Inauguration of the Festival of the USSR in India, New Delhi, 1987.

Source: Russian Embassy in India

During the Second World War, sections of the Indian intelligentsia expressed solidarity with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

This was manifest in the establishment of the Friends of the Soviet Union (FSU), which was set up in West Bengal on June 22, 1941, the day Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. It aimed to show solidarity with the Soviet people’s resistance, to support the global fight against fascism and, eventually, to foster cultural ties and people-to-people contacts between British India and the Soviet Union. The FSU’s patron was Rabindranath Tagore, India’s poet laureate, who had visited the USSR in 1930 and remains popular in present-day Russia.

In 1930, Rabindranath Tagore visited the Federation of the Union of Cinematographic Artists and met the Deputy Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs of USSR in Moscow. In the evening, Tagore watched ‘The Old and the New’ and ‘Battleship Potemkin’ at the Union Cinema Association.

Source: Russian Embassy in India/FB

Encouraged by this support, in the 1940s Moscow began reaching out to the Indian public. The FSU was reconstituted into the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS) in Bombay in 1952, with renowned surgeon Dr. A.V. Baliga as its first chairman.^[1] Over the next few decades its eminent members included India’s most illustrious diplomats, such as T.N. Kaul and K.P.S. Menon. ISCUS focussed on the exchange of art, culture and literature between India and the Soviet Union, while also facilitating cultural delegations.

Other institutions were blended into these efforts, such as the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), established in 1925, to promote scientific and cultural relations with the world.^[2] VOKS worked directly with societies such as ISCUS. In 1954 it sent a Soviet cultural delegation to India and arranged for a reciprocal ISCUS group to visit the USSR a year later.^[3]

The  1950s were active years when the seeds of the intellectual efforts began to flower. The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi worked closely with ISCUS to expand its reach to the Indian public. The embassy enlisted the USSR’s state news agency TASS,^[4] which ran a separate section called the Publications Department. Besides daily bulletins, the department distributed journals such as Soviet Land and News and Views from the Soviet Union.^[5] These journals published articles that highlighted economic, industrial, social and cultural achievements of the USSR, as well as features about Indo-Soviet projects and developments in bilateral ties.

Copies of Soviet Land Magazines

Source: Vandana Menon, ThePrint

In 1955, during the visit of Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Nikolai Bulganin, Premier of the Soviet Union to India, the two countries agreed to step up cultural cooperation and exchanges. In a joint statement,^[6] they said: “…The leaders of both countries have noted with satisfaction the increasing opportunities afforded to the peoples of two countries to get to know each other by the regular exchange of visits by scientists, technicians, economists, parliamentarians, writers and others engaged in cultural pursuits. They hope that there will be a steady expansion of such opportunities for mutual…”

Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin welcomed by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru upon their arrival in New Delhi on November 22, 1955.

Source: Intercontinentale/AFP

In December 1956, the Soviet Embassy set up its own information department, which handled magazines like Soviet Land that soon had editions in Hindi, Marathi, Bengali and other Indian languages. Around the same time V/O Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga,^[7] the state-run exporter of Soviet publications, signed agency agreements with booksellers in India such as the People’s Publishing House.^[8] Initially, books by writers such as Leo Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky, and Russian fairy tales translated into English were sold at heavily subsidised prices. Eager to expand their reach, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, with the help of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Education ministries, recruited 90 Indian language translators to translate Russian books.^[9]

As was the case with the British and American missions in India, there was a degree of suspicion over Soviet motives for expanding its cultural presence. There were rumours that profits from the sale of Russian books in India went to the Communist Party of India (CPI), but the Indian government understood that the Soviets made no money from the subsidised books. The MEA memo noted that “… the contracts for the printing of their publications are generally given by the Soviet embassy to firms owned by CPI sympathisers… [and] provide employment to CPI members. The MEA added that a close watch was being kept on how the sale proceeds were being distributed.”

It was also in the 1950s that the Soviets extended their influence in India through cinema. By 1954 V/O Sovexportfilm^[10] had established an office in Bombay and branches in Madras and Calcutta. The MEA insisted that the branches be staffed entirely by Indian personnel. Under an agreement with the state-owned Soviet film export monopoly, only 12 programmes could be imported into India in a year. A programme consisted of a feature film and one or two supporting documentaries. The films would be distributed through private agencies. The influence was not one way. Indian films too found a vast audience in the USSR, beginning with an Indian film festival in Moscow in 1954,^[11] where Raj Kapoor’s Awara and Shree 420 were huge hits. Kapoor was dubbed “India’s Charlie Chaplin”.^[12]

Raj Kapoor in Moscow in 1967

Source: Yoda Press/The Scroll

In 1958, VOKS was transformed into an umbrella body, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD). The main aim was to focus on public diplomacy and managing global friendship societies like ISCUS.

Until the early 1960s, Soviet organisations like SSOD and Sovexportfilm coordinated cultural activities in India, while the Americans, French and British ran proper cultural centres in the country. It was only in 1965 that the first House of Soviet Culture was opened in New Delhi’s iconic Mandi House area.

Russian House in New Delhi

Source: Russian House

The modernist-style building with strict geometric forms, a flat roof, and extensive glazing resembles many works of Soviet public architecture from the sixties and seventies. The design emphasis was on functionalism and minimalism, and it was adapted to the Indian climate, with spacious shaded areas and covered galleries to protect from the sun.

The New Delhi centre, with its auditorium, exhibition galleries and library, became the model for the centres subsequently built in Madras (1972), Calcutta’s  Gorky Sadan (1974) and Bombay (1975). The Russian government owns a property in Thiruvananthapuram that functions as a cultural centre.

The Soviets invested in language too. Right until the late 1980s, Russian language courses were popular in India. Students often used the centres’ courses as a springboard to learn Russian before going to the USSR for longer programs largely in medicine and engineering, as well as language and literature. The libraries were well-stocked with not just books but also records and music from across the former Soviet Union. The first director of the centre in Bombay was from Uzbekistan, and the centres often arranged for cultural troupes of musicians, dancers and other performing artists from Central Asia.

At the peak of Indo-Soviet bonhomie, the intellectual elite of Indian metros thronged the centre for cultural events. Long-term visitors to the New Delhi centre talk about watching Sergey Bondarchuk’s Oscar-winning four-part film adaptation of Tolstoy’s War and Peace over a weekend. This was de rigueur, to screen Soviet films and classics at the centres.

After the USSR was dissolved in 1991, the centres faced financial difficulties on account of Russia’s economic collapse. But a dedicated local staff kept things going. Among the most fondly remembered Russian teachers was the late Suniti Deshpande, the first Indian to earn a doctorate in the Russian language from the prestigious Pushkin Institute.

It took over a decade after the collapse of the USSR before the rechristened Russian Centres of Science and Culture in India started to function at the level they did in the Soviet era.

The Russian centres now also facilitate cultural programmes such as concerts, ballets and operas in venues like the National Centre for the Performing Arts (NCPA) and Opera House in Mumbai. In December 2025, the Eifman Ballet of St Petersburg held three performances of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina set to the music of Pyotr Tchaikovsky. In October 2026, the New Chamber Orchestra and the St. Petersburg Philharmonic Orchestra also held a concert at the iconic Mumbai venue.

While the centres organise a good number of high-quality events, they feel like a relic of the Soviet days. Russia has clearly moved on from that period and has undergone a major cultural awakening over the last 20 years. However, a visitor to the Russian Houses in Indian metros would get little sense of how much the country has changed.

Centres operated by other foreign cultural giants such as the Alliance française and Goethe-Institut have hired young, talented and energetic Indian employees who not only work as unofficial diplomats but also help produce excellent social media content and outreach campaigns. Given Russia’s new geopolitical shift and positioning in the world, Moscow will do well to formulate a new strategy to revamp these centres and bring in fresh blood, including local Russian speakers to popularise the rich and diverse culture of Russia to a new generation of Indians. This requires larger budgets and a more targeted strategy that is in line with Russia’s renewed focus since 2022^[13] on further developing economic and cultural ties with India – the year India refused to join U.S. sanctions against Russia and reiterated its ‘time-tested’ friendship.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer with a special interest in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References

[1] ‘Indian Friendship Movement: Short Historical Background – ISCUF -Indian Society for Cultural Co-Operation and Friendship’. 30 September 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20200930063347/http:/iscuf.com/indian-friendship-movement-short-historical-background/.

[2] Presidential Library. ‘All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) Was Established.’ 5 April 1925. https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/2047582.

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, Europe (East) Section, File No: 8-207-EM-E-57, 1957

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Europe (East) Section, File No: 8-207-EM-E-57, 1957

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Europe (East) Section, File No: 8-207-EM-E-57, 1957

[6] “The Indian-Soviet Joint Declaration.” Current History, vol. 30, no. 174, 1956, pp. 109–11. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45308868. Accessed 16 Oct. 2026.

[7] V/O stands for Vsesoyuznoye Obyedineniye, which translates to “All-Union Association” or “All-Union Enterpris”, a prefix used for state-owned foreign trade organizations in the Soviet Union that operated under the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

[8] Gupta, Anukriti. ‘People’s Publishing House, New Delhi’. Zikr-e-Dilli, 4 April 2021. https://zikredilli.com/f/peoples-publishing-house-new-delhi.

[9] Ministry of External Affairs, Europe (East) Section, File No: 8-207-EM-E-57, 1957

[10] Sovexportfilm was the official Soviet state organisation responsible for importing and exporting films, functioning as the primary international distributor for Soviet cinema.

[11] Rajagopalan, Sudha. ‘Emblematic of the Thaw’. South Asian Popular Culture, 20 November 2006. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14746680600796972.

[12] Thakur, Charu. ‘70 Years of Indian Cinema in Russia: A Timeless Love Story’. The Global Indian, 13 March 2025. https://www.globalindian.com/story/art-culture/70-years-of-indian-cinema-in-russia-raj-kapoor-mithun-chakraborty-srk/.

[13]‘India-Russia Bilateral Brief’. Ministry of External Affairs, December 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Russia_Dec_2022.pdf.

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The remarkable result of the recent midterm elections was a ‘bluenami’ that witnessed the Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the House and the Senate.^[1] It stunned the world, but for India especially, this could provide some much-needed tariff relief, as the U.S. is one of the most consequential partners for India. The Democratic victory is not a guaranteed triumph for them in the upcoming 2028 U.S. Presidential elections. New Delhi should use the two years starting now to relook at its engagement with Washington and widen and deepen its relationships with America’s diverse political class amid a sudden re-emergence of the progressive forces.

With the Democrats now firmly in control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, there is renewed optimism within diplomatic and strategic circles in India that New Delhi may soon see a resolution to the persistent threats surrounding tariffs. The shift in congressional power could pave the way for a more accelerated and advantageous Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) between the U.S. and India, fostering stronger economic ties between two countries that have long considered themselves to be “natural allies”. An easing of tensions related to the Iran conflict holds the potential to alleviate the energy crisis and ongoing supply chain disruptions, bringing relief to businesses and consumers alike, even as the recurring threat of deep and detrimental economic sanctions on Russia will give New Delhi some strategic breathing space.

