Transcript

Raveena Shivashankar RS: Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict didn’t come out of nowhere. There have been years of tension, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency and cross-border militant activity. But Pakistan had been absorbing TTP attacks for years without striking Afghanistan at this scale. But on October 9, 2025, it felt like a turning point. What actually happened? What was the breaking point? Why did Islamabad decide to strike Kabul directly in October 2025, and what did they hope to achieve?

Dr Raghav Sharma (DRS): It’s important to have some context, essentially, for this escalation. It’s actually a classic case of the chickens coming home to roost.

If you go back to August 2021, Pakistan very emphatically welcomed the Taliban’s victory over Kabul. And this time has shown over the last nearly five years that the Taliban have been in power. This is proven to be a Pyrrhic victory for Pakistan.

And it should not surprise us, because if we go back to the period of the 1990s, Pakistan experienced something very similar, which is, instead of Pakistan acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan, a plethora of Islamist groups jockeyed to acquire reverse strategic depth in Pakistan. Groups like the ones led by Sufi Muhammad. Pakistan expected different results when experimenting with the same formula.

And therefore, what we have seen since August 2021, since the Taliban returned to power, is a secular increase in TTP attacks. There’s been a year-on-year increase in TTP attacks. And this is borne out by the number of civilian casualties, the number of security personnel who’ve been killed, but also the number of militants who’ve been killed.

Levels of violence are at their highest since 2015. And what we have seen is that this has proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. It also punctured the discourse Pakistan had long peddled that a heavy Indian presence during the 20 years of the Republic was being used to foment trouble in Pakistan.

It really has punctured that entire discourse. This specific attack in October 2025 was triggered by a large-scale attack that led to the death of approximately 11 security personnel in Pakistan. And that had come after the ceasefire negotiations that had been mediated by Qatar and Turkey, which had broken down effectively.

And this eventually led Pakistan to retaliate and carry out airstrikes, which, interestingly, came against the backdrop of the Taliban’s very conscientious effort to shore up ties with India. Their interim foreign minister was on a visit to New Delhi when these strikes took place, which has also allowed Pakistan to once again drop the narrative that it is India which is actually using Afghanistan as a proxy battleground to settle scores with Pakistan. And Pakistan hoped essentially that through these airstrikes, it would send out several messages.

One is going to deter possibly future attacks and signal to the TTP and to their backers in Kabul that any attacks that the TTP carries out are going to have costs. And Pakistan is free to take kinetic action in response to the attacks that it attributes to groups like the TTP. They also hoped that by targeting military installations of the Afghan Taliban, they’d be able to wear down whatever military capability that the Afghan Taliban possess in the form of military bases in the American cache of arms that they have access to.

They’re hoping that this would also wear down the Taliban militarily, it will degrade their capability essentially, and it will coerce the Taliban to eventually act in some credible way against the TTP and bring them in and deny them safe sanctuary. But what it has done, certainly in effect, is it has reinforced at a popular level anti-Pakistan sentiment across Afghanistan in very pronounced ways. It has allowed the Taliban essentially to rally people around the flag as it seeks to issue calls for unity to take on what it calls Pakistani aggression.

Third, the Afghan Taliban have sought to use these attacks to shore up their domestic legitimacy and ward off a long-running label that they found very hard to shed, which is that they’re proxies of the generals in Rawalpindi. And they have actually tried to use these attacks to underscore that “we are not proxies of the generals in Pindi. They’re attacking us primarily because we are doing what we believe is good for the national interests of the Afghan state.

Pakistan has not essentially achieved the objectives it wanted to achieve because had it done so, we would not have seen a recurrence of violence, a recurrence of tensions with the Afghan Taliban, which has carried over well into 2026. And interestingly, this also comes at a very volatile point in time.

There’s turmoil in the Middle East. Pakistan is dealing with tensions on its border with India. It is also seeing escalating levels of violence in Balochistan, where separatist groups like the BLA, for instance, have dramatically stepped up their attacks. If you actually pick up empirical data coming out from Pakistan itself, the highest levels of violence are in KPK and Balochistan.

RS: The Balochistan Liberation Army, which has stepped up its attacks and its strategies. From the outside, Pakistan appears to be fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously: the Afghan Taliban and TTP on its western border and the Baloch Liberation Army in the south. Are these connected, or are they separate conflicts that Islamabad is dealing with at the same time? And does this pressure affect Pakistan’s strategy in any way?

DRS: The Baloch insurgency is much older than the TTP. The Baloch and the TTP insurgencies came up in very different contexts. The Baloch insurgency has had many phases from the late 1940s onwards. The latest sort of round of fighting against the Pakistani state gained a lot of momentum after the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the Pakistani state.

The TTP, in contrast, is a relatively younger organisation that came up in the context of NATO intervention in Afghanistan. They also have very different aims. The Baloch are a secular nationalist, rather than ethno-nationalist, grouping, seeking to secede from the state of Pakistan and exert control over their political destiny.

But also, their own natural resources, and address a lot of the grievances that they have against the Pakistani state. The TTP, in contrast, aspires to have a state that is governed by Sharia law. And they don’t have a secessionist agenda.

They simply want to overturn the existing socio-political order in Pakistan, and they want to capture the state to re-engineer society and polity from the top. So, their aims and objectives are different. The context in which these insurgencies were born is very different.

Yet what we have seen is that from about 2006 onwards, there has been an attempt by the TTP to try and make inroads into Balochistan. From 2014 onwards, they issued calls for the Baloch to join the ranks of the TTP. They’ve been using it since about 2021 or 2022, so the period that largely overlaps with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

They’ve used that period to amplify calls to join ranks with the TTP. They are not only now calling on the Baloch to join the TTP, but they are also supporting a lot of the grievances that the Baloch have against the Pakistani state. They have expressed sympathy essentially for the Baloch to not only exercise control over their natural resources but also to find redressal for their grievances about enforced disappearances.

And they’re calling on the Baloch to join the fight against what they see as an oppressive state, or what they’d like to brand as an oppressive Pakistani state. From 2022 to 2023 onwards, what we’ve seen – again, the evidence is very sketchy in the public domain – is that… But there’s been some level of collaboration, at least a tactical level, between the Baloch insurgents and the TTP.

There are at least four Baloch insurgent groups that have joined ranks with the TTP. Minus the BLA, which is the largest, the most well-known, well-armed group. But what is noticeable is that none of the Baloch groups, including the BLA, have opposed or even given any pronounced statement on the expansion of the TTP and its activities into Balochistan – which shows that there is probably some level of operational and tactical cooperation between the two because the two essentially are interested in stretching the Pakistani forces thin by ramping up attacks in both the KPK and Balochistan. They are well aware that the Pakistani forces are stretched thin because there’s also been a buildup of tensions with India over the past. They are keen to capitalise on that.

Also, for the Baloch insurgents, an alliance with the TTP not only helps in terms of stretching the Pakistani forces thin and ramping up attacks. But it could also give them access to training. It can give them access to American arms cash. It can also help the Baloch to move their fighters into Afghanistan, where the TTP have sympathisers for a variety of reasons. The evidence is sketchy. There are ideological differences.

The two are born in very different contexts. But the available evidence suggests there is some level of tactical cooperation between the two, even though their end goals may not be the same. Ideologically, they’re not really co-travellers.

Pakistan finds itself in a fairly precarious position militarily. It is a bit stretched.

RS: In your perspective, who’s faring better militarily right now? Because you just said that, it’s a little stretched. But Pakistan has a professional army and an air force. Afghanistan, despite having no formal international recognition and a collapsing economy, seems to be holding its ground just fine. How do you assess the military balance? What gives the Afghan Taliban the ability to sustain this?

DRS: In the conventional sense of the term, Pakistan has the obvious military edge. It has an air force system, both of which are lacking in the Afghan case. The air force has practically collapsed for all practical purposes post the fall of the republic.

They don’t really have an air defence system to speak of. And the size of the Afghan army under the Afghan Taliban is much smaller. It’s dwarfed by the Pakistani army, which is a professional standing army with years of experience in dealing with counter-insurgency.

We’ve seen that the Pakistanis, both in 2025 and 2026, have shown that they possess the ability to strike at will, where and when they want. They can choose the timing and the scale of kinetic action that they want to initiate against the Afghan Taliban.

We should bear in mind that the Taliban is an ideological movement. It’s a movement that has had 20 years of experience in fighting NATO, which is comprised of army men deployed from perhaps the most well-resourced armies in the world, including the United States. They were able to essentially get the better of them. They therefore can resort to, over a long period of time, if push comes to shove, the ability to resort to low-scale guerrilla warfare, which can be fairly bloody for Pakistan.

More than resorting to guerrilla warfare, they also have the ability to unleash suicide bombers, which would infiltrate not just from Afghanistan into Pakistan, but they have a fairly active network within Pakistan, which, if activated, could actually suck both countries down into a fairly bloody conflict spiral. And the third thing which has come up is that they have not shied away from using drones.

And again, the Afghan Taliban are not the only ones who’ve been doing this. They’ve been observing very carefully what the Iranians have been up to over this long-running conflict they’ve had in the Middle East.

And they’ve used these drones, although not to the same effect, and they’re studying that very closely. They have the capability in the long run to inflict costs on the Pakistani state and Pakistani society by unleashing suicide bombers and by using drones, but also by ramping up ideological indoctrination, which is a fairly pronounced yet underrated challenge. Pakistan will also pay costs in the long run, even though in the short run, they may seem to sort of hold sway.

And the fact that the Middle East has been in turmoil for the last two to three months also limits the ability of these Middle Eastern countries to mediate this conflict in the manner that they had done in 2025. The area of diplomatic options is also limited for Pakistan in terms of who will win.

RS: Afghanistan seems to have more leverage than Pakistan. Even though it doesn’t have a large army like Pakistan, it does have drones. It has better military tactics. So it’s doing much better than Pakistan?

DRS: Afghanistan has drones; I wouldn’t say necessarily better military tactics. It has the ability; it has battle-hardened fighters who fought a 20-year-long insurgency.

They have a lot of experience in the terrain that Pakistan is fighting in as well. They know how to mount suicide attacks and use IEDs, which were absolutely lethal for NATO while they were in Afghanistan.

They are deeply embedded in local networks, which gives them an added advantage vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. Because we have to keep in mind the fact that there are grievances, genuine grievances against the Pakistani state in the local tribal areas. And that has played out in two ways.

One is that it’s galvanised to a certain extent, groups like the TTP, which have played on local grievances. But it’s also led to mobilisation in the form of the PTM, which has got very little coverage. And these people are essentially protesting against enforced “disappearances and collateral damage” that have come about as a consequence of Pakistan’s kinetic actions in not just Afghanistan but also the tribal areas to flush out people who are not pliable to the Pakistani state. There are genuine grievances, and they’ve capitalised on that fairly well. So, they can inflict costs; even though, on the military front, the dice may appear loaded in favour of Pakistan for now, they can wage asymmetric warfare.

