific was routine, reiterating opposition to China’s unilateral attempts to alter the status quo – without naming it.

Canadian Prime Minister Carney got it exactly right when he observed that the G7, if it ever ran the world, did not do so now. He underlined that the role of India and other emerging economies has become much more important than before.

India and other partner countries participated in more than half of the summit’s sessions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remarks at the session on forging new partnerships and rebuilding international solidarity received notice, but many commentators missed his observation of fundamental importance. He stated that the lack of respect for international law was “the biggest hurdle to building international solidarity. “He also frankly conveyed that in an uncertain world, “trade and technology were being used for narrow interests.” While agreeing with the G7 on many points, India did not hesitate to state its differences and decided not to sign several joint statements with it. Consequently, it became a signatory to only two of the documents, which are related to the fight against cancer and Ebola.

At the Evian summit, India’s participation received considerable attention. China is not invited to G7 summits. India was welcomed as a major representative of the Global South. Now, the critical issue is whether, as the BRICS Chair, India will invite France as a special guest to the BRICS summit in September 2026. If so, India and France, working closely together, can serve as a bridge between the G7 and BRICS.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was first published in Hindustan Times.

The post G7 Evian summit matters appeared first on Gateway House.

Transcript

Raveena Shivashankar RS: Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict didn’t come out of nowhere. There have been years of tension, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency and cross-border militant activity. But Pakistan had been absorbing TTP attacks for years without striking Afghanistan at this scale. But on October 9, 2025, it felt like a turning point. What actually happened? What was the breaking point? Why did Islamabad decide to strike Kabul directly in October 2025, and what did they hope to achieve?

Dr Raghav Sharma (DRS): It’s important to have some context, essentially, for this escalation. It’s actually a classic case of the chickens coming home to roost.

If you go back to August 2021, Pakistan very emphatically welcomed the Taliban’s victory over Kabul. And this time has shown over the last nearly five years that the Taliban have been in power. This is proven to be a Pyrrhic victory for Pakistan.

And it should not surprise us, because if we go back to the period of the 1990s, Pakistan experienced something very similar, which is, instead of Pakistan acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan, a plethora of Islamist groups jockeyed to acquire reverse strategic depth in Pakistan. Groups like the ones led by Sufi Muhammad. Pakistan expected different results when experimenting with the same formula.

And therefore, what we have seen since August 2021, since the Taliban returned to power, is a secular increase in TTP attacks. There’s been a year-on-year increase in TTP attacks. And this is borne out by the number of civilian casualties, the number of security personnel who’ve been killed, but also the number of militants who’ve been killed.

Levels of violence are at their highest since 2015. And what we have seen is that this has proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. It also punctured the discourse Pakistan had long peddled that a heavy Indian presence during the 20 years of the Republic was being used to foment trouble in Pakistan.

It really has punctured that entire discourse. This specific attack in October 2025 was triggered by a large-scale attack that led to the death of approximately 11 security personnel in Pakistan. And that had come after the ceasefire negotiations that had been mediated by Qatar and Turkey, which had broken down effectively.

And this eventually led Pakistan to retaliate and carry out airstrikes, which, interestingly, came against the backdrop of the Taliban’s very conscientious effort to shore up ties with India. Their interim foreign minister was on a visit to New Delhi when these strikes took place, which has also allowed Pakistan to once again drop the narrative that it is India which is actually using Afghanistan as a proxy battleground to settle scores with Pakistan. And Pakistan hoped essentially that through these airstrikes, it would send out several messages.

One is going to deter possibly future attacks and signal to the TTP and to their backers in Kabul that any attacks that the TTP carries out are going to have costs. And Pakistan is free to take kinetic action in response to the attacks that it attributes to groups like the TTP. They also hoped that by targeting military installations of the Afghan Taliban, they’d be able to wear down whatever military capability that the Afghan Taliban possess in the form of military bases in the American cache of arms that they have access to.

They’re hoping that this would also wear down the Taliban militarily, it will degrade their capability essentially, and it will coerce the Taliban to eventually act in some credible way against the TTP and bring them in and deny them safe sanctuary. But what it has done, certainly in effect, is it has reinforced at a popular level anti-Pakistan sentiment across Afghanistan in very pronounced ways. It has allowed the Taliban essentially to rally people around the flag as it seeks to issue calls for unity to take on what it calls Pakistani aggression.

Third, the Afghan Taliban have sought to use these attacks to shore up their domestic legitimacy and ward off a long-running label that they found very hard to shed, which is that they’re proxies of the generals in Rawalpindi. And they have actually tried to use these attacks to underscore that “we are not proxies of the generals in Pindi. They’re attacking us primarily because we are doing what we believe is good for the national interests of the Afghan state.

