Twelve weeks can change the mood dramatically in bilateral relations. From April 7, when Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman visited Delhi, driving directly from the airport to National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s office for a fruitful discussion and dinner, to August 5, when former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina delivered an audio address to her constituents at home via New Delhi’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club – the innate volatility of India-Bangladesh relations was on full display.

Just four months ago, the two governments seemed determined to move beyond the difficulties faced during the two-year transition led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh and begin a new chapter. But as Hasina, who was given refuge in India, announced her intention to return to Bangladesh in December 2026 and her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, called Bangladesh “another Pakistan”, the relationship plummeted to a low level, requiring an emergency response from the two governments.

The stakes in a healthy and stable equation are high for both Delhi and Dhaka. The compulsions of geography, history, economy, culture, and strategic interests apply to both sides. The 4,096-km-long border creates constraints and opportunities for the two countries. Against this backdrop, building and strengthening a coalition of interests between realists and pragmatists on both sides of the border is essential to prevent instability and deterioration.

There were fears that the April election outcomes in Assam and West Bengal might have repercussions for ties with Bangladesh. The issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh assumed a new urgency and poignancy. The media played up every incident. The decision made in April to commence sector-wise discussions on major issues through bilateral mechanisms was not followed up. Meanwhile, Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman chose to pay his first foreign visits to Malaysia and China in June 2026, giving fresh ammunition to Bangladesh critics on the Indian side, who argued that he had other priorities.

Sheikh Hasina’s press conference lit a fuse. The Bangladesh government made strong démarches, both before and after it. It was one thing for Delhi to go slow and correctly on Bangladesh’s request for Hasina’s extradition, but quite another to allow her to use a platform in Delhi to denounce the government in Dhaka. It was appropriate for the Indian foreign ministry spokesman to say that Delhi did not “endorse” what she said at the press conference, nor was it involved in arranging the event. However, observers wondered whether the Indian side did enough to persuade Hasina to shelve the conference or convince the host to cancel it in view of Dhaka’s objections and its likely adverse impact on relations with India.

Fortunately, political leaders and senior officials on both sides quickly recognised the damage and seemed aware of the need for prompt remedial action. The calls by the Indian high commissioner Dinesh Trivedi on the Bangladeshi PM, foreign minister, and home minister in Dhaka, followed soon thereafter by his hurried visit to Delhi to brief the government, were clearly indicative of the urgency and fragility of the situation.

Two specific issues drew public attention.

First, Dhaka requested that the extradition of Sheikh Hasina (and other fugitives) be expedited. In response, India reiterated that the request was under examination in accordance with established processes. Experts knew that it was bound to take time, and compliance may be difficult due to a combination of legal, political and psychological factors. But was it possible to offer an assurance that the 5 August-type press conference would not be repeated?

Second, India renewed the invitation to PM Tarique Rahman to visit India for a bilateral state visit and also to participate in the BRICS Summit in September as the chair of BIMSTEC. For a while last week, it appeared that officials would find mutually convenient dates, even though the Indian side preferred dates in September and the Bangladesh side wanted dates in August. Somehow, Dhaka’s key suggestion that a more favourable environment might first be created for the visit was missed by the media and others. Was it laying down a precondition for the PM’s visit to India? If so, this approach was certain to complicate matters. An impasse resulted, throwing a blanket of uncertainty on this important visit, which alone can clear the air and unleash the process of holding meetings of all bilateral mechanisms, as agreed earlier.

Beyond these immediate issues are the questions about the kind of relationship Bangladesh desires to develop with the U.S., China and Pakistan. The Trump administration’s approach to South Asia seems to leave considerable scope for better relations between the U.S. and Bangladesh. Delhi will need to be on guard to ensure that this does not adversely affect India’s interests. Pakistan has gained more than a foothold in Bangladesh as radical and fundamentalist forces secured a significant edge during and after the Yunus transition. The front line of defence against them will have to be the moderate and secular forces in Bangladesh itself. Despite the setbacks it has faced, the Awami League remains a pivotal political force, helping the nation define itself as a blend of its Bengali and Islamic identities.

As for China, Bangladesh remains drawn to the advantages it expects to benefit from cooperation with Beijing. But this can be balanced by India’s multipronged approach to economic cooperation and fair river water-sharing. Delhi did it successfully before and is undoubtedly capable of doing it again, so long as Bangladesh is conscious of the need to respect India’s red lines on security and strategic sensitivity.

On regional cooperation, it should be possible to align the two countries’ positions. Reports suggest Dhaka’s interest in efforts to revive SAARC. Such enthusiasm, if it existed, must be diminishing by the day amid the fast-changing military scenarios in West Asia. How the Mecca Accord or ‘Islamic NATO’ might sit with SAARC is a question Dhaka needs to ponder.