RS: Does Afghanistan have any international support?

DRS: What we’ve seen is that the Afghan Taliban may be isolated in the sense that it’s only recognised by one country.

But what we have seen is that the Afghan Taliban have invited calls for mediation from international actors, but no country has really condemned the Afghan Taliban for what has played out with the Pakistanis over the last couple of months since 2025. There have been concerns that countries have raised about the terrorists, not specifically the TTP. So they have actually managed to salvage the situation diplomatically because they’ve not really been justified in any meaningful way.

In fact, if you look at the reports that came in when mediation efforts were underway in 2025, unofficially, the diplomats, even from the Middle East, were very critical of the Pakistani delegation and their attitude towards mediation efforts. And they were not really critical so much of the Afghan Taliban. They said it’s the Pakistani negotiators who are making things really, really difficult. So, they have actually done fairly well in managing the situation at a diplomatic level.

RS: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact last year, but so far, Saudi Arabia has not visibly stepped in. Meanwhile, it was Qatar and Turkey who broke the ceasefire and not China, even though they have enormous economic leverage over both Islamabad and Kabul. So what’s going on diplomatically? Is China sitting back, or is it quietly supporting either side? And what is Saudi Arabia’s actual position here?

DRS: Countries like Saudi Arabia, even Qatar at the moment, have been sucked up; their diplomatic and geopolitical energies have all been sucked up by the war in the Middle East.

This is really a sideshow for them because they have far larger stakes in terms of what’s been happening visibly, the conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel, because that has a direct bearing on their security. They are really stretched to the hilt, and they’ve therefore not been so involved in the latest conflagration that has played out since March 2026, between the Afghans and the Pakistanis.

While it’s true that the Chinese sort of sat it out in the first round, in the second round, interestingly, while Pakistan was pitching itself as a mediator in the Iran war to the Trump administration, Pakistan itself was soliciting the services of Beijing to hash out differences essentially with the Afghan Taliban. And the Chinese actually hosted an Afghan and a Pakistani delegation in the city of Ürümqi to get dialogue going between the two sides. And basically, all they could get the two to agree on was that they’d continue talking. But there was no ceasefire. There was no agreement that they came up with. In fact, what we see is that around the 28th of April 2026 onwards, there was a renewed round of hostilities triggered by Pakistan bombing Asadabad, which is the capital of Kunar province, with actually there being no clear trigger point as to why Pakistan did that.

The Chinese essentially tried to step in late March without much success. The Pakistanis are not too thrilled about the kind of role that the Chinese have gone on to acquire. If you look at what has transpired since August 2021, the Chinese have had the maximum number of bilateral engagements with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan is at a distant fifth or sixth.

And this is very telling because in the 90s, the Chinese, while they never had any official links with the Taliban, had one of the best unofficial working relationships with the Afghan Taliban, thanks to the ISI.

Today, the roles have flipped to the extent that the ISI was keeping the door open for them. Today, the Chinese are mediating between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. The Chinese essentially are not interested in this conflagration playing out and stretching out over the long run. And that is not because Afghanistan holds any special place for them. They are not interested so much in terms of who governs Afghanistan and what happens there, but what they are concerned about is that any instability from Afghanistan has the potential to spill over and possibly suck in Pakistan, and it could spill over into neighbouring Central Asia, where the Chinese have both huge investments and interests at stake.

So they don’t want that instability essentially to spill over. And that’s what’s been driving the Chinese to try to get the two to iron out their differences. But what this latest round of negotiations has shown is that while China wields influence, it wields economic leverage.

It has been offered to the Afghans that we weld you into the BRI initiative. There are economic takeaways that are hard to resist. But what it does show is that there are limitations to these economic leverages. It does not necessarily translate into policy outcomes of the kind that a state may desire.

While they may have real economic leverage, they’ve not got the Taliban to change their course on giving sanctuary to the TTP or to shed some of their ideological positions on how they see the world. So there are limitations to that.

RS: The Iran war has grabbed everyone’s attention and priorities. So does the Iran conflict affect Pakistan in any way? And does it give any advantage to Afghanistan?

DRS: Yeah. Well, the Iran conflict has reverberated at an economic level for so many countries, including India. But Pakistan, of course, feels the reverberations of conflict in Iran in a far more pronounced way than we do. And that is because it geographically abuts Iran.

So, yes, oil has become more costly. Energy costs are up. And that is going to strain Pakistan’s coffers. It’s going to strain an economy that is already stuttering. So economically, it’s going to be a challenge. It has disrupted trade to an extent. But more importantly, it has the ability for Pakistan’s societal cleavages to be exacerbated.

There is a huge potential for sectarian conflagrations. And that is because Pakistan has a history of using sectarian groups for political ends. Pakistan has one of the largest Shia Muslim populations outside of Iran.

And the Shias in Pakistan over the last many decades have also been subject to violence. But the Shias have also seen a lot; like the Sunnis, they’ve also seen a lot of sectarian mobilisations coming about. The sectarian mobilisation has been fanned by not only domestic political actors but also by external actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, who’ve jockeyed for influence in this part of the world.

And we’ve seen the kind of violence that played out in the immediate aftermath of America’s actions in Iran, which again underscored that this is a vulnerable point socially for Pakistan. And this could sort of flare up in the long run. Coupled with that, you know, it’s Pakistan’s very volatile Balochistan province that shares the border with Pakistan.

So, you know, while things appear stable at the moment, if instability resumes, if the regimes in Iran get shaky, Iran could also have trouble in its system, Balochistan province, which means that it could provide sanctuary to Baloch separatists from Pakistan. And Iran may be willing to use that as a pressure point because Iran has not had a very good history of treating its own Baloch minority in the province. So, yes, I mean, this conflict does inflict vulnerability as far as Pakistan is concerned.

It does sort of, you know, have this element of uncertainty because the Iran war comes at a time when Pakistan is economically not doing great. Its resources are stretched, its security personnel are already stretched because of tensions with India and a need to fight both the Baloch and the TTP insurgencies, and it is seeing tensions with the Afghans. So it certainly does; you know, it does exacerbate the kind of pressure that Pakistan is facing, something it didn’t face in the 1990s when the Taliban were first in power. So it is in a far more delicate position than it was in the 1990s.

RS: What about India’s position in this conflict, as we haven’t taken any formal positions so far, but India and Afghanistan have historically had warm ties? And Pakistan, under pressure, is not really entirely against India’s strategic interests. What is India’s position here? And is there a role India can or should be playing?

DRS: India has issued vociferous statements at an official level. If you look at the MEA press briefings, you look at some of the proceedings of the UN Security Council. India has been fairly vociferous in condemning Pakistan’s airstrikes on civilians.

While it’s good that we’ve condemned the airstrikes and civilians, this makes for a very stark contrast with India’s deafening silence when it comes to access to education for girls. When it comes to the Taliban’s domestic policies, there’s been a deafening silence, so it makes for a very jarring contrast. And again, India is the norm; it’s not the exception.

Most of the states around the world, including countries of the European Union, were on the moral high horse; essentially, their rhetoric on all of this has petered out. And that is because all states are in a transactional relationship with the Afghan Taliban. But I think while it’s fine to condemn attacks on civilians, I think we should not get too involved in the conflagration between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And that is because we don’t want to give credence, or we should not be seen as giving credence, to claims that the Pakistanis have been advancing, that, look, we told you so. You know, the Indians are using the Taliban as a proxy, and they’re using Afghanistan as a proxy battleground to settle scores with us. That doesn’t go with our interests.

It also makes for a very jarring contrast with the fact that while we say that we condemn civilian casualties, and we talk of people-to-people ties, we don’t issue visas to the Afghans, even for education and medicine. So I think we have to be very cautious in terms of what kind of approach we take. There’s very little leverage that we have with either side to mediate the conflict.

What we should be looking at is to see how we can play this to our advantage to build on the existing set of ties. What are the areas of intervention that the conflict opens up for us? For instance, it’s led to a lot of displacement, internal displacement in Afghanistan. And there’s been a lot of demand essentially for India to rekindle a lot of its development initiative projects in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has forcefully repatriated millions of Afghans. Its shelling has dislocated many Afghans. There is a huge humanitarian crisis brewing.

So, where is it that we can step in? Because that is what eventually created large constituencies of goodwill. What we’ve also seen is that conflict with Pakistan has disrupted trade to a very significant extent. We shouldn’t forget that Pakistan was one of the largest trading partners, alongside Iran, of the Afghans.

And what has happened is that because of border tensions with Pakistan and because of the conflict in Iran, border trade essentially has been disrupted, causing huge losses to Afghan traders. It’s also led to losses for the Afghan treasury. About 40 per cent of the Afghan government’s revenue came from customs revenue. That revenue stream has been disrupted. So what is it that we can do essentially to build capacities, to help the Afghans find alternative markets, to support livelihoods? I think these are the areas of intervention that we should be focusing on. And we shouldn’t let the theatrics essentially distract us from pursuing our larger goals.

RS: Do you have any final remarks on this discussion and on this topic? How do you see this conflict that will evolve in the coming months?

DRS: I frankly don’t think that this is going to go away anytime soon. What we should be mindful of is the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan are neighbours. Pakistan is going to be around and exercise influence and leverage over Afghanistan in a way that we will not be able to because of a lack of geographical contiguity.

The Pakistanis have economic and ethnic ties, and therefore their presence is something we’ll have to contend with. We should also keep in mind the fact that no situation between neighbours is ever constant. One shouldn’t get too carried away with what is happening at the moment.

We should really try to focus on the larger picture in order to secure our interests. And theatrics and rhetoric really shouldn’t distract us from that goal.

Also, we should keep in mind the fact that the Taliban-Pakistan relationship is not a black-and-white relationship. It is not a classic patron-client relationship either. There’s always been some give and take.

There are some issues in which the Taliban and the Pakistani state have happily collaborated, and there are other core issues in which the Taliban have refused to cede ground, be it the Durand Line or the issue of the TTP, because it is an ideological movement. It’s not a classic political party that has come to power merely with different ideologies. It’s a very different kind of political animal. This is something we ought to bear in mind when looking at these realities.

And the third thing we ought to be aware of is the fact that this is also a very changed context. It’s a context in which the Taliban are far more diplomatically engaged. Pakistan is not their only lifeline to the world. But this is also a period where we’ve seen China’s footprint grow, not just in Afghanistan but in many parts of India’s neighbourhood. So we cannot take the rhetoric of people-to-people ties, goodwill for India, etc., for granted. We are operating in very different realities, in very complex realities.

Dr Raghav Sharma is a Professor and Director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India.

Raveena Shivashankar is the digital media associate at Gateway House.

This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.

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The arrival of the holy relics of Lord Buddha in Leh, Ladakh, India.

