The UAE’s recent exit from OPEC on May 1, 2026, is further acknowledgement of the reality of the oil market – that in spite of the current disruption due to the U.S.-Iran war, in the long run, there will be a global surplus of oil supply. OPEC’s ability to move oil markets was at its peak in the early 2000s, when there were real fears of oil running out. Additional oil production from the U.S. shale has since made those fears, and OPEC’s ability to move the market, redundant. The UAE’s exit from the cartel is a belated recognition of the changed circumstances.

The U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during his recent visit to India, expressed a desire to sell more energy, primarily oil and natural gas, to India.^[1] The U.S. is the world’s largest producer of oil: during 2025, it produced almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia and Russia – the second and third largest producers, respectively – combined. It is also the largest exporter of natural gas and seeks new markets for its resources. Export of natural gas and agricultural produce has been a major agenda item for President Donald Trump in many of his trade agreements.

For India, both are welcome developments. It is the world’s second-largest oil importer (after China) with net imports of over 4 million barrels/day, accounting for 85%-90% of total consumption. Multiple estimates project that India’s oil demand will reach or surpass 10 million barrels/day by 2050, with imports providing 90% of the consumption. India’s leaders continue to harp on energy self-sufficiency, but that is mostly rhetoric and will not meaningfully alter the numbers. A well-supplied oil market ensures that by and large, India will be able to import energy at an affordable price. The U.S. desire to sell energy can and must be used for India’s gain.

While oil prices will generally remain moderate, around $70-80, India will still have to deal with the occasional crises – such as the present one – which are a part of the oil market. One way to reduce the impact of price shocks is to invest in oil fields overseas – the higher income from these assets partly offsets the burden of higher prices. Historically, India started to invest in overseas oil fields in the early 2000s, with investments in Russia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Mozambique and Brazil, amongst others. However, these investments have slowed down, with just one investment made over the past decade.^[2]

This is partly due to the Indian government’s effort on renewable energy and sustainability made over the past decade and the voluble push for electric vehicles by various arms of the government, which may have discouraged Indian oil companies from investing in oil fields. This is clearly a mistake: oil will not be replaced by renewable energy soon, and India will still need to protect itself against price spikes like the one it is facing now.

India must now again start investing in foreign oil assets, but this time focus on stable, advanced countries such as the U.S., which has the world’s largest and most liquid financial markets and also the largest number of oil companies ranging from very small to very large, like Exxon and Chevron. India should approach these purely as a financial investor – not an operator. Most Western countries have become sensitive about resource ownership by foreign governments, owing to the many Chinese acquisitions made in their markets. And accidents do happen. In case of an accident such as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, an operator can have virtually unlimited liability. A financial investment limits India’s exposure.

Additionally, as a buyer of and an investor in the American energy sector, India may also gain a degree of political cover in the U.S. on issues such as trade and tariffs.

Another critical partner for India is the UAE. The country’s recent exit from OPEC openly declares its interest in selling more oil – the U.S. has long been frustrated that its past production was often capped by OPEC ‘quotas’. The UAE is also one of the few OPEC members with spare production capacity of over 1 million barrels/day – created at a cost of tens of billions of dollars and kept deliberately idle by OPEC in a futile attempt to manage oil prices.

As a large buyer with a growing need for oil, India will be a major market for the UAE – which the Emirate recognises. One of the outcomes of Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to the UAE was an agreement by the latter to enhance its participation in India’s strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) and to work to establish gas reserves as well. ^[3]

A more ambitious and transformative collaboration between the two countries can be the creation of a new benchmark for oil, which is more reflective of the current market realities. While global oil demand has shifted from the West to Asia, prices for oil are still set on western exchanges – primarily ICE London (Brent). India’s commodity exchange MCX has an active trade in oil contracts, but it is very shallow – almost entirely close to the expiry date of contracts, and it doesn’t have physical delivery – indicating that most of this trade is paper speculation.

Being a price-setter will require actual oil sellers such as Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Indian refiners’ buyers such as Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited to carry out a part of their trade on the MCX, together with oil traders and speculators, to enable price discovery. Second, these contracts should require physical delivery of oil – preferably at one of the SPRs/oil terminals where UAE oil is being stored in India. Third, India should allow any investor/trader/oil company to hold oil in these SPRs to back buying/selling on the exchange – as long as the oil is physically present in India and available in an emergency, it serves the purpose of a strategic reserve.

Financial markets are an important component of energy security. As a large oil consumer with a free market economy, India should use its growing heft as a buyer to use the markets to its advantage.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

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References:

[1] U.S. Department of State. “Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press at the Miami Homestead Airport.” https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-press-at-the-miami-homestead-airport

[2] ONGC Videsh Limited. “Middle East.” https://ongcvidesh.com/assets/middle-east/

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2026. “Transcript of Joint Press Conference by EAM Dr. S Jaishankar and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (May 24, 2026).” https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/41227/Transcript+of+Joint+Press+conference+by+EAM+Dr+S+Jaishankar+and+

US+Secretary+of+State+Marco+Rubio+May+24+2026

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The over-two-decade-long story of the Quad has been marked by ups and downs. It is a unique gathering of four maritime democracies, three of which are treaty allies (the U.S., Japan, and Australia) and a common strategic partner (India). This informal plurilateral grouping aims to constrain China’s assertive role and coercive policies.

True to these two goals, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Delhi on May 26, 2026, produced a series of outcomes and sought to project that its members remain committed to deepening cooperation in specific areas through practical measures. This is no mean achievement, in light of the strains and tensions that marked one particular bilateral, that of India and the U.S., in the preceding year, and talk of a G2, a duopoly between the U.S. and China that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have repeatedly indulged in over the past year.

The meeting in Delhi was the third for the Quad since the Trump administration 2.0 commenced its innings and the 11th since the series of ministerial meetings began in September 2019. However, there has been no leaders’ meeting since September 2024, when the US hosted the summit in Wilmington under former U.S. President Joe Biden’s leadership. A glaring institutional ambiguity persists. The Quad appears to have abandoned the rotational principle, and India’s chairship of the grouping has continued since 2024, but it could host the ministerial meeting only this week – and the prospect of India hosting the long-pending summit remains uncertain.

What exactly has the Delhi meeting achieved? The answer should be assessed, keeping in mind the specific context, i.e., key developments in the preceding year: India-U.S. relations are suffering from a series of public differences over tariffs and policy issues concerning Pakistan, Russia, and China; U.S. efforts to woo China that resulted in limited success at best at the U.S.-China summit in mid-May 2026; the Gulf War that saw the three partners (India, Australia, and Japan) refusing to follow the U.S. lead; and high-profile diplomatic exchanges underlining the growing proximity between Europe and India.

To assess the meeting’s outcomes, a critical, holistic review of four documents is essential. These are the joint statement, the statement on Indo-Pacific energy security, the Quad Critical Minerals Initiatives Framework, and the factsheet issued in Delhi.

The joint statement brings the Indo-Pacific back on the table, reaffirming the members’ commitment to “a free and open Indo-Pacific”, and allows countries to determine ”their own paths”. Deeply conscious of the adverse implications of the Gulf conflict for the Indo-Pacific, the foreign ministers reiterated the importance of adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They specifically upheld navigational rights and freedoms and “uninterrupted flow of global commerce” through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. In the same breath, they expressed deep concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas, indirectly criticising China for its “dangerous and coercive actions”.

The members elaborated their shared position on the four pillars of the Quad’s current mandate: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. The document ends with a clear strategic message about the members’ commitment to “a region where all countries can prosper free from coercion”.

The next two documents address the specific issues of energy security and critical minerals. The Quad lists a set of fundamental principles, in light of recent “shifts in the global energy landscape and escalating geopolitical complexities”. At the top of the list is the reiteration of a strong commitment “to ensure well-functioning, stable, transparent, secure and resilient energy markets”. The members are set to identify areas of cooperation based on these principles and plan to convene a Quad Fuel Security Forum to coordinate high-level discussions.

The critical minerals framework is the central outcome of the Delhi meeting. The framework to develop four-country cooperation covers three key areas. Under investment and project development, the partners aim to mobilise $20 billion in government and private-sector support to strengthen critical minerals supply chains, including mining, processing, and recycling. The other areas include regulatory alignment and overall environment and recycling and recovery of critical minerals. How far the member governments can deliver on this important dimension will be watched closely within the region and beyond.

Finally, the Factsheet, also a negotiated document, is a statement of the Quad’s achievements in the past year, including the launch of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC), the expansion of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the resultant development of a comprehensive Common Operating Picture (COP). An important new announcement was the plan for cooperation between the Quad and the government of Fiji to jointly advance port infrastructure and related activities in Fiji. Clearly, China’s activities in the South Pacific loom large in the background.

It is evident that a well-prepared meeting has produced concrete outcomes. Yet, scepticism about the Quad seems to prevail. Aware of this, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that, in fact, their work had increased, not declined, and stressed that the US “continues to remain engaged in the Quad”.

Three developments may reduce the scepticism and increase public confidence in the Quad. First, the many initiatives under previous Quad meetings, like the Quad scholarships, two workshops on counter-terrorism held in 2025, various fellowship programmes, including in STEM subjects, and undersea cable connectivity in the Indo-Pacific, especially the South Pacific, must be audited and completed. Second, the U.S.’s contribution to the Delhi meeting’s outcomes needs a public endorsement by the U.S. president. Thirdly, the U.S. government should facilitate India hosting the next summit in 2026 or early 2027 on its soil, which both the other two members – Japan and Australia – already endorse. That will send a message in the region that the Quad is serious, its reset is credible, and its actions have teeth.

Finally, it is important for the three partners to remember this: without India, there is no Quad.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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The fourth India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS IV) will convene in New Delhi on May 31, 2026, after an 11-year gap – the longest of any interval in the summit’s 18-year history. The delay, however, does not mean that the bilateral is fading or India is not prioritising the continent. After his 2015 visit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi observed that Africa and the Indian Ocean had the highest primacy for India’s foreign policy,^[1] and that remains true still.

IAFS IV’s theme, “IA SPIRIT: India-Africa Strategic Partnership for Innovation, Resilience and Inclusive Transformation”, is therefore not merely a diplomatic event but a credibility test in terms of its outcomes. The summit will heavily focus on economic partnership.

The economic relationship has, by headline numbers, never looked better. India-Africa bilateral trade has risen 112% over two decades, reaching $89 billion in 2025,^[2] nearly double from 2008, when it was $45 billion. India is now Africa’s fourth largest trading partner alongside China, the European Union (EU) and the UAE.^[3]

India is also the second-largest lender in Africa, after China. India’s cumulative investments in Africa amount to $75 billion, which India’s private and public sector aim to double by 2030.^[4]

India has extended 196 Lines of Credit (LoC) worth over $12 billion to 42 African countries, supporting projects across power, water, agriculture, transport, and digital connectivity.^[5] But much more must be done to enhance this genuine progress so that the natural advantages of both India and Africa’s are not underleveraged.