On the other hand, there are incipient fears of attempts by certain countries (such as Pakistan) to persuade Dhaka to join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Is Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Tarique Rahman a pointer in that direction?

The compulsions closer to home are enormous. India and Bangladesh have much to gain by cooperating closely to turn BIMSTEC into a truly effective and forward-looking regional grouping. The seductive concept of the Bay of Bengal Community promises to be a major magnet for all BIMSTEC nations, especially Bangladesh.

The pathway to a cordial and cooperative relationship between India and Bangladesh must be anchored in a clear-cut recognition of mutual sensitivities and deep pragmatism. As M. Riaz Hamidullah, Bangladesh’s high commissioner in Delhi, observed recently: “India is one country with which we share an organic relationship.” Dhaka should know well where India’s red lines lie. India will then be willing to go halfway.

Political headwinds will surely make the task difficult. The challenge for diplomacy is to find the sweet spot before it is too late.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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Over the past decade, India has developed a large-scale digital public infrastructure ecosystem built around interoperable digital systems and shared digital infrastructure. The ecosystem encompasses foundational and sectoral infrastructures across areas including identity, payments, data exchange and public services and has increasingly been discussed as a model of population-scale digital infrastructure.^[1]

The relationship between this infrastructure and artificial intelligence has become increasingly relevant to India’s technology policy. Recent scholarship has conceptualised this relationship in two broad directions: “AI for DPI”, in which AI is used to improve public digital infrastructure and services, and “DPI for AI”, in which digital public infrastructure may contribute to the conditions for AI development.^[2] India’s policy environment increasingly reflects the importance of infrastructure and data to domestic AI capability. Recent government policy discussions have also highlighted the role of digital public infrastructure and open digital networks in supporting the deployment of AI applications across sectors such as healthcare, agriculture and public services.^[3]

This growing policy importance, however, also raises questions about whether and under what conditions data associated with public digital systems can be responsibly used for AI development. The existence of large-scale DPI does not by itself make data generated or processed through such systems publicly available or open for AI development. Where such data constitutes personal data, its processing must have a lawful basis under the applicable data-protection framework, including consent or a recognised legitimate use under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.^[4] The relevance and availability of DPI-associated data for AI development must therefore be assessed in relation to the nature of the dataset, the legal basis for its processing, and the particular purpose for which its use is proposed.

The central question is which governance concerns arise when data associated with India’s Digital Public Infrastructure is considered for indigenous AI development, and how can these concerns be addressed? DPI can certainly contribute to indigenous AI development, but doing so requires governance frameworks capable of addressing the risks that arise when data generated through public digital systems acquire new technological and economic uses.

India’s policy initiatives increasingly recognise the importance of data and digital infrastructure to the country’s AI ambitions. The IndiaAI Mission, approved by the Union Cabinet in March 2024 with an outlay of $1 billion (₹10,371.92 crore) over five years, includes initiatives relating to datasets and the development of indigenous AI capabilities. ^[5] AIKosh, the IndiaAI datasets platform, provides access to datasets, models, toolkits and other AI resources, including assessments relating to the AI-readiness of datasets.^[6]

Image Credits: Gateway House

These initiatives build on India’s existing digital public infrastructure ecosystem, which has developed to support a range of governance, welfare and service-delivery functions. The emerging AI policy agenda adds a further dimension by considering how such infrastructure and appropriately governed data can contribute to domestic AI capacity. Digital public infrastructure and open digital networks can provide the interoperable systems through which data is generated, standardised and exchanged across sectors. This is particularly relevant to AI applications in areas such as healthcare, agriculture and public services, where locally generated and contextually relevant data may contribute to the development of systems better suited to Indian conditions. ^[7]

India’s emerging AI governance framework similarly identifies improved data availability and sharing, locally relevant datasets, enhanced data governance and the integration of AI with digital public infrastructure as important components of the country’s AI ecosystem. The significance of DPI, therefore, lies not merely in the volume of data it generates but in the possibility of transforming appropriately governed DPI-associated data into a resource for indigenous AI research and development.

This transition, however, changes the governance question. Data generated through DPI was not necessarily collected or structured with AI training and research as its original purpose. As such data acquires new uses and value, the conditions governing access to it become increasingly important.

What, then, are the conditions for responsible DPI-to-AI integration? The transition from DPI-associated data to AI development cannot be governed by data availability alone. It raises distinct but interconnected questions concerning the subsequent use of personal data, access to resources necessary for AI development, and the implications of expanded state analytical capacity.

Three concerns are particularly relevant: privacy, competition and access, and state accountability.