The May sun shone brightly and a gentle Himalayan breeze blew through the Buddhist teaching centre at Jivetsal in Choglamsar on the outskirts of Leh. The site was filled with thousands of devotees gathered for the prestigious exposition of the Holy Buddha Piprahwa relics. On May 1, vibrant Tibetan prayer flags fluttered in shades of blue, white, yellow, green and red, and the grandeur of the surrounding mountains echoed with prayers and chants as the relics were officially inaugurated in a grand ceremony led by Amit Shah, India’s Minister of Home Affairs.

The arrival of the sacred Piprahwa relics in Leh was of profound significance, transcending religious celebrations and reaching deep into the realms of civilisational heritage and now with geopolitical connotations as well. These relics,^[1] which include bone fragments, reliquary caskets, intricately carved crystal and soapstone, ornate ornaments, and various funerary objects connected to the life and teachings of the Buddha, represent some of the most significant Buddhist archaeological finds in India. Discovered in 1898 at the site of Piprahwa in what is now Uttar Pradesh, the relics are believed to be linked to the Sakya clan, the very community to which the Buddha belonged.

Their return to Indian soil in 2025, after spending 127 years in foreign custody and an attempted auction in Hong Kong, was a momentous occasion celebrated as a powerful act of cultural reclamation and was also a reassertion of India as the birthplace of Buddhism, particularly Himalayan Buddhism – sending a strong signal to China. The arrival of these relics in Leh restores them to one of the ancient frontiers of Indian civilisation and Buddhism, a region that has harboured rich traditions of spiritual and cultural exchange for centuries. The last time these significant relics were brought to this region was in May 1950, after then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a historic visit to Ladakh for four days. Then, the 19th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, a key figure in Ladakh’s Buddhist community and future representative in the Jammu and Kashmir administration, seized the opportunity to make a special request. He asked Nehru to send the sacred relics of the Lord Buddha and his two principal disciples, Sariputta and Mahamoggallana, that were in the custody of the Mahabodhi Society at Sarnath near Varanasi, to Ladakh.

Nehru’s decision to transport these relics was not merely a gesture aimed at invigorating the local populace’s morale post the 1947 war with Pakistan; it was a strategic move at a time when India was acutely aware of its geopolitical standing as a frontier nation. By taking such symbolic actions, Nehru sent a powerful message to China and the international community, reaffirming India’s commitment to its cultural heritage and civilisational roots. Thus, the arrival of the Piprahwa relics in Leh this year holds immense significance, rekindling historical connections and fostering a renewed appreciation for India’s rich Buddhist heritage among both the local population and visitors from around the world.

Holy Relics of Lord Buddha received at the Sindhu Ghat after a 2-Day Sacred Exposition at Zanskar, Ladakh, India.

Shah, who visited Leh for two days, made sure that the message went out to China loud and clear. In his inaugural address, the Home Minister, flanked by army officers and top-ranking officials from the Intelligence Bureau, stated that India is a “living laboratory of Buddhist culture and compassion” and spoke of Ladakh’s pivotal role in keeping Himalayan Buddhism alive.

The exposition of the holy relics of Tathagata Buddha – the fully enlightened Buddha – ran for two weeks, from May 1 to 14. The relics arrived in Leh on April 29, 2026, via Indian Air Force aircraft and transported with high-level protectionThis was followed by a grand ceremonial procession in Ladakh, amid tight security. There was a threat of the relics being stolen by adversaries and also of the relics being replaced by duplicates.

Ceremonial gathering inside the Dharma Centre in Leh, Ladakh, India.

Before being put under the auctioneer’s block last May, the Piprahwa relics had travelled to Mongolia in 2022, Thailand in 2024, and Russia and Bhutan in 2025. Earlier this month, an exposition of the Holy Relics of the chief disciples of the Buddha—Arahant Sariputta and Arahant Mahamoggallana—was organised in Mongolia from 1 to 10 June 2026 by the Indian Ministry of Culture, the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC), and the National Museum, New Delhi.

Mongolia has been a particular recipient of Buddhist relics from India. In June 2022, four sacred Kapilavastu relics of the Buddha were taken from the National Museum of India to Mongolia for an 11-day exposition, marking their first visit to the country in 29 years. The exposition began on 14 June 2022, celebrated as Mongolian Buddha Purnima. The Relics were displayed alongside Mongolia’s revered Buddha Tooth Relic at the Gandantegchinlen Monastery. These Relics were taken on board a C-17 transport aircraft of the Indian Air Force and accompanied by the then Minister of Law and Justice, Kiren Rijiju, and the 20th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche.

While this may seem a simple act of soft cultural diplomacy, the strategic significance is notable, as Buddhism is now seen as a competitive geopolitical tool, particularly between India and China and also in the wider world. At the centre lies the issue of re-incarnation of His Holiness the 14^th Dalai Lama and the existential crisis facing Tibetan Buddhism today all across the Himalayas.

Several Tibetan scholars and experts today believe that the survival of Tibetan Buddhism in India, especially in the Ladakh region, should be given utmost importance by India if it has to face a belligerent China that has made Tibetan Buddhism and the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama a political issue and part of its foreign policy too.

On February 3, 2026, the fourth session of China’s 12th People’s Congress came to a close, marked by the official endorsement of the outline for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) for Tibet. This heralded the beginning of a new era in Chinese geopolitics characterised by comprehensive efforts aimed at systemic assimilation of Tibetan Buddhism within the Communist system of governance. The adoption of this plan indicates a strategic shift in governance and development priorities for the region, as authorities focus on integrating economic, cultural, and social initiatives within a broader framework aimed at fostering greater unity and cohesion within China, and that includes both Tibet and Xinjiang.^[2]

China is brazenly building a narrative to make the world believe that it was the great Chinese civilisation in which Buddhism was born. Recently, Wang Junzheng, the secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), in his “clarion call” to Tibet’s future, accorded approval of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, reinforcing the mandate to adapt Tibetan Buddhism to a socialist society. The session reaffirmed the “Four Major Tasks” — stability, development, ecology and border strengthening — as the bedrock of TAR governance.^[3]

It is imperative for India to first firmly assert both the origins and the enduring presence of Buddhism within its borders and its historical ties to Tibetan Buddhism. This rich tradition is upheld by monks and rinpoches, alongside ancient stupas, inscriptions, rock carvings, and sculptures. The significance of these cultural elements must be prominently highlighted, especially in strategic regions like Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, which are under constant surveillance by China.

Second, engage more deeply with the Tibetan diaspora living in India, especially on the reincarnation process, which can become a friction point with China.

Third, it is crucial for New Delhi to develop a clear roadmap for how it intends to uphold the traditional Nalanda school of Buddhism, which is followed by Indian and Tibetan Buddhists. It will provide religious and geopolitical gains.

This precious heritage is a strategic bargaining chip against China, which is preparing to elect the 15th Dalai Lama by setting in motion a comprehensive process for his reincarnation.^[4]

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

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© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Sifra Lentin, “Crystal Ash: The Buddha at Piprahwa,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, June 11, 2026 https://www.gatewayhouse.in/crystal-ash-the-buddha-at-piprahwa/

[2] https://archive.is/xNl6k

[3] International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibet Roundup: February 2026,” International Campaign for Tibet, February 2026 https://savetibet.org/news/tibet-roundup-feb-2026/

[4] Nayanima Basu, “Talk Tibet with Candour,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, September 4, 2025 https://www.gatewayhouse.in/talk-tibet-with-candour/

The post Himalayan Buddhist diplomacy appeared first on Gateway House.

The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) is a geopolitical idea, not a geographic reality. It offers a way to comprehend the politics and interstate relations of a large part of the planet, a reimagining that scholars can undertake with greater ease than policymakers.

Definitions of the region differ widely. Russia and China still prefer the older alternative – ‘Asia-Pacific’. The U.S., which played a pivotal role in raising awareness about China’s rise and assertiveness in Asia, defines IPR as the region stretching from ‘Bollywood to Hollywood’, or ‘Asia-Pacific plus India’. The Indian government views the region as extending from the western shores of the U.S. to the eastern shores of Africa. In this light, reputed scholar C. Raja Mohan found a nice middle ground between the Indian and American definitions. He defines IPR as “a region that includes India and East Asia, as well as the waters off this landmass in the Pacific and Indian Oceans” but excludes Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

As the U.S. ‘unipolar moment’ began to end over a decade after the Cold War, Washington was confronted with the reality of China’s rapid rise, both economically and strategically. With this rise came a sharp increase in China’s aggressiveness in Asia, especially in the South China Sea. To counter it, U.S., Japanese, and Australian scholars pushed the notion of a coalition of democracies. This was the bedrock on which the narrative of IPR, with an increasing engagement of India’s strategic community and government, moved forward, particularly in the second decade of the 21^st century. The progress and consolidation of the Quad – comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia – gained momentum during the Trump administration 1.0. This clear trend continued and advanced further throughout Joe Biden’s presidency.

However, the third decade inaugurated the ‘Age of Polycrisis’, during which all conflicts took place in regions other than the Indo-Pacific: the Russia-Ukraine war; Israel‘s military actions in Gaza and the kinetic actions in the surrounding region; U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran in June 2025; U.S. action in Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba; and eventually a full-scale, undeclared war against Iran by the US and Israel and the Iranian strikes against the Gulf states and others. All this combined to bring a sharp reduction in the salience of the Indo-Pacific.

As a result, the IPR does not appear to be the most consequential theatre of geopolitics today. Yet its significance as the platform on which great-power contestation in political, military, technological, and economic domains will play out cannot be overstated. Strategic rivalries in the Indian Ocean, China-India competition in South Asia, India-China and India-Pakistan conflicts, and the potential for the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the rising China-Japan tensions as flashpoints must be factored in. Their evolution, impact, and likely repercussions need to be monitored regularly by governments and strategic communities alike.

That China remains the core strategic issue is beyond debate. Its comprehensive national power, much like its influence in the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, has been on the rise. It pursues an aggressive diplomacy, backed by military action, as New Delhi experienced again during and after the border clash in June 2020. ASEAN, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia – all have tasted that medicine, and they do not like it.

The Quad was crafted as the combined response of Indo-Pacific democracies, backed by deepening naval cooperation through joint exercises and other measures that were kept outside the Quad’s formal framework. The unique combination of three allies – the U.S., Japan, and Australia – with India as their common strategic partner made steady progress in building inner cohesion and external cooperation with other groupings such as ASEAN and the European Union (EU). The Quad found itself in excellent shape in September 2025, when the Biden administration held its farewell summit in Wilmington, U.S. The summit declaration reiterated the leaders’ commitment to “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient”. They projected the Quad as “a force for good that delivers real, positive and enduring impact on the Indo-Pacific”.