India is earnest in its intentions: it has opened 17 new diplomatic missions in Africa in 2018^[6] since 2018, bringing the total number of missions in Africa to 46 – making the continent home for the highest number of Indian missions globally.^[7][8]

But good intentions must understand and fill the gaps – and there are plenty. The trade trajectory has not been linear, as Graph 1 below shows. Trade peaked at $97.8 billion in 2022, driven by the post-COVID markets surge, but then it dropped by 14.9% in 2023, the very next year.

Graph 1: Trade trajectory

Source: ITC Trade Map (from the years 2008-2016),^[9] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and Tradestat (from the years 2017-2024).

India’s exports to Africa are largely value-added: refined petroleum products, rice, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods and vehicles. Africa’s exports to India are dominated by raw materials: crude oil, gold, diamond, pulses, coal, and minerals. This asymmetry is similar to other trade partners of Africa, but it is not optimal: India benefits from Africa’s resources while Africa captures limited value from the exchange.

Africa has a trade surplus with India, exporting more to India than it exports (See Graph 2).

Graph 2 – Exports and Imports

Source: ITC Trade map (from the years 2008-2025)

Africa accounts for 9.6% of India’s total global exports and 7.8% of total global imports. For Africa, India accounts for 6% of total global exports and 5.6% of global imports.^[10] These figures are disproportionately low when compared with Africa’s other trading partners of Africa, such as China, whose trade with Africa is thrice that of India’s at $348 billion in 2025^[11] and the EU, whose trade is four times India’s at $400 billion in 2025.^[12]

India has bilateral trade agreements with 22 African countries, a network built over six decades, from the Indo-Tunisian Trade Agreement of 1960^[13] to the Rwanda Trade Cooperation Framework of 2018. The signing of 20 of the 22 agreements was done just before the first India-Africa Summit. Since then, only two new agreements have been formalised: the Rwanda framework (2018) and, crucially, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) with Mauritius (2021).^[15] This is the only modern, comprehensive agreement India has with any African country, with tariff schedules, services provisions, and rules of origin.^[16] Every other agreement is a legacy framework with little trade in practice (see Table 1).

Table 1 – Timeline of all trade agreements with Africa

India is in active negotiations for a Preferential Trade Arrangement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), comprising South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Eswatini, and Lesotho. These have been ongoing since 2007. The most recent engagement took place in March 2026, where India’s High Commissioner to South Africa expressed confidence about concluding the agreement.^[28] Informal indications suggest that India and Africa may take forward the SACU negotiations.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), operational since 2021, is an opportunity for India but one which it has not fully engaged with. On May 13, 2026, at the Curtain Raiser on the India-Africa Business Dialogue & Exhibition, Piyush Goyal, India’s Union Minister of Commerce & Industry, emphasised the economic potential of this collaboration, which has a potential of $3.4 trillion. The opportunities, if seized, will create resilient partnerships, diversify supply chains, and move beyond raw material trade towards higher-value manufacturing and integrated value chains.^[29]

IAFS IV is the natural moment to announce a structured AfCFTA engagement strategy and treat Africa as a meaningful economic bloc, not a collection of bilateral relationships.

This will require India to step up its^[30] Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flows to the African continent (see Graph 3).

Graph 3: Total OFDI flows from India to Africa, 2015 to 2025

Source: Compiled from India’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment Report, CII and Reserve Bank of India’s Data on Overseas Investment monthly data^[31][32]

India’s annual OFDI to Africa peaked at $5.5 billion in 2016, then declined sharply to under $1 billion by 2023; in 2024, it again increased to $4.1 billion and declined again in 2025 by $1.5 billion. India-Africa OFDI is dominated by a single country, Mauritius. From 2000 to 2024, Mauritius channelled $178 billion in FDI into India, dwarfing every other African country combined. South Africa ($619 million), Seychelles ($217 million), and Morocco ($141 million) follow at a considerable distance (see Graph 4).

Graph 4: Top 10 countries’ FDI Equity Inflows from Africa to India

Source: Compiled from DPIIT, country-wise FDI Equity Inflow to India. ^[33]

The 2015-2026 summit gap was punctuated by a mid-term review meeting in 2019, which outlined the progress of the commitments made in the last summit. This had precious time and opportunity costs. In the 11-year gap, China held three summits – the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summits in 2018, 2021, and most recently in 2024, each anchored by concrete financing commitments. France has held 28 summits since the 1970s, the most recent being held May 11-12 in Kenya. The EU held AU-EU Summits in 2022 and 2025. The U.S. hosted the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2022.^[34] India’s absence from the summit calendar, therefore, is significant.

India still retains an edge in two areas where African demand is structural and growing: technology and capacity-building/human capital/education. Unlike infrastructure and finance, where China leads the race and makes it difficult for India to compete, India uses its excellent digital public infrastructure model and capacity-building programmes, which offer a better value proposition that no other partner can replicate. IAFS IV is the moment to convert that latent advantage into concrete, measurable commitments.

Technology collaborations are a strong pillar of India-Africa relations. Recognising that information technology has become a fundamental part of infrastructure and socio-economic development, India and African countries have undertaken several initiatives (see Table 2).

Table 2: Status of India-Africa technology initiatives

In addition to technology, education collaborations are a bilateral strength. India offers hundreds of scholarships for researchers from Africa under CV Raman Fellowship or Indian Council for Cultural Relations programmes. For African students, tuition costs are significantly lower than in many Western countries. And India’s programmes are well regarded, particularly in medicine, pharmacy, engineering, and technology (see Table 3).^[52]

Table 3: Status of educational initiatives between India and Africa

While several commitments made under the IAFS framework have been implemented, the overall implementation rate is moderate, with significant room for improvement. This is the time for IAFS IV to fulfil some of the past commitments and make ambitious future goals, with implementable timelines.

As the summit convenes, three commitments will meaningfully advance the relationship:

First, operationalise the monitoring mechanism. A third-party review body implementation was promised in 2015 but was never created. IAFS IV should announce its establishment with a clear mandate, timeline, and reporting structure. Without an accountability architecture, the disbursement/implementation rate will not improve, regardless of how large the next commitment is.

Second, announce an AfCFTA engagement strategy. India needs a structured approach to AfCFTA and to treat Africa as a single integrated market rather than 54 bilateral relationships.

Third, anchor a critical minerals partnership. Africa holds over 70% of global cobalt reserves, substantial manganese and platinum^[71] and significant lithium in Zimbabwe and the Congo. India’s clean energy transition, its solar and EV ambitions, creates a structural import dependence on these materials. An India-Africa Critical Minerals Framework, with investment commitments and processing partnerships that allow African countries to move up the value chain, will serve both sides’ interests.

India and Africa are each, in their own ways, at a turning point. Africa is the world’s fastest-growing demographic bloc. India has goodwill and is largely seen as a partner of choice rather than of necessity. The AU became part of the G20 in 2023 during India’s presidency year and is represented by Egypt and Ethiopia in the expansion of BRICS. India, on the other hand, is pursuing Viksit Bharat, its vision of developed-country status by 2047, which depends on diversified markets, secure resource access, and consolidated Global South cooperation, which can be gained by an enhanced partnership with Africa.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

Raveena Shivashankar is the Digital Media Associate, Gateway House. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References: 

^[1] Bhatia, Rajiv. India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons. New Delhi: Routledge India, 2022

^[2] The figure is compiled from the International Trade Centre (ITC)’s trade data for India and Africa. International Trade Centre. “TradeMap: India-Africa Trade Data.” https://beta.trademap.org/en/goods/time-series/exports/c/000/c/000/p/ALL/byProduct/year/default/4/direct/values/USD/table

^[3] News on Air. “India Is Africa’s 4th Largest Trading Partner; Bilateral Trade Nears $100 Billion: EAM Jaishankar.” https://www.newsonair.gov.in/india-is-africas-4th-largest-trading-partner-bilateral-trade-nears-100-billion-dollar-eam-jaishankar/

^[4] Confederation of Indian Industry. Pathways for Shared Progress: India-Africa Economic Cooperation. New Delhi. https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/Pathways%20for%20Shared%20Progress%20India_Africa%20Economic%20Cooperation.pdf

^[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Lines of Credit for Development Projects.” https://www.mea.gov.in/Lines-of-Credit-for-Development-Projects.htm

^[6] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Development Partnership Administration Related Press Release.” https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1525694&reg=3&lang=2

^[7] Embassy of India, Bamako. “Newsletter.” https://www.embassyofindiabamako.gov.in/news_letter_detail/?id=81

^[8] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Question No. 1675: Full-Fledged Embassy.” Lok Sabha. https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/34845/question+no1675+full+fledged+embassy

^[9] Ibid (ref no 2)

^[10] Export-Import Bank of India. India-Africa Trade and Economic Relations Report. Mumbai: Exim Bank of India, 2025. https://www.eximbankindia.in/sites/default/files/2025-07/175file.pdf

^[11] Nanyang Technological University. “China-Africa Trade Hits Record US$348bn as Deficit Balloons.” https://www.ntu.edu.sg/cas/news-events/news/detail/china-africa-trade-hits-record-us-348bn-as-deficit-balloons

^[12] International Trade Centre. “TradeMap Import Data.” https://beta.trademap.org/en/goods/time-series/imports/g/42/g/7/p/ALL/byProduct/year/2024-2025/4/direct/values/USD/table

^[13] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-Tunisia Bilateral Relations. New Delhi: MEA, 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Tunisia_November_2022.pdf

^[14] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “India-Mauritius Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement.” https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183122

[15] Many say the CECPA is the first trade agreement between India and Africa; however, in the past, India has formalised trade agreements with other African countries too.

