The India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) marks its 25th anniversary in 2026. But while the agreement has delivered gains, it is no longer fit for purpose. With the World Trade Organization projecting global merchandise trade growth to slow sharply to 1.9% in 2026, effective regional economic alliances are essential for sustaining growth and resilience.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake agreed to continue negotiations on updating the ISFTA during Dissanayake’s inaugural state visit to New Delhi in December 2024. South Asia remains a relative bright spot amid a global trade slowdown driven by shipping distruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, rising protectionsim and geopolitical fragmentation.

India’s trade flows are at record highs, supported by a new generation of comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with partners including the EU, UK and Australia. Sri Lanka’s National Export Development Plan 2026–2030 aims to more than double total export earnings to $36 billion by 2030 — in part to generate foreign exchange for external debt repayments and to consolidate the country’s recovery from its 2022 debt crisis.

Implemented in 2000, the ISFTA was South Asia’s first bilateral FTA and marked a decisive break from the region’s earlier inward‑looking trade regimes. Slow progress on regional trade liberalisation under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation made bilateralism increasingly attractive. Reflecting the enormous differences in India and Sri Lanka’s size and industrial capacity, the FTA limited market access for goods through asymmetric tariff liberalisation. The agreement included extensive negative lists protecting sensitive sectors in both economies, and while India liberalised tariffs on most Sri Lankan products within three years, Sri Lanka was granted up to eight years for Indian imports.

Even today, India excludes 429 product categories, while Sri Lanka maintains over 1,100 exclusions — limits that increasingly constrain deeper integration. But attempts to upgrade the partial goods-only agreement to a broader framework — including efforts to implement the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the Economical and Technical Agreement — stalled due to opposition from professional associations and business pressures in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lankan exporters seem to face many non-tariff barriers in India. These include tariff rate quotas on apparel — Sri Lanka’s main export — as well as sanitary and phytosanitary regulations for agricultural and processed food exports, technical barriers relating to packaging, and customs clearance rules and delays. Domestically, Sri Lankan firms also face para-tariffs including Sri Lanka’s Commodity Export Subsidy Scheme levy, Port and Airport Development Levy and Special Commodity Levy, which drive an anti-export bias by artificially raising imported raw material costs and making the protected domestic market more profitable than exporting to India.

Despite these constraints, bilateral merchandise trade expanded almost ten‑fold under the ISFTA, reaching $5.4 billion in 2025. India is now Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, while Sri Lanka is becoming an increasingly important regional trading partner for India. Trade between the countries has also diversified, with India’s exports now including refined petroleum, pharmaceuticals, textiles, vehicles and processed foods, while Sri Lankan exports include spices, boats, animal feed and consumer food products.

But there has been substantial asymmetry in the countries’ preference utilisation of ISFTA arrangements. The average annual share of Sri Lankan exports to India covered by ISFTA arrangements from 2001–2025 was 68.9%, compared to just 11.9% for Indian exports to Sri Lanka.

Though investment disciplines lie outside the ISFTA, improved business confidence linked to rules-based trade and sustained economic diplomacy has encouraged significant Indian investment in Sri Lanka. Cumulative Indian foreign direct investment to Sri Lanka reached $2.8 billion in 2025, spurred by various projects and joint ventures. Sri Lankan firms have likewise deepened their presence in India’s apparel sector.

Tourism represents another important spillover, with Indian visitors accounting for 23% of Sri Lanka’s total tourist arrivals in 2025. Despite ongoing travel disruptions due to the Hormuz crisis, India has accounted for more than 40% of arrivals during some of the months since the crisis began, providing much needed stability to the sector.

The global trading system has changed fundamentally since the ISFTA was negotiated. Trade in intermediate goods and services within global supply chains now accounts for roughly half of world trade. India has emerged as a key China+1 corporate hub as corporate derisking strategies reshape global supply chains. Apple’s shift of iPhone assembly to India is turning Chennai and surrounding districts into major centres for final assembly, testing and packaging operations.

For Sri Lanka to benefit meaningfully from India’s expansion into global supply chains, the ISFTA must go beyond goods. Several priority reforms — updating rules of origin from simple value‑addition thresholds to product‑specific rules and liberalising trade in services across information technology, maritime logistics and financial services — would enable Sri Lanka’s services sector to support regional supply chains.

A modernised ISFTA should be positioned as the institutional anchor of a deeper India-Sri Lanka economic partnership. Backed by political commitment and private‑sector support, an ISFTA 2.0 could underpin rules‑based regional integration and embed Sri Lanka more firmly in India‑centred supply chains. Complementary measures ranging from enhanced physical and energy connectivity to new export processing zones and stronger business‑to‑business linkages could amplify these gains. Indian support for climate preparedness and mobilising international finance for debt sustainability will help Sri Lanka tackle downside macroeconomic risks to bilateral trade integration. With decisive action over the next few years, bilateral trade could reach $10–12 billion in a decade or so.

Ganeshan Wignaraja is the Professorial Fellow for Economics & Trade at Gateway House and a Visiting Fellow at ODI Global, London.

This article was first published in East Asia Forum. 

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India hosts the 18^th BRICS summit, a major plurilateral grouping of the 21^st century, amid adverse geopolitical circumstances. Russia, a leading member, remains involved in its war against Ukraine, which began out in February 2022. Three of its members – Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia (which mostly absent itself from meetings or observes silence) – have been engaged in the U.S.-Israel war against Iran. The U.S., the lone superpower with an expressed anti-BRICS sentiment, has issued an unmistakable threat to all states to cut off economic relations with Iran or be prepared to face consequences. The UN and other multilateral organisations have lost much of their relevance and are unable to bring working peace to the ongoing conflagrations.

What then can the BRICS hope to achieve when they meet September 12-13 on Indian soil to advance the cause of world peace, development, a fair international order, and a better deal for the Global South?

Despite the challenges, the members of the BRICS family – 11 member states and 10 partner states – do believe in “the BRICS spirit” and its mission to improve the world by raising their voices on critical issues and by deepening their strategic partnership as a bulwark against future shocks. Hence, it is essential to track the BRICS trajectory through its last three summits to obtain a clear idea of what might emerge at the Delhi summit.

The first decade of the BRICS’ journey (2006-16) was full of promises and achievements. A grouping of merely five nations asserted itself quite well as the economic and political heft of its member states rose and as they created significant mechanisms such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). A major contribution was the reform agenda covering the UN and its Security Council as well as the international financial architecture and quota increase in the IMF and World Bank for developing countries. This helped BRICS emerge as a counterpoint to the G7 and a sheet anchor for the developing world within the G20.^[1]

The second decade (2017-2026), however, was marred by the Covid pandemic and online summits in 2020, 2021, and 2022. While this denied the leaders the opportunity for personal interaction, BRICS still managed to project its solidarity and seriousness of purpose, prompting over 30 nations to seek membership.

The 15^th Johannesburg Summit took place in this backdrop in August 2023. It projected the grouping as a partnership for “inclusive multilateralism” and for “mutually accelerated growth”, committed to fostering a global environment of peace and development. It also reaffirmed its call for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in its three dimensions – economic, social and environmental.^[2] The intra-BRICS cooperation project on the New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR), first established at the 2018 Johannesburg Summit,^[3] for creating and accelerating new opportunities in industrial development,^[4] was carried forward. On institutional development, the member states reached consensus on “the guiding principles, standards, criteria, and procedures of the BRICS’ expansion”. The endeavour was to create an objective basis for accepting new members.