Since then, the Quad has faced rough weather, despite an initially optimistic signal from the Trump administration 2.0, when Marco Rubio, the U.S. secretary of state, hosted a meeting of the grouping’s foreign ministers on the first day of the administration’s tenure. Within months, India-U.S. relations went downhill, and the Trump administration began exploring a rapprochement with China, even flirting with the idea of creating a G2 to moderate their rivalry and harmonise their policies. The Quad summit, scheduled to be hosted by India in November 2025, was postponed indefinitely. At the time of this writing, the world, particularly the Indo-Pacific, anxiously awaits President Trump’s visit to China, speculating about its likely consequences. Recent indications suggest that this visit may be delayed due to the conflict in West Asia.

Over the years, India has developed an Indo-Pacific vision and a matching strategy. Its first option is to work for peace and cooperation with all stakeholders in the regions, but its other priority is to enhance its preparedness, should things go wrong. The desired preparedness stems from enhancing military and economic capabilities internally and constantly improving the power balance externally.

A key policy announcement came from Prime Minister Narendra Modi in March 2025, when speaking in Mauritius, he announced the elevation of India’s policy approach from SAGAR (‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’) to MAHASAGAR (‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’). New Delhi has not offered a definitive explanation of what this elevation truly means, while think tanks have held scores of seminars on the subject.

Consultations with officials and experts, however, have brought some clarity. A former naval chief of India told the author that while India is busy protecting its interests globally, its real security and economic interests lie closer home, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, it is possible to surmise that, at least in the near future, though India will seek geopolitical and geoeconomic collaboration with willing partners in the Pacific region, its security and defence policy will need to concentrate largely on the nation’s perception of threats and challenges in the Indian Ocean.

In this realistically defined context, what India does and how it succeeds in its pivotal role in select plurilateral groupings such as BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave, and IORA may be far more important than what it does in other regional groupings.

Finally, the three nations still committed to the Quad, namely India, Japan, and Australia, need to consider a Plan B if the U.S. loses interest in this grouping completely. They should consider inviting select nations, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to engage with the Quad as observers. Thus, Asian democracies can work together to address the China challenge as the core issue of IPR.

A Track 2.0 dialogue among the leading think tanks of these seven nations seems to be the prudent way forward. A Track 1.5 Dialogue may follow suit.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He served as India’s ambassador to Myanmar from 2002 to 2005. His book India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours won wide acclaim.

This article was first published in the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal in May 2026.

The post The relevance of the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Gateway House.

Buddhist monks and devotees praying to the holy Piprahwa relics in Room 8, Buddhist section, National Museum (New Delhi). Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

An extraordinary exhibition titled “The Light and the Lotus – Relics of the Awakened One” was organised by India’s Ministry of Culture at Rai Pithora Cultural Complex, New Delhi, from January to April this year.^[1] It displayed the William Caxton Peppé collection of the Shakyamuni Buddha’s mortal remains of ash and bone and a dazzling cornucopia of precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, gold-and-silver-stamped disc foils, and crystals.

The Shakyamuni Buddha’s relics are displayed inside a hollow stupa structure in the “Light and the Lotus – Relics of the Awakened One” exhibition. In the foreground (centre) is a bone fragment in a pyramidal display case, flanked by two reliquary caskets, one crystal and an inscribed steatite one. The backdrop has a dazzling array of gems, pearls, and discs of gold and silver. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

These holy relics were repatriated to their home country, India, after a contentious wrangling between the Indian government and Sotheby’s Hong Kong, which had put them up for auction on 7 May 2025. With the active intervention of the Indian government, Sotheby’s pulled it off the auction at the last minute, resulting in a nail-biting deadlock that was resolved when the Godrej family of Mumbai, led by Pirojsha Adi Godrej, purchased the remains from the Peppé family for the people of India at a staggering sum of Rs 900 crore.

Given its religious and historic importance, it was a worthwhile acquisition for what Buddhists and scholars of Buddhist studies consider priceless: not just because of the belief that the relics belong to the historic Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, but, unusually, that these relics possess a provenance that likely proves this.

This startling discovery was made by the landowner of the Birdpore Estate, William Caxton Peppé, a colonial civil engineer, on whose land the Piprahwa stupa and its adjoining monastic complex stood. One of the five reliquary caskets excavated by Peppé has a Brahmi inscription, which roughly translates to ‘This deposit of the corporeal relics of the Blessed Buddha is (the gift) of the Sukiti brothers, together with their sisters, sons, and wives’ of the Shakyas.’^[2]

The Shakyas were the royal clan into which Gautama Buddha was born and whose capital city was Kapilavastu. ^[3]

The reliquary casket with a Brahmi inscription. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

Marg magazine (Volume 77-2) digs deeper into the Exhibition’s narrative, which covered the main events of the Buddha’s life; the history of the first excavation of the Piprahwa Stupa by Peppé in 1898 and the second excavation by K. M. Srivastava of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) between 1971 and 1974; and the global distribution of these mortal relics after 1898.

The chapters in this special issue are written by subject experts and are therefore academically rigorous and detailed. Despite this, the average reader will find them easy to read because few technical terms are used, and most authors’ core arguments are developed chronologically. Happily, too, this volume, being an edited one, has standalone chapters, which gives readers the option to pick and choose what they would like to read and in what order.

There are five sections, each broadly falling under a subject or subjects such as history and archaeology and Buddhist religion and culture. Under these five sections are nine chapters that look at the Piprahwa relics from different perspectives. The volume opens with a detailed introduction by the editor, Naman Ahuja. He frames key issues raised by the repatriation of these relics and the “Tensions at the heart of the Piprahwa Stupa”. An important one is whether holy relics are meant to be ritually enshrined or displayed.

In this context, the role of museums is brought up: Can a place for tourism and scientific study also be a place of worship? The tension referred to is caused because, by definition, the relics are bodily remains, not artefacts for display and study. Ahuja astutely navigates this issue by suggesting that museums must expand to synthesise multiple roles. A photograph in this Marg issue of Delhi’s National Museum’s Buddhism wing (gallery eight) reveals a prayer hall, which backs Ahuja’s point that a museum space can also double as a place of worship. This gallery houses a golden casket containing the holy relics from the 1971-1974 excavations at Piprahwa by K.M. Srivastava.^{[4] [5]}

Crystal reliquary casket from Piprahwa. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

The volume opens with the section, ‘Framing the Piprahwa Relics.’ The only chapter in this section, ‘Beads and Bones: The Case of the Piprahwa Relics’, is by Religious Studies expert John Strong, who traces the journey of the gems from the reliquaries unearthed in the 1898 Peppé excavation in Piprahwa. Of particular interest is the reasoning behind the gems being considered part of the Buddha’s mortal remains, even after being separated from the bones and ashes that were gifted to the King of Siam in 1899.^[6] It also explains why pious and wealthy donors made offerings of semi-precious and precious gems, pearls, gold, and silver in auspicious shapes or images as reliquary offerings.

Donations to Stupas consisted of gems, precious metals, pearls, and crystals that, together with the bones and ashes, are collectively worshipped as holy relics. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

Building on this core chapter, the following four sections examine the Piprahwa relics from both macro and micro perspectives.

In section two, ‘Scientific and Technical Studies’, historian Himanshu Prabha Ray’s chapter ‘The Archaeological Search for the Buddha’s Ashes’ traces the origins of the colonial obsession for locating relics of the historic Buddha, beginning with ASI’s first director, Alexander Cunningham. This chapter elucidates the Buddhist religious and cultural geography of the southern Terai region and the Gangetic plains in which Piprahwa is located. The region is dotted with monastic and stupa sites and possibly with the legendary Kapilavastu, the Shaka capital.

This is followed by an interesting chapter by Ingo Strauch, a professor of Sanskrit and Buddhist studies, on the inscription on the Piprahwa reliquary casket. Strauch’s study of the language, script, and historical context of the reliquary, which he compares to other inscriptions by later Mauryan donors (think Emperor Ashoka). and the popular emergence of Buddhism’s relic culture will be a eureka moment for many readers. The reason being that many would know that it was Emperor Ashoka who sent emissaries overseas, carrying not just the message of the Buddha but also holy Buddha relics to regions like Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.^[7][8]

There is a chapter on the Piprahwa beads (precious and semi-precious) in the Peppé cache, the largest share of beads from the Piprahwa relics. Its author, Jack Ogden, an expert on the history of jewellery materials and techniques, categorises them not just by material type but also by their symbolism (shape), like some pearls and semi-precious stones are shaped in the Triratna, the three foundational pillars of the Buddhist faith: The Buddha, Dhamma, and the Sangha (community). Aside from the dazzling array of gems, Ogden tells us that his study of them has, in fact, retroactively dated the Indian subcontinent’s lapidary history. Both Strauch’s and Ogden’s essays are detailed, and their comparative analyses with inscriptions dating to the same archaeological period and with beads uncovered from other stupas, respectively, will appeal only to readers interested in these subjects.

In the third section, ‘Textual and Doctrinal Perspectives Across Regions’, Peter Skilling, an expert on the literary and material history of Buddhism in South and Southeast Asia, gives a fantastic overview of Buddhism’s relic culture in his chapter ‘Bemused by Buddha’s Bones: The Riddle of Relics.’ He tackles the core question any reader would ask regarding the Peppé collection: what value do the pious assign to the Sharira (bone and ash) vis-à-vis the precious and semi-precious gem offerings?

A bone fragment from the Peppé collection. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

This is particularly relevant to the Peppé collection, as colonial excavators were often untrained archaeologists who valued the beads and precious metals more than the mortal remains. He explains why the Buddha’s Sharira and the semi-precious and precious beads, gold, and silver discs are all considered relics in the context of how a relic culture took root in Buddhism.

The chapter on ‘The Roles of Relics in East Asian Buddhism’ compares relic worship and the miraculous powers attributed to relics of the Buddha and those of his most accomplished and pious Bhikkhus (monks) across regions. This essay ranges across Indian, Chinese, Southeast Asian and East Asian beliefs. It also refers to the Russian province of Kalmykia (98% Buddhist), where a culture of relic worship is deeply rooted. It is pertinent to state here that the Indian government has recently sent the holy relics from the Sanchi Stupa to Mongolia, where they will be given full state honours during their journey to and from Ulaanbaatar. ^[9]

A Kushan era sculpture showing the Mahaparinirvana of the historic Buddha, his final passing and liberation from the cycle of rebirth. Photo courtesy: Sifra Lentin

The last section, Contemporary Questions, loops back to some of the questions raised in the Introduction to this volume. It opens with art historian Saloni Mathur’s chapter ‘A Parable of Postcolonial Return’. Here the parable used is the first-ever repatriation of the holy relics of Buddha’s chief disciples Sariputra and Mahamoggallana to India in 1952 from the United Kingdom. She traces the journey of those holy relics excavated from the Sanchi Stupa, which, after excavation, were housed in the Victoria & Albert (V&A) Museum and the British Museum, London. Their journey home began with a 1932 appeal to the V&A, signed by Anagarika Dharmapala under the auspices of the London branch (est. 1926) of the Maha Bodhi Society, founded in 1891, originally headquartered in Sri Lanka, and now headquartered in Kolkata.^[10]

These relics eventually returned to newly independent India in 1952 and were entombed in a new vihara built by the Society in Sanchi. The story of the Sanchi relics, narrated chronologically and contextualised in the global geopolitics of its time, echoes the same concerns that arose in the Sotheby’s auction of the Piprahwa relics, viz. holy relics cannot be treated as museum artefacts, and if housed in a museum, protocols are necessary to host them. The difference between Piprahwa and Sanchi is that the former belonged to a private collector, and therefore the public-private partnership between the Indian government and Godrej necessitated a purchase of the Peppé collection.