^[16] High Commission of India, Mauritius. “Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA).” https://www.hcimauritius.gov.in/page/comprehensive-economic-cooperation-and-partnership-agreement-cecpa/

^[17] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Trade Agreement.” https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6023/Trade+Agreement

^[18] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Trade Agreement.” https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5574/Trade+Agreement

^[19] Government of India. Trade Agreement between India and Senegal. https://indiantradeportal.in/uploads/Documents/Trade_Agreements/India_Africa/Senegal.pdf

^[20] ibid

^[21] Government of India. Trade Agreement between India and Nigeria. https://indiantradeportal.in/uploads/Documents/Trade_Agreements/India_Africa/Nigeria.pdf

^[22] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-Ghana Bilateral Brief 2025. New Delhi: MEA, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/GhanaBilateralBrief2025.pdf

^[23] Government of India. Trade Agreement between India and Angola. https://indiantradeportal.in/uploads/Documents/Trade_Agreements/India_Africa/Angola.pdf

^[24] Government of India. Trade Agreement between India and Zaire. https://indiantradeportal.in/uploads/Documents/Trade_Agreements/India_Africa/Zaire.pdf

^[25] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-Ethiopia Bilateral Relations. New Delhi: MEA, 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/EthiopiaOct_2022.pdf

^[26] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-Seychelles Bilateral Relations. New Delhi: MEA, 2024. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Seychelles-Bilateral-27.8.2024.pdf

^[27] Government of India. Trade Agreement between India and Swaziland. https://indiantradeportal.in/uploads/Documents/Trade_Agreements/India_Africa/Swazilad.pdf

^[28] Press Trust of India. “India Confident about Revived SACU Trade Pact Talks: Envoy.” https://www.ptinews.com/story/business/india-confident-about-revived-sacu-trade-pact-talks-envoy/3454830 

^[29] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Press Release.”https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2261202&reg=3&lang=1

^[30] Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. “Africa.” https://ficci.in/international/africa-ficci

^[31] Confederation of Indian Industry. India’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment Report. https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/India%E2%80%99s%20Outward%20Foreign%20Direct%20Investment%20Report.pdf

^[32] Reserve Bank of India. “Overseas Investment Data.” https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/Data_Overseas_Investment.aspx

^[33] Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. FDI Factsheet 2025. New Delhi: Government of India, 2025. https://www.dpiit.gov.in/static/uploads/2025/12/c708bb500dc2b64c63ece116aaad301f.pdf

^[34] U.S. Department of State. “U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.” https://2021-2025.state.gov/africasummit/

^[35] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 50 Years of ITEC. https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/24148_REVISED_50_yrs_of_ITEC_brochure.pdf

^[36] Diplomatist. “Uniting Minds and Shaping Futures through India-Africa Educational Partnerships.” https://diplomatist.com/uniting-minds-and-shaping-futures-through-india-africa-educational-partnerships/

^[37] Indian Institute of Democracy and Election Management. IIIDEM. https://iiidem.igotkarmayogi.gov.in/

^[38] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Pan-African e-Network Project Related Press Release.”https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=149191&reg=3&lang=2

^[39] India Science, Technology & Innovation. “India-South Africa Cooperation in Science and Technology.”https://www.indiascienceandtechnology.gov.in/bilateral-cooperations/department-science-technology-dst/south-africa?language=en

^[40] Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. “India-South Africa Strengthen Cooperation in Astronomy, Advanced Materials and Indigenous Knowledge Systems.” https://dst.gov.in/pressrelease/india-south-africa-strengthen-cooperation-astronomy-re-advanced-materials-indigenous

^[41] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Press Release.” https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=1505164&reg=6&lang=1

^[42] Gandhi Mandela Foundation. Gandhi Mandela Foundation. https://www.gandhimandelafoundation.com/

^[43] Gandhi Mandela Academy. “Programs.” https://gandhimandela.academy/programs/

^[44] Research and Information System for Developing Countries. “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Road Map.” https://aagc.ris.org.in/en/road-map

^[45] Gateway House. “Japan and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.  https://www.gatewayhouse.in/japan-aagc/

^[46] Indian Council of Medical Research. About the India-Africa Health Sciences Platform (IAHSP). New Delhi: ICMR. https://www.icmr.gov.in/icmrobject/static/icmr/dist/images/pdf/iahsp/V5_About_IAHSP.pdf

^[47] Ibid (ref no 46)

^[48] Ecofin Agency. “Six African Countries Adopt India’s Digital Public Infrastructure Framework.” February 12, 2026. https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-digital/1202-52814-six-african-countries-adopt-india-s-digital-public-infrastructure-framework

^[49] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Press Release.” https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2143585&reg=3&lang=2

^[50] Mint. “India Expanding Unified Payment Interface (UPI) to African Countries for Commercial Partnerships and Financial Inclusion.” August 24, 2023. https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-expanding-unified-payment-interface-upi-to-african-countries-for-commercial-partnerships-and-financial-inclusion-11693155015557.html

^[51] International Livestock Research Institute. “ICRISAT and Partners Launch AI-Powered Climate Advisory Initiative.” https://www.ilri.org/knowledge/publications/icrisat-and-partners-launch-ai-powered-climate-advisory-initiative-boost

^[52] Parul University. “India-Africa Education in 2026.”  https://www.paruluniversity.ac.in/blog/india-africa-education-in-2026-why-a-former-prime-minister-told-students-that-india-has-everything-africa-needs-what-parul-university-offers-international-students-and-how-the-global-perspective-se/

^[53] India Science, Technology & Innovation. “India-South Africa Cooperation in Science and Technology.” https://www.indiascienceandtechnology.gov.in/bilateral-cooperations/department-science-technology-dst/south-africa?language=en

^[54] Funds for NGOs. “South Africa-India Joint Science and Technology Research Collaboration 2016.” https://www.fundsforngos.org/developing-countries-2/south-africa/south-africaindia-joint-science-and-technology-research-collaboration-2016/

^[55] The PIE News. “32,000 Africans Benefit from Indian Scholarships Since 2015.”  https://thepienews.com/32000-africans-benefit-from-indian-scholars-since-2015/

^[56] Ibid (ref no 53)

^[57] Barefoot College. “About.” https://barefootcollege.org/about/

^[58] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India. “Barefoot College Tilonia.” https://mnre.gov.in/en/barefoot-college-tilonia/

^[59] Ghana-India Kofi Annan Centre of Excellence in ICT. “Ongoing Projects.” https://gi-kace.gov.gh/on-going-projects/

^[60] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Agreement between NUEPA and the Government of Burundi for Setting up of IAIEPA.” https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/15066/Agreement+between+NUEPA+and+the+Government+of+Burundi+for+setting+up+of+IAIEPA++in+fulfillment+of+commitment+made+at+the+First+India+Africa+Forum+Summit+2008

^[61] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Bilateral Brief. https://www.mea.gov.in/portal/countryquicklink/708_bilateral_brief.pdf

^[62] High Commission of India, Accra. “Educational and Development Cooperation.” https://www.hciaccra.gov.in/pages/ODAz

^[63] Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. “Press Release.” https://ficci.in/public/press_release_details/2997

^[64] Pratham. “Pratham: A Movement Born in India, Spreading in Botswana and Beyond.” February 20, 2020. https://www.pratham.org/2020/02/20/pratham-a-movement-born-in-india-spreading-in-botswana-and-beyond/#:~:text=The%20first%20time%20we%20saw,numeracy%20skills%20for%20their%20students.

^[65] Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. “Teaching at the Right Level.” https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evidence-effect/teaching-at-the-right-level

^[66] National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj. “Centre for Geoinformatics Application in Rural Development (CGARD).” https://nirdpr.org.in/cgard.aspx

^[67] Embassy of India, Asmara. “eVidyaBharti and eArogyaBharti Network Project.”https://eoiasmara.gov.in/evbab.php

^[68] Government of India. iLearn Guidelines. New Delhi: Government of India. https://ilearn.gov.in/static/static/pics/iLearn%20-%20Guidelines.pdf

^[69] National Forensic Sciences University. “International Cooperation and Partnerships.” https://nfsu.ac.in/details/99

^[70] High Commission of India, Nairobi. “Archived Announcement.” https://hcinairobi.gov.in/eoinrb_listarchview/OTE0

^[71] International Monetary Fund. “Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Critical Mineral Wealth.” April 29, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2024/04/29/cf-harnessing-sub-saharan-africas-critical-mineral-wealth

The post India-Africa: taking stock before the summit appeared first on Gateway House.

A partnership between India, a country of subcontinental size, and Africa, a continent of fifty-four countries, may seem asymmetric until one notes that each region is home to nearly the same number of people—1.4 billion. Together, they represent about a third of humankind today. In 2050, they will count for about 40 per cent of the world’s population. Hence, cooperation between them will contribute to worldwide peace, stability, and development in the mid-twenty-first century.

A futuristic perspective, however, should be anchored in a blend of past romanticism and present realism. The “peoples of Africa and India^[1] have known each other and traded across the Indian Ocean for millennia.” Their shared experience of a long, arduous, but successful struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination transformed the world, bringing a measure of political equality that was unimaginable until the mid-20th century. They have been engaged in a common endeavour to secure sustainable development and a respectable seat at the table of global governance. Besides, as the Delhi Declaration 2015^[2] of the third India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) reminded us, “Africa and India represent rapidly growing economies with demographic advantages and are building on their long-standing development partnership, including through the active participation of the Indian diaspora across the African continent.”

This essay proposes to spell out the existing challenges to the partnership, its optimal potential, and the possible pathways to realise it over the next quarter-century.

The fact that the IAFS process, which was initiated in 2008 and reached its climax in 2015, fell into disuse for the next decade, reveals both the potential and the limitations of this partnership. The three summits, held in 2008, 2011, and 2015, generated hopes that both sides were fully committed to taking their relationship to an altogether new level of vitality and diversification. Yet the partners failed to hold the fourth summit in 2020, contrary to their commitment. It took another five years to decide that the next summit may be convened in New Delhi in May 2026.

Whether this inordinate delay was avoidable and whether both sides are responsible for it are controversial questions that need not be discussed here. The lesson is that both sides must recognise that building deeper ties is a priority. They must find the necessary will, time, and resources to do so, amid their other pressing priorities.

India and Africa face varied challenges to upgrading and deepening their strategic partnership.

First, India faces serious competition on a continent that is wooed not only by the great powers but also by middle powers such as Brazil, Türkiye, the UAE, South Korea, and Australia. The severest challenge, of course, stems from China, which has become one of the most important partners for many African countries.

Second, despite a rich history of India–Africa cooperation, a relative lack of interest in Africa in some Indian circles—diplomatic, business, and media—has been a serious constraint. This needs to be addressed appropriately, perhaps by establishing a new think tank in India dedicated exclusively to studying Africa in all its dimensions.

Third, frequent instability and conflict in Africa discourages Indian trade and industry, which is largely risk-averse.

Fourth, geographic distance matters, not so much in the case of Southern and Eastern Africa, which is viewed as part of the Indian Ocean neighbourhood, but it does in West and Central Africa, which are seen as part of a distant world.