Pakistan has not essentially achieved the objectives it wanted to achieve because had it done so, we would not have seen a recurrence of violence, a recurrence of tensions with the Afghan Taliban, which has carried over well into 2026. And interestingly, this also comes at a very volatile point in time.

There’s turmoil in the Middle East. Pakistan is dealing with tensions on its border with India. It is also seeing escalating levels of violence in Balochistan, where separatist groups like the BLA, for instance, have dramatically stepped up their attacks. If you actually pick up empirical data coming out from Pakistan itself, the highest levels of violence are in KPK and Balochistan.

RS: The Balochistan Liberation Army, which has stepped up its attacks and its strategies. From the outside, Pakistan appears to be fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously: the Afghan Taliban and TTP on its western border and the Baloch Liberation Army in the south. Are these connected, or are they separate conflicts that Islamabad is dealing with at the same time? And does this pressure affect Pakistan’s strategy in any way?

DRS: The Baloch insurgency is much older than the TTP. The Baloch and the TTP insurgencies came up in very different contexts. The Baloch insurgency has had many phases from the late 1940s onwards. The latest sort of round of fighting against the Pakistani state gained a lot of momentum after the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the Pakistani state.

The TTP, in contrast, is a relatively younger organisation that came up in the context of NATO intervention in Afghanistan. They also have very different aims. The Baloch are a secular nationalist, rather than ethno-nationalist, grouping, seeking to secede from the state of Pakistan and exert control over their political destiny.

But also, their own natural resources, and address a lot of the grievances that they have against the Pakistani state. The TTP, in contrast, aspires to have a state that is governed by Sharia law. And they don’t have a secessionist agenda.

They simply want to overturn the existing socio-political order in Pakistan, and they want to capture the state to re-engineer society and polity from the top. So, their aims and objectives are different. The context in which these insurgencies were born is very different.

Yet what we have seen is that from about 2006 onwards, there has been an attempt by the TTP to try and make inroads into Balochistan. From 2014 onwards, they issued calls for the Baloch to join the ranks of the TTP. They’ve been using it since about 2021 or 2022, so the period that largely overlaps with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

They’ve used that period to amplify calls to join ranks with the TTP. They are not only now calling on the Baloch to join the TTP, but they are also supporting a lot of the grievances that the Baloch have against the Pakistani state. They have expressed sympathy essentially for the Baloch to not only exercise control over their natural resources but also to find redressal for their grievances about enforced disappearances.

And they’re calling on the Baloch to join the fight against what they see as an oppressive state, or what they’d like to brand as an oppressive Pakistani state. From 2022 to 2023 onwards, what we’ve seen – again, the evidence is very sketchy in the public domain – is that… But there’s been some level of collaboration, at least a tactical level, between the Baloch insurgents and the TTP.

There are at least four Baloch insurgent groups that have joined ranks with the TTP. Minus the BLA, which is the largest, the most well-known, well-armed group. But what is noticeable is that none of the Baloch groups, including the BLA, have opposed or even given any pronounced statement on the expansion of the TTP and its activities into Balochistan – which shows that there is probably some level of operational and tactical cooperation between the two because the two essentially are interested in stretching the Pakistani forces thin by ramping up attacks in both the KPK and Balochistan. They are well aware that the Pakistani forces are stretched thin because there’s also been a buildup of tensions with India over the past. They are keen to capitalise on that.

Also, for the Baloch insurgents, an alliance with the TTP not only helps in terms of stretching the Pakistani forces thin and ramping up attacks. But it could also give them access to training. It can give them access to American arms cash. It can also help the Baloch to move their fighters into Afghanistan, where the TTP have sympathisers for a variety of reasons. The evidence is sketchy. There are ideological differences.

The two are born in very different contexts. But the available evidence suggests there is some level of tactical cooperation between the two, even though their end goals may not be the same. Ideologically, they’re not really co-travellers.

Pakistan finds itself in a fairly precarious position militarily. It is a bit stretched.

RS: In your perspective, who’s faring better militarily right now? Because you just said that, it’s a little stretched. But Pakistan has a professional army and an air force. Afghanistan, despite having no formal international recognition and a collapsing economy, seems to be holding its ground just fine. How do you assess the military balance? What gives the Afghan Taliban the ability to sustain this?

DRS: In the conventional sense of the term, Pakistan has the obvious military edge. It has an air force system, both of which are lacking in the Afghan case. The air force has practically collapsed for all practical purposes post the fall of the republic.