The ‘tension’ is debated further in the last two chapters in this section. The chapter ‘Next Stop Nirvana and the Piprahwa Relics’ by Johannes Beltz, curator of South and Southeast Asian art, who curated a 2005 exhibition of the Peppé collection at the Museum Rietberg, Zurich, addresses questions he faced when deciding how to display the collection for local European audiences. This is contrasted with the reception the relics received in Siam (Thailand) in 1899, when the ashes and bones with some jewels from the Peppé excavation were gifted that year by the colonial government in India to King Rama V, and their enshrinement in the chaitya of the Golden Mount Temple, Bangkok, is described in the chapter, ‘From Piprahwa to the Golden Mount’.^[11]

The Marg volume 77-2, is a tome of knowledge. Some questions, unfortunately, remained unasked, though hinted at, throughout the volume, and the reader will surely have liked to learn the answers. Questions like ‘Is it a simplification to say that Buddhism fled India so completely that no one, including overseas pilgrims, visited these holy stupa sites, resulting in their neglect for centuries?’ What happened in the intervening centuries, broadly from the early mediaeval period to 1898? With the focus solely on the Piprahwa relics and their importance for Buddhists and Buddhist studies, there is no comparison or reference to early Hinduism and Jainism, faiths that coexisted in this ancient period.

Sifra Lentin is Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] This exhibition was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 4 January 2026 and ended with the last curator’s walk on 26 April. This author visited the Exhibition on 30 April and was guided by a museum docent. The Holy Relics were travelling the next day on Buddha Purnima – the day it is believed Gautama Buddha was born, attained enlightenment, and died – to Leh, Ladakh, for public display and worship from 1 to 14 May. They are now housed in the National Museum, New Delhi.

[2] William Caxton Peppé was a British colonial landowner and civil engineer who lived on the Birdpore estate, where the Piprahwa stupa is located. By 1898, when Peppe dug a vertical shaft into the stupa from the top, it was already well established that wealthy Buddhist donors deposited precious and semi-precious stones; pearls; stamped images of Triratna, flowers, a lion, an elephant, and a chakra on gold and silver disc foils; and crystals as offerings into the stupas built for the remains of the historic Buddha, who died about 480 BCE, or those who achieved a high level of ‘Buddhahood’ like his most renowned followers, Sariputta and Mahamoggallana, whose relics were discovered in the Sanchi Stupa (Madhya Pradesh).

[3] It was speculated by Archaeologist K.M. Srivastava, based on the clay sealings discovered from the monastic complex adjoining Piprahwa stupa that it was part of the Shaka capital city of Kapilavastu. This theory has not held up because no remains of a city near it have been uncovered.

See Skilling, Peter. ‘Bemused by Buddha’s Bones: The Riddle of Relics’. In Crystal & Ash: The Buddha At Piprahwa Vol. 77 Number 2 (Mumbai, The Marg Foundation, December 2025. pp. 96-98.

[4] This approach was evident at ‘The Light and the Lotus’ exhibition, where the Relics were displayed inside a built hollow stupa with seating around it for those who would like to pray.

[5] The National Museum, New Delhi, has the most sizeable collection of bones (20 fragments) and ash from the Piprahwa Stupa. These were excavated post-independence. The repatriated Peppé collection, now housed in the National Museum, has a few bone fragments but a very large cache of precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, gold, silver, and crystals. The Indian Museum, Kolkata, too possesses a large collection of jewels in addition to the stone coffer and reliquary vases from the 1898 excavation.

[6] The bones and ash from this first excavation were gifted to Siam in 1899, and portions from this were gifted in turn to erstwhile Burma and Ceylon.

[7] Most Indian readers are familiar with the fact that it was the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka who popularised Buddhism in his vast empire and also sent his son and daughter overseas to propagate Buddha’s “Dhamma.” It was an act of piety but also a diplomatic outreach.

[8]  The Marg volume is focused only on the Piprahwa relics after the first Peppé excavation in 1898. However, the historic Buddha’s relics were also apportioned earlier.

It is believed that after the Mallas of Kushinagara cremated the Buddha’s body with ceremonies befitting a Universal King (cakravartin), his holy relics, from the funeral pyre, were collected and divided and given by Brahmin priest Dhona of Kushinagar to kings and priests

The eight shares were distributed among Ajatashatru of Magadha, the Licchavis of Vaishali, the Sakyas of Kapilavastu, the Mallas of Kushinagar, the Bullies of Allakappa, the Mallas of Pava, the Koliyas of Ramagrama, and a Brahmana of Vethadipa. The sacred relics were enshrined in eight different stupas. Two more stupas came into existence, one over the urn in which the relics had been collected and the other over the embers. Thus, stupas erected over the bodily relics of Buddha (Saririkastupas) are the earliest surviving Buddhist shrines.

It is stated that Ashoka (circa 272–232 BCE), being an ardent follower of Buddhism, opened up seven of these eight stupas and collected the major portion of the relics for enshrinement within innumerable (84000) stupas built by him in an effort to popularise Buddhism and spread dharma.

See Press Information Bureau of the Government of India’s PDF on the Piprahwa relics. https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2024/feb/doc2024220313101.pdf

[9] See Lentin, Sifra, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/SCO_Sifra-Lentin.pdf

[10] The Maha Boddhi Society was founded by Anagarika Dharmapala for the revival of buddhism in its holy land, India.

[11] This chapter is by Ampasiri Jumsai Na Ayudhya, from the Thai royal lineage, and Wannaporn Rienjang.

The post Crystal & Ash: The Buddha at Piprahwa appeared first on Gateway House.

For someone who has monitored the Myanmar file for four decades, the past week has produced exceptional insights. The 30 May-3 June visit to India by Myanmar president Min Aung Hlaing drew extensive media coverage and commentary and, for the region’s experts and stakeholders, an intensive dialogue. What was said, read, and heard?

A stand-alone visit by the president served the purpose of both governments, which was to pursue a stronger relationship that would promote their interests in a calibrated manner. India hoped to be guided by its Neighbourhood First, Act East, and Indo-Pacific policies, imparting substance and warmth to its ties with a vital neighbour. Myanmar was happy with the opportunity to arrange its president’s visit to the neighbouring democracy, with the potential to serve as a counterweight to China and as an instrument to reduce its excessive dependence on its northern neighbour. In short, a clear convergence of perspectives paved the way for this significant visit.

The visit had its share of critics, who assailed New Delhi for welcoming the general who imposed a military coup in 2021 and was held responsible for all that followed. There are weaknesses in their analyses.

First, there is the moral argument: India, the world’s largest democracy, should have no dealings with a military dictator. This emanates from ignorance, bias, or both. As a matter of policy, India deals with the government of the day, regardless of its democratic or military character. That is what most other states do as well.

Second are the arguments put forward by expatriate Myanmar NGOs that “legitimising the military junta is not pragmatism, it is self-harm.”^[1] These are prejudices that do not recognise Indian policymakers’ right to decide what is and what is not in the country’s national interest.

Finally, there is the convoluted China argument. Why deal with Min Aung Hlaing when he is so close to and dependent on Beijing? In a special media briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who also served as ambassador to Myanmar and China, provided a brilliant counter-argument. He justified “sustained dialogue” and “engagement” by stating, “History has shown that disengagement does not give us any results that are better than engagement, and it certainly does not produce democratic change, if that is what we are interested in. On the other hand, disengagement only produces a vacuum that others go on to fill, to our detriment. And those others have no interest in democracy.”^[2]

Given this backdrop, there were five significant gains from the Myanmar president’s visit.

One, a long dry spell in bilateral relations at the political level has ended. The visit of India’s minister of state for external affairs to attend the president’s inauguration in April tested the waters. Naypyitaw’s positive response cleared the way for this major political contact after a six-year gap. It was designed carefully, with an emphasis on the Buddhist connection and the exploration of business potential. At the official level, protocol was limited; the joint statement was briefer than usual; and signing new agreements was postponed.

Two, all issues relating to border management – security, connectivity, and development – were discussed candidly and constructively. India’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbour carried an unspoken implication: New Delhi stands for a united Myanmar. In exchange, and presumably after some serious discussion, the Myanmar side accepted Para 10 of the joint statement, which reiterated an old assurance that its territory “would not be permitted to be used against India’s security interests”.^[3] New Delhi considers this reiteration valuable. Regarding the mega-infrastructure projects, the need for cooperation was recognised, but it was tempered by the realism of the prevailing security situation.

Three, defence cooperation has been registering steady progress through a mix of strategic discussions, training programmes, exercises, and naval visits.

Fourth, the visit’s thrust was on expanding and diversifying commercial and economic cooperation, especially by involving the business leadership on both sides. It was a full calendar. Stakeholders such as the Reserve Bank of India and its Myanmar counterpart, meetings of business fora in Delhi and Mumbai, and discussions with new actors in addition to the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry revealed the potential for growth in bilateral trade from the current $2 billion to reach $3 billion in the short term and $5 billion in the medium term. However, it was also clear that Indian investors and business leaders will turn their assurances into action as they see Myanmar marching toward normalcy, peace, and stability.

Five, the Indian leadership showed integrity and courage by talking with the visiting president about the need to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to his nation’s political challenges. The leaders and people of Myanmar must achieve this through their own ‘Made-in-Myanmar’ efforts. It was made clear that no outsider has any ready-made solution to offer. But India’s humanitarian assistance and experience in governance will always be made available to all in Myanmar.

The president’s visit went well from the viewpoints of both capitals. Myanmar viewed it as a strategic gain. But there is a gap. The hard reality today is that Myanmar is a fragmented nation, divided into two parts: the government and the Resistance. The latter, too, enjoys considerable strength and has stakes in the nation’s future. India’s traditional “two-track policy” demands a suitable equilibrium. Doors for dialogue with the key elements of the Resistance must be kept open, for many of them, not the military, control the Myanmar side of the critical India-Myanmar border region. It is within the realm of practical diplomacy to engage with the other side while cultivating cooperative ties with the government.