A significant decision was taken in Johannesburg – to expand the grouping. Six states, namely Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, were invited to become full members of BRICS. Eventually, Argentina declined, while Saudi Arabia maintained ambiguity but was still accepted as a member. Ethiopia was admitted even though it did not meet the criteria. Later, Indonesia was added, thus taking the membership to 11.

The 16^th Kazan summit was held in October 2024 amid rising enthusiasm for BRICS in the developing world. It began by extolling the virtues of multipolarity and multilateralism. While the former would expand opportunities for the Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the latter was an article of faith with the leaders, stressing their commitment to “a more agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic, and accountable, international and multilateral system.” Reform of the UN, including the Security Council; the strengthening of the international trading system “with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core”; and progress towards Sustainable Development in accordance with the tenets of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were presented as the key components of the desired international order.^[5]

Stress was also laid on fostering economic and financial cooperation for “just global development”. In particular, the finance ministers and central bank governors were tasked to continue their consideration of “the issue of local currencies, payment instruments, and platforms”. The list of BRICS partner states was also finalised at this summit.

Brazil hosted the 17^th summit in Rio de Janeiro in October 2025. In a 126-paragraph declaration, all the key themes and proposals of BRICS were elaborated, with varying emphasis. The summit also saw the inaugural meeting of the new partner states. Deep concern was expressed about the “ongoing conflicts in many parts of the world”, which reduced development spending in favour of military expansion. The grouping condemned the U.S.-Israeli military strikes against a fellow member – Iran – as well as coercive economic measures taken against Iran by the Western powers.^[6]

This led the BRICS to seriously take steps to deepen trade and financial cooperation within the BRICS family. This was laid down in the “Strategy for BRICS Economic Cooperation 2025″, which set out a roadmap for three priority areas: trade, investment and finance; digital economy; and sustainable development. It also committed member states to respect each other’s economic sovereignty and pursuit of cooperation through consensus.^[7] BRICS as a workable alternative to the existing order was beginning to be well accepted, and in 2024, 30 countries were in the queue to join the grouping, according to the Russian president.^[8][9]

Against this backdrop, the 18^th summit in Delhi takes place amidst intense international diplomatic activity. It was preceded by the SCO summit in Bishkek (August 3-September 1) and the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, U.S. (August 31-September 1), and will be followed by President Xi Jinping’s official visit to the U.S., possibly from September 23-25.

The Delhi Summit, therefore, will take into account the global view, with five critical dimensions.

First, India as a host nation is eager for the top leaders of the five founding members of BRICS to be present in Delhi as well as a majority of the top leaders of the other member and partner states. This will give visible heft to the summit. This will provide diplomatic ballast, producing a consensus-based Delhi Declaration, full of meaning and substance. This was the task that the foreign ministers failed to complete at their meeting in May 2026.

Second, the war in Iran has created unprecedented pressure on the BRICS. With a mixture of anti-Western or non-Western perspectives, the grouping found it easy to take positions in the past that were antithetical to the U.S. Not anymore, particularly with the Trump administration. On the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, BRICS needs to take a position that satisfies all sides. It may criticise both the invasion of Iran and the Iranian counterattacks, without naming the countries concerned, while calling for an early, holistic and peaceful settlement and stressing the need to keep international waterways open for commerce and to ensure the safety of seafarers.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement of 4 March 2026^[10] offers an example. ASEAN’s statement reiterated the dangers to “regional and global peace and stability”, reflecting the grouping’s broader vulnerability to the conflict. Washington’s threat to all nations to cut economic ties with Iran or face secondary U.S. sanctions must be addressed with a blend of firmness and resilience. On these other sensitive matters, the Sherpas have been busy and are currently engaged in “candid conversations” that could yield formulations acceptable to all and introduce some positivity into the discussions.

Third, at the heart of the BRICS agenda – UN reform, reform of international financial governance architecture, advancing Sustainable Development Goals 2030, strengthening of the WTO, and the call for more financing for the development of developing countries – there is little realistic possibility of meaningful progress. However, that will not prevent the grouping from reiterating its traditional positions. Much of this manifesto is likely to be ignored by the G20 summit under the U.S. presidency. Realists in the BRICS family are aware that they need to wait for a more opportune time.

Fourth, the Indian Chairship of BRICS has devoted most of its efforts to deepening, diversifying, and expanding intra-BRICS cooperation, focusing on building resilience and innovation across the three pillars of political and security, trade and economic, and people-to-people exchanges. Over 350 events have been held to push this people-centric agenda, such as the Academic Forum, Sports Ministers’ Meeting, Youth Summit, and Civil Forum that took place throughout the year.^[11] Even if only a small segment of these ideas, plans, and initiatives changes the policies of BRICS governments in reality, it should still be considered a worthwhile exercise.

Fifth, ‘socialisation’ of new members and their integration with the mindset, practices and traditions of the grouping established over the past 20 years is a task that must be carried forward with consistency and sensitivity. At the same time, a perception of equality among all members – new and old – must prevail. As regards partner states, their expectation of being elevated to full membership will need to be balanced against the grouping’s imperative to develop strong internal coherence first.

The opportunity to host the BRICS summit is valuable to India, and it will not return, at least for a decade. Hence, New Delhi is engaged in an all-out diplomatic endeavour to ensure optimal success, but the outcome depends on the chemistry, creativity, and sincerity of all leaders, not just the Chair.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

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© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References: 

^[1]Otaviano Canuto and Bruno Saraiva, “BRICS in Times of Tectonic Shifts: The Group’s Agenda in a Challenging Geopolitical Context,” CEBRI-Journal 4, no. 13 (January–March 2025): 22–39, https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/199/brics-in-times-of-tectonic-shifts.

^[2]“XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration: BRICS and Africa; Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism,” Sandton, South Africa, August 23, 2023, BRICS Information Centre, University of Toronto, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html.

^[3]“BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution”, BRICS PartNIR Innovation Center, accessed September 3, 2026, https://www.bricspic.org/en/Pages/Home/NewsDetail.aspx?rowId=5.

^[4]“XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration”, BRICS Information Centre, University of Toronto, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html

^[5]“XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration: Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security,” Kazan, Russia, October 23, 2024, BRICS Information Centre, University of Toronto, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html.

^[6]Prime Minister’s Office, “Rio de Janeiro Declaration: Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, July 7, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2142786&reg=48&lang=2.

^[7]“Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025″, November 2020, BRICS Information Centre, University of Toronto, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/2020-strategy.html.

^[8]“Vladimir Putin Announces That 30 Countries Are Ready to Join BRICS,” TV BRICS, January 1, 2024, https://tvbrics.com/en/news/vladimir-putin-announces-that-30-countries-are-ready-to-join-brics/.

^[9]In 2025 the figure may have risen to more than fifty countries, of which twenty-three had formally submitted membership applications. See “50+ Nations Seeking BRICS Membership: A Game-Changer for Global Geopolitics”, BricsGrain, October 20, 2025, https://www.bricsgrain.com/50-nations-seeking-brics-membership-a-game-changer-for-global-geopolitics/.

^[10]“ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the Middle East”, ASEAN, March 4, 2026, https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-3/.

^[11]“BRICS 2026: Event Overview”, Ministry of External Affairs, India, accessed September 3, 2026, https://www.brics2026.gov.in/event-overview/

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References:

[1] Kimani, Alex. “The Biggest Victims of Trump’s Economic D-Day on Iran,” OilPrice.com, August 24, 2026, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Biggest-Victims-Of-Trumps-Economic-D-Day-On-Iran.html.

[2] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 19^th Century English poet and philosopher

[3] Ma, Sylvia, and Xinyi Wu. “China Trims US Treasury Holdings amid Iran War, Fed Uncertainty,” South China Morning Post, August 18, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3364353/china-trims-us-treasury-holdings-amid-iran-war-fed-uncertainty.