Fifth, some experts claim that New Delhi has not been able to allocate adequate financial resources to development cooperation with Africa. The delay in holding the fourth summit further contributed to it. Finally, the polycrisis-ridden third decade of the twenty-first century sapped the energy and enthusiasm generated by the IAFS in 2015. A long list of crises comes to mind: COVID-19, the India-China border clash, the war in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas hostilities in Gaza and Israel’s other strikes in the region, America’s tariff wars, the U.S.-Israel strikes against Iran, and eventually the broader Gulf war involving the U.S., Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states and the resultant energy and economic challenges. These may have reduced the bandwidth for new initiatives aimed at turning the India-Africa equation into a defining relationship of the present time.

As the governments in India and Africa and the African Union (AU) plan their next steps leading to the fourth summit, they must adopt a holistic view and consider that incremental progress on all four pillars of the strategic partnership—political-diplomatic; security-defence; trade, technology, and economy; and people-to-people connections—is achievable. To this end, they must balance each other’s priorities and craft a new declaration that is both visionary and practical.

Africa considers India a role model for its governance, grounded in democracy and development, and for its determination to pursue the widely accepted goals of the Global South. Africa, with its large market, demographic dividend, and immense natural resources, especially energy and critical minerals, can be a vital partner for India.

The case for recalibration rests on three premises.

Firstly, deep complementarity exists between the needs and capabilities of both sides. Africa considers India a role model for its governance, grounded in democracy and development, and for its determination to pursue the widely accepted goals of the Global South. India must provide additional development assistance, create technological linkages, and help African states strengthen their manufacturing bases and employment opportunities. Africa, with its large market, demographic dividend, and immense natural resources, especially energy and critical minerals, can be a vital partner for India. Besides, in the political domain, “India believes that Africa must have an adequate presence and role in global decision-making, including in the reformed UN Security Council,” as External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar^[3] put it, while adding, “And in turn, we count on Africa to stand up for a partner with whom it has a past, a present, and a future.”

Second, the Gen Z population in both geographies is increasingly aspirational and highly globalised, but largely ignorant of the rich heritage of the India-Africa relationship. Efforts to bridge this divide should be encouraged, particularly through cultural and educational exchanges and field visits.

And third, while the lead will have to be necessarily provided by the governments, all relevant segments of Indian and African societies must be involved in the relationship enrichment to produce maximum results.

Concerning the content of this strategic partnership, it is based on “the needs and priorities of the African countries”, stated the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in answer^[4] to a question in the Lok Sabha. It clarified that the alignment with the AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Agreement) and Agenda 2063 is “essential for our bilateral engagements with African countries”. It listed the following as key areas for long-term collaboration: energy, agriculture, healthcare, infrastructure, capacity-building, and digital public infrastructure.

Two Focal Areas

In this context, one should underline the potential for progress in two specific areas: skilling and human resource development and maritime security and the blue economy.

Skilling and human resource development

Africa is rich in human capital but needs nurturing through education, training, skilling, and preparation to become employment-ready, thereby producing a valuable dividend that spurs widespread economic growth. By 2030, 40 per cent^[5] of the world’s “young people will be African, and 75% of Africa’s population will be under 35.” All ten of the world’s youngest countries are in Africa. By 2050, 1.3 billion people on the continent will be under thirty.

India is in the same boat. Even as it strives to upgrade its own human capital, it must apply its enhanced development cooperation tools to expand the scope of human resource development in Africa, especially in select partner countries. This requires more financial resources to create educational, training, and capacity-building institutions; deploy new digital technologies, including AI, and modern distance education methods; and involve business and industry to ensure that an educated workforce finds jobs that fuel Africa’s economic growth. Slots for education and training, offered under the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), and other programmes, will require substantial expansion to achieve the desired impact. In addition to the network of Indian institutions established in Africa over the past two decades, Indian universities, including Indian Institutes of Technology, should be encouraged to open campuses or branches in suitable locations across the continent.

Nivedita Ray, from the Indian Council of World Affairs, has suggested^[6] “a tri-tiered governance model” consisting of a high-level oversight body for the IAFS, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) liaison offices, and bilateral joint working groups to execute an innovative strategy, stressing that “India-Africa collaboration in education and capacity building holds transformative potential for shared prosperity”.

Maritime security and the blue economy

The second focal area should be maritime security, leveraged through a judicious application of instruments to deepen blue economy-related cooperation between India and select African countries.

Among the emerging spheres of security and defence cooperation, maritime security ranks as a priority. Littorals on the east and west coasts of Africa and Indian Ocean island states face non-traditional threats such as piracy, terrorism, maritime crime, illegal fishing, environmental degradation, and disaster relief assistance management. India’s awareness of this aspect and calibrated activism in this domain are reflected in the recent elevation^[7] of its vision from SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions). A recent manifestation of India’s commitment to provide maritime security was the inaugural Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement^[8](AIKEYME) exercise. A six-day multilateral event, held in April 2025 in Dar es Salaam, it was jointly hosted by the Indian Navy and the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force. It focused on combating regional security challenges and strove to boost interoperability and offer opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. More such initiatives with other partner countries should be expanded and explored.

Cooperation in the blue economy^[9] is the other side of the same coin. Much of the intellectual and policy research has already been completed, as evidenced by readily available sources. The immediate need is for New Delhi to announce its official policy on the blue economy and co-develop, with willing African states, an operational plan to forge linkages in sectors like water resource management and food security risks, fisheries and aquaculture, marine tourism, offshore renewable energy, marine biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.

The Fourth Summit

At the launch of the theme, logo, and website for the fourth IAFS, Jaishankar outlined^[10] future areas of cooperation, highlighting “new frontiers in digital, fintech, and innovation reshaping economies across the African continent”. He termed the forthcoming summit “a unique opportunity to further deepen our engagement” and a platform for a more ambitious, inclusive, and future-directed phase of the partnership.

This year’s theme—IA Spirit – India-Africa Strategic Partnership for Innovation, Resilience, and Inclusive Transformation—captures, he said, “the essence of a relationship that goes beyond transactions and is marked by shared values, mutual respect, solidarity and collaboration.”

While Africa is portrayed as a region of immense importance to India, the MEA’s development aid budget remains tilted in favour of India’s immediate neighbours. For example, in the FY 2024–2025 budget aid^[11] for Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives amounted to approximately 2,068 crores ($248 million), 700 crores ($84 million), and 400 crores ($48 million), respectively, but only 200 crores ($24 million) were set aside for “African countries.” However, this should be viewed in the larger context. At the joint review^[12] of India–Africa cooperation undertaken in September 2019, the MEA announced that out of $10 billion allocated for the lines of credit in 2015, $6.4 billion had been committed and that, as against the promised grant assistance of $600 million, a higher sum of $700 million was committed for Africa. Besides, of the 50,000 training slots promised, 40,000 had been completed by 2019.

Yet, given the magnitude of Africa’s needs and the fact that over a decade has elapsed since the last summit, there is a compelling case for additional assistance in ample measure for Africa.

Pathways to the Summits

There is no dearth of ideas for imparting fresh momentum to strengthening this strategic partnership. Keeping in mind the next five years, and utilising the opportunity offered by the fourth summit, this author offers a five-point formula, as follows:

1. To raise the level of dialogue and cooperation with the AU, India should work to launch an annual strategic dialogue between the AU Commission chairperson and the Indian external affairs minister; a periodic dialogue between the AU foreign ministers’ troika and the Indian minister on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York on global issues; and a regular dialogue at the senior officials level between the AU Commission and the MEA on all G20-related issues.

2. Special efforts may be initiated to deepen cooperation between India and four RECs: the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

3. A candid recognition that bilateral trade and investment in the past decade have been marked by sharp fluctuations rather than steady growth is essential. Therefore, the target of $200 billion by 2030 for trade, announced by the Indian government, requires serious work and a time-bound implementation plan. Recommendations by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) to elevate economic cooperation, included in its August 2025 paper,^[13] deserve thoughtful consideration.

4. A joint strategy on critical minerals, sustainable infrastructure, and green growth will serve the interests of both sides. Hence, the plea for “an Africa–India green-industrial alliance (that) could reshape the geography of global value chains” and the need to establish “an Africa-India Critical Minerals Council (AICMC),” articulated by Lethabo Sithole,^[14] managing partner at Amila Africa, makes much sense.

5. Investment in enhancing the knowledge capital about Africa in India and about India in Africa can’t afford further delay. Financial support for scholars to visit the two geographies and the establishment of a Network of India-Africa Think Tanks (NIATT)^[15] are essential for long-term benefits. By involving key officials from both sides, this could also easily be converted into a track 1.5 dialogue.

Finally, a parting thought: India must push for holding the IAFS once every three years instead of five to project the seriousness of purpose and sustain institutional momentum.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was first published by Carnegie India.

References: 

[1] https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25980_declaration.pdf

[2] https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25980_declaration.pdf

[3] https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35322/

[4] https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/39914/QUESTION+NO+2166+STRATEGIC+PARTNERSHIP+WITH+AFRICA

[5] https://intelligence.weforum.org/topics/a1Gb0000000LGeREAW/key-issues/a1Gb00000015QoxEAE

[6] https://csep.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Africa%E2%80%93India-Blueprint-for-Growth.pdf

[7] https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39157/English_translation_of_Press_Statement_by_Prime_Minister_during_the_India__Mauritius_Joint_Press_Statement_March_12_2025

[8] https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121495&reg=3&lang=2

[9] https://ficci.in/study_details/24017

[10] https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/41074/Remarks_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_the_launch_of_Theme_Logo_and_Website_for_the_Fourth_IndiaAfrica_Forum_Summit_IAFSIV_April_23_2026

[11] http://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/RSe-4613-1-28-03-2025.pdf

[12] https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31819

[13] https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/India%20Africa%20Report%202025.pdf

[14] https://csep.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Africa%E2%80%93India-Blueprint-for-Growth.pdf

[15] https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/India-Africa-Partnership-Achievements-Challenges-and-Roadmap-2030.pdf

The post India-Africa strategic partnership needs realism appeared first on Gateway House.

The 2026 Africa-France Summit, rebranded as “Africa Forward: Africa–France Partnerships for Innovation and Growth” and held in Nairobi on May 11–12,^[i] represents one of the clearest attempts in decades to recast a historically fraught relationship. Co-hosted by Emmanuel Macron and William Ruto, the President of Kenya, the choice of Nairobi, rather than a Francophone capital, was itself a strategic statement. It signalled both a geographic and conceptual shift away from the legacy circuits of Françafrique and toward a broader, continent-wide engagement grounded in economics, technology, and new partnerships.

From the outset, the summit carried significance beyond its formal agenda. It came at a moment when France’s influence in large parts of Francophone Africa has visibly eroded, particularly in the Sahel following the withdrawal of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.^[ii] Against this backdrop, the Nairobi meeting was as much about repositioning France as it was about engaging Africa. For Kenya, meanwhile, the summit was an opportunity to project itself as a continental diplomatic hub and a gateway to African markets and innovation ecosystems.