However, while a Democratic win in the midterms – one of the worst midterm upsets for a sitting President since 1974 – may have tied U.S. President Donald Trump’s hands internally, externally he will continue to wield power with considerable authority; he is still the President.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will likely meet Trump during the East Asia Summit scheduled in Manila, Philippines, from November 16 to 18 and then again at the G20 Summit in Miami, Florida, on December 14 to 15, 2026. This is perhaps India’s last opportunity to get the trade deal signed on reasonable terms after New Delhi faced an onslaught in terms of tariff whip and sanctions threat. The trade deal, if signed, will be the first of its kind between India and the U.S. and will give New Delhi an economic edge in such turbulent times and also provide some strategic heft.

For New Delhi, it is essential to approach the relationship with Washington with a nuanced, two-pronged strategy that reflects the evolving political landscape in the U.S. First, India must actively and more strategically broaden its engagement with the diverse political spectrum emerging in the U.S. Historically, India has leaned on its traditional bipartisan support from both major political parties. However, this approach is increasingly outdated, with the political climate in the U.S. becoming much more polarised, and support from either party is not guaranteed. Therefore, India must build relationships across the aisle, fostering dialogues with not just established figures but also emerging political leaders such as the newly elected senators like Abdul El-Sayed – the first Muslim senator – from Michigan, Peggy Flanagan – the first Native American woman senator – from Minnesota, James Talarico – the first Democrat to win a Texas Senate seat in nearly 40 years – and Annie Andrews – South Carolina’s first elected female Democratic senator – among others. One way to achieve this for Indian diplomats in the U.S. – and Indian scholars and academics – is to make a focused effort to understand the U.S. states and their players, and especially the new and emerging political class across the key winning states. The U.S. is not a centralised monolith but a successful federation of powerful states.

India’s engagement from now on must also understand and address the interests and concerns of different political factions and underlying groups that drive them, ensuring that New Delhi’s voice and perspectives are included in the discussions that shape U.S. policy towards India.

Second, no matter what the Democrats in D.C. say, a President of the U.S. is never a lame duck. U.S. Presidents typically wield significant power until the very last moment of their presidency. Thus, India must remain vigilant and proactive, continuing to maintain strong ties with the White House, regardless of which party is in power. For India, the overarching aim is to navigate the U.S. relationship effectively, capitalising on the executive branch’s ability to dictate key policy directions like the imposition of trade tariffs and sanctions.^[2] By understanding the political currents in Washington, where both the Senate and the House of Representatives will soon be firmly under Democratic control, and responding with flexibility and insight, India can position itself as a crucial and long-term partner for the U.S., one that contributes meaningfully to shared global challenges while advancing its own national interests.

An imminent challenge is the appointment of Stephen Miller as the White House Chief of Staff. Miller had taken a tough stance on India in his former role as White House Deputy Chief of Staff, particularly on New Delhi purchasing Russian oil.

Neither India nor China figured in the midterms at all. What figured were Russia, Ukraine, Israel and Iran because they have direct economic repercussions on the U.S.’ domestic economy. The Iran war reached America’s gas stations and kitchens; hence, the defeat of the Republicans became inevitable.

A Stimson Centre report on the U.S. midterms rout said that “New Delhi craves the restoration of what had been a U.S. consensus favouring partnership with a rising India as a core pillar in a global geopolitical strategy to balance China. This election cannot deliver full confidence on that score, but it will give India’s leaders new reasons to take a “wait and see” approach over the next two years rather than altogether losing their patience with Washington.”^[3]

On the optimistic side, the potential benefits for India from the midterm upset could be considerable. A change in leadership may lead to an end to the Iran conflict, ease energy prices and, with the intensifying competition with China following the Nvidia-Jensen Huang matter, perhaps reposition India as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence. A more flexible U.S. stance toward Moscow could ease tensions in India’s diplomatic relationships.

The 120th United States Congress will convene on January 3, 2027, at noon, providing India a two-month strategic window to work on enhancing new ties with the U.S. While a Democratic victory will not reverse Trump’s foreign policy moves, the ease with which he took decisions regarding America’s long-time allies and partners, including India, might see a slowdown as Congress will surely challenge those decisions. The immediate task for India for the remaining two years of the Trump presidency is to get the BTA signed while, in the long term, deepening its familiarity and engagement with Congress. From this moment, New Delhi will have to abandon its long-time strategy of playing defensively and position itself as proactive – because Trump has forever changed the way the U.S. deals with India.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References

[1] U.S. Vote Foundation. ‘What Are Midterm General Elections?’ Accessed 12 November 2026. https://www.usvotefoundation.org/what-are-midterm-elections.

[2] ‘The Executive Branch’. The White House, n.d. Accessed 12 November 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/government/executive-branch/.

[3] Matamis, Joaquin. ‘Experts React: The Midterms and America’s Place in the World • Stimson Center’. Stimson Center, 4 November 2026. https://www.stimson.org/2026/experts-react-the-midterms-and-americas-place-in-the-world/.

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The global economy is entering a period of transition. Recent disruptions have shown that growth is increasingly influenced by factors beyond domestic capacity. Access to energy, critical resources, technology and reliable trade routes will determine how countries navigate an uncertain global environment.

Global growth expectations have moderated from earlier projections of around 2.5% to below 2%, reflecting the impact of market uncertainty and geopolitical pressures. For emerging economies, these developments have reinforced the need to build stronger supply chains, secure essential resources and develop partnerships that support long-term growth.

For India, this changing environment presents an opportunity to strengthen the foundations of its next phase of development. The focus must be on three strategic priorities: creating diversified trade pathways, ensuring access to critical commodities and developing reliable energy and technology capabilities.

Connectivity has emerged as an important element of this strategy. Trade routes are no longer viewed only as commercial infrastructure. They influence economic security, supply-chain stability and access to markets and resources. The multiple ongoing conflicts around the world demonstrate the risks of depending too heavily on a limited number of partners or pathways.

India is now positioned at the centre of multiple connectivity initiatives, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Each of these initiatives represents an effort to strengthen India’s links with important economic regions while creating greater flexibility in global trade.

The INSTC, first conceptualised in 2000, has gained renewed importance as countries seek alternative trade routes connecting India with Russia, Central Asia and Europe. The corridor combines maritime, rail and road networks to improve the movement of goods across Eurasia.

The Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor represents another opportunity for India by strengthening access to Russia’s Far East, a region rich in energy resources, minerals and industrial potential. As India and Russia work towards expanding bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030, stronger trade links will be important in supporting the movement of resources, industrial inputs and commercial goods.

These corridors should not be viewed as replacements for existing trade routes. Their value lies in expanding available options and giving economies greater flexibility when traditional avenues face disruption.

The Northern Sea Route represents another emerging dimension of this connectivity landscape. Stretching approximately 5,600 kilometres along Russia’s Arctic coastline, the route connects the western part of Eurasia with the Asia-Pacific region and is being developed as a complementary logistics corridor to strengthen global supply-chain resilience.

The development of the Northern Sea Route is closely linked to specialised Arctic infrastructure and Russia’s nuclear icebreaker capabilities. Rosatom, as the infrastructure operator of the NSR since 2018, supports navigation along the route, infrastructure development, navigational and hydrographic services, and maritime safety in the Arctic. Through its nuclear icebreaker fleet operated by FSUE Atomflot, Rosatom enables safer and more reliable navigation in Arctic conditions, highlighting the importance of technology and long-term investment in making emerging trade corridors commercially viable.

However, geography alone cannot create a successful trade corridor. Reliable infrastructure, specialised capabilities and long-term cooperation are required to make new routes commercially viable.

Access to commodities will be another defining factor in the future global economy. Energy resources, critical minerals, food and industrial materials will influence economic partnerships and national development strategies. For India, reliable access to these resources will be essential to support manufacturing expansion, infrastructure growth and the broader energy transition.

Energy security will be particularly important as India’s electricity demand continues to rise. Industrialisation, urbanisation and digital growth will require dependable power systems that can support economic activity while meeting sustainability objectives.

Nuclear energy can contribute to this requirement by providing reliable, large-scale low-carbon electricity. India-Russia cooperation in civil nuclear energy demonstrates how long-term partnerships can support energy security, technology exchange and industrial development. Rosatom’s cooperation with India reflects the role of international collaboration in building dependable clean-energy capabilities.

Beyond energy, technology will shape the next phase of global competitiveness. Artificial intelligence and emerging technologies are transforming industries and changing economic competition.

India’s strengths in information technology and digital services must now expand into research, advanced technologies and innovation-led growth. International partnerships can support knowledge exchange and accelerate capabilities in areas that will influence future industries.

The changing global environment is also creating space for new forms of cooperation. The world is moving towards a more multipolar structure, where countries are increasingly working through regional and plurilateral partnerships. Platforms such as BRICS are gaining relevance as emerging economies seek greater cooperation on infrastructure, energy, technology and development priorities. For India, participation in these groupings strengthens its ability to engage with multiple partners across different sectors.

The changing global environment presents India with both an opportunity and a responsibility. As economic influence becomes more distributed, countries that can combine resources, technology, connectivity and strategic partnerships will be better positioned to shape the next phase of global growth.

India’s future position will depend on how effectively it brings these priorities together. Diversified trade pathways, secure resources, reliable energy systems and innovation will determine future competitiveness. India’s strategic choices today will shape its ability to contribute to and influence the emerging global order in the decades ahead.

Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director, Gateway House.

This article was first published in Hindustan Times.

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Ambassador Mohan Kumar is a Professor of Diplomatic Practice at Jindal School of International Affairs.

Lt. Gen. S. L. Narasimhan is the Distinguished Fellow for National Security and China Studies at Gateway House.

Amit Bhandari is the Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity at Gateway House.

This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

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The peer-recognition initiative highlights noteworthy practices and contributions across the global think tank community. This recognition reflects Gateway House’s sustained research and scholarship, its ability to produce and disseminate rigorous research and ideas, stimulate public debate on India’s foreign policy choices, and develop international partnerships.

You can download OTT’s Think Tanks to Watch 2026 list here.

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Europe needs to set aside talk of populism because it becomes an obstacle in evaluating what’s at stake. For Europe’s competitiveness in the world, it requires states that are fashioned or refashioned as sovereign states in individual countries as economic actors. A big problem these states will be facing is the unemployment issue, with technological transformation displacing large numbers of jobs in industry and the service sector. In the case of Europe, this would also mean a loss of its status as the prime market for goods, a destination for global connections.

Manjeet Kripalani (MK): Good afternoon, we are very pleased to have Dr Huricihan Islamoglu, who is Professor of Economic History at Bogaziçi University, Istanbul. Dr. Islamoglu has studied and taught on both sides of the Atlantic and has been analysing the European and Atlantic project for decades.

Dr Islamoglu was also a Gateway House visiting fellow during 2016 – an interesting time in Turkey’s security when there was an attempted coup against President Erdogan and a moment in India’s political and economic journey when the country conducted the experiment with demonetisation.