Privacy and secondary use:

The integration of DPI-associated data into AI development raises a fundamental question on whether data processed for one specified purpose can subsequently be used as an input for AI development without adequate safeguards governing that new use. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, makes the purpose of processing legally significant. Where processing is based on consent, section 6 requires that consent relate to a specified purpose and that the personal data processed be limited to what is necessary for that purpose.^[8] The India AI Governance Guidelines similarly identify unresolved questions concerning the application of data-protection principles to AI development, including the treatment of publicly available personal data, the compatibility of collection and purpose limitation with modern AI systems, and the scope of research and “legitimate use” exceptions.^[9]

The issue, therefore, is not whether DPI-associated data should be categorically unavailable for AI development. Rather, its movement from public digital systems into AI development requires a legal basis and safeguards appropriate to the purpose for which it is subsequently used. The India AI Governance Guidelines accordingly recommend measures including privacy-enhancing technologies, machine unlearning and algorithmic auditing as potential approaches to mitigating AI-related risks.^[10] The objective should thus not be simply to maximise the volume of data available for AI training but to enable its responsible use while preserving the privacy and accountability conditions governing its processing.

On competition and access:

The use of DPI-associated data for indigenous AI also raises a question of access. If data generated or accumulated through public digital systems becomes an input into AI development, the terms on which such data is made available may affect who is able to participate in developing AI systems. This does not mean that DPI-associated data should automatically be treated as an open resource. Personal data, confidential information and other legally protected material must remain subject to restrictions on access and use.

The competition question instead arises where data can legitimately be made available for AI development: whether its institutional design permits meaningful access to a sufficiently broad range of actors rather than creating unnecessary barriers to participation.

The issue is not confined to data. India’s Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology identified inadequate datasets and limited computing facilities among the fundamental barriers to deploying AI at scale in India.^[11] In parallel, the IndiaAI Mission has developed shared compute infrastructure. More than 38,000 GPUs have been onboarded through 14 empanelled service providers, with access made available to start-ups, researchers, academic institutions and government organisations.^[12] This provides an example of policy intervention aimed at widening access to computational resources needed for AI development.

For DPI-to-AI integration, therefore, the relevant competition concern is not universal access to every DPI dataset, but the design of access to resources that can lawfully and appropriately contribute to AI development. Where DPI-associated data is suitable for such use, questions of accessibility, interoperability and the terms of access become part of the governance framework surrounding its transition into an AI resource. The objective should be to ensure that public digital infrastructure can contribute to indigenous AI development without unnecessarily restricting participation in the ecosystem that it is intended to support.

Regarding state surveillance and accountability:

The integration of DPI with AI also raises questions about expanding state analytical capacity. DPI should not be characterised as an AI-enabled surveillance system merely because it facilitates the collection and exchange of digital information. However, increasingly capable AI systems may allow public authorities to analyse and draw inferences from such information at a greater scale, making corresponding safeguards necessary.

The Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence provides an important framework. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India, the Court recognised that an infringement of privacy must satisfy requirements of legality, a legitimate state aim and proportionality.^[13] These principles are relevant to AI-enabled uses of DPI because technological capability alone cannot justify a particular use of personal information. For the DPI-to-AI transition, expanded analytical capacity must therefore be accompanied by defined purposes, lawful authority, proportionality and institutional oversight. AI governance mechanisms may supplement these safeguards but should not replace the constitutional constraints governing state action.

India’s transition from Digital Public Infrastructure to indigenous AI should not be understood simply as an effort to make more data available for AI development. The more important question is how data associated with public digital systems can be brought into new technological uses without weakening the legal and institutional safeguards that govern its collection, access and use.

The objective, therefore, should not be to maximise the conversion of DPI-associated data into AI resources. It should be to establish conditions under which such data can be used where legally and appropriately justified, with access structured responsibly and the exercise of state power remaining subject to meaningful safeguards. If India can develop this balance, DPI can contribute to indigenous AI not merely through the data and infrastructure it makes available but through a governance framework capable of sustaining innovation alongside privacy, participation and public accountability. This model will resonate with other countries which are seeking DPI with AI for their own systems.

Ashish Bharadwaj is Pro Vice Chancellor of WPU Goa and Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education at Gateway House.

Nada Shawl is a student at BITS Law School.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References: 

[1] “Center for Digital Public Goods, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Report on the State of Digital Public Infrastructure in India 2025, Bangalore: CDPG, IIMB, 2025. https://www.iimb.ac.in/cdpg/pdf/State-India-DPI_Report.pdf.

[2] Sengupta, Amrita, Alexandre Costa Barbosa, and Mila T. Samdub. “Understanding Interrelationships between AI and Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) in India and Brazil,” The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), no. 35 (2025): 1–11.

[3] Press Information Bureau, “India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation.” Government of India, February 15, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2228315&reg=48&lang=2.

[4] Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 4.

[5] Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Approves Ambitious IndiaAI Mission to Strengthen the AI Innovation Ecosystem,” Government of India, March 7, 2024. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2012355&reg=48&lang=2.