Participation reflected this dual ambition. Around 30 African heads of state and government attended, along with representatives from the African Union, the European Union, international financial institutions, and private-sector leaders. This level of attendance showed that, despite African reservations, France still has an attraction, even if challenged by others.

The current Summit differed from earlier Summits in its themes. Traditional France-Africa Summits, held since 1973, have pursued geo-strategic collaboration. In the Cold War era, they exerted sustained influence over their former colonies, mainly through a strong grip on local leadership. Even in the post-Cold War period, summits such as those in Bamako (2005) or Dakar (2014) continued to emphasise counterterrorism, migration control, and military partnerships, particularly as jihadist threats expanded in the Sahel.

By contrast, the Nairobi summit focused on economic transformation.^[iii] Its agenda left behind the dated schema, instead prioritising investment, energy transition, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, health systems, and reform of global financial institutions. Macron announced investment commitments of roughly €23 billion ($27 billion), spanning both French and African contributions.^[iv] The emphasis was not on aid flows but on “bankable projects,” private capital mobilisation, and structural reform—especially of credit rating systems that African leaders argue unfairly inflate risk and borrowing costs.

This shift is significant. It reflects a broader change in African expectations: from dependency-orientated partnerships to those centred on capital access, industrialisation, and technological upgrading. In that sense, the Nairobi summit aligned more closely with contemporary African priorities and with global economic realities.

At the same time, the symbolism of location should not be underestimated. Hosting the summit in Kenya, the first non-Francophone African country to do so, was a deliberate break with a tradition of reinforcing a perception of exclusivity and hierarchy. Nairobi, by contrast, projected inclusivity and diversification. It also underscored Kenya’s own ambitions. Ruto used the platform to position his country as a convening centre for finance, diplomacy, and innovation, aligned with the opportunities presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Concrete outcomes further reinforced Kenya’s role as a key beneficiary.^[v] French announcements included around €1 billion in bilateral initiatives focused on development and sustainability: civilian nuclear cooperation for long-term energy security, investments in wind energy and battery storage, support for hydroelectric infrastructure and flood management, expansion of the port of Mombasa, and financing for sustainable aviation fuel production. Additional projects targeted digital connectivity, meteorological systems, agricultural resilience, and support for Kenyan export sectors such as tea.

Though it had innovative ideas, the Africa Forward Summit struggled to leap over hurdles of anxiety and mistrust.

First, the credibility gap remains substantial. The language of “partnership of equals” has featured in previous summits as well, notably in the 2017 Africa-France Summit hosted in Abidjan, but implementation has often lagged behind rhetoric. Popular sentiment in Africa is still influenced by a history of geoeconomic intervention, the basing of French troop contingents across several African countries, and economic inequality. Innovative ways will need to overcome this legacy.

Secondly, the threat of hollow diplomacy remains. Huge economic declarations and promises are often recycled without fulfillment. The Nairobi Summit sought to rectify this perception by including implementation and the role of the private entrepreneurs. Success will be measured by how many announcements will be turned into real employment-generating projects. Without such perceptible results, the summit risks becoming another overambitious adventure.^[vi]

Thirdly, the strategic context needs to be acknowledged. Unlike earlier times, when France was unique in its African engagements with few rivals, now it is one among many partners. China, India, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states have well-established programmes and cooperative ventures across Africa. With alternative models of partnership. Hence, Africa Forward can be perceived as France rising to a new challenge in the wake of its loss of strategic space in West and Central Africa. Macron’s outreach reflects adaptation to a multipolar Africa rather than a continuation of past dominance.

Finally, the summit highlighted how sensitive the politics of perception have become. A widely noticed incident in which Macron criticised a feisty audience during a discussion with youth drew varied remarks. Some saw Macron trying to keep the session in order; others saw it as a manifestation of persistent paternalism. These isolated incidents often resonate beyond their immediate context, where historical perspectives simmer.

In its new form, the Africa Forward summit shows a transitional phase. It departs from earlier France–Africa summits in three key ways: its geographic shift beyond Francophone Africa, its economic and technological focus, and its explicit, at least rhetorical, acknowledgement of African agency. At the same time, it remains constrained by structural legacies, credibility challenges, and intensifying global competition.^[vii]

Its long-term significance will depend less on its declarations and more on its outcomes. If France can genuinely recalibrate its role from dominant partner to one among many, and if promised investments materialise in ways that benefit African economies and societies, Nairobi may mark the beginning of a more balanced and pragmatic relationship. If not, it will be remembered as another well-branded summit whose aspirations outpaced its delivery.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References: 

[i] Élysée Palace. “Africa Forward: Africa-France Partnerships for Innovation and Growth Summit.” May 6, 2026. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/05/06/africa-forward-africa-france-partnerships-for-innovation-and-growth-summit

[ii] Modern Diplomacy. “Macron and Ruto Strengthen Ties at Nairobi Africa-France Summit.” May 11, 2026. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/05/11/nairobi-africa-france-summit-reflects-strategic-convergence-between-macron-and-ruto-amid-shifting-global-alliances/

[iii] Agence Française de Développement. “Africa Forward: Key Takeaways from the Nairobi Summit.” May 13, 2026. https://www.afd.fr/en/news/africa-forward-key-takeaways-nairobi-summit

[iv] Africa Forward Summit. https://africaforwardsummit.go.ke/

[v] African Business. “Africa Forward Summit Will Be Judged by What It Delivers.” May 6, 2026.
https://african.business/2026/05/trade-investment/africa-forward-summit-will-be-judged-by-what-it-delivers

[vi] Ibid (ref no 3)

The post The Africa Forward Summit appeared first on Gateway House.

Bangladesh elected a new government in February this year after former long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power in a violent mass protest on August 5, 2024. Her party, the Bangladesh Awami League, was banned from participating in this year’s election, which saw the return of the rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. Hasina has been living in India since then and talks about her plans to return to Bangladesh and revive her party’s activities there. She spoke exclusively to Nayanima Basu.

Nayanima Basu (NB): You have said you will return to Bangladesh soon. When will that be, and why have you decided to return now?

Sheikh Hasina (SH): My return is not tied to a specific date. We are working to establish a democratic environment, uphold freedom of expression, restore political rights, and reinforce the rule of law. These efforts are crucial for my return and the nation’s independence and welfare. My goal and my party’s goal are to unite the people of Bangladesh like before. My absence does not mean silence. I am continuing to fight for my country and working to bring light to the darkness we face. We are engaging diplomatically, utilising international legal frameworks, and leveraging global media to expose the conspiracy behind the removal of the Awami League government.

But to simply answer your question, I will return to Bangladesh soon. Bangladeshis know that it was me who brought democracy there.

NB: In which capacity do you plan to return? There is a ban on the Bangladesh Awami League currently, and what do you expect the current Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) will do with you?

SH: I always have worked for the welfare of people in Bangladesh, whether in government or in opposition. When we were in power, we only focused on the country’s development and the well-being of its people. Today Bangladesh is reaping the benefits of the work that I and my party did. And the people of Bangladesh can now clearly see the work we have done. Let me remind you that in 1971, the then Pakistani government also banned the Awami League. If bans could really silence the Awami League, Bangladesh would never have come into existence.

NB: Is the Awami League undergoing a leadership change? There are speculations that you may be soon stepping down as the chief of the party.

SH: The Awami League has always upheld democratic values, maintaining its core ideologies despite changes over time. As the largest political party in Bangladesh, we face both allegations as well as rumours, but our dedicated supporters—true Awami League workers—are essential to our strength.

Since August 5, 2024, state repression against our leaders and activists has escalated under the illegal interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, resulting in unprecedented attacks on our party. Despite these challenges, Awami League workers remain committed to the party, and their sacrifices will be recognised. Those abroad must also earn their place through contributions and work.

Bangladesh is currently facing a critical situation, with political and democratic rights being restricted and the judiciary misused for repression. The economy is in crisis, and the law and order situation has deteriorated, leading to rising crime and vulnerability among women, children, and minorities. As extremism resurfaces, the spirit of the Liberation War is being undermined.

This situation is not just a national issue but relates closely to global human rights and democracy. If democracy fails in Bangladesh, it will impact regional and global security. I urge democratic nations and organisations to recognise the seriousness of the situation and to support the fight for human rights and the rule of law.

To the people of Bangladesh: Keep hope alive. The Awami League is committed to restoring democracy and good governance. We will continue to fight for a prosperous, inclusive future, undeterred by oppression or false judgements. Together, we will make Bangladesh stand tall again.

No amount of threat has ever deterred me. I have always kept my head held high. The Awami League cannot be suppressed. This party lives in the hearts of the people and survives through their love. In the interest of the country and its people, the return of the Awami League is inevitable — it is only a matter of time.

NB: The current BNP government is increasingly seen to be getting close to China and Pakistan even as anti-India sentiments are rising. How do you see this?

SH: Our relationship with India is steeped in history and significance. Not only is India our neighbouring country, but its vital support in our great Liberation War is an undeniable facet of our shared past. Despite this, a troubling trend has emerged within our nation, where anti-India rhetoric has become a prominent tool wielded by anti-liberation factions and ideologically stagnant groups. These entities have exploited this narrative as one of their main political instruments, seeking to further their own agendas at the expense of national unity.

For their own petty political gains, they relentlessly propagate anti-India sentiment, creating an atmosphere of discord and misunderstanding. The illegitimate interim government led by Dr Yunus has unfortunately continued this harmful practice, perpetuating a divisive narrative rather than fostering cooperation.

Our political opponents have consistently levelled accusations against the Awami League, claiming that we are “selling the country” to India and signing agreements that undermine national interests. However, throughout the past 18 months of the interim government and under the current administration, these critics have been unable to substantiate their claims with even a single example of an agreement that could be considered detrimental to our nation. The people of Bangladesh are observant and aware, watching closely as these narratives unfold, well aware of what truly serves the interests of our country.

NB: Which are the particular agreements you are referring to?

SH: When the Awami League came to power in 1996, we signed the Indo-Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, which is coming up for renewal this year in December. In 2014, we added nearly 20,000 square kilometres of maritime territory to Bangladesh’s map through the resolution of maritime boundary disputes with India. Then came the historic Land Boundary Agreement in 2015, under which we permanently resolved the enclave issue between the two countries.

The India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline that we established is now serving as one of the key lifelines of Bangladesh’s energy sector amid the global energy crisis that has emerged due to the tensions in West Asia.