They don’t really have an air defence system to speak of. And the size of the Afghan army under the Afghan Taliban is much smaller. It’s dwarfed by the Pakistani army, which is a professional standing army with years of experience in dealing with counter-insurgency.

We’ve seen that the Pakistanis, both in 2025 and 2026, have shown that they possess the ability to strike at will, where and when they want. They can choose the timing and the scale of kinetic action that they want to initiate against the Afghan Taliban.

We should bear in mind that the Taliban is an ideological movement. It’s a movement that has had 20 years of experience in fighting NATO, which is comprised of army men deployed from perhaps the most well-resourced armies in the world, including the United States. They were able to essentially get the better of them. They therefore can resort to, over a long period of time, if push comes to shove, the ability to resort to low-scale guerrilla warfare, which can be fairly bloody for Pakistan.

More than resorting to guerrilla warfare, they also have the ability to unleash suicide bombers, which would infiltrate not just from Afghanistan into Pakistan, but they have a fairly active network within Pakistan, which, if activated, could actually suck both countries down into a fairly bloody conflict spiral. And the third thing which has come up is that they have not shied away from using drones.

And again, the Afghan Taliban are not the only ones who’ve been doing this. They’ve been observing very carefully what the Iranians have been up to over this long-running conflict they’ve had in the Middle East.

And they’ve used these drones, although not to the same effect, and they’re studying that very closely. They have the capability in the long run to inflict costs on the Pakistani state and Pakistani society by unleashing suicide bombers and by using drones, but also by ramping up ideological indoctrination, which is a fairly pronounced yet underrated challenge. Pakistan will also pay costs in the long run, even though in the short run, they may seem to sort of hold sway.

And the fact that the Middle East has been in turmoil for the last two to three months also limits the ability of these Middle Eastern countries to mediate this conflict in the manner that they had done in 2025. The area of diplomatic options is also limited for Pakistan in terms of who will win.

RS: Afghanistan seems to have more leverage than Pakistan. Even though it doesn’t have a large army like Pakistan, it does have drones. It has better military tactics. So it’s doing much better than Pakistan?

DRS: Afghanistan has drones; I wouldn’t say necessarily better military tactics. It has the ability; it has battle-hardened fighters who fought a 20-year-long insurgency.

They have a lot of experience in the terrain that Pakistan is fighting in as well. They know how to mount suicide attacks and use IEDs, which were absolutely lethal for NATO while they were in Afghanistan.

They are deeply embedded in local networks, which gives them an added advantage vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. Because we have to keep in mind the fact that there are grievances, genuine grievances against the Pakistani state in the local tribal areas. And that has played out in two ways.

One is that it’s galvanised to a certain extent, groups like the TTP, which have played on local grievances. But it’s also led to mobilisation in the form of the PTM, which has got very little coverage. And these people are essentially protesting against enforced “disappearances and collateral damage” that have come about as a consequence of Pakistan’s kinetic actions in not just Afghanistan but also the tribal areas to flush out people who are not pliable to the Pakistani state. There are genuine grievances, and they’ve capitalised on that fairly well. So, they can inflict costs; even though, on the military front, the dice may appear loaded in favour of Pakistan for now, they can wage asymmetric warfare.

RS: Does Afghanistan have any international support?

DRS: What we’ve seen is that the Afghan Taliban may be isolated in the sense that it’s only recognised by one country.

But what we have seen is that the Afghan Taliban have invited calls for mediation from international actors, but no country has really condemned the Afghan Taliban for what has played out with the Pakistanis over the last couple of months since 2025. There have been concerns that countries have raised about the terrorists, not specifically the TTP. So they have actually managed to salvage the situation diplomatically because they’ve not really been justified in any meaningful way.

In fact, if you look at the reports that came in when mediation efforts were underway in 2025, unofficially, the diplomats, even from the Middle East, were very critical of the Pakistani delegation and their attitude towards mediation efforts. And they were not really critical so much of the Afghan Taliban. They said it’s the Pakistani negotiators who are making things really, really difficult. So, they have actually done fairly well in managing the situation at a diplomatic level.

RS: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact last year, but so far, Saudi Arabia has not visibly stepped in. Meanwhile, it was Qatar and Turkey who broke the ceasefire and not China, even though they have enormous economic leverage over both Islamabad and Kabul. So what’s going on diplomatically? Is China sitting back, or is it quietly supporting either side? And what is Saudi Arabia’s actual position here?

DRS: Countries like Saudi Arabia, even Qatar at the moment, have been sucked up; their diplomatic and geopolitical energies have all been sucked up by the war in the Middle East.