The dramatic transformation that is playing out before us is that of the Europe project, which is on fire. What is your view? Is it happening in Europe, and what will its likely fate be?

In the Americas – North and South – how do you see their political trajectory, and what can we expect from the dramatic shifts taking place? Finally, there is Eurasia, which is shaping up as the new centre of connectivity for trade, energy, and human services. How is that formation being cast?

Huricihan Islamoglu (HI): Europe started as a market project. It was essentially an American project. In the post-World War period, America needed an outlet for its surplus consumer goods.

The American economy, during the war, was geared towards the production of weapons. When the war ended, the high productive capacity of the industry was diverted to the production of consumer goods, resulting in overproduction. Europe was the most appropriate channel for the surplus, really, with compatible human capital and compatible tastes and values.

American corporations also favoured Europe as a venue for investments. Contrary to the common understanding that American corporations preferred underdeveloped markets, in reality, during the post-war period, they really preferred Europe with its skilled labour and common cultural premises. Therefore, Europe had to be constructed as a market project, as a single market.

The Marshall Plan was important in this as it provided funds for Europe’s economic recovery. And Europe started to come back. Especially in Germany, industries destroyed by the war started to come back. The 1951 European Coal and Steel Community declared the common market for the two inputs essential for industrial development.

Germany in the seventies and eighties was developing into a major industrial power. The Bretton Woods agreement, signed in 1944, enabled fixed exchange rates and pegged the dollar to gold.^[1] It also provided the financial infrastructure for America’s trade with Europe in consumer goods and for investments by American corporations.

It should be remembered that the post-war era until the end of the USSR in 1989 was also the period of the Cold War. The fact that Germany, following its defeat in the Second World War, was not allowed to build an army meant that its security was underwritten by the U.S., a factor that contributed to the exclusive channelling of incoming funds toward economic development. In this period, Germany was also building its welfare state with high levels of social spending (in competition with socialist East Germany), sustained by high taxation levels, a development which has now become a liability when the economy is contracting.

This happy state of affairs in the post-war period was disrupted. The financial infrastructure provided by Bretton Woods collapsed in 1971, when President Nixon went off the gold standard. The American economy began to go into debt in the seventies. The Great Society projects of President Lyndon Johnson, the Vietnam War, etc., took a toll, and America could no longer have a stable dollar. At that time, U.S. President Richard Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connely  said to his European counterparts at the G-10 meeting in Rome in 1971, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”

So, it became a European problem. Subsequently, it became a world problem.

Today, we’re facing that issue. The dominant economy in the world is no longer a surplus economy; it is heavily in debt. The American dollar as a universal currency is no longer a stable means of exchange in the global economy. For Europe, a stable currency was a precondition for the post-war trading environment among different countries as well as for trade with the U.S.

This was the eighties and nineties. Led by big corporations, the global economy grew, and Europe affected its own unification in 1993 following the adoption of a single currency at Maastricht. Instead of relying on the financial architecture provided by Bretton Woods, Europe, now the European Union, had a single currency, which stabilised exchange relations among its different states.

Now, this European financial architecture proved to be problematic in a number of ways. But how problematic was not visible when the global economy was growing in the nineties.

Between 1997 and 2007, until the financial crisis, was the golden age of Europe. This was the peak of European industrial development, especially in Germany. German cars, small and economical, were on American highways until that dominance was first challenged by the Japanese and subsequently by the production of smaller American cars. Nevertheless, this period was really a golden age for Europe until the financial crisis of 2007-08.

That crisis led to the questioning of the financial architecture introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. It also needs to be underlined that this was a crisis of the developed world, of developed economies, the sort where the Global South was not really affected, or only indirectly affected, by suffering its aftershocks.

With the crisis, the unsustainability of the financial architecture provided by Maastricht became evident. This is how it worked. Under the Maastricht Treaty, there was a separation of monetary policy from the fiscal policies of individual states.

Monetary policy became the domain of the European Central Bank (ECB). Fiscality, of course, is the domain of individual states. But this separation literally crippled the states because states could no longer control their money.

When, for instance, Britain left the union, the primary argument was, We want to control our money. What does it mean, controlling the money? For instance, if there are high levels of debt, as European countries have now, they want to increase their exports. In order to increase exports, they have to devalue their currency so cheaper goods can find customers in the global markets. But under the Maastricht architecture, it is not possible to do this because European countries have no control over their money.

Their money is controlled by the ECB and through networks of global central banks. I remember at one point in Turkey, talking to central bankers, I was told that they saw more people from other central banks than they did their own bureaucrats in Turkey. So, there was a camaraderie, so to speak, among the central bankers worldwide.

This was true not only for Europe but throughout the world through the adoption of the Washington Consensus or, simply, market reform packages introduced by the IMF and the World Bank. The issue was policy packages of trade liberalisation and privatisation worldwide. The single currency in Europe, made possible by Maastricht, and the global network of autonomous central banks were part of the liberation of money – removing it from the domination of individual states and making it part of the economy or joining it with the world of commodities. Following the financial crisis and a decade later, in 2020, the COVID crisis, states in developed Western economies went further into debt, and the financial architecture of Maastricht and that of the global economy under the domination of the U.S. were questioned. This was happening in a context of slow economic growth and escalating societal unrest.

Such questioning was due to institutional fault lines in Western economies as much as to developments in the global economy at large, especially to unprecedented growth rates elsewhere, most notably in China and India. Often leading to the use of multiple currencies in global trade.

Back to the present state of affairs, actors in the global economy, states, and corporations are looking for institutional solutions to ease financial transactions beyond those provided by the Washington Consensus and the EU. In this context, as individual states are taking charge of their trade policy and fashioning industrial policy that is in tune with trade policy, they are willing to try out multiple currencies, including their domestic currencies as well as new currencies in global trade, often bypassing the dollar.

Because as much as the American economy has been in debt, the dollar continued to be the dominant means of exchange and was weaponised in the struggle to maintain its dominance in different parts of the world, as was the case in Afghanistan, where the U.S. withheld the country’s dollar reserves in the U.S. banks at a time when the country was in the grip of a famine following the Taliban takeover in 2021.^[2] Similarly, the U.S. refuses to let go of Russian dollar reserves as punishment for the Russian invasion of Crimea. These actions did not stop individual countries from conducting their trade in alternative currencies, as we know, and from competition from the Chinese yuan.

MK: What role did China play in contributing to this? Because it has hastened this moment, especially where the European project is struggling.

HI: When the Western developed economies were struggling with these issues, we had the unprecedented growth of the Chinese economy. Simply put, European economies are unable to compete with China in global markets. The reason, according to some economists, is that European industries and corporation, during its golden age between 1997 and 2007, did not really invest in innovations, in innovating their production systems, or in the development of new products.

The corporate profits of European companies were largely channelled into Wall Street, London, into the stock market, and into financial markets. This is especially true in the case of the German automotive sector, which in the nineties and in the 2000s turned to cheap labour markets in China and invested there for the production of parts.

This was the period of boom for the German industry. On the Chinese side, this was a time of building capacity, absorbing the know-how of European enterprises, and enjoying government subsidies. Afterwards, Chinese exports came into the global markets, threatening European exports. There is a new model of Asian industrial development, subsequently formalised by the Korean economist Keun Lee of Seoul National University. The model presupposed an initial period of exposure to the global market at the lowest level of value chains, to be followed by a period of withdrawal and consolidation of the learning acquired in the first phase, as well as of infusion of government assistance. In the third phase, the enterprise has acquired innovative production capacity to make it competitive in global markets.

And when we look at the Chinese economy and its actors, we shouldn’t just look at the major corporations and the state-owned and private companies but also at the millions and millions of small enterprises which are linked to the big corporations, constituting extensive and highly complex networks of production. These smaller enterprises, individually or jointly, could also venture into global trade, especially investing in regional or domestic trade. It was very difficult, really, for Europe, as well as for America, to compete with Chinese networks of production, both linked to big corporate bodies or acting independently of them.

The absence of an extensive and competitive production network is one factor which largely figures in the inability of European economies to compete in global markets.

Returning to the institutional fault lines of Europe, rather than the EU, we identify two such fault lines: one is about the institutional separation of monetary policy from state fiscal policy, which we already talked about; it led to crippling states not intervening in the economy to increase their export competitiveness in the face of Chinese competition. Such a separation prevented individual states from developing an industrial policy – which is becoming a major concern in individual countries if they are to compete in the global economy.

This focus on industrial policy is a departure from the globalisation era of the eighties and nineties, until 2007, when trade policy and global integration through trade were priorities. It assumed production to be the prerogative of developed Western economies and the rest of the world was to be integrated into the Western production centres, providing those centres with markets for their manufactured goods and for their capital investments, and supplying Western industries with cheap labour as well as with food and raw materials. Indeed, there was a flavour of the Western empires of the late 19^th century!

Globalisation had the unintended consequence of a diffusion of industrial capacity, with industrial economies from the North and South competing in the global markets.

When we are talking about the current crisis of Europe, we are talking about the state of the European economy in the post-globalisation context of the global economy. This is a context in which industrial policy, and the ability of individual economies to compete in global export markets, are defining features, and states are, in this new context, in the process of transforming (albeit painfully) into actors – both political and economic- in support of industrial, export-oriented economies.

MK: What are the other fault lines in today’s Europe?

HI: The second fault line is the democracy deficit, the lack of representation on the part of societal actors (especially those other than global corporate actors and their domestic linkages) in the decision-making processes.

EU governance, as well as the governance of the global economy within the framework of the Washington Consensus, primarily relied on experts or non-elected officials. This was ruled by non-representative experts, such as the European Commission, which is a body of experts. The European Parliament is not a decision-making body but a consultative institution. Instead, what people or different groups, workers, peasants, and students want is to have a say, really, in the making of rules, which determine the conditions of their social and economic existence.

The issue is the social unaccountability of the expert bodies which make up the EU governance. Existing rules of the Union, a prime example being the Common Agricultural Policy, largely address the concerns of big corporations, agribusiness, and marginalising small producers. The Common Agricultural Policy absorbs nearly half of the EU budget, with the biggest share of subsidies going to big agricultural corporations.

There is also the issue of law and its unaccountability. Decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are binding in the individual societies that make up the Union, and these decisions have priority (principle of primacy or principle of supremacy) over national laws of individual states or the decisions of national courts or judges with respect to cases where the law of the Union coincides with the national law. This is true in the case of human rights laws. That is, EU law takes precedence over national law, including legislation and national constitutions. The tension between the EU and national laws is demonstrated in the ongoing crisis in Poland triggered by the attempt of the prime minister (representing the EU camp) to remove from the Constitutional Tribunal two judges defending the sovereignty of national law.

So, there’s the governance issue (referring to both the regulations of the Commission and the decisions of the ECJ) and the deficiency of representation in both institutions — a democratic deficiency — which translates into inequalities in income and wealth within the eurozone, with EU elites facing populations in individual states which are excluded from the enchanted sphere of the EU and for whom the states in debt and/or paralysed otherwise can do little.