Throughout its history, the Awami League has maintained a transparent approach to foreign relations, steadfastly protecting the nation’s interests. The party has never compromised national sovereignty by entering into agreements that serve personal or foreign interests at the expense of the country’s well-being.

NB: What about apprehensions of a rise in militancy in Bangladesh?

SH: This is not only a threat to Bangladesh but also one of the greatest threats to regional and global security. Surely you remember that during the BNP-Jamaat alliance government from 2001 to 2006, Bangladesh became a safe haven for militancy.

Simultaneous bomb attacks were carried out in 63 districts of the country, and a grenade attack was launched against me. Several Awami League leaders were killed in militant attacks; judges were murdered; cultural institutions and religious places of worship were attacked. The then British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury was also targeted in a militant attack. Under state patronage, incidents such as the import of ten truckloads of illegal weapons took place.

After coming to power, we declared zero tolerance against militancy and used all our strength to free the country from extremism. Through the modernisation of law enforcement agencies, the formation of specialised anti-terror cells, and proper surveillance, we were able to control militancy.

NB: But what about the Holey Artisan Bakery attack of 2016?

SH: I acknowledge the painful reality of tragic incidents like the Holey Artisan attack that occurred during our administration. These events were rooted in intricate global conspiracies. However, we took decisive action by identifying the perpetrators, holding them accountable under the law, and ensuring that justice was served. As a result, Bangladesh transformed into a safer country, witnessing a significant reduction in the threat of militancy.

Unfortunately, after August 5, 2024, a troubling shift unfolded. Convicted top militants, previously imprisoned, were released without any substantial measures taken to apprehend those who had escaped. From the outset of the interim government, extremism began to creep back into various facets of society. Banned organisations, which once operated in the shadows, started to conduct their activities openly, brazenly challenging the rule of law. Disturbingly, many individuals previously convicted for their involvement in militancy and terrorism managed to infiltrate parliament, posing as public representatives through dubious electoral processes.

This alarming trend suggests that the dark days of 2001–2006 are looming once again, with the ominous shadow of militancy re-emerging across the country. The threat has even seeped into the ranks of our armed forces and law enforcement agencies, creating a precarious situation for national security.

Equally disconcerting is the treatment of those within law enforcement and intelligence agencies who played crucial roles in the fight against militancy. Many have been unjustly dismissed from their positions, subjected to false accusations, and continually harassed. While those once connected to militant activities are walking free and resuming their operations, the dedicated members of our security forces, who have tirelessly worked to combat these threats, are becoming targets of state-sponsored harassment. This stark contrast illustrates a disturbing reality: since August 2024, extremism has not only resurfaced but also appears to be spreading with the direct support of the state.

NB: How do you assess the current economic situation in Bangladesh under the BNP?

SH: The interim government led by Dr Yunus has drastically harmed the economy through violence and mismanagement, resulting in millions unemployed and a historic drop in foreign investment. In just one and a half years, they borrowed 373 thousand crore Taka ($30.38 billion USD), crippling the banking sector and halting development projects. The current government under Tarique Rahman continues this trend, borrowing nearly 100 thousand crore Taka ($8.1 billion USD) in just three months. Today, the economy is in dire straits, with shortages of electricity, fuel, and essential goods, causing widespread hardship.

In contrast, when the Awami League formed the government in 2009, we faced a severe economic crisis and successfully navigated it, including during the COVID pandemic as well as the challenges that came out of the Russia-Ukraine war. Our focus has always been the welfare of the people, while Yunus and Tarique Rahman have acted in their own interests, leading to the current tragic state of the country.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This interview was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

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The Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) will take place in New Delhi from 28–31 May 2026. It is a good time to assess Africa’s summitry and how India compares with Africa’s other partners in terms of intention and outcome.

Africa has long hosted summits with its external partners – 11 so far (see chart) – but some are more important than others, viz. Japan, China, the EU and India. France was the first country to host one, followed by Japan. The first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) took place in Tokyo in October 1993. Over 33 years, nine such events were held, the last being in Yokohama in August 2025.

China began its high-level diplomacy with the ministerial conference known as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), with the first conference held in Beijing in October 2000. Several African presidents attended it. The ninth iteration took place in September 2024.

The European Union (EU)-African Union (AU) summits began in Cairo in April 2000. In 25 years it held seven summits, the last one being in Luanda, Angola, in November 2025.

India was late in joining the party. It was only at the beginning of the 21st century that New Delhi began taking several initiatives concerning Africa and subsequently launched the summit programme.

The below chart is the timeline of summits between Africa and its partner countries

The following table gives an overview of the major Africa–partner summits

Source: Compiled from summit websites, joint declarations, and official press statements ^[1]

The first India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-1) was held in New Delhi in April 2008. This was followed three years later by the second summit held in Addis Ababa in May 2011. Both conferences took place with limited African participation, as determined by the Banjul Formula.^[2] This was a formula adopted by the AU in 2006, in which the AU would choose 15 African leaders, including the heads of the continent’s five regions, to attend summits.

In 2019, India reaffirmed that its engagement with Africa is comprehensive and multi-dimensional and at the IAFS-III moved away from the Banjul formula and adopted an inclusive approach by inviting the heads of all 54 African countries.^[3] Abandoning the formula was widely welcomed by the continent,^[4] and other countries too ignored it. This led to the AU leaving the door open for all leaders to attend summits such as FOCAC and TICAD.

So far, India has still held only half as many summits as Africa’s other summit partners.

The three IAFS (2008, 2011, 2015) have successfully institutionalised and elevated India-Africa ties. After the third summit, there was a consistent approach to develop and diversify cooperation with African countries. During 2014–2019, nearly 100 African leaders visited India on various missions.^[5] In August 2024, the MEA extended its Lines of Credit to 68 countries and increased it to $32 billion.^[6] The education aspect is significant; during IAFS-III (2015), India committed 50,000 training and scholarship slots over five years. By the 2019 mid-term review, over 40,000 slots had already been utilised.^[7] The upcoming summit will further cement those linkages.

The following tables break down each summit, along with their scope and outcomes.

IAFS-I 2008 outcomes^[8][9]

The First India-Africa Forum Summit, held in New Delhi in April 2008, was a landmark event. It created, for the first time, an interaction between India and Africa. Its primary purpose was to reinvigorate and redefine the decades-old partnership^[10] on a more equal and mutually beneficial footing. The summit covered a wide range of sectors, including agriculture and food security, science & technology, higher education, health, infrastructure, trade & industry, peace and security, and climate change. It also laid special emphasis on education and capacity building by announcing the C.V. Raman International Fellowship for African researchers and several academic exchange programmes, many of which continue to remain active to date.

IAFS-II 2011 outcomes^[11]

The Second India-Africa Forum Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2011, built upon the foundation of the inaugural summit. It deepened most of the initiatives proposed in 2008, while further expanding the scope of the partnership

The summit adopted the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, along with a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action. It placed greater emphasis on finance, economic cooperation, agriculture and health. 

IAFS-III 2015 outcomes^[12]

The Third India-Africa Forum Summit, held in New Delhi in October 2015, focused on stepping up the intensity of the India-Africa partnership. The emphasis was on strengthening the partnership and making it effective, result-orientated, and action-driven.

The outcomes were a mix of old and new intentions.^[13] While the summit carried forward several initiatives from previous summits, such as infrastructure development, energy and power collaboration, and education and exchange programmes, it also introduced new focus areas, including the blue economy, greater emphasis on tele-education, and stronger multilateral engagement, particularly regarding UNSC reform.

The document also mentioned space technologies, but the focus was vague and underemphasised. Overall, the summit gave renewed momentum to economic engagement.

Mid-Term Review of IAFS III 2019^[15]

The Mid-Term Review Meeting of the Strategic Cooperation Framework of the Africa-India Forum Summit III took place in New Delhi, India, from September 11-12, 2019. The meeting comprised representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs, India, a Delegation from the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and representatives of the African Diplomatic Corps, including the IAFS Committee in New Delhi, India. The meeting deliberated on the preparations for the IAFS IV to be held in 2020. Both sides underlined the need for early engagement to prepare for the next IAFS IV Summit.

The COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted Africa in healthcare and its economy.^[18][19] India came to the rescue, being a leader in providing vaccines. India provided 150 tonnes of medical aid to 25 African countries as well as supplied 24.7 million doses of Made-in-India COVID vaccines as grants and commercial and COVAX supplies to 42 countries in Africa.^[20] This reflected the health cooperation through the export of affordable low-cost generics, building of health infrastructure, providing aid and technical assistance, and hosting medical and research students and professionals.

Simultaneously, trade also picked up speed, from $66.6 billion in 2019 in bilateral trade to $89.5 billion. The outward foreign direct investment from India to Africa increased from $1. 8 billion in 2019 to $3.7 billion in 2021.^[21]

India’s focus on Africa saw a landmark development when, during India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, the AU was admitted as a full permanent member of the G20. Although this was supported by all countries, it was driven by India’s strong advocacy and effort, marking a historic milestone in India-Africa relations.

The fourth Summit is taking place after an 11-year gap, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The current context is equally daunting, with the war in the Gulf, in Europe and in several places in Africa, reflecting the challenges. Nevertheless, there are high expectations that IAFS-IV will inject fresh momentum into the partnership and deliver concrete outcomes.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

Raveena Shivashankar is the Digital Media Associate, Gateway House. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References: 

^[1] France-Africa Summit

Nkafu Policy Institute. “The African-France Summit and an Overview of Its Recommendations Since 1973.” https://nkafu.org/the-african-france-summit-and-an-overview-of-its-recommendations-since-1973/

Africa Forward Summit. Africa Forward Summit. https://africaforwardsummit.go.ke/

TICAD

Tokyo International Conference on African Development. “TICAD’s History.” https://www.ticad8.tn/content/2/ticads-history

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).” https://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/pagewe_000001_00054.html

AU-EU Summit

European External Action Service. “Looking Back at Key Moments over 25 Years of AU-EU Partnership.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/looking-back-key-moments-over-25-years-au-eu-partnership_en

Council of the European Union. Joint Declaration of the African Union-European Union Summit. Brussels: European Council, 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/5tdhb1f4/joint-declaration_au-eu-summit.pdf

Council of the European Union. “EU–African Union Summit, 24–25 November 2025.” European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/11/24-25/

FOCAC

Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. “Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.” http://www.focac.org/eng/ljhy_1/dyjbzjhy_1/CI12009/

India-Africa Forum Summit

India-Africa Forum Summit. “About.” https://www.iafs2026.in/about/

Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. Joint Press Statement: Mid-Term Review of India-Africa Forum Summit III. Addis Ababa, 2019. https://eoiaddisababa.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/FINAL-Joint-Press-Statement-Mid-Term-Review-of-IAFS-III-12092019.pdf