[4] “China Foreign Exchange Reserves,” Trading Economics, Accessed September 2, 2026. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves.

[5] Stratford, Michael, Megan Messerly, Nahal Toosi, and Phelim Kine. “Bessent’s ‘economic D-Day’ against Iran begins with a ‘warning shot’,” Politico, August 24, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/24/bessent-iran-economy-01047365.

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/24/bessent-iran-economy-01047365

[7] Ibid. Note 1

[8] Paraskova, Tsvetana. “The Oil Shock Is Weakening India’s Economy and Finances,” OilPrice.com, June 9, 2026, https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/The-Oil-Shock-Is-Weakening-Indias-Economy-and-Finances.

[9] Omran, Haj. “Israel and America Want the Kurds to Join the Fight in Iran.” Economist, March 5, 2026. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/03/05/israel-and-america-want-the-kurds-to-join-the-fight-in-iran.

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Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was first published in the Hindustan Times. Read the article here.

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The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the tripartite security agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan has raised some concerns in India. While terms of the Accord have not been made public, lazy commentary has termed it an ‘Islamic Nato’ – where an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all members. This seems unlikely as the three countries have different motivations that have prompted them to create the alliance, and different capabilities that they bring in.

Two of the three members, Pakistan and Turkey, have economies in crisis. Pakistan requires constant financial support, much of it from Saudi Arabia, to keep its economy afloat. Turkey continues to suffer from high inflation – which peaked at over 70% in 2022 and has averaged over 50% for the past four years. Both these countries require external financial help, which Saudi Arabia can provide. In return, Saudi Arabia seeks to replace the reduced American military footprint in the Persian Gulf region – which now seems a likely outcome of the war. Saudi’s own record in conflicts, such as the one with Houthis, indicates its limited military capabilities. While this is not stated, the tripartite alliance seems a cash-for-protection deal.

A serious concern flagged off as a result of the alliance is that of closer Saudi-Pakistan ties, including greater diplomatic cover for Pakistan, especially against India. However, this may be overstating the case. A reading of the world energy market indicates that Saudi-India ties are at a different level entirely, compared to the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, and are unlikely to be negatively affected by this development.

Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest exporter of oil, which forms the basis of its prosperity. Oil trade also dictates Saudi ties with other nations. The disruption due to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war in the Persian Gulf is perhaps the biggest ever since World War II, but the price of oil has stayed below its historical levels. At its peak, in 2007, oil price touched $147/barrel – over $200/barrel at today’s value, versus an oil price of $90/barrel or so at present. The relatively moderate increase in oil prices, despite the severity of the disruption, indicates a well-supplied oil market. Countries like the U.S. have increased their oil supply and export and Russia continues its export of oil despite sanctions. Consequently, six months into the crisis, and there aren’t fuel lines outside the pumps.

From an oil supplier’s perspective, a world well-supplied with oil is the anti-OPEC: instead of supplier-security, it is demand-security that will be a major concern in the future. For India, which is a larger importer with a growing demand for oil, moderate energy prices will be a welcome tail wind.

Simultaneously, there is a shift in oil demand patterns – oil consumption of European nations and Japan, all major users in the 1980s, has been falling consistently over the past four decades. China’s economy, which drove the growth in global demand for the past twenty-five years, is also slowing down. India, which imports over 4 million barrels/day of oil, is the only large oil market projected to grow over the next two decades past 10 million barrels/day of imports. A supporting data point is the price of diesel, which in end-August 2026 exceeded the crude oil price by $100/barrel. This indicates that oil refiners are making more money (briefly) compared to oil producers because historically, refining and retail have been the poor cousins of production and have accounted for a much smaller share of the pie. This is also an indication of the increased importance of market access visa-vis control over oil supplies.

Thus, from an oil exporters perspective, India is one of the most important economic partners going forward. India’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, Russia, or the United Arab Emirates, should be viewed from that perspective. This is also evident from continued Saudi interest in investing in India’s downstream energy infrastructure. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will risk a partnership crucial for its economic security to help a client state like Pakistan,

A significant new connector in Saudi-India ties is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced in 2023 during India’s G20 presidency. The planned multi-modal corridor which connects India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, is currently stuck because of the two conflicts in West Asia – Israel-Hamas and U.S.-Iran. Turkey and Pakistan were not a part of IMEC, and their alliance with Saudi Arabia is being viewed as a potential negative for the corridor.

While IMEC remains uncertain, the U.S.-Iran war in fact shows its long-term potential. IMEC has little utility as a conduit for containers of goods moving from India to Europe. Shifting containers from a ship to train, then moving them on a train, and then again loading them on a ship – these are all expensive actions. The closure of Hormuz, and the subsequent attacks by Houthis in Bab al Mandab, have shown the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia’s existing oil export routes.

Riyadh can bypass both these chokepoints if it is able to build oil pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea – which can run along the proposed IMEC route and will be far safer than the existing paths.  IMEC can also be a route for moving data, via optic fibre cables. Global internet traffic moves on sub-sea optic fibre cables, many of which pass through the Red Sea. Disrupting global internet traffic can be as simple as dragging a ship’s anchor along the seabed to physically cut cables. Data cables using the land route across the UAE and Saudi Arabia will be safer than cables passing close to Houthi controlled territory. Thus, while IMEC remains an uncertain prospect right now, it may have a long-term logic that will be difficult to resist.

India’s growing economic heft makes more important as a partner for oil exporters in the Gulf compared to Pakistan, which struggles for ‘strategic partnerships’. India should work at deepening these productive ties, through mutual investments and connectivity initiatives such as the IMEC. Economics often trumps strategy.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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The State of Israel will have its national elections for the next Prime Minister on 27 October this year. Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest serving Prime Minister, is contesting again for the top job.

He faces several odds this time. First, his judicial ‘reforms’ – a controversial set of bills to alter the judicial appointment system and to limit the judicial review system of the Supreme Court. In 2022, before the Hamas attacks, it created a domestic uproar among the masses, which turned hostile, resulting in protests by lakhs and constant riots in major cities of Israel throughout the year. The attacks and subsequent long war(s) in Gaza and elsewhere abruptly ended the protests, but the issue is still outstanding.

Second, it was under his watch that Hamas carried out its terror attacks, killing more than 1,200 Israelis and taking over 250 hostages. Third, his government announced a “fight-whatever-it-takes” policy till Hamas’ “elimination” from Gaza. But that hasn’t happened yet, even after three years of war and a grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Fourth, Israel’s international standing has diminished under his leadership over the last three years.

Benjamin Netanyahu still has his traditional base among the nationalists, religious and Mizrahim (Jews of Middle East origins) segments of Israeli society who think he fought well and “demolished” Gaza, assassinated other “enemies” of Israel like Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 and Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in February 2026. The fact that the Israeli army could withstand the multifront wars against Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis in Yemen and now Iran speaks of resilience rather than defeat. For many in Israel, Netanyahu has also stood firm against international criticism of Israel’s army, and he still is their best diplomat who can defend Israel abroad as well as fight the rising antisemitism.

Israelis are deeply aware of the significance of the upcoming national elections amidst the incomplete wars, internal sharp divisions between liberals and religious, and the pro-Bibi (popular nickname for Netanyahu) and anti-Bibi groups. Due to the persistent domestic divisions for many years, Israel had four national elections between 2020 and 2022. The next two months’ time to the election, is a tense and volatile time for Israelis.