These fault lines were first revealed following the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the COVID crisis, leading to the debt crisis of individual states and an EU economy unable to compete in the global economy. Neither the EU nor the individual states are able to effect any change, as EU governance separates the economy from the political will of individual societies; the individual states, although they may possess the political will, are shut off from the economy to respond to the demands of different social groups.

The daily problems of European governance stare at us from TV screens and on the streets in the cities: in France now and elsewhere in Italy, Germany, and the protests on the streets by different groups – farmers, students, workers. There is overall dissatisfaction; there is unemployment resulting from factory closures due to inability to compete in export markets as well as from technological transformation; there’s the question of insufficient government funding in secondary and higher education; reaction to immigration from the Global South. Immigrants are viewed as competition for state funding in social services, and in the labour markets as pulling wages down. Government debt in major European states (except for Germany) has skyrocketed, with consequences for inflation. Total government debt for the entire Euro region has reached 88.7%  of GDP.

Extreme right parties in individual countries are gaining ground and moving to the centre: they demand distancing from the EU; express dissatisfaction with big corporations; advocate an end to government spending, to immigration, for lower gas prices, and to end the war with Russia. What we see is a Europe, politically and socially, on the brink of radical transformations. One could say that in the highly competitive global economic context, the project for a united Europe as an actor in the present global market context does not seem to be sustainable economically and politically. The EU, as it is, is not able to make effective economic policy, compete in global markets, and ensure social and political stability in the individual countries of the euro zone.

What we are seeing is, sort of, the bare outlines of individual economies increasingly freeing themselves from the EU’s financial and governance architecture but with close ties in economic cooperation, in trade and industrial production.

MK: Across the Atlantic, over to the Americas, we are also seeing dramatic changes. In both North and South America, the political trajectory is changing. What can we expect from those shifts?

HI: We need to evaluate the present state of affairs in South America in the post-globalisation context of the global economy. This context is one of intensified competition in export markets alongside the transformation of states as active facilitators of this process, involving the role of investors in enterprises, funding infant industries, and facilitating access of enterprises to export markets. In the era of globalisation, the South American economies formed a regional economic union, Mercosur (in 1991), responding to the introduction of market reforms dictated by the Washington Consensus, providing unbounded opening of individual economies to the activities and exploitation of multinational corporations. This had dire consequences in the form of unsustainable inequalities and impoverishment of large segments of the population.

Alongside Mercosur, in the nineties and into 2000, South America witnessed the coming to power of a series of social democratic governments responding to the devastation caused by the opening of individual economies to the free exploitation by multinational corporations. ‘Chavismo,’ named after Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, was part of that reaction to the unbounded free-tradeism of the eighties and nineties in South America. Chavez, from 1998 until his death in 2013, diverted revenues from the country’s rich oil resources to education and health services and to development projects in Venezuela and elsewhere in South America.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s Donroe Doctrine, after the Monroe Doctrine of the 1820s towards the region, especially the dramatic capture and removal from office of Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro, and appropriation of oil wells in the country, can be seen in the context of his challenge to the left-leaning ‘populist’ regimes in South America. The Venezuela affair was also about demonstrating the technological and military prowess of the U.S. and telling the world, especially the Chinese (with a significant stake in Venezuela’s oil), that the U.S. was still interested in South America.

On the other hand, Lula da Silva’s win in the recent elections in Brazil – notwithstanding the significant support given to Lula’s opposition by the Trump administration – shows that in South America the U.S. no longer has the final say. Lula is one of the left-wing populist leaders Trump is targeting, and Trump’s high tariffs did not deter large segments of the Brazilian population from voting for Lula, who reacted by reaching out to BRİCS (established in 2006), a power centre in the global economy. In so doing, Lula confirmed Brazil’s position in the global economy and not just as an actor in South America and therefore subject to Trump’s Donroe Doctrine. His appeal was part of a broader demand for a multipolar world, where the dollar will not be dominant, and where the Global South will have a say in the governance of the global economy.

Mercosur, the South American trade and customs bloc, since the early 2000s, has become a major target of the competition in global trade, with China surpassing the U.S. as the region’s biggest trading partner ($518 billion). China buys raw materials and minerals, including lithium, soybeans, and crude oil, primarily from Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru; it sells to these countries, and others, high-technology industrial goods and electric vehicles. Notwithstanding the discontents of globalisation, in the nineties and into the 2000s, the Mercosur economies grew, also providing a big market for imports for a variety of products from different world regions, including India and Turkey.

The Donroe Doctrine also sought to respond to the other ways China entrenched itself in the Mercosur region through the extension of state-to-state loans, through the building of infrastructure for the Belt and Road İnitiative, and especially through the building of communication networks of roads and ports. In other words, despite pronouncements that China is there only for economic relations, the Chinese government is deeply involved with individual states and in their politics.

Trump’s response to such involvement has taken the form of supporting so-called right-wing ‘populist’ regimes, making sure they come to power in individual countries.

More precisely, Trump’s favoured regimes, in South America and elsewhere, are those of strongmen compliant with his dictates (and to those of U.S. companies and investments) and ideologically leaning to the right. Most notable among these are Javier Milei in Argentina and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador. Recently conservative populist strongmen are also running in Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. In contrast to the former military regime of the sixties and seventies, which had the backing of the U.S. government and multinational companies, the present strongmen represent elected governments and operate within constitutional frameworks, though they are often criticised for violations of democratic principles.

MK: How is populism a description of present state regimes in South America?

HI: Populism is a difficult term. It does not necessarily identify an ideological orientation, though it is increasingly associated with right–wing ideologies and with nationalism, laden with implicit and explicit references to the rise of the Nazi Party in 1930s Germany through democratic elections. It also refers to the dominance of a strongman rhetorically appealing to masses of the population while having the backing of capitalist corporations. In the free-trade environment of the early 21^st century,  populism as a term was embraced by the mainstream media, speaking to corporate concerns and to describe interventions in markets by states in favour of certain groups in society – for instance, introducing a minimum wage for workers or state spending for social services.

To my mind, ‘populism’ is not a very useful terminology to describe the transformations in the government and the global economy or to describe the emerging sovereign governments of the post-globalisation era. Here we are talking about decision-making bodies in the global economy consisting of big corporations, and other similar governments, ensuring the development of industrial economies competitive in global markets while speaking to the concerns of groups in national or domestic societies (workers, peasants, the retired, students and others).

Seeing to all this has not been easy; the new sovereign bodies are in the process of finding their institutional bearings (rules are made and unmade continually). Social disruptions and numerous regional wars witnessed worldwide indicate that we are far from the making of a sustainable order in the global economy or in individual societies, to put an end to inequalities and the resulting class wars. In the global economy, multiple regional wars are instigated by big corporate interests for access to valuable resources, such as the ongoing conflicts in the Congo, West Africa, as well as Sudan.

The terminology of populism tends to obscure what is actually taking place in the global economy or what is emerging as new ways of governing that economy and the individual societies, the new politics, and its new actors, including domestic ones.

It is also erroneous to identify the new sovereign governments, with the current central party states in Asia, and to turn them into ideal types of what government should be like in the post-globalisation era. This is especially true in the case of the Chinese state formation, which itself is also undergoing significant transformations, responding to the turmoil in the global economy and domestically.

Worldwide, we seem to be at a juncture where all actors are looking for institutional solutions. Among such solutions is the emergence of individual industrial economies in competition with each other and the making of regional and trans-regional units in the global economy, including Mercosur and BRICS as islands of cooperation in global competition. It needs to be underlined that the development of sovereign governments, not at the bidding of powerful corporations, with grounding in domestic societies, is part of the history of the global economy. Each government, as well as the individual industrial economies they steer, will be shaped by the politics of the regions they are in, by the challenges they face, and by the struggles among them in the global economy and in domestic societies.

Latin America, as elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East, is experiencing the unravelling of the global economy which, from the nineties until the 2007-8 financial crisis, was held together by the dominance of the American dollar, by the sheer power of the American military opening new markets for corporate investment and trade. This notwithstanding the fact that Bretton Woods was undermined and the U.S. government is in serious debt. As long as the U.S. was strong militarily, the dollar could serve as a unifying factor.

Growth trends of the nineties and 2000s worldwide also led actors, in areas previously outside of the orbit of developed economies, to explore possibilities of industrial development and to move up the ladder of global value chains previously occupied by big multinational corporations. The new industrial economies (including those belonging to BRICS and outside of it) entered into bilateral trading relations using domestic currencies (yuan, rupees), opening the door for the use of multiple currencies in global transactions, bypassing the dollar.

Criticism of the governance model which gave us the free-trade ‘globalisation’ and favoured big corporations and big banks – is now giving way to understandings of sovereign governments of individual industrial economies that are competitive in the global market while addressing domestic interests. Such conceptions of governments and industrial economies competing in global markets while, at the same time, staying rooted domestically, have been met with allegations of populism by the corporate world, and especially by their media outlets.

But the corporations that ruled the world, as we saw at Davos, no longer do. Davos has sort of unravelled. The idea of Davos was superseded, as these other development islands emerged. It’s multiple development islands, as opposed to a single island of development located in the West, and emanating from the West, through investments, through the circulation of goods and services, from the West.

The Global South had emerged to challenge the domination of global corporations, global banks, and financial institutions. (The challenge to the latter takes the form of multiple currencies). The challenge to corporate domination also took the form of new ways of governing the global economy. Will this give us the rise of sovereign, representative governments with strong ties to the global economy and to individual societies? That challenge presupposes a priority of industrial policy, of creating an industrial economy competitive in global markets and setting the terms of trade in those markets rather than being subjected to the terms of that trade. That also gives us a world in which boundaries between North and South are increasingly being erased.

MK: This brings us to exactly where you are sitting, on the Bosphorus River, in Eurasia. Given how Europe is getting disconnected and West Asia is now going to be in the process of remaking itself, is Eurasia the new centre of connectivity for trade, energy, and human services? How is that mapping itself out?

HI: Connectivity is a concept we need to problematise. Yes, as you suggested, thinking about connectivity in relation to what’s happening in this part of the world, which I would call Middle Eurasia — the world from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean — we need to look at the processes through which the region is remaking itself.

First, some clarification about terminology. Middle East or West Asia are generally used to designate this region. Both terminologies hark back to the time of Western interests in the area. The Middle East is a term for oil, which was first used in 1900 by an American captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan. He first wrote about it in London’s National Review at a time when the new resource – oil – had been discovered in Iraq at the end of the 19th century. And he used this term, “the rich oil resources of the Middle East,” in his article.^[3] So the Middle East is a very tricky term.^[4]

Regarding connectivity in Middle Eurasia: In the 1990s, at the peak of the globalization era, with the Belt and Road Initiative of China, connectivity was about connecting China to Europe. That is changing now. Americans are interfering in the region heavily. They are competing for connectivity with the Chinese, so the region is becoming an arena of competition over connectivity between China and Trump’s U.S. You can view the Iranian war in this context.