Africa-Turkey Summit

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Türkiye and the African Union.” https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-and-the-african-union.en.mfa

Korea-Africa Summit

African Development Bank. “2024 Korea-Africa Summit.” https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/events/2024-korea-africa-summit-71032

Italy-Africa Summit

Italian Institute for International Political Studies. “The Mattei Plan after the Addis Ababa Italy-Africa Summit.”  https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/mattei-plan-after-addis-ababa-italy-africa-summit

^[2] Institute for Security Studies. “How to Rationalise Africa’s Many Partnerships.” PSC Insights. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/how-to-rationalise-africas-many-partnerships

^[3] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Question No. 451: Relooking India’s Africa Policy.” Rajya Sabha. https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/31002/QUESTION+NO451+RELOOKING+INDIAS+AFRICA+POLICY

^[4] Gateway House. “Key Developments in India’s Approach to Africa.” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/key-developments-indias-approach-africa/

^[5] ibid (reference no. 4)

^[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Lines of Credit for Development Projects.” https://www.mea.gov.in/Lines-of-Credit-for-Development-Projects.htm

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “India-Africa Bilateral Documents.” https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31819

^[8] Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. “Delhi Declaration: India-Africa Forum Summit 2008.” https://eoiaddisababa.gov.in/delhi-declaration-india-africa-forum-summit-2008/

^[9] India-Africa Forum Summit. “India-Africa Framework for Cooperation 2008.” Accessed May 14, 2026. https://www.iafs2026.in/document/india-africa-framework-for-cooperation-2008/

^[10] Bhatia, Rajiv. India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons. New Delhi: Routledge India, 2022.

^[11] India-Africa Forum Summit. “Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.” https://www.iafs2026.in/document/africa-india-framework-for-enhanced-cooperation/

^[12] India-Africa Forum Summit. India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation. 2026. https://deviafs.negd.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/India-Africa-Framework-for-Strategic-Cooperation.pdf

^[13] ibid (reference no. 10)

^[14] Tripartite Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme. “Member States Overview.” https://tttfp.org/member-states-overview/

^[15] ibid (reference no. 7)

^[16] African Union. “African Continental Free Trade Area.” https://au.int/en/african-continental-free-trade-area

^[17] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Official Launch of eVidyaBharti and eArogyaBharti Project by External Affairs Minister.” October 9, 2019. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31928/Official+Launch+of+eVidyaBharti+and+eArogyaBharti+Project+by+External+Affairs+Minister+October+09+2019%20

^[18] German Institute for Global and Area Studies. “Africa after the COVID-19 Lockdowns: Economic Impacts and Prospects.” https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/africa-after-the-covid-19-lockdowns-economic-impacts-and-prospects

^[19] World Trade Organization. “The Effect of COVID-19 on the Economies of Africa.” In Strengthening Africa’s Capacity to Trade, chapter 2. Geneva: WTO, 2021. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/strengthening_africas_ch_02_the_effect_of_covid_19_on_the_economies_of_africa_e.pdf

^[20] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “India Supplies Medicines to African Countries.” April 2020. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32675/India_supplies_medicines_to_African_Countries

^[21] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “COVID-19 Slashes Foreign Direct Investment in Africa by 16%.” June 18, 2020. https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-slashes-foreign-direct-investment-africa-16

The post Stacking up the India-Africa summits appeared first on Gateway House.

Rajiv Bhatia with Aung San Suu Kyi Naypyidaw in 2013

Myanmar’s complex experiment with limited democracy (2011–21) was derailed by the military coup on 1 February 2021. A five-year-long nightmare, marked by violent internal conflicts, instability, and economic stagnation, followed. After the imperfect elections held between December 2025 and January 2026, a new government led by President Min Aung Hlaing assumed charge on 10 April 2026. Thus, yet another chapter opens in the nation’s vexed history at a time when the Resistance forces control a sizeable segment of territory and clashes between them and the Tatmadaw, the military, continue unabated. Will it be a new dawn bringing peace, stability, and development, or will the political divide persist?

Pondering over this conundrum, memories flood my mind about my three-decade-long association with a country with two names – Burma, which became Myanmar in 1989.

Arrival

It was a humid day in June 2002 when my ageing mother, wife, and I landed at Yangon airport, having travelled from Kolkata on an Indian Airlines flight. As the ambassador-designate, I was warmly received by protocol officials and embassy colleagues. I noticed that the VIP lounge was filled with people and was happy to discover that they all were ambassadors of their countries stationed in Yangon who had come to welcome the latest addition to the local diplomatic corps. A delightful but rare tradition, it heralded my joining a new family of fellow students of Myanmar affairs.

The drive from the airport gave us the first glimpse of the capital’s best-known landmark — the Shwedagon Pagoda. Upon arrival at India House, our home for the next three years, I was aware it ranked among the finest properties that the government of India had anywhere in the world. Designed in the Victorian style — oversized rooms, lofty ceilings, massive columns, and a large portico with a huge terrace — it took you back to the golden days of the British Raj. With its white colour glistening brilliantly in sunlight, the building was popularly known as the “White House of Yangon”. Months later, the German ambassador told me, “You know, every time we have guests from Germany, we bring them in our car to show them the India House from the outside.”

Two colours enjoyed special significance: olive green and orange. The first represented the Tatmadaw, which has ruled the country since independence, except for a little over a decade in the beginning. The orange symbolised Buddhism in a country with an overwhelming majority of Theravada adherents. Pretty pagodas, young monks in ochre robes going around in a neat line every morning for alms, and Buddhist rituals were a natural part of the local landscape. But we also found that the Burmese were adept at incorporating Hindu rituals and traditions of Nats (spirits) worship into their day-to-day life. Largely, people seemed at ease, despite underdevelopment and a precarious political situation.

Flashback

Earlier during the 1990s, I visited Myanmar at least on three occasions in my capacity as the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, handling relations with four neighbours — Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Myanmar, from 1991 to 1994. My first familiarisation tour made it clear how strained relations between Yangon and Delhi had become due to India’s full-fledged support for the failed democracy movement.

This triggered a policy review, which resulted in India adopting a new “Two-track” policy to build and sustain cooperative relations with the military government and to continue extending moral and political support to the cause of democracy while refraining from interference in the country’s internal affairs. Subsequent visits in the august company of Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit and Home Secretary N.N. Vohra formed part of the government’s endeavours to implement the new policy. These efforts produced tangible results at the right time, paving the way for a substantial upgradation of the bilateral relationship.

The soundness and durability of the “Two-track” policy are now well established. It remains in operation after over 35 years. The latest visit by an Indian dignitary, Kirti Vardhan Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, to Myanmar to attend the inauguration of the new president affirms this policy.

Ambassadorial Tenure

Serving as Ambassador from 2002 to 2005, I discovered a country at peace with itself, even though its security and political challenges were yet to be resolved on a lasting basis. Ethnic insurgencies persisted in the northern and eastern border regions. The struggle for democracy continued, with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi spending most of her years under house arrest. Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), governed the country with a firm hand, ensuring stability and security, while limiting economic development and assuring the people that a new constitution was being prepared. Eventually, it emerged in 2008. The nation had to wait for another couple of years before general elections were held in November 2010. They cleared the way for a new governance model of shared authority between elected civilian leaders and the military from April 2011.

Rajiv Bhatia presents his credentials to Senior General Than Shwe, then head of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), in Yangon in 2002.

Meanwhile, our diplomatic efforts to strengthen India-Myanmar relations began to bear fruit. In my time, four ministerial visits contributed handsomely to this process, two from the NDA government (Arun Jaitley and Arun Shourie) and two from the UPA government (Mani Shankar Aiyar and Natwar Singh). This underlined bipartisan support in India and a widely shared perception of Myanmar’s importance. It has been a vital neighbour for us in terms of security and development in the Northeastern states, our Look/Act East Policy, and our geopolitical competition with China. Myanmar too, has been an active participant in this process due to its keenness to pursue an independent foreign policy and to keep its options open without being excessively dependent on a single power.

Two high points of my tenure were the visits to Myanmar by Vice President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat in November 2003 and the state visit to India by SPDC Chairman Than Shwe in October 2004. Shekhawat was the highest-level visit since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in 1987. Then Shwe’s visit took place after a 24-year lapse; General Ne Win visited India in November 1980. Shekhawat expressed satisfaction with “the multifaceted relationship”. His host, General Maung Aye, observed that Myanmar remained grateful for the cooperation extended by India in various domains.

The SPDC Chairman’s visit to India in 2004 was a milestone. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit conveyed Myanmar’s willingness to help India address security challenges in the border region. On the other hand, it articulated India’s interest in a democratic Myanmar while clarifying that it was for Myanmar to bring in democracy. The private time I spent and the informal conversations I had with the Senior General, while accompanying him to Agra, Bangalore, and Kolkata, were illuminating about his personality and background as well as the peculiar way he related to and discovered India.

The Other Side

True to our calibrated policy, we kept in touch with the democracy camp, supporting and encouraging it as much as we could. Within weeks of my arrival in Yangon, I had an opportunity to meet Daw Suu Kyi at the residence of the US chargé d’affaires. Later, she was confined to spend much of her time under house arrest at her historic residence, No. 54–56, University Avenue, Yangon.

I was permitted to call on her there on 30 January 2003, a rare privilege. She gave me a cup of tea and her undivided attention. We discussed many aspects of the situation in Myanmar and its external relations, especially its ties with India. I mentioned the significance of the date and timing of our meeting, the precise hour when the people of India observed silence to remember the Father of the Nation. She remembered Tees, January, Marg in New Delhi, the road near which was located the official residence of her mother, who served as Burma’s Ambassador to India. Years later, I met her again when she was free, an MP, and on the way to securing power and becoming the State Counselor and de facto Premier.

Parting Thought

As I watched President Min Aung Hlaing deliver his inaugural address before the newly elected Parliament on 10 April on television, I wished him and the people of Myanmar well. My thoughts also went to the lady who lost her freedom again, on 1 February 2021, and has been in prison or under house arrest since then. She is 80 now and is reportedly ailing. There is little reason to believe that her popularity with her people has declined, although several political activists seem to think that the nation has moved on. The uncontestable fact is that she remains the best-known name and face of Myanmar.

When the military, the democracy camp, and the Resistance forces can find a modus vivendi for the benefit of their people, Myanmar will enter a new era of hope, stability, and progress, rejuvenating its great ASEAN family.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was first published in India’s World, Volume 2 (Issue 5), May, 2026.

The post Leaves from my Myanmar diary appeared first on Gateway House.