There is altogether a new actor emerging in the upcoming election which wasn’t the case in past elections: the Jewish-Israeli diaspora. These are the Jews outside of Israel who are keen to come home and vote in the 2026 election.

According to Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, of the global Jewish population of 15.8 million, about half or 7.2 million live in Israel (45% of the world Jewish population). Of these, 6.3 million, or 40% of the world Jewish population, live in the U.S. Beyond the U.S., the largest Israeli communities are in Britain, Canada, Germany and France. Most Israelis have dual or multiple citizenships; hence, an Israeli with a passport and citizenship abroad can come to vote in the country. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, a premier think-tank for domestic surveys and political system, half a million Jews abroad are potential voters in Israel, the only condition being their physical presence for voting as Israel doesn’t grant remote voting^[1]. Some Israeli Jews have temporarily relocated, are studying abroad or spending a limited period overseas. But many have chosen to make their lives elsewhere. More Jews now live outside of Israel. Israelis stationed abroad and Jews born in foreign lands make a strong community. Like the Jews inside Israel, the Jews abroad are quite unalike. Even the diaspora in the U.S. is not homogenous: there are reformist, universalists, nationalists and conservative orthodox Jews among them who hold many different views.

Consequently, Netanyahu and his government are concerned about a campaign called “Fly and Vote in Israel’s Crucial National Elections” by the America Israel Democracy (AID) Coalition, a prominent Jewish organization in the U.S. Most Israelis living abroad have opposed the current government for the 2022 Judicial ‘Reforms’ which divided the whole country over fundamentals of the state, judicial independence, rule of law and most importantly the principles of checks and balances in democratic states. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, perceives this whole mobilization directed against them, to be masterminded by the Jews abroad who are now planning to come  vote in October. According to the Times of Israel ^[2], the Likud party wants to restrict this mission because it is directed against Netanyahu personally.

The majority, two-third of the American Jews, have negative views of Netanyahu’s leadership in Israel as well as his foreign policy according to the Associated Press-NORC Centre for Public Affairs Research survey from July 2026.^[3] Influential American-Jewish analysts say Netanyahu doesn’t appreciate the American Jews and their political values.  Most vote Democrat, believe in the American dream of a free society and a liberal state that supports pluralism based on equality and liberty according to the latest survey by the U.S.-based Jewish Electorate Institute which focuses on Jews’ electoral behavior.^[4] On his part, Netanyahu has been closer to the Republican party base with its Evangelical Christian ethos,  and has made it explicit that he prefers leaders like Donald Trump over Joe Biden or Barack Obama.

In Israel, Netanyahu has been supporting the religious parties that push Israel toward political and religious conservatism at the cost of its democratic ethos. Like under his leadership, the Kotel agreement for an egalitarian place of worship for women at the Holy Wall in Jerusalem was not implemented in 2017 because of the political push from the religious coalition. Women of the Wall^[5] is a movement that began in Israel in 1988, to support equal rights for men and women to pray at Jewish holy places. Large segments of the Jewish diaspora support this.

In 2018, when the Nation-State Law (Nationality Bill) was passed – which reinforced Israel as Jewish land, Hebrew as the national language, Jerusalem as the capital and Jewish settlements as a positive development –  many global Jewish diaspora groups expressed deep concern and opposition to its exclusionary nature and viewed it as a threat to democratic values. Major diaspora organizations like American Jewish Committee (AJC) bitterly criticized the legislation for sidelining non-Jewish minorities and weakening the pluralistic ties between Israel and world Jewry.^[6]

Right after these two disgruntlements, came the issue of radical judicial reforms in 2022, which the majority of the global Jewry in various countries demonstrated against as well as funded protest movements inside Israel, determined to keep the country’s judicial independence and checks and balances. The civil society movement, known as Kaplan Force^[7], received unusual support from the high-tech industry and the startup companies which has a large Israeli presence abroad and who feel that Netanyahu has shaken Israel’s democratic foundations.

Netanyahu has his struggles with the diaspora, but the State of Israel itself has had complex relations with Jews born or living abroad. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion did not like the fact that the American Jews didn’t come home, “to the holy land ending life in exile”, after Israel’s establishment in 1948. American Jews didn’t suffer classical antisemitism or ghettoisation and pogroms as in the case of Russia and Europe, and they argued with early Israeli leadership that they would better contribute to the well-being of Israel from afar through aid, advocacy and solidarity.

Now, Israel as full-fledged state has a vibrant and often divided society constantly in a clash with itself or the state. Israel doesn’t grant absentee votes because the direct intervention of the diaspora can hurt its fragile sovereignty. Yet, one of the mandates of Israel’s Declaration of Independence was that the State of Israel will belong to all the Jews and they have a right of return. Therefore, the Jews living abroad or born elsewhere but have Israeli nationality, are eligible to come physically and exercise their vote on 27 October. There have been various studies and legislative bills that sought to establish criteria for voting by Israelis from abroad in order to balance the right to vote to those whose centre of life and existence is not in Israel.^[8]

The religious and ultra-orthodox communities abroad also travel to vote according to their preferences and faiths. Thus, not everyone from abroad will come to vote against the current government. There is massive mobilisation this year in the light of the events of the last four years of this government that the secular, liberal, internationalist Jews and peace activists of all kinds have expressed their intention of having a say on election day.

Dr Khinvraj Jangid is Professor and Director Centre for Israel Studies, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] “Who will not be able vote on election day?,” Israel Democracy Institute, 24 June 2026.

[2] “Likud Threatens Legal Action against Initiative to Bring Israelis Abroad Back to Vote.” Times of Israel, August 17, 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-threatens-legal-action-against-initiative-to-bring-israelis-abroad-back-to-vote/.

[3] Peoples, Steve and Sanders, Linley. ”Most American Jews Don’t Feel Supported by Either Party or President Trump, New AP-NORC Poll Finds,” Washington Post, July 9, 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/07/09/poll-jewish-adults-democrat-republican-trump-netanyahu/5e28fe0e-7b76-11f1-b194-f872dd4ec5aa_story.html

[4] Jewish Voters Highly Engaged, Prioritize Domestic Issues; Strong Support for Israel and Caution on Military Action and Advocacy, The Jewish Electorate Institute, Jewish Electorate Institute, April 15, 2026. https://www.jewishelectorateinstitute.org/jei-s-spring-2026-latest-poll.

[5] Women of the Wall. “Women of the Wall: The Modern-Day Western Wall Liberators.” https://womenofthewall.org.il/.

[6] Cortellessa, Eric. “Reform and AJC Leaders Bitterly Criticize Israel’s Nation-State Bill,” Times of Israel, July 19, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-jewish-group-deeply-disappointed-with-nation-state-bill/.

[7] Kaplan Force. “Kaplan Force.” https://www.kaplanforce.com/en-us.

[8] Note 1: Ibid.

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The U.S.-India Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) is ensnared in a complex web of tariffs imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2025 and 2026. The tariffs, intended to protect American industries, have raised significant concerns within Indian policy circles, particularly in light of India’s inclusion in the U.S. Commerce Department’s Special 301 investigations of forced labour, excess capacity and inadequate intellectual property protection.

Compounding these challenges is the Trump administration’s plans to endorse the Russian Sanctions Bill which empowers Washington to impose tariffs of up to 100% on Russia’s various trading partners, including China and India. This potential move could significantly alter the landscape of bilateral trade dynamics, particularly for India, which is looking to strengthen its economic ties with the U.S.

Just five months ago, in February 2026, President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a high-level phone call, announced what was described by Washington insiders as a “historic” trade deal focused on reciprocal trade benefits. It was in this phone call that both leaders agreed for the reciprocal tariffs to be brought down to 18% from 25% and for there being no tariffs on India for procuring Russian oil. In return, India agreed to either eliminate or substantially lower tariffs on a wide range of U.S. industrial goods, creating a more favourable trading environment for both nations.