The connectivity issue in both cases is an outside project. Just as Europe was an American project, the connectivity project was first introduced by China to reach European markets and is now being taken over by the Americans to block China’s reach to export markets, to throttle Iran, to undermine Russian influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and finally, to facilitate Israel‘s access to this area rich in resources and a potential market for weapons.

But what does connectivity imposed from outside mean for the powers on the ground? When we look at the economies, like China and India, in this geography, India has found its own trajectory of industrial development. Turkey is more problematic because in the global markets its products are increasingly wiped out by Chinese competition. Also, as Turkey is closely linked to European economies through value chains, the weakness of the European economy is reflected in Turkey, its competitiveness, etc. The only way Turkey has tried to bypass the non-competitiveness of the European economies is through arms production, which forms the field in which Turkey has certain autonomy in taking the initiative to introduce new technologies, freeing itself from the dictates of European value chains.

The concentration in Turkey on war industries is good and bad. Good in the sense that it is a sort of independent, autonomous domain of development, which allows the Turkish economy to distance itself from the European decay. At the same time, it requires markets. So far, the region has provided ample markets for Turkish arms, Turkish drones, and other weaponry with wars in Sudan, in Yemen, in Iran, and until recently in Syria.

What are all these wars for? This region is a battlefield — the area between the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Indian Ocean. There’s conflict on the border between India and China, and India and Pakistan. There’s a war in Iran. There’s a war in Yemen, Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. It goes on and on.

These, mostly proxy wars, are fights over control of strategically important territory or passageways for global trade, as has been the case in Yemen and the Persian Gulf. They, for the most part, represent struggles for dominance of regional states e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and India, in the region.

The issue here is whether or not intra-regional connectivity could be the wave of the future. Most economies in the region, like in Iraq and Syria, have been wiped out by earlier wars. They’re trying to emerge from the destruction of the previous wars of the nineties, which were wars initiated by the demands of big corporations in the region. In Iraq, oil companies wanted access to Iraqi oil, and it resulted in the invasion by the American army and its allies in 2003. The Syrian war (2013) was part of the American attempt to root out Russian presence in the region as well as the Iranian proxies.

That was the story of the 1990s and early 2000s. Now Iraq and Syria are barely coming to their own. The three major economies —India, Turkey, and Israel — are distancing themselves from the Western economies and are competing for dominance over the region. Israel is, of course, in a unique position; it is both a sort of foothold of the West but increasingly trying to establish itself as a regional power, distancing itself from the U.S., given the fickle nature of the U.S. and Europe and the fickle nature of those economies in crisis. Turkey, similarly, is trying, as is India, to build a regional power base. The attempt by the Turkish and Iraqi governments to connect the Indian Ocean economies to the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia via the Development Corridor has been a casualty of the war waged by Israelis and Americans against Iran. Turkey, having assisted in installing the present Syrian government following a ten-year-long civil war with millions of people displaced or dead, is an important actor in the rebuilding of the Syrian economy.

Also, since the 1990s into the 2000s, Turkey has become an energy hub with pipelines from Russia and Azerbaijan, connecting to European markets and supplying Turkey with cheaper oil. Turkey is also accessing some of its oil reserves in the Black Sea as well as competing with Israel, Greece and Egypt for reserves in the eastern Mediterranean.

The issue here is whether or not the intra-regional connectivities could be the wave of the future. We have attempts towards economies of connectivity (BRI, Trump Corridor), seemingly outside projects. Will the regional powers be able to appropriate these projects for their own purposes, for the construction of new economies, led by sovereign governments?

A new model is emerging worldwide, over the model of economic development we have known under globalisation, ruled by big corporations and states in assistance of big corporate bodies. We’re moving away from that. It’s not that big corporations have disappeared from the scene; they’re very much there, but they’re there now with a host of other enterprises, an entire sector of enterprises engaging with new technologies. These enable the entry of new enterprises into global markets, especially in arms production.

MK: That is a vast sweep of what is going on in the world and how the European project has reached its current impasse. We wind up by going back to Europe. Are we going to see the EU break up into the old parts of Europe again? And what will be the lessons learned?

HI: Not so many lessons learned, but it was a sort of phase. It appears as though we won’t have that kind of free rein of corporate power again. Because, first of all, it’s socially and politically unsustainable. We can’t ignore that anymore. That free rein of corporate power was sort of brutally blind to what was happening in society — to human beings and human elements outside of this economy — the boundaries of which were defined by corporations themselves. It was a sort of definition of the economy, which includes the corporations themselves and the service sector, which facilitated their existence worldwide. That was a unique moment.

At the same time, that moment coincided with unprecedented levels of growth and resulted in these new development islands. We talk about the negative side a lot, but the positive side is the rise of China, it’s the rise of India, even Turkey and Brazil, etc. They were not there before. They were just the Global South, which meant subservience to developed Western economies. So there’s no going back. History never goes back. We have to live with the consequences of that, good and bad. Now we are in a new era. And in this new era, the governance of both the global and individual economies is important, as are sovereign governments which are not entirely subservient to big corporations.

The European states are not a sort of revival of the old states. They have been changing. We’re not going to see a revival of the welfare states. Though, the intellectual reflex seems to be likely going back to the old Keynesian states with their ample social policy measures.

Even the Chinese themselves are presently considering Keynesian social policy measures in response to the emerging crisis of unemployment among university graduates and to the exigencies of an ageing population. It is not clear whether or not such policies can be sustainable in the long term. Can the states, including the Chinese state, afford such spending?

States are in debt now. For the French state, 119% of GDP is debt. For Germany, it’s a little less, around 60%. But in Italy, it’s 114%, and for the overall Eurozone, that level is something like 88.8% of GDP. These are high debt levels.

We’re not talking about spending states anymore. We’re talking about states which are economic actors. They buy equities in companies. Trump has been doing this. He bought equity for the American government in Intel. And this is not only to encourage corporations and increase their profits. With the rich so powerful and possessed of diverse ways and means of avoiding taxes, the states have to be earners.

The economy and state as economic partners – that dimension is becoming important. A new kind of state is in the making: the state as managers of the economy, as economic actors. This is a new configuration. But the question is: will the state, in its role as manager, as governor of the economy, reach out to different sectors in society — workers, peasants, the poor, students and how?

What will happen to Europe? Europe needs to set aside talk of populism because it becomes an obstacle in evaluating what’s at stake; it blocks out a serious discussion about the new state.

For Europe’s competitiveness in the world, it requires states that are fashioned, or refashioned, as sovereign states and individual countries as economic actors. For instance, one big problem these states will be facing is the unemployment issue with technological transformation, recently AI, displacing large numbers of jobs in industry and in the service sector. In the case of Europe, this would also mean a loss of its status as the prime market for goods and a destination for global connections.

Europe has a lot to overcome.

Huricihan Islamoglu is a Professor of Economic History, Bogazici University, Istanbul, and a former visiting fellow at Gateway House.

Manjeet Kripalani is Executive Director, Gateway House.

This interview was conducted exclusively for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, and has been edited and abridged for clarity and brevity. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References

[1] At $35 to an ounce of gold

[2] Deposited by central banks of different countries for purposes of exchange rate stabilisation, for international trade and debt regulation, among other ways of stabilizing the world economy under Bretton Woods agreements in the post-war period. Such practices were to be affected by the IMF.

[3] Koppes, Clayton R. ‘Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term ‘Middle East’.’ Middle Eastern Studies. Vol 12 (1). Jan 1976, Page no 95-98. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4282584

[4] Farrokh, Kaveh. ‘The term “Middle East”-Geopolitical invention?.’ Transanatolie. Accessed 5 November, 2026. https://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/In%20Brief/middle_east.htm.

The post Project Europe: Survival means setting aside talk of populism appeared first on Gateway House.

The state visit to Pakistan by the President of the Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, from October 20 to 22, 2026, has drawn considerable attention in India and elsewhere. ‘What is the Maldives up to?’ deserves an objective answer, set in the larger context of its role in the region’s evolving power dynamics.

A tiny country, with barely 300 km of land area,^[1] a population of half a million,^[2] and a nominal GDP of $8.5 billion,^[3] the Maldives is a cluster of 1,200 islands situated in the Indian Ocean.^[4] Governing it is a challenge, given the physical difficulty of connecting and delivering services to people living on far-flung islands. But the country has much going for it: a fiercely independent and proud people, a significant geostrategic location near vital sea lanes,  rich tourism opportunities, and abundant fisheries.

A critical look at Muizzu’s foreign policy since he took office in 2023 reveals that he continues to follow the ‘Maldives First’ aim to create and sustain as many international and regional partnerships as possible, without hurting the vital interests of any of its partners. It remains to be seen whether his latest outreach towards Pakistan will have negative implications for India.

But first, it is essential to chart the trajectory of Muizzu’s diplomacy over the past three years. The historical background is clear. Three of his predecessors – Maumoon Abdul Gayoom (1978–2008), Mohamed Nasheed (2008–2012), and Ibrahim Mohamed Solih (2018-2023)^[5] followed a largely India-centric strategy, giving primacy to a mutually beneficial and amicable partnership with India. The Presidency of Abdulla Yameen from 2013 to 2018, in contrast, is remembered for his strained and adversarial relationship with India.

Muizzu began on a negative note, driven by his ‘India Out’ campaign, demanding the withdrawal of a small contingent of Indian military personnel in the Maldives. In January 2024, he said that the Maldives respected and trusted India, while asserting that if Indian troops were not withdrawn from the Maldives, it will amount to disregarding the “democratic will” of the Maldivian people and would “imperil the future of democracy in the country”.^[6] India agreed, and in May 2024, it began withdrawing its military personnel and replaced them with technical personnel to operate the aviation platforms.^[7]

Instead of choosing India for his first visit abroad, Muizzu went to Türkiye first, in November 2023, and then to China in January 2024 and signed 20 agreements. In the same year, the Maldives and China released an action plan for building a ‘Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership’ for 2024-2028.^[8][9]

After President Muizzu’s visit to China,  reality set in, bringing India’s centrality to the Maldives’ external relations to the fore. Malé realised that the expectations placed on China were unrealistic and that it could derive more tangible benefits from India alone. A positive phase in India-Maldives relations followed. Concrete gains and new agreements came after the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to the Maldives in August 2024, President Muizzu’s visit to India in October 2024 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Malé in July 2025.^[10][11]

Three factors led the Maldives to fall back on its traditional preference for a friendly India: first, the weight of a pro-India constituency within the Maldives. Second, the non-fulfilment of excessive expectations placed on China, and third, India’s patient and pragmatic handling of the Maldives file.