[6] Press Information Bureau, “MeitY launches AIKosha,” Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, March 6, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2108961&reg=48&lang=2.

[7] Press Information Bureau, “India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation,” Government of India, February 15, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2228315&reg=48&lang=2.

[8] Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, s 6(1).

[9] Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. India AI Governance Guidelines: Enabling Safe and Trusted AI Innovation. New Delhi: Government of India, November 2025. https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/nov/doc2025115685601.pdf.

[10] Ibid.

[11] PRS Legislative Research, “Impact of Emergence of AI and Related Issues,” Standing Committee Report Summary, New Delhi: PRS Legislative Research, 2026. https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/impact-of-emergence-of-ai-and-related-issues.

[12] Press Information Bureau, “AI Models Developed under IndiaAI Mission Represent Important Progress in Building India’s Own AI Capabilities Tailored to Local Languages and Use-Cases,” Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, March 13, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2239614&reg=1&lang=1.

[13] Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 (India). https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_26-Sep-2018.pdf.

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The 2026 Japan Defence White Paper^[1] (JDWP) provides clarity on the direction in which Japanese defence policy is progressing. The paper captures the transition currently underway in the region. It covers the three strategic documents of 2022 – the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) – which are being revised sooner rather than later, at a time when Japan’s defence budget has attained the expected level of 2% of GDP^[2] and the deterioration of the Indo-Pacific security environment is more rapid than expected.

The JDWP is thus not so much an annual stocktaking of Japan’s defence efforts as a link towards a new conception of national security in Japan. Japan now views its defence capacity as bigger than the size and modernisation of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF). The 2026 JDWP brings together foreign policy, intelligence, and economic, technological and industrial capacities into a “comprehensive architecture for national defence.”^[3] This is a significant progression from the earlier Japanese perception of territorial defence capacities under the cover of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

The JDWP does not diminish the significance of military capability. It notes that China is clearly the core strategic challenger, while North Korea and Russia are perceived as interlinked problems due to their enhanced military collaboration. Instead of increasing its conventional strength, Japan is looking afresh at the basis of its military power.

The 2026 JDWP emphasises “new ways of warfare.”^[4] This is based on its understanding of how the Ukraine war has been conducted and the developments in West Asia, which have together raised concerns in Tokyo about the massive deployment of cost-effective unmanned systems. These require the speedy integration of AI, cyber, space and electromagnetic warfare. It acknowledges that recent conflicts have given rise to short technological life cycles before new systems come into play and understands that Japan cannot remain confined to preparing to respond to China’s large-scale military development by investing only in expensive conventional weaponry. Japan believes that it should be able to effectively operate in a quickly changing technological warfare situation.

Due to this, the JDWP emphasises cost-effective unmanned systems such as UAVs, unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles, as well as the planned SHIELD architecture for littoral defence. The Air Self-Defence Force is being reconfigured into a Japan Aerospace Self-Defence Force with responsibilities for cyberspace and related capabilities.^[5] Earlier defence papers looked distantly at these capabilities: now they are given greater primacy.

The basic strategic argument in Japan is transitioning from platform superiority to technological adaptability. The preparation is for conflicts in which capabilities for innovation, quick replacement after attrition, ammunition replenishment and modification of systems for greater efficacy would be equally important to developing sophisticated platforms.

At the heart of the JDWP is the recognition that the Japanese industrial base is now integral to the development of defence capability. Technological prowess and defence production, which earlier were chapters within the White Paper, have now become a separate section. The industrial base is enunciated as integral to Japan’s defence capability itself.

Japan has a developed industrial base which, since World War II, has not enlarged its defence segment or market. Several Japanese companies withdrew from the business of defence as Japan relied heavily on the U.S. security umbrella for most of its requirements. Japan now aims to convert defence production capabilities into economically sustainable opportunities, which should not depend only on the restricted procurement activity of the Japanese SDF.^[6]

The 2026 JDWP treats economic security – which in 2020 was strictly defined as^[7] that which serves the national interest from an economic perspective, using both strategic autonomy and strategic indispensability to achieve it – as an instrument of defence policy. The paper does not perceive economic security as a parallel policy in the domain of Japan’s traditionally important economic ministries. Instead, economic security is now an element of the defence production architecture, with three interconnected responses: resilient supply chains, the development and defence of advanced technologies, and the sustained maintenance of Japan’s defence capability and technological prowess.

The JDWP believes that these will increase Japan’s autonomy, superiority and indispensability in the Indo-Pacific. This is an important response. Japan is searching for autonomy through selective resilience but not complete self-sufficiency or a breach from the main pillar of the U.S.-led alliance.^[8]

Japan aims to ensure that its own technologies, industrial capabilities, and supply chains are available to it in any crisis and not denied. Yet it does want to restrain these same attributes that make Japan a dependable partner. This is certainly a conception that goes beyond traditional autarky; it sits well within Japan’s wider economic security policies, covering semiconductors, critical technologies, supply-chain diversity and the defence of strategic industries.