Eventually, both sides announced the finalisation of a ‘Framework Agreement’ that was to lead up to an ‘Interim Agreement’. However, since then, a series of events have become stumbling blocks, pushing the trade agreement further down the road.

By the end of February, discussions between India and the U.S. were put on hold as a result of a pivotal ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding tariffs. The court’s decision raised serious doubts about the legal basis for Trump’s tariff initiatives, specifically questioning the authority granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This sudden uncertainty effectively stalled progress towards finalising the trade agreement and left both nations reassessing their next steps in the negotiation process.

In late June, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer visited New Delhi and both sides said they had made “substantial progress” but declined to set a deadline. While it seemed that Greer’s visit was to push the trade talks ahead, there came another shock from the U.S. by way of investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which has the potential to add another 12.5% tariff on Indian products.

Not surprisingly, India wants legally binding assurances that the U.S. won’t introduce future actions that contradict the agreement — essentially predictability that today’s concessions won’t be undermined by tomorrow’s investigations.

There is an additional burden: the U.S. Senate’s passage of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 which empowers the U.S. President to levy up to 100% tariffs on goods from the top five importers of Russian energy, including India and China. The bill is awaiting House review and presidential signature, but it most certainly threatens India’s discounted crude imports from Russia and broad export market including to Europe. However, the tariffs are not strictly automatic upon passage; the legislation leaves room for presidential waivers or exemptions if nations scale back energy reliance. The bill will also compel India to hedge its long-standing defence and economic ties with Russia against its vital economic partnership with the U.S.

Mark Linscott, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, summed it up in an August 18 paper for the Atlantic Council, noted, “While U.S. and Indian negotiating teams have continued working to finalise the interim agreement, some momentum appears to have been lost as they await the results of pending investigations and the possibility of additional Section 301 cases to come. For its part, India has been clear that it is ready to conclude the interim agreement, so long as it can be assured that the tariffs that result are preferential to those imposed on other major competitor nations.”

“To date, unforeseen developments have repeatedly prevented the United States and India from crossing the finish line on a trade agreement,” Linscott adds.

In the current chapter of the BTA negotiations, the U.S. is pushing hard for market access across India on corn, soybeans, dairy, GM crops, pulses/grains, and dry fruits. India is not agreeable: roughly 40%–50% of its population is tied to farming, and past farmer protests (which forced New Delhi to repeal its 2021 farm laws) have not been forgotten, still casting a political shadow.

High-level sources say dairy and GM crops for human consumption are effectively “off the table,” with the U.S. likely settling for limited access on pulses and dry fruits.

India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has gone on the record to state that the deal with U.S. will prove to be fruitful only when India gets a competitive advantage over its rivals like China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Bangladesh among others. He said this at an event in London in June 2026 adding, “We obviously must have some reason to be able to enter into force that agreement which we have already agreed upon.”

Keeping Trump’s uncertainty on trade tariffs in mind, India is understood to have demanded a sunset clause under the BTA during Greer’s visit. Under this clause, the BTA will have a built-in expiration clause that will be mutually agreed upon, unless both parties renew the agreement. The U.S.-EU trade deal has such a clause. India has sought a similar provision under the BTA.

The BTA in-suspension will only find meaningful solution if and when PM Modi meets President Trump in person. That could take place in September during the UNGA meeting in New York. It will be wise for India to carefully monitor the political pressures the U.S. President is facing domestically and develop a work-around it.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

Manak, Inu, and Helena Kopans-Johnson. “Trade Agreements, Explained.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 12, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/articles/trade-agreements-explained.

Linscott, Mark. “What It Will Take for the US and India to Conclude a Trade Agreement.” Dispatches (blog). Atlantic Council, August 18, 2026. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-it-will-take-for-the-us-and-india-to-conclude-a-trade-agreement/.

Ministry of Commerce and Industry. “Final US Section 301 Measures on Forced Labour: India Placed in Lower Tariff Tier at 10%.” Press release. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, July 25, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2289348&reg=3&lang=1.

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When we look back at the history of India, it is easy to think of historical figures as larger-than-life characters. But every major movement, every breakthrough idea, and every resilient institution was started with individuals who were once sitting exactly where you are sitting right now: figuring out who they were, what they cared about, and where they fit into the world.

Consider Shri Ardeshir Godrej, a founding father of the Godrej Group. He left his career as a lawyer to launch a business in colonial India, manufacturing locks in a small workshop in an area which is famous not only for Lalbaugcha Raja but also for the historical connection between Godrej and the Indian democracy.

Around that time, freedom fighter Madam Bhikaji Cama, along with another member of the illustrious Godrej family, co-founded the influential Paris Indian Society. Madam Cama is known for being the first person to hoist the Indian flag on foreign soil in Germany. You can actually see that flag even today at the Kesari Library in Pune. It’s called Kesari library after Kesari, the newspaper started by Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, remembered as the father of Indian revolution. Tilak started the Deccan Education Society and Fergusson College in Pune, which paved the way for other colleges and universities like ILS Law School, Symbiosis, MIT WPU, Gokhale Institute, College of Engineering, IISER, IITM, the University of Pune, etc. He is the reason why Pune is called “The Oxford of the East” today, and some of you might go to college there.

These sound like legendary tales. But here is the secret: all these figures were once just like you—young people searching for their purpose, figuring out who they were, and trying to navigate an uncertain world with humour, anger, love, and a lot of pressure. These pioneers had a simple desire that many of you share today: they wanted the freedom to make their own choices and to build something meaningful, and they also wanted to be taken seriously. In teenage years, it’s wanting independence, wanting to prove you are special at something—whether it’s coding, sports, music, art, content creation, or entrepreneurship. It is the exact same spirit of enterprise that built this country.

Let me share some stories.

When we achieved independence, grand celebrations broke out in India and around the world. But behind the scenes, two quiet, monumental acts of leadership were unravelling.

First, the Constituent Assembly, a diverse body of nearly 300 members spanning every background, occupation, gender and belief, was drafting our Constitution, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Ours is perhaps the longest written constitution in the world and the only one which is artistic. It became an enduring masterpiece of not only law, rights and duties, but also art, design, and calligraphy.

I have promised that I will visit again to explain how the pages of our constitution were illustrated, why we chose the Ashoka Pillar as the national emblem, Satyamev Jayate as the national motto, why our Constitution is an elegant bag of borrowings from over 50 nations, how our Constitution endured the test of time while others collapsed.

But back to the topic:

Soon after the constitution was enacted, it was time for the first general election in independent India in 1951. Godrej manufactured 16 lakh steel ballot boxes to operationalise our new democracy. From those steel boxes to partnering with ISRO for the Mangalyaan & Chandrayaan space missions, the group standing firmly behind your beautiful school has helped build India in more ways than we can imagine.

The second monumental act of leadership in the backdrop of independence was this:

Foreign media was publishing news of Indian independence along with the name of one person closely associated with the idea of India. Everyone in India, from Delhi to Ahmedabad, Bombay to Madras, wanted to see the man who contributed immensely, but he couldn’t be found.

In Aug 1947, when grand celebrations were taking place, there were communal riots and discord in many parts of the country. Two days before Independence, Gandhi Ji chose to walk on the streets of the city that witnessed the most violent riots. India was celebrating freedom, but Calcutta was burning with communal violence. While many people were leaving the streets out of fear, Mahatma Gandhi walked into them to place his trust once again on the messages of harmony and unity.