In recent years, relations with India have progressed well, with New Delhi stepping in to assist with a series of financial measures like currency swap facilities worth $400 million under the October 2024 agreement^[12] and continuing other forms of generous assistance such as extending credit lines amounting to $513 million.^[13]

However, recent developments in West Asia, especially the U.S.-Israel war against Iran, have unleashed new forces, creating fresh complications as well as some opportunities for the Maldives. Its inclination to connect with Islamic nations has always been present. This impulse may have grown stronger now, as neighbours like Saudi Arabia and the UAE face serious threats to their security and economic interests. Pakistan stepping in to help Saudi Arabia and forming the Mecca Pact with it and Türkiye in August 2026 has been a significant development for the Maldives. A mix of geography and Islamic affinity has shaped the course of the Maldives’ ties with Pakistan.

President Muizzu’s visit to Pakistan was the first by a  Maldivian President in 11 years. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, last visited the Maldives in 2017.

First, as is normal on a state visit, Muizzu met the President and the Prime Minister, but he also met Field Marshal Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, showing the Pakistani political elite’s full engagement in upgrading the relationship.

Second, PM Shehbaz Sharif briefed Muizzu on Pakistan’s positions on Jammu and Kashmir and the Indus Waters Treaty. Muizzu said nothing publicly on these issues but spoke of the Maldives’ commitment to playing a constructive and productive role in revitalising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), including creating conditions to convene the summit at the earliest possible opportunity.^[14]

Third, the two sides signed  20 agreements, covering defence and maritime security, public administration and law enforcement, trade, economy and health, and education, environment and culture.^[15]

Fourth, the two governments set a target to increase trade from the current $13.9 million to $200 million over the next two years.

Fifth, Muizzu announced that Maldivian, the national airline, will soon start direct flights between Malé and Karachi.

Two motivations lie behind this project to upgrade bilateral cooperation on the 60^th anniversary of the diplomatic relations. First, a pressing political instinct to connect better with fellow Muslim countries, which appeals to Muizzu’s domestic constituency, and the presidential elections are barely two years away. Second, the desire to balance close relations with India by creating or expanding other options.

Seen this way, the Maldives is practising the policy of multi-alignment. In all fairness, no one should object. But given India’s immense stakes in the partnership with the Maldives, New Delhi needs to convey, once again, its clear-eyed expectation that the Maldives’ actions will not affect India’s security and vital economic interests. A foreign minister-level interaction in the near future will be an occasion for a candid conversation.

Finally, India should consider responding to the Maldives’ passion for regional groupings, including SAARC. It is already a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC). Its role in these institutions should be given due recognition and encouragement. India should also devise, with some diplomatic imagination, a formula to bring the Maldives into the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) as an observer or guest. This will satisfy the Maldives’ need to belong to extended South Asia, given that its yearning for SAARC is unrealistic.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House and a former ambassador. He also served as Joint Secretary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives) in the Ministry of External Affairs.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

^[1] Bhatia, Rajiv.’Maldives turns to India.’ Gateway House, October 17, 2024.https://www.gatewayhouse.in/maldives-turns-to-india/.

^[2] World Population Review. ‘Maldives Population 2026.’ Accessed 5 November, 2026. https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/maldives.

^[3] International Monetary Fund. ‘Maldives Datasets.’ Accessed 5 November, 2026. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/MDV.

^[4] Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, Republic of Maldives. ‘Atolls of Maldives.’ Accessed 5 November, 2026. https://www.atollsofmaldives.gov.mv/.

^[5]  The President’s Office, Republic of Maldives. ‘Former Presidents.’ Accessed 5 November, 2026. https://presidency.gov.mv/PO/FormerPresidents/10.

^[6] Parashar, Sachin. ‘India not withdrawing forces will imperial democracy in Maldives, defence ties will continue: President Muizzu.’ Times of India. 4 Jan, 2024. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-not-withdrawing-forces-will-imperil-democracy-in-maldives-defence-ties-will-continue-president-muizzu/articleshow/106523430.cms.

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. ‘Transcript of Weekly Media Briefing By the Official Spokesperson.’ 9 May, 2024. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings?dtl/37805/Transcript_of_Weekly_Media_Briefing_by_the_Official_Spokesperson_May_09_2024.

^[8] Bhatia, Rajiv. ‘Maldives’ pivot to China.’ Gateway House, 15 January, 2024. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/maldives-pivot-to-china/.

^[9] Bhatia, Rajiv. ‘Maldives’ pivot to China.’ Gateway House, 15 January 2024.

https://www.gatewayhouse.in/maldives-pivot-to-china/

^[10] Bhatia, Rajiv. ‘Maldives turns to India.’ Gateway House, 17 October 2024. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/maldives-turns-to-india/

^[11] Bhatia, Rajiv. ‘India-Maldives reset.’ Gateway House, 31 July, 2025. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-maldives-reset/

^[12] Reserve Bank of India. ‘RBI Enters into Currency Swap Agreement with Maldives Monetary Authority.’ 7 October, 2024. https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=58839

^[13] Reserve Bank of India. ‘Exim Bank’s GOI-supported Line of Credit (LOC) for Rs. 4,850 crores the Government of Maldives, for financing various development projects in Maldives.’ 23 September, 2026. https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx?Id=13712

^[14] Atoll Times. ‘Pakistan raises India-related concerns in talks with Maldives.’ 21 October, 2026. https://atolltimes.mv/post/news/17479

^[15] Adhadhu. ‘Maldives and Pakistan ink 20 agreements, including military MoU’,  Adhadhu.com, 21 October 2026, https://adhadhu.com/88723.

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In a rare development, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited India from October 20 to 22, the second visit this year after his earlier trip in May. This time, however, it was in a different geography of India: Mumbai and Jamnagar, compared to Kolkata and Delhi previously.

Two photographs defined the contours of the second visit – one showing Rubio and U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Gor with India’s external affairs minister and foreign secretary in Mumbai, and the other showing the U.S. duo with Mukesh and Anant Ambani, Chief Managing Director and Executive Director, respectively, of Reliance Industries Limited, in Jamnagar. The second photo seemed to have drawn greater attention. This visit was no doubt about conventional diplomacy, but it was perhaps more about public diplomacy and economic diplomacy.

The visit was important because Rubio, besides being the secretary of state, is also the national security adviser and a potential Republican candidate for president or vice president in the 2028 elections. This time his meetings in India presented a chance to evaluate the trajectory of India-U.S. relations since the Trump administration began its second innings in January 2025.

In the background of steady bipartisan support for a strong India-U.S. partnership during the previous 25 years, optimism prevailed. Even before the second term began, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar confidently stated in November 2024 that while many countries were nervous about (a Trump-led) U.S., “India was not one of them.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington in February 2025 raised hopes that a natural convergence between ‘Make America Great Again’ (Maga) and ‘Make India Great Again’ (Miga) would bring the two countries closer together.

However, circumstances changed quickly. In the subsequent year-and-a-half, Washington and New Delhi drifted apart. They did not find themselves on the same page on a long list of issues, comprising the Pakistan, China, and Ukraine war; the Iran conflict; tariffs and trade deals; the visa question; Russian oil; the G20; BRICS; and the Global South-related issues.

Rubio’s visit in May 2026 helped somewhat in expanding mutual understanding on some of these issues. But since then, Washington and Beijing deepened their proximity, as exemplified by the Trump-Xi summit in September. Besides, the Graham Act 2026, additional restrictive measures on H-1B visas, and Trump’s continuing claim of ‘mediation’ that ended the India–Pakistan conflict, aggravated bilateral tensions.

The U.S. Embassy in Delhi must have been tired of frequent criticism in the Indian media in recent months and acted to counter it. The result: Indian experts had begun pointing to the glaring gulf between the Embassy’s positive projection of the relationship and Washington’s actions that seemed to hurt India. A good counter was to bring a familiar political heavyweight from the U.S. capital. And it so happened that Rubio was willing to find time, especially because the U.S. national interest dictated that deeper energy cooperation be developed between India and the U.S.

By choosing Mumbai and Jamnagar for his itinerary, the U.S. side succeeded in focusing attention on a whole range of issues relating to trade, investment and energy cooperation. In addition, by making himself available for several full-fledged interviews and other interactions with media persons, Rubio leveraged the opportunity to put across the U.S. perspective in a clear and candid manner, with primarily Indian audiences in mind.

On China, for example, he countered the impression that the U.S. had turned “soft”. Rubio observed that the U.S. aimed to attain “a level of strategic stability” with China and to avoid a U.S.-China trade war that would be devastating to the rest of the world.

On Pakistan, he was not defensive. Without referring to close personal chemistry between President Trump and General Asif Munir, Rubio insisted that the U.S. needed “to have a relationship with Pakistan”, while reiterating the traditional position that it was not at the expense of India.

On H-1B visa issues, he clarified that the US was in the midst of “fixing” its visa system and that India was not specifically targeted in this context.

To those who bemoaned the slow death of the Quad due to the changed U.S. policy approach towards China, Rubio expressed support and enthusiasm for the Quad framework, adding that a leaders’ summit was planned to take place in November, on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila. He expected the summit to produce deliverable results.

However, the timing for the Manila summit is yet to be finalised. Besides, with China’s leader sitting in the main conference room, possibly confabulating with ASEAN leaders, participants in the Quad summit – if it takes place – will need to choose their collective pronouncements with utmost care. Washington may be unwilling to wreck the ongoing progress in strengthening its ties with Beijing.

On the U.S.-India trade agreement, Rubio assured that it was “incredibly close” and that it was only a matter of weeks, not months, before it was signed. Optimists were happy to hear this, while sceptics recalled that U.S. officials had given similar assurance just a few months ago.

Pragmatists argued that India must observe patience, noting that without an agreement, the duty on Indian exports to the U.S. that is currently 10% would increase to 18% after the trade agreement is concluded.

The central issue was energy, with global energy trends impacting the U.S. and others negatively, especially at a time when midterm elections for Congress are imminent. Washington’s decision to hold back on enforcing the Graham Act and conclude a diesel agreement with Russia needs to be viewed in this context.

Rubio’s brief for the Jamnagar leg of the visit was to explore and urge that India, through Reliance and other companies, buy more Venezuelan crude in the future. Very few countries in the world have refineries that process high-sulphur crude, but India is one of them. Linked to this, is the other U.S. request to India: end or reduce the import of Russian oil. This is a complex matter. Subject to technical and price factors, India can increase the intake of Venezuelan oil, but it will be unwilling to oblige the U.S. on the second request.

Regardless of immediate outcomes, Rubio’s visit to Jamnagar was a major plus for Reliance Industries, the world’s largest refiner of crude, and India. He termed the country “a refining superpower”, which was gladly accepted by Indians. Explaining the rationale of his visit to Jamnagar, Rubio stressed that energy was clearly a national security issue.

Asked how he saw the India relationship, Rubio emphasised that it was “positive, and in many ways”. Analysts are less sanguine and point to the paradox of overt coldness in ties, mixed with optimism for progress.

Mukesh Aaghi, president and CEO of the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum, noted that the politics of Trump and Modi may be different, but there is “a sense of maturity and stability between them, and (therefore) a special relationship continues.” If so, the forthcoming meetings between the two leaders in Manila and Miami are potentially significant opportunities for the two governments to stabilise and strengthen bilateral relations. They can ill afford a rocky ride in 2027.