This is really a sideshow for them because they have far larger stakes in terms of what’s been happening visibly, the conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel, because that has a direct bearing on their security. They are really stretched to the hilt, and they’ve therefore not been so involved in the latest conflagration that has played out since March 2026, between the Afghans and the Pakistanis.

While it’s true that the Chinese sort of sat it out in the first round, in the second round, interestingly, while Pakistan was pitching itself as a mediator in the Iran war to the Trump administration, Pakistan itself was soliciting the services of Beijing to hash out differences essentially with the Afghan Taliban. And the Chinese actually hosted an Afghan and a Pakistani delegation in the city of Ürümqi to get dialogue going between the two sides. And basically, all they could get the two to agree on was that they’d continue talking. But there was no ceasefire. There was no agreement that they came up with. In fact, what we see is that around the 28th of April 2026 onwards, there was a renewed round of hostilities triggered by Pakistan bombing Asadabad, which is the capital of Kunar province, with actually there being no clear trigger point as to why Pakistan did that.

The Chinese essentially tried to step in late March without much success. The Pakistanis are not too thrilled about the kind of role that the Chinese have gone on to acquire. If you look at what has transpired since August 2021, the Chinese have had the maximum number of bilateral engagements with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan is at a distant fifth or sixth.

And this is very telling because in the 90s, the Chinese, while they never had any official links with the Taliban, had one of the best unofficial working relationships with the Afghan Taliban, thanks to the ISI.

Today, the roles have flipped to the extent that the ISI was keeping the door open for them. Today, the Chinese are mediating between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. The Chinese essentially are not interested in this conflagration playing out and stretching out over the long run. And that is not because Afghanistan holds any special place for them. They are not interested so much in terms of who governs Afghanistan and what happens there, but what they are concerned about is that any instability from Afghanistan has the potential to spill over and possibly suck in Pakistan, and it could spill over into neighbouring Central Asia, where the Chinese have both huge investments and interests at stake.

So they don’t want that instability essentially to spill over. And that’s what’s been driving the Chinese to try to get the two to iron out their differences. But what this latest round of negotiations has shown is that while China wields influence, it wields economic leverage.

It has been offered to the Afghans that we weld you into the BRI initiative. There are economic takeaways that are hard to resist. But what it does show is that there are limitations to these economic leverages. It does not necessarily translate into policy outcomes of the kind that a state may desire.

While they may have real economic leverage, they’ve not got the Taliban to change their course on giving sanctuary to the TTP or to shed some of their ideological positions on how they see the world. So there are limitations to that.

RS: The Iran war has grabbed everyone’s attention and priorities. So does the Iran conflict affect Pakistan in any way? And does it give any advantage to Afghanistan?

DRS: Yeah. Well, the Iran conflict has reverberated at an economic level for so many countries, including India. But Pakistan, of course, feels the reverberations of conflict in Iran in a far more pronounced way than we do. And that is because it geographically abuts Iran.

So, yes, oil has become more costly. Energy costs are up. And that is going to strain Pakistan’s coffers. It’s going to strain an economy that is already stuttering. So economically, it’s going to be a challenge. It has disrupted trade to an extent. But more importantly, it has the ability for Pakistan’s societal cleavages to be exacerbated.

There is a huge potential for sectarian conflagrations. And that is because Pakistan has a history of using sectarian groups for political ends. Pakistan has one of the largest Shia Muslim populations outside of Iran.

And the Shias in Pakistan over the last many decades have also been subject to violence. But the Shias have also seen a lot; like the Sunnis, they’ve also seen a lot of sectarian mobilisations coming about. The sectarian mobilisation has been fanned by not only domestic political actors but also by external actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, who’ve jockeyed for influence in this part of the world.

And we’ve seen the kind of violence that played out in the immediate aftermath of America’s actions in Iran, which again underscored that this is a vulnerable point socially for Pakistan. And this could sort of flare up in the long run. Coupled with that, you know, it’s Pakistan’s very volatile Balochistan province that shares the border with Pakistan.

So, you know, while things appear stable at the moment, if instability resumes, if the regimes in Iran get shaky, Iran could also have trouble in its system, Balochistan province, which means that it could provide sanctuary to Baloch separatists from Pakistan. And Iran may be willing to use that as a pressure point because Iran has not had a very good history of treating its own Baloch minority in the province. So, yes, I mean, this conflict does inflict vulnerability as far as Pakistan is concerned.