The JDWP argues that investment in defence industries will create economic benefits through larger defence procurement, which can sustain companies, generate employment, provide an impetus to regional economies and create technological crossovers with the purely civilian economy. The paper believes that the border between civilian and military technologies is increasingly ambiguous. Expenditure on defence is seen not merely as a fiscal expenditure emanating from the poor security environment in the region but as an instrument of industrial policy. This is an important conceptual alteration in Japanese thinking.

The JDWP discusses startups and dual-use technology in the same vein. Japan seeks to relate the traditional fledgling defence industry with academia, researchers, venture capital and civilian technology innovators. The establishment of the Defence Innovation Science and Technology Institute^[9] in Tokyo in 2024 and various initiatives to bring civilian technologies into defence research, like AI, robotics and drones, manifest an effort to alleviate the structural weaknesses in the Japanese defence system – like high unit costs and low margins and a severe shortage of cyber talent. This will need to overcome the slow pace of transferring commercial innovation into military technology, which has so far been the case in Japan.

Now Japanese defence exports have become significant policy inputs. In April 2026, export restrictions on Japan’s defence products were simplified. These are presented not only as a foreign policy measure but also as an industrial necessity. Defence exports help create economies of scale and better sustain production lines, thus reducing costs. They can create shared maintenance and support partnerships. The connection between arms transfers, strategic partnerships and domestic industrial sustainability is clearly enunciated in the paper.

The JDWP shows no reduction in its commitment to the U.S. alliance; it sees that as the cornerstone of Japanese security and places the integration of growing Japanese capabilities with U.S. capabilities at the heart of the partnership. A subtle deviation is nevertheless visible. While maintaining the U.S. partnership, Japan is developing its own capacities to diminish risks emanating from over-dependence on any single partner. Higher domestic production, bigger stockpiles, robust technological capabilities and strategic cooperation with the Quad countries, the UK, Italy and the Philippines are seen as resilient elements of a growing Japanese defence architecture.

This is not strategic autonomy in a European sense, nor is it readiness to breach the relationship with the U.S. It is more like Japan seeking to make its alliance with the U.S. more effective, with Japan increasing its capabilities to contribute more. This could lead to a wider, more variegated security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, in which Japan will now not only be a provider of bases and funds to its alliance with the U.S. but also provide its technology, defence production capacity and operational capabilities to a wider network of partners.

The 2026 JDWP is now more of a progression than a report on achievements, as in previous years. Earlier JDWPs focused on the worsening security environment around Japan. In 2022, the paper did provide a framework for basic defence reinforcement, and between 2023 and 2025, the JDWPs concentrated on implementing the conceptualised transformation.

The ultimate significance of the 2026 White Paper will become clearer when the revised National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and Defence Buildup Programme are released later this year. The White Paper suggests that these documents may institutionalise a broader Japanese conception of security in which military strength, economic resilience, technological superiority and industrial capacity are increasingly inseparable.^[10]

For India, this evolution is particularly relevant. Japan’s emerging defence model creates possibilities beyond traditional maritime cooperation. India could become part of the Japanese effort to build resilient production and technology networks across the Indo-Pacific. The opportunity is not simply to buy Japanese equipment but to participate in joint development, manufacturing, maintenance, supply chains and dual-use technologies.^[11]

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

[1] Defence of Japan 2026, Japan MOD, 4 August 2026, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/index.html.

[2] Progress and Budget in Fundamental Reinforcement of Defence Capabilities, MOD, 26 December 2025, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/fy2026_20251226a.pdf.

[3] Note 1: Ibid., Part III, Chapter 1.

[4] Note 1: Ibid., Chapter 4.

[5] Note 1, ibid., Chapter 3.

[6] Walter Sim, ‘Security for the future’: Inside Japan’s multi-trillion-yen push to strengthen its defence industry, Straits Times, 4 August 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/security-for-the-future-inside-japans-multi-trillion-yen-push-to-strengthen-its-defense-industry.

[7] Suzuki Kazuto, “Modern Economic Security: Definition and Arguments”, Discuss Japan: Japan Foreign Policy Forum, no. 66 (September 27, 2021), https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/diplomacy/pt2021092718421511597.html.

[8] Note 1: Ibid., Part III Chapter 2.

[9] Kousuke Saitou, Japan’s push for a dual-use defence startup ecosystem, East Asia Forum, 27 December 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/12/26/japans-push-for-a-dual-use-defense-startup-ecosystem/.

[10] Note 1: Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2.