Instead of asking people, “Which side are you on?”, he walked alongside a Muslim leader into tense neighbourhoods, asking people to imagine the fear of the person facing a weapon or an angry mob. Gandhi chose to stand where people were being targeted; he stood fearlessly alongside victims. Slowly, something unexpected happened. People who had been fighting began coming out of their homes. People who were hiding out of fear for their lives started talking to others. Some even embraced one another and comforted them. Now you know why Vaishnava Janato is Gandhi Ji’s favourite bhajan. Peed parai jaane re means ‘to feel and understand the pain of others’.

Imagine being Gandhi that day. You could have celebrated freedom with everyone else. Instead, you chose to stand where people were hurting and being violent. You chose to stand where people were in so much pain that they couldn’t relate to the joy of freedom.

That is empathy—not merely feeling sorry for someone but having the courage to step into their pain. To look them in the eye and recognise their dignity. And perhaps that is the simplest meaning of communal harmony: “I may not share your religion, your traditions or your experiences – but I can still understand your pain, respect your dignity, and I stand beside you.”

Empathy is a biological superpower—it lowers stress, builds resilience, and rewires our brains for connection. I urge you to practice it. You will notice that it can be contagious – the more empathy you demonstrate, the more you experience it yourself, and the more you see it around you.

Why do I share these stories with you today on August 15th? Because you are not just the future of India—you are its active present. Every value that built this nation—empathy, perseverance, curiosity, and courage—is something you are navigating in your own lives right now.

All of us who are older than you know what it feels like to be a teenager. You are navigating a storm of unspoken questions: Am I smart enough? Am I good at anything? Do my friends actually like me? What am I going to become?

Let us connect the lessons of our history to where you stand today:

1. Your marks don’t define who you are. Your ideas, patience, friendships, empathy define you.

One bad exam or a low percentage does not make you stupid, nor does it ruin your future. You can respect your parent’ dreams without turning those dreams into your entire identity. I can guarantee you that none of your esteemed teachers sitting here performed perfectly in every single subject throughout their lives.

Nation-building requires different talents — musicians, coders, dancers, doctors, athletes, scientists, writers. Just as the Constituent Assembly needed 300 people with completely different skills to build a nation, India today needs more than just exam toppers.

Actually, even small ideas become powerful over time and can have a lasting impact. Let me share two stories:

First, the story of Hansa Mehta, another freedom fighter. She studied philosophy when very few women were allowed to study in India and then studied sociology in England when only a handful could go abroad. But you know what her lasting contribution has been: she played a key role in shaping the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One of the major debates concerned the text of Article 1, which used the phrase “All men were born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Hansa Mehta, the only delegate from India, wanted this changed to “all human beings are born free and equal”. How remarkable is that?

Second, for the longest time the grand festival of Ganesh Chaturthi was a private domestic ritual which only a few elite households followed. Someone thought, ‘Why can’t I take the celebrations to the public?’ It was Maharashtra’s own Bal Gangadhar Tilak who conceived 10-day public celebrations of Ganesh Chaturthi with speeches, plays, music, mela, ending with visarjan. The rest is history. He started the first public Ganesh Utsav in Naik Chawl in Girgaon Chowpatty 133 years ago.

That’s the power of one small idea. If it can challenge the status quo, it can lead to a mass awakening of society. Tilak’s statue was installed just a few metres ahead of Wilson College 40 years after he did this. Hansa Mehta travelled the world when she was in her mid-20s, but her seminal contribution was when she was 45. It takes time.

2. You don’t have to have your whole life figured out today.

At 15, it is completely fine to be confused. Remember I shared that Ardeshir Godrej started as a lawyer before he realised his calling was manufacturing and innovation. By the way, while we are on this topic, law is a great subject to consider for university and as a career. Please don’t get wrong ideas. There is a saying in law that “if you succeed in the profession, you will become Motilal. If you don’t, you will end up becoming Jawaharlal.”

At the age of 16, a young Shri Naval Godrej started working in the same Lalbaug factory – not in a swanky office but on the hot, uncomfortable factory floor to make machine parts. I read this in a special edition of Amar Chitra Katha.

Another freedom fighter, Usha Mehta, finished studying philosophy at the same Wilson College, then started studying law but quit midway because she joined the Quit India movement with Gandhi Ji and Lala Lajpat Rai. In 1942, a big protest against the Simon Commission was announced at the Gowalia Tank, present-day Malabar Hill in south Bombay. Unfortunately, all senior leaders – Gandhi, Patel, Tilak – were arrested two days before. But it didn’t stop a massive crowd from gathering. A 22-year-old Usha ended up addressing the crowd. She hoisted the flag and shouted, “Simon go back” with the protestors. She didn’t stop. With her friends, Usha started the first secret Congress underground radio for which she was eventually arrested by the British police. She was one of the first political prisoners to be released from jail.

Imagine being Usha that day. Leading thousands of Indians, giving confidence, and leading the movement.

Your teenage years are not a finite race to beat the person next to you. This is the age of exploration—try coding; play a sport you are not a champion in; listen to music you haven’t heard before; try an art form (any art form); try cooking; even making innovative content online which requires tremendous imagination and good writing skills.

But digital content could lead to unproductive interpersonal comparisons.

3. Practice empathy over comparison.

When Gandhi Ji walked through Calcutta on the eve of independence in 1947, he looked at real human beings rather than rumours, hearsay, or appearances. It was Albert Einstein who said about Gandhi that “generation of people to come will scarce believe that such a man as this in flesh and blood had walked upon this earth.”

Today, much of the pressure you feel comes from comparing your behind-the-scenes life to someone else’s social media highlight reel. In reality, people look much less like their Instagram profiles and a lot more like their Aadhaar card photos.

Stop comparing. Build a life you actually enjoy and surround yourself with friends who make you feel comfortable being yourself. What matters is building relationships. Choose friends who make you feel safe to be yourself. Give compliments generously – honest compliments are the real vitamin C needed to nurture relationships. In building relationships, in building anything, mistakes happen all the time.

But,

4. You have the freedom to make mistakes and try again and again.

Many of you secretly want to be exceptionally good at something, to build a business, create art, make videos, or master a skill that makes adults take notice. You want independence and respect. That journey starts with giving yourself permission to fail, ask for help, and reset.

The desire to look confident, to understand relationships, to earn your own money, or simply to take a break from constant pressure is universal. Even the older people around you – sometimes your parents, teachers, uncles, aunts, leaders, celebrities. Everyone around you is figuring it out as they go. Everyone.

You don’t need to hold a public office, or have wealth, or be a rank holder to contribute to creating a better society. Nation-building is not something that only happened in 1947, nor is it reserved for popular political leaders, sportspersons winning world cups, or scientists launching space probes.

You build India every time you choose empathy over judging someone

Every time you support a friend who is struggling, you make their day better.

Every time you try again after failing, you become a better citizen.

Every time you intervene when someone is unfairly treated, you help build a better community.

Every time you step up to be yourself, you help create a better society.

Every time you’re kind to someone who feels left out in the classroom or the sports ground, you move India an inch forward.

Dear students, you’re better than you think you are. And this is your time to shine.

I will end with a couplet of late Rahat Indori. It’s from all Udayanchal students to the world out there:

“Shaakhon se toot jaye wo patte nahi hai hum, aandhi se koi keh de ki aukat mein rahe.” ^[1]

Happy Independence Day, Everyone.

Ashish Bharadwaj.

To learn more about the event at Udayachal High School, click here.

Ashish Bharadwaj is Distinguished Fellow, Law and Education, Gateway House. 