It does sort of, you know, have this element of uncertainty because the Iran war comes at a time when Pakistan is economically not doing great. Its resources are stretched, its security personnel are already stretched because of tensions with India and a need to fight both the Baloch and the TTP insurgencies, and it is seeing tensions with the Afghans. So it certainly does; you know, it does exacerbate the kind of pressure that Pakistan is facing, something it didn’t face in the 1990s when the Taliban were first in power. So it is in a far more delicate position than it was in the 1990s.

RS: What about India’s position in this conflict, as we haven’t taken any formal positions so far, but India and Afghanistan have historically had warm ties? And Pakistan, under pressure, is not really entirely against India’s strategic interests. What is India’s position here? And is there a role India can or should be playing?

DRS: India has issued vociferous statements at an official level. If you look at the MEA press briefings, you look at some of the proceedings of the UN Security Council. India has been fairly vociferous in condemning Pakistan’s airstrikes on civilians.

While it’s good that we’ve condemned the airstrikes and civilians, this makes for a very stark contrast with India’s deafening silence when it comes to access to education for girls. When it comes to the Taliban’s domestic policies, there’s been a deafening silence, so it makes for a very jarring contrast. And again, India is the norm; it’s not the exception.

Most of the states around the world, including countries of the European Union, were on the moral high horse; essentially, their rhetoric on all of this has petered out. And that is because all states are in a transactional relationship with the Afghan Taliban. But I think while it’s fine to condemn attacks on civilians, I think we should not get too involved in the conflagration between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And that is because we don’t want to give credence, or we should not be seen as giving credence, to claims that the Pakistanis have been advancing, that, look, we told you so. You know, the Indians are using the Taliban as a proxy, and they’re using Afghanistan as a proxy battleground to settle scores with us. That doesn’t go with our interests.

It also makes for a very jarring contrast with the fact that while we say that we condemn civilian casualties, and we talk of people-to-people ties, we don’t issue visas to the Afghans, even for education and medicine. So I think we have to be very cautious in terms of what kind of approach we take. There’s very little leverage that we have with either side to mediate the conflict.

What we should be looking at is to see how we can play this to our advantage to build on the existing set of ties. What are the areas of intervention that the conflict opens up for us? For instance, it’s led to a lot of displacement, internal displacement in Afghanistan. And there’s been a lot of demand essentially for India to rekindle a lot of its development initiative projects in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has forcefully repatriated millions of Afghans. Its shelling has dislocated many Afghans. There is a huge humanitarian crisis brewing.

So, where is it that we can step in? Because that is what eventually created large constituencies of goodwill. What we’ve also seen is that conflict with Pakistan has disrupted trade to a very significant extent. We shouldn’t forget that Pakistan was one of the largest trading partners, alongside Iran, of the Afghans.

And what has happened is that because of border tensions with Pakistan and because of the conflict in Iran, border trade essentially has been disrupted, causing huge losses to Afghan traders. It’s also led to losses for the Afghan treasury. About 40 per cent of the Afghan government’s revenue came from customs revenue. That revenue stream has been disrupted. So what is it that we can do essentially to build capacities, to help the Afghans find alternative markets, to support livelihoods? I think these are the areas of intervention that we should be focusing on. And we shouldn’t let the theatrics essentially distract us from pursuing our larger goals.

RS: Do you have any final remarks on this discussion and on this topic? How do you see this conflict that will evolve in the coming months?

DRS: I frankly don’t think that this is going to go away anytime soon. What we should be mindful of is the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan are neighbours. Pakistan is going to be around and exercise influence and leverage over Afghanistan in a way that we will not be able to because of a lack of geographical contiguity.

The Pakistanis have economic and ethnic ties, and therefore their presence is something we’ll have to contend with. We should also keep in mind the fact that no situation between neighbours is ever constant. One shouldn’t get too carried away with what is happening at the moment.

We should really try to focus on the larger picture in order to secure our interests. And theatrics and rhetoric really shouldn’t distract us from that goal.

Also, we should keep in mind the fact that the Taliban-Pakistan relationship is not a black-and-white relationship. It is not a classic patron-client relationship either. There’s always been some give and take.

There are some issues in which the Taliban and the Pakistani state have happily collaborated, and there are other core issues in which the Taliban have refused to cede ground, be it the Durand Line or the issue of the TTP, because it is an ideological movement. It’s not a classic political party that has come to power merely with different ideologies. It’s a very different kind of political animal. This is something we ought to bear in mind when looking at these realities.

And the third thing we ought to be aware of is the fact that this is also a very changed context. It’s a context in which the Taliban are far more diplomatically engaged. Pakistan is not their only lifeline to the world. But this is also a period where we’ve seen China’s footprint grow, not just in Afghanistan but in many parts of India’s neighbourhood. So we cannot take the rhetoric of people-to-people ties, goodwill for India, etc., for granted. We are operating in very different realities, in very complex realities.