Transcript

Manjeet Kripalani (MK): For the first time in India, one party is in power in all of East India. This has implications for India’s foreign policy, particularly on our eastern flank. What are those implications, and what can we expect?

Harsh Shringla (HS): At least for Bengal, this is the first time in 50 years, that both the centre and the state were in sync. The last time was in 1976. Today we have a historic situation where West Bengal finally has a government that can deliver, works for the people and is in sync with the central government, and so a lot of decisions that impinge not only on development in the state but also on our international relations and our neighbourhood first and our Act East policy will finally be able to come into effect.

One of the examples I can give you is the river water sharing. There was so much resistance from Mamata Banerjee (former chief minister of West Bengal), not on substantive terms but just for the sake of opposing anything that the centre did which would take our country forward. She had a lot of reticence on issues she could not understand, and she did not allow any progress on either the Ganges water treaty and its renewal – which is now expected at the end of the year – or on the Teesta river water sharing or even on the plan to develop the Teesta basin on the Bangladesh side of our border. That’s just one example.

Border fencing, for example – we have a serious issue of infiltration, and North Bengal especially is very, very sensitive from a security standpoint. But despite that, I think she did not provide the land necessary for border fencing to be constructed, and that impeded our efforts to completely seal the border and, with fencing, make us better neighbours from that point of view. So, there are many such examples, whether it is with Bangladesh or whether it is Nepal. I remember even initiatives in Nepal were blocked because of the attitude of the Trinamool government under Mamata Banerjee.

Don’t forget the Bhutan border also with Jaigarh and Phuentsholing, that border is also an important border. The Darjeeling constituency itself has three international borders as we discussed the last time we met with Nepal on the west, Bhutan on the east and Bangladesh in the south. And if you go a little further north over Sikkim, you also come to the border with Tibet and China. So, it is a very, very strategically important area which gives a country access to our own northeastern region. I would say it is the international crossroads between India and a number of our neighbours.

That is the salience of North Bengal.

But all this has changed. A Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government coming into Bengal with a full plethora of developmental tools and resources at its disposal will not only change the face of Bengal but will also change the way we work and cooperate with our immediate neighbours.

MK: The BJP has said that within 45 days, the fencing work will begin and be in progress. What are the other things that are being done now to prepare Bengal to be this new outward-looking region, to prepare it for the new world that awaits?

HS: One of the areas that the BJP manifesto focused on was the development of logistics and infrastructure. Whether it is ports, highways, airports, or railways, very strong infrastructure development that extends also to roads that are not national highways, PWD roads, or the smaller roads and that connectivity also have an impact. The development of Kolkata Port and Haldia Port – these are very, very important gateways, not only to Bangladesh and Myanmar but also to the rest of Southeast Asia.

And for Nepal also, Kolkata Port is the designated port through which all Nepal’s imports and exports go. The development of logistics and the infrastructure will benefit all our neighbours and stimulate trade and investment relations and economic relations with our neighbours. And from that perspective, it will make a lot of difference.

Another idea that just came up was fisheries. West Bengal is a state that has an abundance of water. It has a coastline, it has rivers, it has lakes. But yet, when you go to buy fish in the market, the fish has to be from Andhra Pradesh or Gujarat. West Bengal does not produce enough fish even to feed its own population. But there is a huge potential, Rs. 65,000 crores’ worth of marine products exports. With investment in cold storage chains, with investments in marine processing, aquaculture, and fish culture, West Bengal can be a major contributing factor to seafood exports across the world.

And all of these developmental activities have a certain benefit even for our neighbours. One thing I omitted to mention in infrastructure was also the development of pipelines and transmission lines. These connectivity issues are not just in road and railway but also in energy in terms of high-speed internet. All of these areas can now come up very, very quickly, with West Bengal taking the lead as the gateway not only to Northeast India, but  to our neighbours across our immediate area.

MK: Till investors start feeling confident, will the funding come from the central government initially and then maybe domestic funders and finally foreign funders? Or is there already an interest from international investors?

HS: My own sense is that there’s been a huge mismanagement of funds. We’ve seen a number of scams that have taken place in West Bengal, the Narada-Sarada Chit Fund scams, the education scams, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act scams. The entire system will have to be overhauled. And we have to make sure that the buck goes a much longer way. It goes where it should be going, which is to the people of Bengal. So, if the finance is available from the state of Bengal, it should be much better managed and streamlined.

In addition to this, the central government will have to infuse, at least in the initial period, a certain measure of funds that can enable rapid, accelerated economic development in line with the expectations of the people but also to compensate for 50 years of the lack of a complete lack of development, especially in northern India.

And of course, I’ve been speaking to certain interests. The Japanese were here recently at very senior levels. They had expressed a lot of interest that if circumstances are conducive for foreign investments,

They have an Act East forum that we share with Japan. They’re very interested in investing in West Bengal. There are many other countries that would be interested in looking at the potential that investor-friendly Bengal can offer. And there is going to be a huge difference in the way private investors, not just foreign direct investment, but investors, and also our own domestic industry will be looking at Bengal.

After all, Bengal was one of the most industrialised states of India. Today, it’s one of the least industrialised. It’s gone from a state that people used to come to in search of employment, but it’s now become a state where people have to go out of Bengal to find employment. So, we have to reverse that trend. We have to reverse that tide and bring back industry, bring back manufacturing, bring back jobs, bring back the service sector, and revitalise Bengal’s economy.

MK: Bengal also has to bring back the talent that has been leaving for the past 50 years.

HS: Oh, absolutely. Talent from Bengal is all over India now. Wherever you go, you know, very, very bright. Bengali minds are making that difference. And many of them, who are too comfortable, may not want to go back. So, we have to create the right conditions for them to get back and to be able to contribute in their own home area.

Harsh Vardhan Shringla is a Member of Parliament and former Foreign Secretary of India.

Manjeet Kripalani is the Executuve Director at Gateway House. 

This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.

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For decades, the digital world operated under a silent consensus: Silicon Valley provided the code, and the rest of the world provided the data. But as artificial intelligence (AI) evolves from a convenient novelty into the very nervous system of national governance, that era of technological dependence is reaching a volatile end.

In New Delhi, the conversation has shifted from “digital adoption” to “digital swaraj“—a demand for absolute technological self-reliance. The national discourse is shifting from data sovereignty to a more expansive technological sovereignty. The urgency of this shift was laid bare earlier this month with the release of Mythos AI in the U.S. in April this year.

Developed by Anthropic, Mythos is not just another chatbot; it is an autonomous cybersecurity sentinel capable of identifying “zero-day” vulnerabilities across entire operating systems without human intervention. While its creators champion it as a defensive breakthrough, for India, it represents a systemic digital threat.

When an external entity holds a “master key” to global software vulnerabilities, a nation’s financial and critical infrastructure is only as secure as a foreign corporation’s goodwill.

India’s response is rooted in its unique Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). Unlike the closed ecosystems of the West or the state-monitored walls of China, India’s “India Stack”—comprising Aadhaar, UPI, Direct Benefit Transfers, and the newer ONDC—treats technology as a public good. This foundation is now being leveraged to build a “Sovereign AI” stack. According to a recent KPMG report (2026),^[1] India is developing a national 38,000-GPU compute pool and indigenous 2nm chip designs to ensure that the “brains” of its AI do not reside on foreign servers.

India’s farsighted goal is a hybrid model where global innovation meets local control, where interoperable technologies meet local needs, and where globally standardised digital products and services meet domestic laws and customs. If proved robust and reliable, it can be a model for many countries of the Global South that fall between the U.S. private structures and the Chinese state-led ones.

This infrastructure is being fortified by a sophisticated new legal architecture. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2024, safeguards the privacy and data of Indians. The IT Rules (Amendment) of February 2026 represents a decisive break from “intermediary neutrality”. a legal and technical principle that treats online service providers (such as search engines and social media platforms) as passive conduits, not responsible for the content uploaded by their users, provided they do not initiate transmission, select the recipient, or modify the information. This is also called the ‘safe harbour’ protection under the IT Act, 2000, which ensures that platforms are not treated as publishers or speakers of third-party content.^[2]

The law now mandates a three-hour takedown window for AI-generated misinformation and requires “traceability metadata” for all synthetically generated content. This is a vast improvement over the previous 36-hour window for social media platforms to remove unlawful content (on grounds such as national security, public order, or decency) after ‘actual knowledge’ of it was received.^[3]

Slashing the response time for deepfakes by 92% – which are still actively proliferating in India due to a massive surge in the technical sophistication of AI-generated content reaching millions of social media users within minutes after being uploaded – will give respite to victims of malicious digital content.^[4] Even with a mandated 3-hour takedown window, the damage from online viral velocity is often swift and severe.

India is asserting that its digital borders are as real – and as defensible – as its physical ones. India’s DPI is designed to counter private AI architectures by shifting the balance of power from proprietary, closed-loop systems to open, interoperable, and citizen-centric frameworks. While private AI architectures often rely on data monopolies and vendor lock-in, the DPI model aims to democratise technology by providing shared building blocks that anyone can use to innovate.

India’s ambitions of being the provider of alternative solutions from Big Tech (whose solutions may not be in congruence with the priorities of developing countries) extend beyond its own borders. At the India AI Impact Summit 2026, the message to the Global South was clear: you no longer have to choose between “digital colonisation” and digital isolation. By offering its DPI and low-cost AI models to over 45 countries, India is positioning itself as the “provider of choice” for nations that want to modernise without surrendering their data sovereignty to trillion-dollar tech giants.

The path forward is not about isolationism but about algorithmic accountability. For India, Sovereign AI is not merely a technical milestone; it is the ultimate safeguard of national interest in an age where the greatest weapon is not a missile but a line of code.

Ashish Bharadwaj is the Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education, Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

[1] KPMG International (2026): “Sovereign AI and National Security: Strengthening autonomy in critical systems.”

[2] Several countries are in various stages of legislation that makes platforms pay for the content they take from publishers. In May 2026, Australia’s News Bargaining Incentive becomes law, forcing platforms to pay Australian news publishers. Brazil is at the forefront of the movement to balance the rights of content creators and AI developers; it has compensation mechanisms in its legislative bill. The EU AI Act will be implemented in August, focusing on transparency and identifying AI systems that are high risk. India is seriously considering the payment model. It is mindful to balance the need for locally relevant data to train Indian AI models against pressure from the creative and news industries to be paid for providing data used to train LLMs.

[3] Categories of highly sensitive content, such as non-consensual intimate imagery and victim-centric complaints, had a faster mandated removal time of 24 hours.

[4] The speed of regulation is currently being outpaced by the volume of creation. Women are increasingly becoming victims of deepfakes and other forms of technology-facilitated digital violence.

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