Secretary Rubio’s second visit to India has already made a constructive contribution to this process.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served as the High Commissioner to Kenya, South Africa and Lesotho.

This article was first published in Firstpost.

The post Energy diplomacy to reset India-U.S. ties? appeared first on Gateway House.

The centre of gravity in global affairs has been shifting to geoeconomics, with trade policy increasingly influenced by security concerns, industrial strategies, and strategic rivalry. Fragmentation, unilateral measures, and pressures on established rules have strained the multilateral trading system. Yet this same context has created room for middle powers to act as bridge-builders, coalition partners, and pragmatic defenders of rules-based trade. While geoeconomic fragmentation poses significant challenges, it may create opportunities for middle powers to exercise greater agency.

Brazil’s trajectory is a good illustration of this dual dynamic in which rising frictions and competition also create incentives for cooperation. Even as geopolitical tensions rise, the country has advanced a series of trade agreements and deepened engagement with partners across regions. What may appear as a paradox – greater fragmentation alongside renewed integration – is in fact a strategic deliberative pivot towards diversification, predictability and legal certainty. Agreements that took decades to negotiate are now moving forward, suggesting that economic cooperation remains both viable and necessary.

‘Brazil had to manage frictions related to the EU’s sustainability framework.’

At the centre of this strategy is the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, provisionally in force since 1 May 2026. It exemplifies Brazil’s middle-power diplomacy, connecting two regions with shared values and long-term interests while sending a clear signal in favour of openness and predictability. Its swift ratification by the congresses of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay – completed in less than three months – also points to broad political support, a momentum likely sharpened by the current geopolitical climate.

In advancing the Mercosur-EU Agreement, Brazil also had to manage frictions related to the EU’s evolving sustainability framework, particularly the EU Deforestation Regulation. While Mercosur countries expressed concerns regarding the measure’s sustainability benefits, trade impact and consistency with WTO principles, the negotiations moved forward through pragmatic engagement and dialogue. The final agreement preserves regulatory autonomy on both sides while incorporating mechanisms aimed at safeguarding the balance of negotiated concessions and ensuring greater predictability for exporters.

This agreement is part of a broader expansion of Brazil’s trade network. In April 2026, two additional agreements were submitted to Congress, Mercosur-EFTA and Mercosur-Singapore. Together, these initiatives increase the share of Brazilian exports covered by trade preferences from around 12 per cent to 31 per cent, marking the most significant expansion of the country’s trade agreements to date. Additionally, negotiations with partners such as Canada have regained pace, reflecting a growing global urge for stable, rules-based partnerships amidst systemic instability.

‘Brazil’s response to the tariffs illustrates the balancing act faced by middle powers.’

Brazil’s response to the 2025 wave of unilateral tariff measures, notably the 50 per cent US tariffs impacting one-third of shipments, illustrates the balancing act faced by middle powers. Brazil has emphasised dialogue and mutually beneficial solutions, while underscoring that engagement must be based on respect and the preservation of national interests. This year’s report confirms that expert perceptions have shifted: key partners remain important, but their role is increasingly seen through the lens of risk and uncertainty, reinforcing the importance of diversification.

Despite these pressures, Brazil’s trade performance has remained robust. Record export and import levels in 2025, alongside a record number of exporting firms, point to a diversified international footprint that provides a natural buffer for Brazil against bilateral disputes.

Brazil has also remained actively engaged in discussions on the reform of global trade governance. Its position reflects a dual-track approach: advancing bilateral and plurilateral agreements while supporting a stronger multilateral system. There is broad backing for a stronger WTO, alongside continued engagement in trade negotiations. This is not a choice between paths, but a combination of both.

By hosting COP30 and chairing BRICS in 2025, Brazil has placed itself at the centre of discussions on sustainability, development, and economic cooperation. In a more fragmented and uncertain world, Brazil’s approach remains anchored in openness and flexibility. The country is not willing to take sides and is actively engaged in preserving the conditions that make non-automatic alignment viable. By maintaining relations with a wide range of partners and investing in a diversified network of agreements and forums, Brazil strengthens its resilience and expands its room for manoeuvre. In doing so, it illustrates how middle powers can remain central to adaptation of the international trading system.

Tatiana Prazeres is the Foreign Trade Secretary for the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services.

This chapter is extracted from the 2026 Emerging Middle Powers Report. You can download the report here.

The post Be Dynamic, Be Like Brazil appeared first on Gateway House.

Prime Minister Netanyahu welcomes members of the Bnei Menashe Jewish community from northeastern India.

Source: @IsraeliPM / X

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met representatives of Israel’s 85,000-strong Indian Jewish community on the second day of his two-day state visit to Israel, on 26 February this year, he observed, “Their deep-rooted connection to India and their remarkable contributions to Israel stand as a living bridge between our two nations.”^[1] This people-to-people connector between the two nations is slated to grow even stronger, as the remaining 6,000 Bnei Menashe (children of the tribe of Menashe) from India’s northeast states of Mizoram and Manipur prepare to make their migration or Aliyah (‘to go up’) to Israel.^{[2] [3] [4]}

The Bnei Menashe are from the Tibeto-Burman Kuki-Mizo tribes. In the 1930s and 40s, after converting to Christianity, certain pre-Christian beliefs and rituals persisted. The most important was the strong belief that they were descendants of Manmasi or Manasia, a revered Judaic ancestor.^[5] When they studied the Hebrew Bible, or Old Testament, as Christians, they felt a familiarity that Christianity did not evoke. The strongest was that their ancestor, Manmasi, was possibly Menashe, grandson of the Biblical Patriarch Jacob and one of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. This became a conviction, and a movement to revert to their roots began.

Since the late 1970s, the Bnei Menashe, with a population of about 10,000, have struggled to be recognised by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate as one of the ten lost tribes of the Biblical Northern Kingdom of Israel, exiled and dispersed in 722 BCE after an Assyrian invasion. According to Jewish religious law, they are not considered Jews because of their 2,700-year break from practising Judaism. But they persisted, first by forming proto-Judaic groups whose leaders reached out to India’s traditional Jewish communities; from the early 1990s, an Ashkenazi rabbi began bringing them to Israel. Finally, in 2006, Israel’s Chief Rabbinate recognised the Bnei Menashe as a ‘seed of Israel’ or Lost Tribe.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with Israel’s Indian Jewish community

Source: @narendramodi / X

In November 2025, an Israeli cabinet decision reversed Israel’s decades-long policy of fixed quotas for Bnei Menashe immigrants. It launched “Operation Wings of Dawn”, a $29 million programme that sponsors, trains and resettles them across Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has earmarked 2030 as the year by which all Bnei Menashe who wish to make Aliyah or return can do so under the auspices of Israel’s Ministry of Aliyah and Integration and the Jewish Agency for Israel.

Following this and PM Modi’s state visit to Israel, about 600 Bnei Menashe immigrated to Israel in April and May this year. The remaining Bnei Menashe in Mizoram, about 600, will leave before the end of this year.^[6] About 4,800 still reside in the conflict-torn state of Manipur and are scheduled to leave between 2027 and 2030.

Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu and Finance Minister Smotrich with recent Bnei Menashe immigrants dressed in traditional outfits

Source: @ofir.sofer / Instagram

For this article, members of this community living in Aizawl and Kosabi, the latter being Bnei Menashe Kuki refugees from Manipur, were interviewed. The Manipur refugees are poor, eking out a living through daily-wage work, making necklaces, handweaving Mizo textiles, and selling vegetables and homemade snacks. Consequently, they look forward to a better life in Israel and the prospect of finally joining family and community members there, a few of whom had immigrated in the early 1990s.^[7] All of them will undergo a formal Orthodox conversion to Judaism that will entitle them to Israeli citizenship. The process takes six months after they reach Israel.^[8]

The religious fervour and hopes this community will carry with itself to its new home in Israel can only be understood through their history, sometimes fantastical legends, beliefs, and the role of individuals and non-government organisations (NGOs) in bringing this small community of tribal Indian Northeast Jews to the attention of the mainstream Jewish world.

Historically, two strands explain the discovery of the Bnei Menashe as an Israelite tribe.

One is their pre-Christian belief that they are descendants of Manasia, the grandson of Jacob. Jacob’s 12 sons form the Twelve Tribes of the undivided Biblical Kingdom of Israel. The territorial share of one son, Joseph, is represented by his sons, Menashe and Ephraim.^[9] The Assyrian invasion of the Northern Kingdom of Israel in 722 BCE, after undivided Israel split into two on the death of King Solomon in 922 BCE, resulted in the exile and dispersion of the Ten Tribes of the North, including descendants of Jacob’s grandsons Menashe and Ephraim.

When and how the Bnei Menashe arrived in the hills of present-day Mizoram and Manipur is not known, but the discovery of Jewish lost tribes like Maharashtra’s Bene Israel (Children of the Kingdom of Israel) or Ethiopia’s Beta Israel far from their ancestral and spiritual homeland is not uncommon.^[10]

Asaf Reithal, the cantor of the Shalom Tzion synagogue, stands next to the foundation plaque of the Bnei Menashe Council that celebrates its golden anniversary this year. The Council was the first organisation in this community and included those in Manipur too.

Source: Sifra Lentin

The conviction that this community was indeed a Lost Tribe firmed up over time. The strong similarities between their rites, rituals, and practices in their pristine state and those of Halachic (Jewish religious) ones were unmistakable to Rabbinic scholars who visited them. This was triggered after the community wrote to the head librarian of Hebrew University in 1979, asking for information on Judaism. The letter reached Rabbi Eliyahu Avichail, who replied.^[11]

Community member and Chazzan (cantor) of Shalom Tzion synagogue, Aizawl, Asaf Renthlei, points to the community’s pre-Christian practice of covering their heads, shoulders, and arms with large Mizo-woven shawls when praying, as Jews traditionally do. Today, Bnei Menashe men continue this practice but instead enter their synagogue with a kippah (cap) and a tallit, a large Jewish prayer shawl, draped over their head, shoulders, and arms, while women enter with their heads covered and long sleeves. “These were practices we remembered down generations,” Renthlei recalls. Other similarities emerged, like a Bnei Menashe song that spoke of the parting of waters akin to the parting of the Red Sea when Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt and towards Canaan, and food preparation practices similar to kosher dietary laws.^[12]

Photo of Rabbi Eliyahu Avichail (seated extreme left), his deputy Michael Freund (standing in blue shirt), and Rabbi Birbaum (seated extreme left), who also visited the community in Mizoram, and Bnei Menashe community members.