Finally, PM Modi explicitly enquired about the health and welfare of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy icon – reflecting compassion and political realism. But India needs to go further: New Delhi must establish contact with Kim Aris, her son, and assure him that it will do what it can to help her and that he is not alone in his fight to secure the freedom for his ailing, 81-year-old mother, who remains the most popular leader and the best-known name of her nation.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He served as India’s ambassador to Myanmar from 2002 to 2005. His book India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours won wide acclaim.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Ro Ding, ‘The junta in Myanmar is not the partner India needs’, The Indian Express, 5 June 2026. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/junta-myanmar-is-not-the-partner-india-needs-min-aung-hlaing-modi-10723943/

[2] ‘Transcript of Special Briefing by MEA on the Visit of the President of Myanmar’, Ministry of External Affairs, 01 June, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings?dtl/41251/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_by_MEA_on_the_visit_of_President_of_Myanmar_June_01_2026

[3] India-Myanmar Joint Statement during the Official Visit of the President of Myanmar to India (May 30 – June 03, 2026), Ministry of External Affairs, 01 June 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41250/India++Myanmar+Joint+Statement+during+the+Official+Visit+of+the+President+of+Myanmar+to+India+May+30++June+03+2026

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The Artificial Intelligence (AI) industry in the U.S. is on a high, reflected in the trio of major AI upcoming initial public offerings by Anthropic, OpenAI and SpaceX, hogging the headlines and retail and institutional investor funding. Even the globally disruptive Iran war is a distant event from Wall Street’s enthusiastic embrace of AI.

The ebullience may be ebbing. The past few weeks have seen some developments which indicate that AI enthusiasm may be cooling down due to the high cost of its use – enough to give even cash-rich companies a pause. Companies such as Microsoft[i] and Amazon[ii] have asked employees to cut down their use of AI, the former by cutting down subscriptions for Claude and the latter by reduced emphasis on maximising the use of tokens, a measure of AI usage (See box). Uber, an eager user of AI for its activities, has run through its entire AI usage budget for 2026 in just four months[iii].OpenAI CEO Sam Altman acknowledged in a recent media interview that companies are beginning to question the return on investment on AI tools[iv].

The impending public issues of the two largest AI companies – Anthropic and OpenAI – both currently valued at $1 trillion each should also give pause. On May 26, Anthropic raised $65 billion at a valuation of $965 billion[v]. On March 31, OpenAI announced it had raised $122 billion at a valuation of $852 billion. OpenAI also filed for its IPO on June 8, 2026, less than 2 weeks after Anthropic.[vi] Rocket-maker SpaceX, which has a substantial AI component, filed its prospectus with the SEC on May 20 to raise $75-$80 billion, at an overall valuation of $1.25 trillion.[vii] None of these companies is currently profitable, though Anthropic is said to be on track to report its first ever profitable quarter (April-June 2026). Apart from these three, Alphabet (formerly Google) has recently announced a proposed share sale to raise $80 billion to finance AI infrastructure.[viii]

The cutback on AI spend by corporate clients coupled with the rush to tap public markets may be a sign that the AI boom may be slowing – the maturing of an industry or the popping of a bubble, depending on how an observer chooses to view it. While AI may bring about long-term changes in business and the economy, it is also likely to be commodified, making the trillion-dollar valuations unsustainable.

However, it will be a mistake to write off the euphoria entirely, as investments made during booms often lead to long-term innovations. For instance, the optic fibre cables laid during the dotcom boom of the 1990s provided cheap bandwidth, server infrastructure, and trained technical manpower, which helped companies like Amazon, Google, and Facebook become the giants they are today.

The investments in AI are likely to lead to similar spin-off gains. For instance, the power-hungry AI datacentres are leading to innovations in energy, as well as a revival of investments in the U.S. Amazon[ix] and Google[x] have both signed agreements to buy small modular reactors – a promising but expensive technology which looks viable when trillions of dollars are at stake. Microsoft is restarting the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor – which famously shut down after a leak in 1979 – to power its data centres. Meta (Facebook) has signed multiple agreements with companies promoted by Sam Altman and Bill Gates to put up 6,600 MW of nuclear power by 2032.[xi] The U.S. nuclear sector, which had been practically moribund since 1980, is now witnessing innovation not seen since the 1960s.

Scores of investors are finding rich pickings in smokestack stocks, especially in the energy equipment sector and conductive materials like silver and copper. The order backlog for companies like ABB is at record highs. And old Boeing aircraft are being purchased as their jet engines are repurposed to power data centres.[xii]

Why does this matter for India? India has left itself out of the AI cycle almost entirely and is lagging far behind. During 2025 and 2026, there has been a substantial net outflow of foreign capital from the Indian markets – Rs 160,102 crore ($18 billion) in 2025 and Rs 258,717 crore ($27.9 billion) so far in 2026.[xiii] While there are multiple reasons for investors cooling off on India, American tech sucking up hundreds of billions of dollars has definitely played a significant role. This financial outflow accounts for the lacklustre performance of the Indian equity markets over the past two years and has resulted in a loss of business confidence as companies find it difficult to raise capital. The lack of funding seems especially stark in the startup sector, which has seen sharply reduced fund flow compared to the pre-2022 era. A slowdown of the AI boom may see foreign investors return to India, which should revive investments and business activity.

More important is the serious implication for India’s IT services sector, which employs over 6 million and generates annual revenue of over $250 billion.[xiv] This money, in turn, drives much of India’s consumption and the economy. The 40-year-old model of these companies is dated, and little new investment has been made so the sector can cross the chasm. There is a long-held fear that AI will replace entry level jobs in the IT/BPO sector. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI[xv] and Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic[xvi] have both warned of large-scale white-collar job losses due to AI in the past. Of late, both have softened their tone, projecting AI as a productivity multiplier rather than a job destroyer.

A recent paper by Vishal Sikka,[xvii] the former CEO of Infosys and an early backer of OpenAI, suggests that there could be limits on Agentic AI being able to perform complex tasks at an affordable cost, as the token costs increase exponentially. Neither of these dimensions will save India’s services companies from a rocky future.

Generative vs Agentic AI

Indian tech companies have traditionally spent less on research compared to their counterparts in the West, or even Chinese tech majors, and are left out of the AI race. The sector is now in the unenviable position of waiting for AI valuations to mature so investments can revive. The tech infrastructure created during the dotcom boom helped Indian tech companies by first creating demand for their services (originally body shopping) and then making offshoring/outsourcing possible. It is not clear if any such benefits exist for India’s tech industry this time round.

It is possible that a more innovative set of founders, similar to the tech startups of the past decade, benefit from this round of AI innovation. For the Indian government, this is a good time to make the markets more friendly for long-term investors, including Indian retail investors who have invested heavily locally, by removing irritants such as long-term capital gains tax. A move has been made to eliminate taxes from bond investments; a similar move toward equity investment can finance AI start-ups and may ensure that India gets a foot in the AI door.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[i] https://sqmagazine.co.uk/microsoft-drops-claude-code-github-copilot-cli/

[ii] https://www.businessinsider.com/token-reckoning-amazon-uber-reassess-ai-investments-2026-6

[iii] https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/technology/articles/ubers-anthropic-ai-push-hits-223109852.html

[iv] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/01/cnbc-exclusive-transcript-openai-ceo-sam-altman-speaks-with-cnbcs-david-faber-on-power-lunch-today.html

[v] https://www.anthropic.com/news/series-h

[vi] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/08/openai-confidentially-files-for-ipo-prepping-wall-street-for-ai-debut.html

[vii] https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026036936/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm

[viii] https://s206.q4cdn.com/479360582/files/doc_news/2026/Jun/01/attachments/2026-June-Alphabet-Equity-Capital-Raise-Press-Release-PDF.pdf

[ix] https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/sustainability/amazon-nuclear-small-modular-reactor-net-carbon-zero

[x] https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/sustainability/google-kairos-power-nuclear-energy-agreement/

[xi] https://about.fb.com/news/2026/01/meta-nuclear-energy-projects-power-american-ai-leadership/

[xii] https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-data-centers

[xiii] https://www.cdslindia.com/eservices/Publications/FIICalendar

[xiv] https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/185/AU1697_scVB9Q.pdf?source=pqals

[xv] https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/sam-altman-believes-ai-will-change-world-and-everything-else

[xvi] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/28/ai-jobs-white-collar-unemployment-anthropic

[xvii] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.07505

[xviii] https://www.businessinsider.com/sam-altman-openai-top-token-spender-ai-costs-issue-2026-6

The post AI and its spin-off gains appeared first on Gateway House.

Raveena Shivashankar (RS): Rabi Lamichhane, the chief of Nepal’s ruling party, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), was on a five-day visit from June 1 to June 5, 2026. During this visit, he met with the BJP’s chief, Nitin Nabin; the Home Minister, Amit Shah; National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval; External Affairs Minister, Dr Jaishankar; and finally, the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. What was the reason for this visit, and why now? Is the timing relevant, and what was the outcome of this visit?

Nayanima Basu (NB): India and Nepal share very close ties – historic, cultural, and traditional; and of course, the strongest part of the bilateral relationship is the people-to-people linkage, and we’ve seen Nepal undergoing a lot of political transformation and changes for almost a decade. We saw their constitution coming into effect in 2015, but even then, there was no political stability. There was this communist regime that was there in Nepal for all this time. We now have a very new virgin party, the RSP, which is being led by Prime Minister Balendra Shah.

Now, I think when you have a brand new party in your immediate neighbourhood and you share almost open borders – why, I would say ‘almost’, because, you know, there are certain tensions coming up, but you do have open and porous borders with them. If you remember, our former External Affairs Minister, Ms Sushma Swaraj, used to say, ‘roti beti ka rishta’. Now, whether you agree to that or not, this upsets a lot of Nepali people, but then that has been the reality and the fact that these two countries are very well integrated. So, when you have a brand new party in your immediate neighbourhood, it is always good to have more and more conversations and dialogues.

After the Gen Z revolution that happened last year in September, 2025, a lot of things have been changing in Nepal. To begin with, there was no kind of surety that RSP would have such a landslide victory, because people were thinking no matter what, some seats by the end of the day would go to the Nepali Congress or other political parties, which have been traditionally having a stronghold. So, the coming in of RSP was not just a shock for India; it was also a shock and surprise for the world.

And we’ve seen that probably Prime Minister Balendra Shah has a very different payoff; you know, his governance style has been very different. When he was the mayor of Kathmandu, I’ve heard from several of my friends in Nepal that he’s a taskmaster, he believes in getting things done, and that’s how he has been. I think probably the core Nepali population really wanted Balendra Shah, so they decided and gave him a chance because, in the end of the day, the same kinds of demands people have there are jobs, economic growth, and taking the country to the next level, which has really not been happening under the previous governments.