Dr Raghav Sharma is a Professor and Director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India.

Raveena Shivashankar is the digital media associate at Gateway House.

This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

The post Pakistan-Afghanistan: Conflict Without Resolution appeared first on Gateway House.

The arrival of the holy relics of Lord Buddha in Leh, Ladakh, India.

The May sun shone brightly and a gentle Himalayan breeze blew through the Buddhist teaching centre at Jivetsal in Choglamsar on the outskirts of Leh. The site was filled with thousands of devotees gathered for the prestigious exposition of the Holy Buddha Piprahwa relics. On May 1, vibrant Tibetan prayer flags fluttered in shades of blue, white, yellow, green and red, and the grandeur of the surrounding mountains echoed with prayers and chants as the relics were officially inaugurated in a grand ceremony led by Amit Shah, India’s Minister of Home Affairs.

The arrival of the sacred Piprahwa relics in Leh was of profound significance, transcending religious celebrations and reaching deep into the realms of civilisational heritage and now with geopolitical connotations as well. These relics,^[1] which include bone fragments, reliquary caskets, intricately carved crystal and soapstone, ornate ornaments, and various funerary objects connected to the life and teachings of the Buddha, represent some of the most significant Buddhist archaeological finds in India. Discovered in 1898 at the site of Piprahwa in what is now Uttar Pradesh, the relics are believed to be linked to the Sakya clan, the very community to which the Buddha belonged.

Their return to Indian soil in 2025, after spending 127 years in foreign custody and an attempted auction in Hong Kong, was a momentous occasion celebrated as a powerful act of cultural reclamation and was also a reassertion of India as the birthplace of Buddhism, particularly Himalayan Buddhism – sending a strong signal to China. The arrival of these relics in Leh restores them to one of the ancient frontiers of Indian civilisation and Buddhism, a region that has harboured rich traditions of spiritual and cultural exchange for centuries. The last time these significant relics were brought to this region was in May 1950, after then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a historic visit to Ladakh for four days. Then, the 19th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, a key figure in Ladakh’s Buddhist community and future representative in the Jammu and Kashmir administration, seized the opportunity to make a special request. He asked Nehru to send the sacred relics of the Lord Buddha and his two principal disciples, Sariputta and Mahamoggallana, that were in the custody of the Mahabodhi Society at Sarnath near Varanasi, to Ladakh.

Nehru’s decision to transport these relics was not merely a gesture aimed at invigorating the local populace’s morale post the 1947 war with Pakistan; it was a strategic move at a time when India was acutely aware of its geopolitical standing as a frontier nation. By taking such symbolic actions, Nehru sent a powerful message to China and the international community, reaffirming India’s commitment to its cultural heritage and civilisational roots. Thus, the arrival of the Piprahwa relics in Leh this year holds immense significance, rekindling historical connections and fostering a renewed appreciation for India’s rich Buddhist heritage among both the local population and visitors from around the world.

Holy Relics of Lord Buddha received at the Sindhu Ghat after a 2-Day Sacred Exposition at Zanskar, Ladakh, India.

Shah, who visited Leh for two days, made sure that the message went out to China loud and clear. In his inaugural address, the Home Minister, flanked by army officers and top-ranking officials from the Intelligence Bureau, stated that India is a “living laboratory of Buddhist culture and compassion” and spoke of Ladakh’s pivotal role in keeping Himalayan Buddhism alive.

The exposition of the holy relics of Tathagata Buddha – the fully enlightened Buddha – ran for two weeks, from May 1 to 14. The relics arrived in Leh on April 29, 2026, via Indian Air Force aircraft and transported with high-level protection. This was followed by a grand ceremonial procession in Ladakh, amid tight security. There was a threat of the relics being stolen by adversaries and also of the relics being replaced by duplicates.

Ceremonial gathering inside the Dharma Centre in Leh, Ladakh, India.

Before being put under the auctioneer’s block last May, the Piprahwa relics had travelled to Mongolia in 2022, Thailand in 2024, and Russia and Bhutan in 2025. Earlier this month, an exposition of the Holy Relics of the chief disciples of the Buddha—Arahant Sariputta and Arahant Mahamoggallana—was organised in Mongolia from 1 to 10 June 2026 by the Indian Ministry of Culture, the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC), and the National Museum, New Delhi.