[11] 16th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement, Paragraph 6, MEA, 2 July 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41391/16th_IndiaJapan_Annual_Summit_Joint_Statement.

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The popular Japanese art of manga has been in fierce competition with K-pop and Korean webtoons for the attention of India’s Gen Z. The Big Three of Japanese anime and manga franchises, Naruto, One Piece, and Bleach, have struck a chord with Indian audiences with their energetic and determined protagonists who struggle for acceptance and recognition. Their followers have grown, especially during the Covid-19 lockdown, to such levels that fans are now inspired to pursue Japanese-style manga and animation. Do they have a professional future in India?

Anime and manga are uniquely Japanese. Anime is an animated storytelling style that originated in Japan in the early 1950s. Characterised by its distinct visual expression, strong storytelling, and evocative artwork, anime has evolved into a worldwide phenomenon, trickling into entertainment, design, and global pop culture. Manga is the Japanese term for comic books and graphic novels. Traditionally published in black-and-white and read right to left, this storytelling medium combines detailed action, in-depth stories, and emotions.

Page from ‘The Beast Legion’ by Jazyl Homavazir

Image Credits: Jazyl Homavazir

This appeals to the average Indian, who is brought up in the storytelling tradition and mythology. The Japanese anime fed easily into this stream for readers, most of whom were fans of the Japan-U.S. collaborative phenomena, Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. It also gave birth to a minuscule subculture of anime artists in India, especially in Mumbai and Kolkata, as early as 2010. They were driven by passion but starved of mainstream infrastructure or commercial validation.

Fifteen years later, in 2026, a subculture of manga and anime fans has erupted into a massive commercial force. According to Delhi-based market researcher IMARC Group, the Indian market for anime products, valued at over $1.2 billion in 2025, is projected to touch $3.3 billion by 2034—an over 11% annual growth rate. India’s is no longer just an emerging demographic; with an estimated 118 million active viewers across platforms, India is now the second-largest anime viewership market globally, trailing only behind China.

One Piece Cosplayers at Comic Con Mumbai

Image Credits: Instagram/@padmawitty

However, these staggering consumption metrics mask a critical deficiency in the domestic ecosystem. India remains strictly a consumer market and a service provider rather than an IP generator. Kodansha, a Japanese production house, produces manga in India with local translations at cheaper rates.^[1] The core challenge today is not a lack of audience or artistic talent, but a systemic gap in original production frameworks. There is friction between grassroots creative potential and the commercial bottlenecks that stifle domestic storytellers.

If India is to transition from being merely a lucrative destination for foreign manga exports into a self-sustaining global production hub, it should address the institutional challenges in IP incubation, domestic publishing, and creator monetisation.

There are some positive indicators. The big boys of entertainment, Netflix and Sony, have entered the anime simulcast market, a global distribution and streaming market for anime content released simultaneously with its Japanese broadcast. It offers users instant access to anime episodes, significantly reducing anime piracy.^[2]

Netflix is the leading streaming platform for anime in India, with an estimated 74% market share. Crunchyroll, a Sony Group’s streaming service specialising in Japanese anime, is expanding in India through premiere screenings, live events, and digital marketing initiatives to reach new audiences while increasing Hindi, Tamil and Telugu dubbed anime offerings – almost all being watched on smartphones. Another subsidiary, Sony YAY!, is tapping into anime licensing and merchandising (L&M) as a major revenue source. ^[3] Anime fan conventions, like the annual Anime India, are multiplying across tier-two and tier-three cities.^[4]

Still from Naruto Shippuden

Image Credits: Crunchyroll

However, the anime structural ecosystem in India is absent, with minimal opportunities for local artists and creators to access, professionally grow and build sustainable careers in. This applies to comics too. Independent artists struggle to showcase their work at conventions and events and depend on online sales, all funded out of their own personal pockets.

A successful, established ecosystem such as Japan releases an anime once a manga reaches a significant milestone or if a studio is passionate enough to convert it into a series. In Japan, a manga comic is available at every convenience store, comic bookstore, and railway station, and that too at reasonable prices.

India does not have such a well-established distribution mechanism for comics and manga comics yet. And although there are many talented artists in India, there are no production houses actively investing in this space or nurturing the creators. This art is still not recognised as a viable mainstream career or source of income.

Niche Indian animators are approached by ad houses to create anime-style content—but with unrealistically low budgets and highly compressed timelines. Decision-making more often lies with those with little or no expertise or understanding of the art and process, resulting in excessive micromanagement and a loss of creative autonomy and freedom for the animation director.

A common mindset is that everything can be produced at the lowest possible cost. But it will not result in high-quality outcomes. Hideo Katsumata^[5][6] of Avex Pictures, one of the largest anime production companies in Japan, says it takes anywhere between $445,000 to $630,000 to create one 24-minute anime episode after pooling in some of the best talents from across the world. He was referring to the anime series Yuri on Ice. Would Indian companies be willing to invest similar amounts?