Source: Elisheva Zodingliani

These similarities became evident after the community converted to Christianity in the late 19th century, when the British gained control of India’s northeast and permitted missionaries from different Christian churches and sects, particularly the Presbyterians and Baptists, to establish themselves there.^[13]

What drew the Bnei Menashe to normative Judaism were the numerous Christian Evangelical sects they joined and constantly shifted loyalties from one to the other, particularly the Messianic, Sabbather (like the Church of God), and Vanmi (People of Heaven). These Christian sects adopted rites and rituals from the Hebrew Bible, such as observing the Jewish Sabbath, while remaining Christian. This restlessness reflected the times. In 1959, the region was ravaged by famine, soon followed by the 1962 Indo-China War in India’s northeast border state of Arunachal Pradesh. Economic distress was a key factor behind the Mizo National Front’s armed insurgency for a separate, independent Mizoram.^[14]

“One of the most consequential was the Vanmi in the early 1970s,” says Isaac Thangjom, a founder of Degel Menashe, an Israeli NGO working for the community, and co-author of ‘Lives of the Children of Manasia’ (2022).^[15] “I would term them as being proto-Judaic,” he says, “as they discussed the Old Testament, the Law, and the Jewish Sabbath.”

Remarkably, despite the civil war in their region, their isolation, and their humble backgrounds, they reached out to other Indian Jewish communities.

Bnei Menashe Refugees from Manipur

Source: Sifra Lentin

Their first success was when T. Daniel from Churachandpur, Manipur, visited Bombay, soon after a visit to Calcutta in 1973.^[16] He stayed for three months with an elderly Baghdadi woman named Esther, who taught him Hebrew and the practices of normative Judaism. He returned home with Jewish prayer books, wrote a book, ‘Israel Ihi’uve, We Are Israel’, and founded the first Jewish-style congregation in Churachandpur, Manipur. The next one was established in Imphal.^[17] These congregations were made up of breakaway groups from Christian sects, which embraced Judaism. However, the numbers remained minuscule.

The second historical strand in the community’s early history is the role of Jewish NGOs, which advocated for and sponsored the Bnei Menashe’s early Aliyah to Israel. The most important figure is the late Israeli Rabbi Eliyahu Avichail, an Orthodox Ashkenazi rabbi well known as a Lost Tribes hunter.^[18]

Elisheva in her home

Source: Sifra Lentin

A young Elisheva during Hanukkah celebrations in the first Hebrew school, Aizawl.

Source: Elisheva Zodingliani

Since receiving the letter in 1978 from the community, Rabbi Avichail made a concerted effort to reach them. He made his first visit to Silchar, Assam, in 1986, because he was not given the Indian government’s Protected Area Permit (PAP) to enter Mizoram and Manipur. He and the community delegation failed to meet in Silchar; he returned to Calcutta, where they finally met. He first visited the Bnei Menashe in 1989-90 in Aizawl. Elisheva Zodingliani, the community’s grand old lady now over 80, remembers this visit and the ones that followed fondly. She helped set up and run the first Hebrew school in Aizawl.

Rabbi Avichail was the first authoritative religious figure to teach the Bnei Menashe their faith.^[19] His influence on this small community is profound. He gifted them Torah scrolls, prayer books and tallitot (prayer shawls), set up a Hebrew School, and named them ‘Bnei Menashe’. Crucially, he sponsored a community member, Gideon Rei, on a trip to Israel and a two-year stay to study the religion in a yeshiva, or religious school.^[20] Rei returned to Aizawl to oversee his community’s religious life.

Meanwhile, Mumbai’s Organisation for Educational Resources and Technological Training (ORT) school, which provided skills-based training and familiarity with Israeli culture for those making Aliyah from India, was critical in preparing the first Bnei Menashe immigrants as early as 1983.^{[21] [22] [23]} The Rabbi sponsored about 50 of these ORT students through his NGO, Amichav, to immigrate to Israel.

Even today, although ORT schools in Mumbai are closed, it runs the Sunday Hebrew classes in Aizawl and a full-fledged regular school for internally displaced Bnei Menashe children in Kibbutz Ma’oz Tzur in Lamka, Manipur.^[24] In 2006, another NGO, Shavei Israel, founded by Avichail’s deputy Michael Freund, was permitted by the Israeli government to sponsor the migration of the Bnei Menashe.^[25] Between 2006 and 2020, Shavei sponsored about 4,000 Bnei Menashe migrants.^[26]

This year brought hope for many of those left behind because the Israeli government itself has taken full charge of the sponsorship and immigration process.  When ‘Operation Wings of Dawn’ winds down in 2030, and the final 4,800 Bnei Menashe leave for Israel,^[27] India’s Northeast will be without almost all its Jews.

There is palpable excitement in the small communities in Aizawl and Kolasib as they prepare to leave by brushing up on their Hebrew, while settling more mundane property and other matters. Not all are leaving. Elisheva believes it’s too late for her to settle in Israel, while Nadav Havnar, treasurer of Shalom Tzion synagogue, plans to leave in 2030. He feels someone should lock up and secure the synagogues. But most look forward to their new lives with a prayer on their lips and hopes for prosperity.

Sifra Lentin is Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] “PM Modi interacts with Indian-origin Jews in Israel, lauds their deep-rooted connection to India”, PTI, Jerusalem, 27 February 2026. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-modi-interacts-with-indian-origin-jews-in-israel-lauds-their-deep-rooted-india-connection/article70681428.ece.

[2] The number 6,000 is taken from a press release by Israel’s Prime Minister’s office.

Prime Minister’s Office. ‘PM Netanyahu to New Immigrants from the Bnei Menashe Community: “We Are Going to Bring the Entire Community to Israel over the next Four Years.” Prime Minister’s Office’. 11 June 2026. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/event-newcomer110626.

[3] The tribe of Menashe is one of the Ten Lost Tribes of the Northern Kingdom of Israel, whose capital was Samaria. When the Assyrian king Antiochus Epiphanes invaded Israel about 722 BCE, the ten tribes were exiled and dispersed. India’s Marathi-speaking Bene Israel community from Maharashtra’s Konkan Coast traces its origins to the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel; hence, they call themselves Bene Israel or the Children of Israel.

[4] On July 5, 1950, the Knesset unanimously adopted the Law of Return, 1950. Section 1 of the Law reads as follows: Every Jew has the right to immigrate to the country.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘The Law of Return – 1950’. 20 August 2001. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/the-law-of-return-1950.

[5] This revered ancestor is referred to as Manmasi in Manipur and Manasia in Mizoram.

[6] A residual community comprising mostly its elders will likely remain in Mizoram.

[7] Interviews were conducted from 9 to 11 June 2026 in Aizawl and Kosabi.

[8] Judaism is a non-proselytizing religion; hence, the process of conversion is arduous. According to one interviewee, when Rabbi Avichail, the first Israeli Rabbi to visit Mizoram and Manipur, religiously mentored the Bnei Menashe and sponsored a few to make Aliyah, the conversion process took as long as two years. Today, it is shortened but requires intensive preparation. It is only orthodox conversion that is recognised by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate.

[9] The Kingdom of Israel split after the death of King Solomon in 922 BCE into the Northern Kingdom of Israel, home to ten tribes, and the Southern Kingdom of Judah, home to the two tribes of Judah and Benjamin. ‘Israel (Biblical Kingdom) | Map, History, & Kings | Britannica’. Accessed 27 October 2026. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Israel-Old-Testament-kingdom.

[10] The Bene Israel of Maharashtra and Ethiopia’s Beta Israel are considered Jews by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate; hence, they do not undergo formal conversion. The Bnei Menashe’s long break from Judaism is the reason why they must undergo formal Orthodox conversion.

[11] A feisty, educated, Mizo insurance agent, Zaithangchhungi, visited Israel to meet Rabbi Eliyahu Avichail in 1982. Zai, as she is fondly known in the community, remained a Presbyterian Christian, but her book “Israel-Mizo Identity” made the case that the Mizo (Chhinglung) tribes are children of Menashe and descendants of Israel.

[12] For a detailed study on this, see Halkin, Hillel, Across the Sabbath River: In Search of a Lost Tribe of Israel (New York, Houghton Mifflin & Co., 2002)

[13] Lentin, Sifra. ‘Mizoram’s Chin Refugees from Myanmar’. Articles. Gateway House, 23 July 2026. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/mizorams-chin-refugees-from-myanmar/.

[14] Mizoram was then the Lushai Hills district of Assam state.

[15] The author interviewed Mr Thangjom over a WhatsApp call on 2 September 2026.

[16] Money was raised for these visits by T. Daniel’s uncle, who sold part of his rice fields to sponsor his nephew.

[17] Halkin, Hillel, and Isaac Thangjom. Lives of the Children of Manasia. Gefen Publishing House Ltd., 2002. Oral interview in this book with Isaac Thangjom.

[18] Hillel Halkin’s book “Across the Sabbath River: In Search of a Lost Tribe” (2002) recounts the challenges and umpteen disappointments Avichail faced while searching for Israelites in the dense forests along the China-Myanmar border in the 1990s. Orthodox (Hassidic) Jews believe that the Messiah will only arrive after all the Lost Tribes return to the Holy Land.

[19] He taught them the Ashkenazi or East European liturgy, unlike the Sephardic liturgy sung by India’s traditional Jewish communities.

[20] Gideon Rei and Shimon Gir travelled to Israel at the same time. Shimon’s passage was paid for by his father. The first Bnei Menashe to travel to Israel was T. Avichail Hangshing, who went on his own sometime in 1983 or 1984.

[21] Isaac Thangjom pointed out that the earliest Bnei Menashe students to study in ORT, Mumbai, arrived around 1983. He highlighted the help that the Bene Israel community extended to his community. This was possible because two prominent members from the Bnei Menashe community, his father and T. Avichail Hangshing, who were cousins, were both IAS officers and interacted with the Bene Israel in Delhi and Mumbai. This was how the first Bnei Menashe students made their way to ORT Mumbai.

[22] Interview with Isaac Thangjom on 2 September 2026.

[23] Polytechnic courses like shorthand-typing, machine-tools training, beautician, cooking, and later computer courses, which would help new immigrants earn a living, were once taught at the ORT School. Hebrew classes were also held.

[24] This community enclave was established in 2023, after the COVID pandemic and Manipur ethnic violence erupted on 3 May 2023. It is intended for internally displaced Bnei Menashe refugees and is wholly sponsored by the Israel-based NGO Degel Menashe (lit. Flag of Menashe), whose secretary is Isaac Thongjom, a well-regarded community leader and historian.

[25] In 2006, the Bnei Menashe community was split in its loyalties. Rabbi Avichail’s deputy, Michael Freund, headed a breakaway faction from the Bnei Menashe Council and founded the NGO Shavei Israel to rival the Rabbi’s own NGO, Amichav. When the Israeli government permitted Shavei Israel to facilitate the Bnei Menashe’s immigration to Israel, many switched loyalties, and old-timers like Elisheva, who had advocated tirelessly for her community to make Aliyah, were left behind. The rivalry was so bitter, say community members, that only Shavei loyalists were chosen for Aliyah between 2006 and 2020.

[26] ‘Bnei Menashe’. Shavei Israel, n.d. Accessed 27 October 2026. https://www.shavei.org/communities-2/bnei-menashe/.

[27] The conversion rate used is 1 New Israeli Shekel (NIS) to 0.33 US dollars. Rate as of 6 September 2026.

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