Mongolia has been a particular recipient of Buddhist relics from India. In June 2022, four sacred Kapilavastu relics of the Buddha were taken from the National Museum of India to Mongolia for an 11-day exposition, marking their first visit to the country in 29 years. The exposition began on 14 June 2022, celebrated as Mongolian Buddha Purnima. The Relics were displayed alongside Mongolia’s revered Buddha Tooth Relic at the Gandantegchinlen Monastery. These Relics were taken on board a C-17 transport aircraft of the Indian Air Force and accompanied by the then Minister of Law and Justice, Kiren Rijiju, and the 20th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche.

While this may seem a simple act of soft cultural diplomacy, the strategic significance is notable, as Buddhism is now seen as a competitive geopolitical tool, particularly between India and China and also in the wider world. At the centre lies the issue of re-incarnation of His Holiness the 14^th Dalai Lama and the existential crisis facing Tibetan Buddhism today all across the Himalayas.

Several Tibetan scholars and experts today believe that the survival of Tibetan Buddhism in India, especially in the Ladakh region, should be given utmost importance by India if it has to face a belligerent China that has made Tibetan Buddhism and the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama a political issue and part of its foreign policy too.

On February 3, 2026, the fourth session of China’s 12th People’s Congress came to a close, marked by the official endorsement of the outline for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) for Tibet. This heralded the beginning of a new era in Chinese geopolitics characterised by comprehensive efforts aimed at systemic assimilation of Tibetan Buddhism within the Communist system of governance. The adoption of this plan indicates a strategic shift in governance and development priorities for the region, as authorities focus on integrating economic, cultural, and social initiatives within a broader framework aimed at fostering greater unity and cohesion within China, and that includes both Tibet and Xinjiang.^[2]

China is brazenly building a narrative to make the world believe that it was the great Chinese civilisation in which Buddhism was born. Recently, Wang Junzheng, the secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), in his “clarion call” to Tibet’s future, accorded approval of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, reinforcing the mandate to adapt Tibetan Buddhism to a socialist society. The session reaffirmed the “Four Major Tasks” — stability, development, ecology and border strengthening — as the bedrock of TAR governance.^[3]

It is imperative for India to first firmly assert both the origins and the enduring presence of Buddhism within its borders and its historical ties to Tibetan Buddhism. This rich tradition is upheld by monks and rinpoches, alongside ancient stupas, inscriptions, rock carvings, and sculptures. The significance of these cultural elements must be prominently highlighted, especially in strategic regions like Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, which are under constant surveillance by China.

Second, engage more deeply with the Tibetan diaspora living in India, especially on the reincarnation process, which can become a friction point with China.

Third, it is crucial for New Delhi to develop a clear roadmap for how it intends to uphold the traditional Nalanda school of Buddhism, which is followed by Indian and Tibetan Buddhists. It will provide religious and geopolitical gains.

This precious heritage is a strategic bargaining chip against China, which is preparing to elect the 15th Dalai Lama by setting in motion a comprehensive process for his reincarnation.^[4]

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Sifra Lentin, “Crystal Ash: The Buddha at Piprahwa,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, June 11, 2026 https://www.gatewayhouse.in/crystal-ash-the-buddha-at-piprahwa/

[2] https://archive.is/xNl6k

[3] International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibet Roundup: February 2026,” International Campaign for Tibet, February 2026 https://savetibet.org/news/tibet-roundup-feb-2026/

[4] Nayanima Basu, “Talk Tibet with Candour,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, September 4, 2025 https://www.gatewayhouse.in/talk-tibet-with-candour/

The post Himalayan Buddhist diplomacy appeared first on Gateway House.

The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) is a geopolitical idea, not a geographic reality. It offers a way to comprehend the politics and interstate relations of a large part of the planet, a reimagining that scholars can undertake with greater ease than policymakers.

Definitions of the region differ widely. Russia and China still prefer the older alternative – ‘Asia-Pacific’. The U.S., which played a pivotal role in raising awareness about China’s rise and assertiveness in Asia, defines IPR as the region stretching from ‘Bollywood to Hollywood’, or ‘Asia-Pacific plus India’. The Indian government views the region as extending from the western shores of the U.S. to the eastern shores of Africa. In this light, reputed scholar C. Raja Mohan found a nice middle ground between the Indian and American definitions. He defines IPR as “a region that includes India and East Asia, as well as the waters off this landmass in the Pacific and Indian Oceans” but excludes Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

As the U.S. ‘unipolar moment’ began to end over a decade after the Cold War, Washington was confronted with the reality of China’s rapid rise, both economically and strategically. With this rise came a sharp increase in China’s aggressiveness in Asia, especially in the South China Sea. To counter it, U.S., Japanese, and Australian scholars pushed the notion of a coalition of democracies. This was the bedrock on which the narrative of IPR, with an increasing engagement of India’s strategic community and government, moved forward, particularly in the second decade of the 21^st century. The progress and consolidation of the Quad – comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia – gained momentum during the Trump administration 1.0. This clear trend continued and advanced further throughout Joe Biden’s presidency.