They also have to look at India as their immediate biggest neighbour, not just neighbour, but also the fact that, you have this integrated economic relationship. So, I think this visit of the RSP’s chief was extremely crucial, and there were certain reports that were also coming out that Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri wanted to go to Nepal, and Balendra Shah said no. While we do not have any confirmation on all of that, we see this visit of the RSP chief coming here, Rabi Lamichhane, as the brain of the party. So, it’s very good that he came here and, you know, met the ruling party here, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and had more of a political dialogue. He met Prime Minister Modi and also met Home Minister Amit Shah, and I really think that is very interesting. That’s probably going to give a very new perspective to the India-Nepal bilateral relations, because you really will not see Home Minister Amit Shah meeting foreign dignitaries so often in such depth.

So, Lamichhane’s meeting with Amit Shah, I think, will augur well for the relationship, but it remains to be seen eventually when Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Balendra Shah have their own bilateral dialogue.

We’ve recently seen reports of what Prime Minister Balendra Shah has spoken in their parliament – that, you know, I think he is keeping the border dispute, the unsettled border – that I will not call it a dispute as such, but the tensions are there because that little portion is still unsettled, such as Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh. So, that is their priority, it seems. That has also been one of the sticky parts in the bilateral relationship.

We saw Rabi Lamichhane also writing an op-ed in one of the Indian newspapers, Hindustan Times, talking about the fact that what really came out and what I thought was very important from the op-ed was the fact that he said, ‘To achieve true friendship, you cannot brush core issues under the rug.’ By that he meant settling the border dispute and the border issues, and I think that has to take off. But that also will take off only when the Prime Ministers meet.

RS: The RSP had a landmark victory in Nepal’s national election. The question now is, can they now hold on to their power and sustain themselves? Will the popular young prime minister, Balendra Shah, manage his party and electorate well?

​NB: This is their first time, and he has proven his governance style when he was the Mayor of Kathmandu, and I think that is where the people there have given him a chance to rule the entire country. It remains to be seen what he does ahead.

His governance style looks very different. He is not into going out and giving foreign policy or external policy that kind of priority. I think he’s very clearly stated, if you follow the local media reports there, that he wants to now look inside the country and take Nepal into a very different trajectory of growth. He is focusing on job generation, and after all, once that is settled, maybe he will be looking at foreign policy, but that does not mean he will not have any relationship or the country will close; of course not. But his immediate challenge is to bring Nepal back to a positive growth trajectory. If he’s able to do that kind of mandate, I think he will be good enough.

But then again, this being Nepal, you would not know what will really happen. Challenges are many politically, and let us also not forget that there is still a certain section of the Nepali population that is out there that supports the return of the monarchy. The Communist Party would really want to bounce back, and they have tacit support from China. So all those challenges he’ll be facing.

But despite all that, I think if he’s able to have a good GDP and job generation – that’s what Gen Z wants there – and bring back some of the industries, I think he will be there for a long time.

RS: He is focusing more on domestic issues, it seems. Is that the reason why he has not engaged in any foreign visits as of now? And let’s say that he does have any foreign visits, would he consider coming to India first or China?

​NB: If you really follow Nepal closely and the media reports there, it seems that he has no plans to go anywhere now. His first trip would probably be to the U.S. for the United Nations General Assembly, which happens every year in September. Maybe he’ll do that first and break the typical protocol of either going to China or India. We saw what Prime Minister KP Oli, the former Prime Minister of Nepal, did, choosing China over India. But I think that does not define the foreign policy of a country. It depends on scheduling issues also sometimes.

But of course, if Balendra Shah finally decides to go to China first and not to India, then it is a concern for India. We are hearing from Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman that he might be going to China first and not India.

So I guess when India talks about the Neighbourhood First policy, we need to also ensure that our neighbours, the leaders, should first come to India. But frankly speaking, that really is just good for optics for argument’s purposes. It really depends on what the main outcome of that visit is.

RS: Looking at the broader South Asian neighbourhood, there have been a series of visits from South Asian leaders. The first was from Bangladesh’s foreign minister, and the recent visit of the RSP’s chief. As you now mentioned, Bangladesh’s prime minister is considering going to China first rather than India. So, how are the South Asian leaders managing their relationship with India in the current geopolitical context?

NB: It’s not just about what India is doing, but also within our neighbourhood, things are changing, dynamics are changing. You have this whole new young generation coming up. In Bangladesh, the fact is that with the new generation, several new demands and new aspirations come up and that is something India should be very much aware of.

The fact that, let’s say, the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tariq Rahman really decides to go to China first, we need to sit and analyse whether the population in Banggladesh also wanted it or they wanted him to come to India first.

But then, again, coming back to your question, changes are happening in South Asia. India needs to be very much aware of it. India needs to focus, I think, much more seriously on its neighbourhood because there are several changes happening and happening very rapidly.

Gone are the days when India really could say that or maybe act like they were taken by surprise. You can’t be surprised anymore. This is your immediate neighbourhood, which is very much under the Chinese radar. So you need to be very firm in managing your neighbours and be serious and also understand what it is that they want from you.

We can build a railway network, let’s say for Bangladesh, connecting the Northeast and Bangladesh. But we also need to understand whether they want it or not, whether it is for their benefit or ours. Because that’s what our neighbours have started to question.

​RS: We have seen anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh; do we get the same feelings in Nepal as well?

NB: I think the anti-India sentiment is kind of catching up fast in our neighbourhood, and there are several reasons for it. India is aware of that, and that is also because a lot of changes are happening, and the new generation is not really aware of the historical aspect of this kind of bilateral relationship. Like for Bangladesh, when I was there for the elections in February, I realised the youth, the student youth leaders, while they are very much aware of the 1971 history, the India-Bangladesh and the Pakistan war that they had in 1971 that got them independence, they are aware of the history, but then they don’t want to be defined only by that aspect of the history. They want to have their own identity. I think that’s where the tension is coming from. India should not refuse to acknowledge that and look the other way.

So, anti-India sentiment is there and will always be there. That is also because we are a big country; we have our own domestic political issues, which sometimes reflect very poorly in our neighbourhood. Some of the comments that we are seeing coming from some of our ministers during this recent election campaign against Bangladeshis and immigration have not gone down well in Dhaka. And that again gives rise to a lot of anti-India sentiments.

But I think that is also the responsibility of that particular country to keep that in check because, at the end of the day, they need to also educate their own population on why India is also important, and this anti-India sentiment can give them a few headlines, but it cannot be the mainstay.

RS: Speaking on the South Asian neighbourhood, Min Aung Hlaing was also on a five-day visit to India, and that was a pretty notable visit. What came out of it, and what does it mean for India-Myanmar bilateral?

NB: It’s very important for us to understand the history of Myanmar, which has its own dynamics, its own history, and its own kind of place within Southeast Asia and South Asia. The military rule and everything else that they have had came from the democracy under Aung San Suu Kyi, who is believed to be now under house arrest. Some reports say that she’s no longer under detention. She’s been released.

But these tensions go on, and the current president, Min Aung Hlaing, who was in India for his maiden visit abroad after becoming the president, has been the main architect of the coup that took place there in February 2021. But we’ve seen India historically has engaged with the junta there, the military that is the Tatmadaw, and which is why Min Aung Hlaing is not new to India.

So, this visit was important. India must play an effective and responsible role in talking about democracy there because we’ve seen not just the Western world but even some countries in ASEAN have also stated that the elections in Myanmar had been a sham. They have questioned the outcome. They’ve questioned the way the elections have happened there. But he has become the president. We also need to see that he is now the leader of that country, we need to engage again because Myanmar is sensitive. You have your Northeast, which is totally vulnerable and exposed to them. There are several insurgent groups, and this was what the prime minister had also discussed with President Min Aung Hlaing when they both met. The external affairs minister has also stated that Prime Minister Modi spoke about Aung San Suu Kyi on what is happening to her and the democratic forces out there. India follows a certain kind of two-track policy. India follows a peace process there.

But then this is also true that India has to engage with the junta but also see to it that India should not be on the wrong side of history. That’s also very important.

RS: Do you think India can bring peace to Myanmar?

​NB: I don’t think India should be doing that. As a big neighbour and a friendly partner country to Myanmar, we can at least tell them what they need to do. But beyond that, I don’t think India needs to get involved or bring peace there. We can see civil war happening there in several pockets of the country; several territories have gone away from the hands of the junta.

There are anti-junta regimes that have come up. So they’re having their own issues, and I think they need to sort it out themselves. Of course, when such big visits take place, that’s when India needs to tell them what it has to tell them.

But beyond the point, if you start giving them lectures on how to bring peace, then, of course, there’s a population there as well who will say that India is getting involved in their internal matters, and that has become a very sensitive topic in today’s geopolitics. There is a certain section that expects India to play a role. It should be the largest democracy in the world. But beyond the point, you cannot play any role.

You can always stand on the right side of history and assert your principles to your partners.

RS: How is India faring in its Neighbourhood First and Act East Policies? Does India need to do more? How can it gain trust again and make its neighbours its strongest allies? How can it compete with China?

NB: India needs to be very, very serious with the neighbourhood. If you really want to have, to become, this global leader, such as having a permanent seat at the United Nations, you are being watched as to how you are handling your immediate neighbourhood. The condition in the immediate neighbourhood as of now is really not that positive, also because of their own internal issues and the things that India has done.

In the last couple of years, we’ve seen what has happened between India and Bangladesh, which was our biggest supporter and friendly country, but India failed to see what was happening there underneath. While it had the support of the Sheikh Hasina government, India did not engage with other stakeholders.

And I think that is extremely important for India to manage the neighbourhood and make it a strong point. Be it Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh. Pakistan and Afghanistan have very different dynamics; it is very important to have dialogue with all the stakeholders, at least wherever there is a democratically elected government.

We see that in the neighbourhood now, either have the Taliban or the Tatmadaw as good friends – is what I generally say these days, but that’s not how it should be. I mean, yes, you need to engage the Taliban. You also need to engage the Tatmadaw of Myanmar, but you need to also have a very good relationship with Bangladesh, with Sri Lanka, and, of course, with other countries, like Nepal, because with them you have people-to-people linkages, very strong linkages.

With Bangladesh, I think the challenges are increasing every single day. We are going to have, the India-Bangladesh border talks, which are going to happen and will be the first high-level border talks that we have had after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party came in there. Then there is the Ganga water treaty coming up for renewal in December. So these little things, if you really sort them out well and let them not linger within your bilateral relationship, there will be some kind of reset. The Teesta River water issue sharing – that dispute is also going to come up soon because the Chinese have offered a different kind of innovative technology in the Teesta River, and if they really start doing that, it will become a big problem for India.

​So India should sort that problem and address the immediate issues and the issues that our neighbours are telling to address. If you do that, then I think it will become your strong point.

Nayanima Basu is a journalist who writes on issues of foreign policy and is the author of “The Fall of Kabul: Despatches from Chaos”.

Raveena Shivashankar is the digital media associate at Gateway House.

This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.

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The post Decoding India’s Neighbourhood dynamics appeared first on Gateway House.