Building the ecosystem also requires quality animation education and training, which leads to creative imagination and larger-than-life storytelling—the heart of an anime/manga story. India lacks this, resulting in Indian creators without adequate knowledge of the required budgets, timelines and expertise involved – and their turning to the easiest themes – of heroes harnessing godly powers and ancient Indian weapons.

This is slowly changing. At Mumbai’s major entertainment summit WAVES, the brilliance of local creators delving deep into local folklore, culture, and some one-shots was visible to all.

India has a large pool of talented artists and small upcoming studios doing creative anime, but they prefer to work in international markets rather than locally due to limited funding. New ventures like BhasaSetu, funded by the Indian government,^[7] the Indian Comic Association, and Cosmics,^[8] are encouraging young artists, with the latter offering them the opportunity to publish their works.

Monkey D. Luffy and his Straw Hat Pirates crew fight against oppression and natural enemies of the ruling world government. This message resonated with youth across the world with many of them using the flag as a symbol of freedom and rebellion at protests.

Image Credits: Gateway House

What can be done to establish a local anime ecosystem?

First, India must establish a centralised hub for production houses to collaborate with writers, creators, and animators.

Second, there should be anime-centric two-year degree programmes offering students direct mentorship by experienced manga and anime artists from India and Japan – with learnings on how anime can be delivered affordably. This can be enabled through an FTA-supported educational and cultural partnership and business framework to collaborate with Japanese manga and animation training institutes. The Australia India Sports Collaboration of July 2026 can be a model.^[9] The National Institute of Design (NID), Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and Satyajit Ray Film Institute can add anime production to their coursework.

Third, it is necessary to establish a structured comics distribution and printing system that enables local creators to translate, print, and distribute their manga comics in India and worldwide. It should allow for equitable profit-sharing while preserving full IP ownership for the creator. Such an initiative could pave the way for a robust ecosystem in the future.

Fourth, the large corporations like Netflix, which are benefiting from the Indian market, must back local anime content creation and leverage their international distribution networks to reach global audiences.

Fifth, states can introduce targeted grants, tax exemptions, and industry support programmes for small- and medium-scale studios (of under 30 to 40 people) involved in local and global work and government-backed initiatives to help showcase and pitch their original IPs to global platforms and investors. A model to follow could be the UK, which has a voluntary £1-per-ticket levy on large entertainment shows to recycle money from the top of the pyramid to the grassroots base—an elegant, industry-led mechanism. These will expand the medium with young artists keen to pursue careers in anime.

Most importantly, linking up India’s anime sector with Japan’s will update the cultural relationship and bring the peoples of the two Indo-Pacific nations closer together.

Jazyl Homavazir is a 2D animation professional and creator of The Beast Legion, India’s first manga.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References:

[1] Kamalikaa Biswas, “India Ranks Among Top Three Global Anime Viewership Markets,” Outlook Respawn, April 20, 2026, https://respawn.outlookindia.com/pop-culture/pop-culture-news/india-ranks-among-top-three-global-anime-viewership-markets.

[2] “Why Anime Simulcast Piracy Spikes Within Hours of a New Episode,” Remove Your Media, March 6, 2026, https://removeyourmedia.com/2026/03/06/why-anime-simulcast-piracy-spikes-within-hours-of-a-new-episode/.

[3] Shailja Tiwari, “‘Animation Is No Longer Just for Kids…': Sony YAY! Expands into Anime and Merchandising, Says Ambesh Tiwari,” Financial Express, [date], https://www.financialexpress.com/business/brandwagon-sony-yay-expands-anime-ambesh-tiwari-3770691/.

[4] At a recent screening of the Japanese series Naruto, Sony India CEO Ambesh Tiwari mentioned that locally dubbed anime content by Sony YAY! has increased anime consumption in tier two and three cities by almost 50% in 2025. Crunchyroll releases Hindi-dubbed episodes, offering voice artists a new career option, and releases more than 75 anime series each year.

[5] “Exclusive: Anime Times President Hideo Katsumata Talks About Expanding in Indian Market, Industry Issues & Future Collaborations,” Animehunch, October 2025, https://animehunch.com/exclusive-anime-times-president-hideo-katsumata-talks-about-expanding-in-indian-market-industry-issues-future-collaborations/.

[6] “Anime India, the Country’s Largest Japanese Anime Convention, Announced! Death Note Director Tetsuro Araki and Avex Pictures’ Hideo Katsumata to Grace Mumbai This August,” Anime News India, July 14, 2025, https://animenewsindia.com/2025/07/14/anime-india-the-countrys-largest-japanese-anime-convention-announced-death-note-director-tetsuro-araki-and-avex-pictures-hideo-katsumata-to-grace-mumbai-this-august/.