However, the third decade inaugurated the ‘Age of Polycrisis’, during which all conflicts took place in regions other than the Indo-Pacific: the Russia-Ukraine war; Israel‘s military actions in Gaza and the kinetic actions in the surrounding region; U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran in June 2025; U.S. action in Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba; and eventually a full-scale, undeclared war against Iran by the US and Israel and the Iranian strikes against the Gulf states and others. All this combined to bring a sharp reduction in the salience of the Indo-Pacific.

As a result, the IPR does not appear to be the most consequential theatre of geopolitics today. Yet its significance as the platform on which great-power contestation in political, military, technological, and economic domains will play out cannot be overstated. Strategic rivalries in the Indian Ocean, China-India competition in South Asia, India-China and India-Pakistan conflicts, and the potential for the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the rising China-Japan tensions as flashpoints must be factored in. Their evolution, impact, and likely repercussions need to be monitored regularly by governments and strategic communities alike.

That China remains the core strategic issue is beyond debate. Its comprehensive national power, much like its influence in the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, has been on the rise. It pursues an aggressive diplomacy, backed by military action, as New Delhi experienced again during and after the border clash in June 2020. ASEAN, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia – all have tasted that medicine, and they do not like it.

The Quad was crafted as the combined response of Indo-Pacific democracies, backed by deepening naval cooperation through joint exercises and other measures that were kept outside the Quad’s formal framework. The unique combination of three allies – the U.S., Japan, and Australia – with India as their common strategic partner made steady progress in building inner cohesion and external cooperation with other groupings such as ASEAN and the European Union (EU). The Quad found itself in excellent shape in September 2025, when the Biden administration held its farewell summit in Wilmington, U.S. The summit declaration reiterated the leaders’ commitment to “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient”. They projected the Quad as “a force for good that delivers real, positive and enduring impact on the Indo-Pacific”.

Since then, the Quad has faced rough weather, despite an initially optimistic signal from the Trump administration 2.0, when Marco Rubio, the U.S. secretary of state, hosted a meeting of the grouping’s foreign ministers on the first day of the administration’s tenure. Within months, India-U.S. relations went downhill, and the Trump administration began exploring a rapprochement with China, even flirting with the idea of creating a G2 to moderate their rivalry and harmonise their policies. The Quad summit, scheduled to be hosted by India in November 2025, was postponed indefinitely. At the time of this writing, the world, particularly the Indo-Pacific, anxiously awaits President Trump’s visit to China, speculating about its likely consequences. Recent indications suggest that this visit may be delayed due to the conflict in West Asia.

Over the years, India has developed an Indo-Pacific vision and a matching strategy. Its first option is to work for peace and cooperation with all stakeholders in the regions, but its other priority is to enhance its preparedness, should things go wrong. The desired preparedness stems from enhancing military and economic capabilities internally and constantly improving the power balance externally.

A key policy announcement came from Prime Minister Narendra Modi in March 2025, when speaking in Mauritius, he announced the elevation of India’s policy approach from SAGAR (‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’) to MAHASAGAR (‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’). New Delhi has not offered a definitive explanation of what this elevation truly means, while think tanks have held scores of seminars on the subject.

Consultations with officials and experts, however, have brought some clarity. A former naval chief of India told the author that while India is busy protecting its interests globally, its real security and economic interests lie closer home, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, it is possible to surmise that, at least in the near future, though India will seek geopolitical and geoeconomic collaboration with willing partners in the Pacific region, its security and defence policy will need to concentrate largely on the nation’s perception of threats and challenges in the Indian Ocean.

In this realistically defined context, what India does and how it succeeds in its pivotal role in select plurilateral groupings such as BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave, and IORA may be far more important than what it does in other regional groupings.

Finally, the three nations still committed to the Quad, namely India, Japan, and Australia, need to consider a Plan B if the U.S. loses interest in this grouping completely. They should consider inviting select nations, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to engage with the Quad as observers. Thus, Asian democracies can work together to address the China challenge as the core issue of IPR.

A Track 2.0 dialogue among the leading think tanks of these seven nations seems to be the prudent way forward. A Track 1.5 Dialogue may follow suit.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He served as India’s ambassador to Myanmar from 2002 to 2005. His book India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours won wide acclaim.

This article was first published in the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal in May 2026.

The post The relevance of the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Gateway House.