The whole world was looking at the results of one head of state – that was U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from May 13-15, 2026. He was on the back foot when he went to China. This was due to his announcement that he would wind up the Iran war before going to China. His plans for a visit from March 31-April had to be postponed, and even in May during this trip, the Iran war was not over though a ceasefire was in effect. And, just prior to his May visit, China had instructed its companies sanctioned by the U.S., to ignore the sanctions – an open act of defiance by Beijing.

While the ceremonial programmes went as expected – the Chinese are masters at that – in substance the discussions did not go as expected for the U.S. There are several reasons why.

In the opening remarks which Trump was the first to make, he mentioned the bilateral aspects and praised Chinese President Xi Jinping and his friendship with Trump. Xi’s statement was more statesmanlike. An analysis of the readouts from China^[1] and the  U.S.^[2] reveals that there was almost no meeting of the minds. The readout and the fact sheet^[3] from the White House mentioned that the two sides discussed ways to enhance economic cooperation to include increasing Chinese investment in U.S. industries, $17 billion worth of agricultural purchases by China per year till 2028, purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft, restoring of market access for beef and sale of poultry from the U.S. The establishment of two boards, one for trade and another for investment, finds mention. Mentioned also were ending the flow of fentanyl precursors from China, which has been a problem for the U.S. for some time now, and the claim of Xi’s support for the Strait of Hormuz to remain open, with both countries agreeing that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. The U.S. Fact sheet mentioned that China will address the U.S.’s concerns on rare earths.

Xi spoke differently. He said China and the U.S. should not be rivals. He mentioned the Thucydides Trap^[4] and cautioned the U.S. on its support for Taiwan. He went to the extent of saying that if the Taiwan issue is not handled properly, it could lead to clashes and conflicts between both the countries.  Xi proposed a “Constructive Strategic Stability”. The explanation of this term was provided later by Mr. Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China, during his press interaction^[5] in Beijing after the completion of the visit. He said Constructive Strategic Stability meant providing strategic guidance for bilateral relations over the next three years and beyond and highlighted four connotations for the term.

One, positive stability where cooperation makes the relationship more resilient. Two, healthy stability in which the competition is kept within proper limits and does not become a zero-sum game. Third, constant stability that is achieved through policy continuity and China and the U.S. honouring their words and moving in the same direction.  Lastly, achieving lasting stability where peace is expected and wars and conflicts are not acceptable. These are to be achieved by adhering to the three China-U.S. joint communiqués^[6], respecting each other’s social systems, development paths, core interests, major concerns, and right to development.

The Chinese readout also stated that President Trump had agreed to work with President Xi to strengthen communication and cooperation, properly handle differences, make bilateral relations better than ever before and embrace a fantastic future and said Trump asked the business leaders in his delegation to present themselves to Xi.^[7]

Wang Yi’s press interaction then proceeded along grand lines. He stated that achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can go hand in hand, and the two countries can help each other succeed and advance the well-being of the whole world. He confirmed that President Xi would pay a state visit to the U.S. this fall, likely to coincide with the UN General Assembly meeting.

President Xi Jinping announced an important initiative – to invite 50,000 young Americans to China on exchange and study programs over a period of five years. President Trump also said multiple times that he welcomes Chinese students to the U.S. The Chinese reiterated that China remained a hot destination for American businesses and investors.

China encouraged the U.S. and Iran to settle their differences and disputes through negotiation, including on the nuclear issue. China called for reopening the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible on the basis of the continued ceasefire and believed that the only solution was achieving a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. On the Ukraine crisis, both China and the U.S. want to see an early end to the conflict, and both have done a great deal to promote peace talks in their own ways.

A critical analysis of the visit reveals seven takeaways.

First, the Chinese have a practice of announcing important visits one week prior, simultaneously by both sides. By announcing the dates unilaterally, Trump made the Chinese uncomfortable.

Second, there was no joint statement issued at the end of the visit – an indication that there are issues with no consensus. In contrast, during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing almost immediately after the Trump visit, China and Russia issued two joint statements including one joint statement^[8] on “advocating a multipolar world and new type of international relations.”

Third, the read outs and the fact sheet indicate the varying level of importance given to the issues discussed. The U.S. read out and the fact sheet seem to address the audience in the U.S. and is mainly trade and investment-oriented. Barring the boards of trade and investment, there is no commonality in the statements of the two countries.

Fourth, the U.S. seems to have accepted Xi’s proposal for Constructive Strategic Stability as it figures in the U.S. fact sheet. This means the U.S. is accepting the terms set by China for the bilateral relationship. This is corroborated by the fact that U.S. is holding in abeyance $14 billion worth of weapons and equipment that is to be supplied to Taiwan.

Fifth, While China says it welcomes 50,000 students from the U.S. over the next five years and Trump says he welcomes it, in fact it runs contrary to the U.S.’ actions of targeting Chinese students in its country. Sixth, and in the same vein, if what China says is true, that American businesses find China an attractive place to do business with, it goes against the U.S.’ own decoupling strategy.

Lastly, on Iran, China clearly seemed to take the lead by saying that it encourages the U.S. and Iran to arrive at an amicable solution.

A comparison of this visit with Mr. Trump’s previous visit to China in November 2017, is revelatory.  After that trip, there was a Joint Press statement^[9] issued, the tone of which that indicated that China and the U.S. were comparable powers. This time around, it seems from the statements that China has the upper hand. In this tale of two visits, there are two different outcomes – and in the most recent one, China appears to trump the U.S.

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

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References:

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. “President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump” May 14, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202605/t20260514_11910330.html

[2] The White House. 2026. “Readout of President Trump’s Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in China. May 2026. https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/readout-of-president-trumps-meeting-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping/

[3] The White House. 2026. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry.” May 17, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry/

[4] Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Accessed June 4, 2026. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/destined-war-can-america-and-china-escape-thucydidess-trap

[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. “Briefing by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on China-U.S. Summit and Common Understandings.” May 16, 2026  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202605/t20260516_11911719.html

[6] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. 2026. “China-U.S. Relations: Important Documents.” Accessed June 4, 2026. https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zywj/lhgb/

[7] In olden days the Chinese expected the foreigners to present themselves before the emperor. Depicts a sense of superiority.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2022. “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.” Facebook post. February 4, 2022. https://www.facebook.com/MIDRussia/posts/-joint-statement-of-the-russian-federation-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-on-/1331321295857594

[9] The White House. 2017. “Remarks by President Trump and President Xi of China in Joint Press Statement | Beijing, China.” November 9, 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-xi-china-joint-press-statement-beijing-china/

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The vulnerability to oil supply disruptions and subsequent price shocks is shared by all regions of the world. For major oil-importing members such as India, elevated prices translate directly into billions of dollars in additional monthly foreign exchange outflow, industrial shutdowns, and downstream food inflation. Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia face currency depreciation, fuel rationing and supply shortages. China, with the world’s largest strategic petroleum reserve at over 90 days of import cover, is relatively insulated. Oil-exporting members such as Russia remains under sanctions while Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are embroiled in a full-fledged military conflict on opposing sides. The crisis has exposed a membership that is simultaneously affected by the disruption and unable to act collectively in response.

The BRICS Energy Cooperation Roadmap 2025-2030 published only last year, offers limited relief. Its focus on long-term energy transition, green hydrogen, and decarbonisation is misaligned with the immediate imperative of market stabilisation. Unlike the International Energy Agency which compels members to maintain 90-day reserves and mobilised 400 million barrels of emergency supply in March 2026 or the ASEAN’s Petroleum Security Agreement model, BRICS has no substantial framework as a grouping to respond to a supply shock of the present scale.

This paper underscores the urgent need for internal reform within BRICS energy cooperation and proposes a set of institutional and financial measures to strengthen the grouping’s collective resilience. It argues for deeper coordination through shared reserve mechanisms, targeted financial support for vulnerable members, expanded joint energy infrastructure, and stronger cross-border investment frameworks in both hydrocarbons and critical minerals. Together, these measures aim to reduce external vulnerabilities, enhance energy security, and position BRICS to build more integrated and resilient supply chains for both conventional energy and the transition to cleaner energy systems.

The underlying rationale herein is of economic unity prevailing over geopolitical divide within BRICS. Stable energy markets are a shared interest across BRICS regardless of political alignment. The foremost requirement behind the proposed measures is the recognition that collective economic architecture is both urgent and achievable for members.

You can download ‘A BRICS Energy Stability Framework’ here.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

The issue paper is part of the first edition of the Geopolitical Futures Policy Series on Perspectives on Statecraft and Institution Building by Asia Pacific Consulting and Advisory, a subsidiary of The Asia Foundation.

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The paper’s assessment of the grouping’s record is mixed, as it points to a grouping with genuine but restricted achievements. Its institutional innovations such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement demonstrated that BRICS could undertake concrete reforms. The Rio Summit 2025 produced four substantive documents and reaffirmed the grouping’s foundational principles. However, the Cross-Border Payments initiative has not been implemented, the NDB remains a fraction of the World Bank’s size, and summit declarations have consistently overrun what the grouping can and has delivered.

Several pertinent challenges have placed the grouping under scrutiny. First, the West Asia conflict, in which members Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, find themselves on opposing sides, has made collective statements impossible and exposed the limits of consensus-driven governance in a structurally divided grouping. Second, the U.S. administration’s tariff imposition threats against any BRICS move on the dollar have had a restraining effect on the grouping’s ambitions and deterred member engagement. The Western media’s amplification of de-dollarisation fears has compounded the problem by attributing to BRICS an agenda of replacing the U.S. dollar, an objective that the grouping has shown no immediate appetite to pursue. Third, China and Russia continue to withhold unambiguous support for India, Brazil, and South Africa at the UN Security Council, forming an internal structural challenge. It is a contradiction that has persisted throughout the grouping’s existence despite its commitment to multilateral reform. Further, as C. Raja Mohan (2026) has argued that with the coexistence of ‘regional rivals’, the efficacy of BRICS has also taken a hit.

India’s 2026 chairship presents a timely opportunity to redefine BRICS’ trajectory from mere aspiration towards meaningful action. This paper recommends four key priorities: first, resolving the identity question of whether BRICS speaks for middle powers or the broader Global South, while also bringing greater clarity on the de-dollarisation narrative propounded by the Western media. Second, intensifying intra-BRICS cooperation in trade, technology and supply chains; third, leveraging India’s constructive G7 standing to establish a formal inter grouping dialogue and fourth, bidding to host a permanent BRICS Secretariat in India itself. Whether India can lead the shift in BRICS from occupying a defensive posture to an assertive and credible leadership will determine whether the grouping fulfils its founding promise and emerges as a formidable force on the global stage.

You can download ‘BRICS at a Pivotal Moment’ here.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

The issue paper is part of the first edition of the Geopolitical Futures Policy Series on Perspectives on Statecraft and Institution Building by Asia Pacific Consulting and Advisory, a subsidiary of The Asia Foundation.

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