For interview requests with the author or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] “We are not the leaves that break off from the branches; someone tell the storm to stay within its limits.”

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Twelve weeks can change the mood dramatically in bilateral relations. From April 7, when Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman visited Delhi, driving directly from the airport to National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s office for a fruitful discussion and dinner, to August 5, when former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina delivered an audio address to her constituents at home via New Delhi’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club – the innate volatility of India-Bangladesh relations was on full display.

Just four months ago, the two governments seemed determined to move beyond the difficulties faced during the two-year transition led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh and begin a new chapter. But as Hasina, who was given refuge in India, announced her intention to return to Bangladesh in December 2026 and her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, called Bangladesh “another Pakistan”, the relationship plummeted to a low level, requiring an emergency response from the two governments.

The stakes in a healthy and stable equation are high for both Delhi and Dhaka. The compulsions of geography, history, economy, culture, and strategic interests apply to both sides. The 4,096-km-long border creates constraints and opportunities for the two countries. Against this backdrop, building and strengthening a coalition of interests between realists and pragmatists on both sides of the border is essential to prevent instability and deterioration.

There were fears that the April election outcomes in Assam and West Bengal might have repercussions for ties with Bangladesh. The issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh assumed a new urgency and poignancy. The media played up every incident. The decision made in April to commence sector-wise discussions on major issues through bilateral mechanisms was not followed up. Meanwhile, Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman chose to pay his first foreign visits to Malaysia and China in June 2026, giving fresh ammunition to Bangladesh critics on the Indian side, who argued that he had other priorities.

Sheikh Hasina’s press conference lit a fuse. The Bangladesh government made strong démarches, both before and after it. It was one thing for Delhi to go slow and correctly on Bangladesh’s request for Hasina’s extradition, but quite another to allow her to use a platform in Delhi to denounce the government in Dhaka. It was appropriate for the Indian foreign ministry spokesman to say that Delhi did not “endorse” what she said at the press conference, nor was it involved in arranging the event. However, observers wondered whether the Indian side did enough to persuade Hasina to shelve the conference or convince the host to cancel it in view of Dhaka’s objections and its likely adverse impact on relations with India.

Fortunately, political leaders and senior officials on both sides quickly recognised the damage and seemed aware of the need for prompt remedial action. The calls by the Indian high commissioner Dinesh Trivedi on the Bangladeshi PM, foreign minister, and home minister in Dhaka, followed soon thereafter by his hurried visit to Delhi to brief the government, were clearly indicative of the urgency and fragility of the situation.

Two specific issues drew public attention.

First, Dhaka requested that the extradition of Sheikh Hasina (and other fugitives) be expedited. In response, India reiterated that the request was under examination in accordance with established processes. Experts knew that it was bound to take time, and compliance may be difficult due to a combination of legal, political and psychological factors. But was it possible to offer an assurance that the 5 August-type press conference would not be repeated?

Second, India renewed the invitation to PM Tarique Rahman to visit India for a bilateral state visit and also to participate in the BRICS Summit in September as the chair of BIMSTEC. For a while last week, it appeared that officials would find mutually convenient dates, even though the Indian side preferred dates in September and the Bangladesh side wanted dates in August. Somehow, Dhaka’s key suggestion that a more favourable environment might first be created for the visit was missed by the media and others. Was it laying down a precondition for the PM’s visit to India? If so, this approach was certain to complicate matters. An impasse resulted, throwing a blanket of uncertainty on this important visit, which alone can clear the air and unleash the process of holding meetings of all bilateral mechanisms, as agreed earlier.

Beyond these immediate issues are the questions about the kind of relationship Bangladesh desires to develop with the U.S., China and Pakistan. The Trump administration’s approach to South Asia seems to leave considerable scope for better relations between the U.S. and Bangladesh. Delhi will need to be on guard to ensure that this does not adversely affect India’s interests. Pakistan has gained more than a foothold in Bangladesh as radical and fundamentalist forces secured a significant edge during and after the Yunus transition. The front line of defence against them will have to be the moderate and secular forces in Bangladesh itself. Despite the setbacks it has faced, the Awami League remains a pivotal political force, helping the nation define itself as a blend of its Bengali and Islamic identities.

As for China, Bangladesh remains drawn to the advantages it expects to benefit from cooperation with Beijing. But this can be balanced by India’s multipronged approach to economic cooperation and fair river water-sharing. Delhi did it successfully before and is undoubtedly capable of doing it again, so long as Bangladesh is conscious of the need to respect India’s red lines on security and strategic sensitivity.

On regional cooperation, it should be possible to align the two countries’ positions. Reports suggest Dhaka’s interest in efforts to revive SAARC. Such enthusiasm, if it existed, must be diminishing by the day amid the fast-changing military scenarios in West Asia. How the Mecca Accord or ‘Islamic NATO’ might sit with SAARC is a question Dhaka needs to ponder.

On the other hand, there are incipient fears of attempts by certain countries (such as Pakistan) to persuade Dhaka to join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Is Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Tarique Rahman a pointer in that direction?

The compulsions closer to home are enormous. India and Bangladesh have much to gain by cooperating closely to turn BIMSTEC into a truly effective and forward-looking regional grouping. The seductive concept of the Bay of Bengal Community promises to be a major magnet for all BIMSTEC nations, especially Bangladesh.

The pathway to a cordial and cooperative relationship between India and Bangladesh must be anchored in a clear-cut recognition of mutual sensitivities and deep pragmatism. As M. Riaz Hamidullah, Bangladesh’s high commissioner in Delhi, observed recently: “India is one country with which we share an organic relationship.” Dhaka should know well where India’s red lines lie. India will then be willing to go halfway.

Political headwinds will surely make the task difficult. The challenge for diplomacy is to find the sweet spot before it is too late.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

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Over the past decade, India has developed a large-scale digital public infrastructure ecosystem built around interoperable digital systems and shared digital infrastructure. The ecosystem encompasses foundational and sectoral infrastructures across areas including identity, payments, data exchange and public services and has increasingly been discussed as a model of population-scale digital infrastructure.^[1]

The relationship between this infrastructure and artificial intelligence has become increasingly relevant to India’s technology policy. Recent scholarship has conceptualised this relationship in two broad directions: “AI for DPI”, in which AI is used to improve public digital infrastructure and services, and “DPI for AI”, in which digital public infrastructure may contribute to the conditions for AI development.^[2] India’s policy environment increasingly reflects the importance of infrastructure and data to domestic AI capability. Recent government policy discussions have also highlighted the role of digital public infrastructure and open digital networks in supporting the deployment of AI applications across sectors such as healthcare, agriculture and public services.^[3]

This growing policy importance, however, also raises questions about whether and under what conditions data associated with public digital systems can be responsibly used for AI development. The existence of large-scale DPI does not by itself make data generated or processed through such systems publicly available or open for AI development. Where such data constitutes personal data, its processing must have a lawful basis under the applicable data-protection framework, including consent or a recognised legitimate use under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.^[4] The relevance and availability of DPI-associated data for AI development must therefore be assessed in relation to the nature of the dataset, the legal basis for its processing, and the particular purpose for which its use is proposed.

The central question is which governance concerns arise when data associated with India’s Digital Public Infrastructure is considered for indigenous AI development, and how can these concerns be addressed? DPI can certainly contribute to indigenous AI development, but doing so requires governance frameworks capable of addressing the risks that arise when data generated through public digital systems acquire new technological and economic uses.

India’s policy initiatives increasingly recognise the importance of data and digital infrastructure to the country’s AI ambitions. The IndiaAI Mission, approved by the Union Cabinet in March 2024 with an outlay of $1 billion (₹10,371.92 crore) over five years, includes initiatives relating to datasets and the development of indigenous AI capabilities. ^[5] AIKosh, the IndiaAI datasets platform, provides access to datasets, models, toolkits and other AI resources, including assessments relating to the AI-readiness of datasets.^[6]

Image Credits: Gateway House

These initiatives build on India’s existing digital public infrastructure ecosystem, which has developed to support a range of governance, welfare and service-delivery functions. The emerging AI policy agenda adds a further dimension by considering how such infrastructure and appropriately governed data can contribute to domestic AI capacity. Digital public infrastructure and open digital networks can provide the interoperable systems through which data is generated, standardised and exchanged across sectors. This is particularly relevant to AI applications in areas such as healthcare, agriculture and public services, where locally generated and contextually relevant data may contribute to the development of systems better suited to Indian conditions. ^[7]

India’s emerging AI governance framework similarly identifies improved data availability and sharing, locally relevant datasets, enhanced data governance and the integration of AI with digital public infrastructure as important components of the country’s AI ecosystem. The significance of DPI, therefore, lies not merely in the volume of data it generates but in the possibility of transforming appropriately governed DPI-associated data into a resource for indigenous AI research and development.

This transition, however, changes the governance question. Data generated through DPI was not necessarily collected or structured with AI training and research as its original purpose. As such data acquires new uses and value, the conditions governing access to it become increasingly important.

What, then, are the conditions for responsible DPI-to-AI integration? The transition from DPI-associated data to AI development cannot be governed by data availability alone. It raises distinct but interconnected questions concerning the subsequent use of personal data, access to resources necessary for AI development, and the implications of expanded state analytical capacity.

Three concerns are particularly relevant: privacy, competition and access, and state accountability.

Privacy and secondary use:

The integration of DPI-associated data into AI development raises a fundamental question on whether data processed for one specified purpose can subsequently be used as an input for AI development without adequate safeguards governing that new use. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, makes the purpose of processing legally significant. Where processing is based on consent, section 6 requires that consent relate to a specified purpose and that the personal data processed be limited to what is necessary for that purpose.^[8] The India AI Governance Guidelines similarly identify unresolved questions concerning the application of data-protection principles to AI development, including the treatment of publicly available personal data, the compatibility of collection and purpose limitation with modern AI systems, and the scope of research and “legitimate use” exceptions.^[9]

The issue, therefore, is not whether DPI-associated data should be categorically unavailable for AI development. Rather, its movement from public digital systems into AI development requires a legal basis and safeguards appropriate to the purpose for which it is subsequently used. The India AI Governance Guidelines accordingly recommend measures including privacy-enhancing technologies, machine unlearning and algorithmic auditing as potential approaches to mitigating AI-related risks.^[10] The objective should thus not be simply to maximise the volume of data available for AI training but to enable its responsible use while preserving the privacy and accountability conditions governing its processing.

On competition and access:

The use of DPI-associated data for indigenous AI also raises a question of access. If data generated or accumulated through public digital systems becomes an input into AI development, the terms on which such data is made available may affect who is able to participate in developing AI systems. This does not mean that DPI-associated data should automatically be treated as an open resource. Personal data, confidential information and other legally protected material must remain subject to restrictions on access and use.

The competition question instead arises where data can legitimately be made available for AI development: whether its institutional design permits meaningful access to a sufficiently broad range of actors rather than creating unnecessary barriers to participation.

The issue is not confined to data. India’s Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology identified inadequate datasets and limited computing facilities among the fundamental barriers to deploying AI at scale in India.^[11] In parallel, the IndiaAI Mission has developed shared compute infrastructure. More than 38,000 GPUs have been onboarded through 14 empanelled service providers, with access made available to start-ups, researchers, academic institutions and government organisations.^[12] This provides an example of policy intervention aimed at widening access to computational resources needed for AI development.

For DPI-to-AI integration, therefore, the relevant competition concern is not universal access to every DPI dataset, but the design of access to resources that can lawfully and appropriately contribute to AI development. Where DPI-associated data is suitable for such use, questions of accessibility, interoperability and the terms of access become part of the governance framework surrounding its transition into an AI resource. The objective should be to ensure that public digital infrastructure can contribute to indigenous AI development without unnecessarily restricting participation in the ecosystem that it is intended to support.

Regarding state surveillance and accountability:

The integration of DPI with AI also raises questions about expanding state analytical capacity. DPI should not be characterised as an AI-enabled surveillance system merely because it facilitates the collection and exchange of digital information. However, increasingly capable AI systems may allow public authorities to analyse and draw inferences from such information at a greater scale, making corresponding safeguards necessary.

The Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence provides an important framework. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India, the Court recognised that an infringement of privacy must satisfy requirements of legality, a legitimate state aim and proportionality.^[13] These principles are relevant to AI-enabled uses of DPI because technological capability alone cannot justify a particular use of personal information. For the DPI-to-AI transition, expanded analytical capacity must therefore be accompanied by defined purposes, lawful authority, proportionality and institutional oversight. AI governance mechanisms may supplement these safeguards but should not replace the constitutional constraints governing state action.

India’s transition from Digital Public Infrastructure to indigenous AI should not be understood simply as an effort to make more data available for AI development. The more important question is how data associated with public digital systems can be brought into new technological uses without weakening the legal and institutional safeguards that govern its collection, access and use.

The objective, therefore, should not be to maximise the conversion of DPI-associated data into AI resources. It should be to establish conditions under which such data can be used where legally and appropriately justified, with access structured responsibly and the exercise of state power remaining subject to meaningful safeguards. If India can develop this balance, DPI can contribute to indigenous AI not merely through the data and infrastructure it makes available but through a governance framework capable of sustaining innovation alongside privacy, participation and public accountability. This model will resonate with other countries which are seeking DPI with AI for their own systems.

Ashish Bharadwaj is Pro Vice Chancellor of WPU Goa and Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education at Gateway House.

Nada Shawl is a student at BITS Law School.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References: 

[1] “Center for Digital Public Goods, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Report on the State of Digital Public Infrastructure in India 2025, Bangalore: CDPG, IIMB, 2025. https://www.iimb.ac.in/cdpg/pdf/State-India-DPI_Report.pdf.

[2] Sengupta, Amrita, Alexandre Costa Barbosa, and Mila T. Samdub. “Understanding Interrelationships between AI and Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) in India and Brazil,” The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), no. 35 (2025): 1–11.

[3] Press Information Bureau, “India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation.” Government of India, February 15, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2228315&reg=48&lang=2.

[4] Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 4.

[5] Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Approves Ambitious IndiaAI Mission to Strengthen the AI Innovation Ecosystem,” Government of India, March 7, 2024. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2012355&reg=48&lang=2.

[6] Press Information Bureau, “MeitY launches AIKosha,” Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, March 6, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2108961&reg=48&lang=2.

[7] Press Information Bureau, “India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation,” Government of India, February 15, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2228315&reg=48&lang=2.

[8] Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 6(1).

[9] Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation. New Delhi: Government of India, November 2025. https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/nov/doc2025115685601.pdf.

[10] Ibid.

[11] PRS Legislative Research, “Impact of Emergence of AI and Related Issues,” Standing Committee Report Summary, New Delhi: PRS Legislative Research, 2026. https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/impact-of-emergence-of-ai-and-related-issues.

[12] Press Information Bureau, “AI Models Developed under IndiaAI Mission Represent Important Progress in Building India’s Own AI Capabilities Tailored to Local Languages and Use-Cases,” Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, March 13, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2239614&reg=1&lang=1.

[13] Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 (India). https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_26-Sep-2018.pdf.

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