[7] “Start Up Accelerator WaveX Extends ‘Bhasha Setu’ Challenge Deadline to July 30, 2025, to Boost Participation and Seek AI-Based Multilingual Solutions,” Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Press Information Bureau, July 22, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2146973&reg=48&lang=2.

[8] “About Us,” Cosmics, accessed August 3, 2026, https://cosmics.co.in/about-us/.

[9] “India-Australia Roadmap for Sports Collaboration,” Prime Minister’s Office, Press Information Bureau, July 10, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2283122&reg=48&lang=1.

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On July 13, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar launched India’s official campaign for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC for 2028-29. The elections will be held in June 2027, and India’s competitor for the Asia-Pacific seat is Tajikistan If elected, this will be India’s ninth time on the UNSC.

The UNSC is today the UN’s most significant limb wherein its members, in particular the P5—the U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China—preside over the maintenance of global peace and security. At the moment, two of the P-5, instead of being neutral, are themselves involved in the two bitter wars ongoing in the Gulf and in Ukraine

Unlike the actions of the P-5, including exercising vetos, the elections are process-driven and strict. The UNSC has 15 members, of which five are permanent and 10 are non-permanent members, which are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. These non-permanent numbers rotate between the 193 countries that comprise the membership of the UN. In its 80-year existence, however, 143 countries have led the UNSC, leaving out a fourth of the grouping.

Of the UNSC’s 10 elected members, three from Africa, two each from Asia, Latin America, and Western Europe, and one from Eastern Europe. European representation reflects a certain reality following WWII. Five elected members retire every year, making way for a rotation among the non-permanent members. Pakistan is presently on the UNSC from Asia, serving the 2025-26 term, while Bahrain is there till 2027. Kyrgyzstan will replace Pakistan in 2027 and serve through 2028.

Unlike UN resolutions where a country’s vote is publicly displayed, a blank sheet is the ballot paper for the UNSC. Voters are supposed to know who is running, and write-in the name of the country of their choice on the ballot

Viewed from an outsider’s perspective, India’s challenge against Tajikistan should hardly be a contest given India’s global standing, G20 membership, etc. But elections at the UN follow their own convoluted logic, as was seen in June this year. In a three-way contest for two seats among the western countries, Portugal and Austria pipped heavyweight Germany. The election being a secret ballot, it is hard to be definitive, but it appears that in the global South there is a certain unhappiness with Germany’s support for Israel on Gaza. There is also the issue of smaller countries’ bonding in solidarity with other smaller countries against global heavy weights.

As large financial contributors to the UN and aspirants for permanent membership of the UNSC, the Germans have sought to get elected to the UNSC every seventh or eighth year (they last served the 2019-20 term). This is also the case with Japan. The German loss appears to be now prompting the Japanese to relook at a proposed bid for the UNSC in 2032 and instead revert to looking ahead to 2043, which would be their turn by rotation in the 54-member Asian group.

At the same time, in the Asian group, Kyrgyzstan soundly defeated the Philippines, a country that has long been around at the UN and had ASEAN backing. The reason? The 50-plus-member Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) group and strong Chinese backing not just tilted the scales but did so to such an extent that the Kyrgyz obtained as many as 142 votes out of 191 cast and comfortably crossed the two-thirds requirement of 127 votes.

There was also a contest for the UNGA Presidency this time in which the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh got the better of the candidate from Cyprus. Here too it would appear that factors which are similar to what benefited Kyrgyzstan and saw the defeat of Germany were in operation.

These factors obviously add to the needs for a robust and across-the-globe campaign by India. Rightly, therefore, the Indian campaign has been launched well in time not only to ensure the election but with the highest possible number of votes to signal global acceptance of India, now the world’s most populous country, as a permanent member of the UNSC.

The situation for India in 2027 is not dissimilar to 2010, when India contested for the UNSC. Then, Kazakhstan was in the fray too. Active diplomacy in New York and across the world coupled with strong efforts on the bilateral front saw the Kazaks repositioning their candidature to 2017-18, leaving India as the sole candidate in 2010. India was elected with 187 votes from 192 cast – a record. Such a global endorsement continues to remain important for India as it seeks a permanent place on the high table of the UNSC.

Ambassador Manjeev Puri is an Adjunct Distinguished Fellow and a former diplomat who served in the UN, EU and Nepal as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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In 2022, Western governments imposed the hardest sanctions on Russia, over 26,000 as of 2025,^[1] the most comprehensive on any major economy since World War II. Russia, a known high-technology player, was cut off from Western semiconductors, software, capital markets, and technology partnerships immediately after its “special military operation” in Ukraine.^[2] Nvidia chips became inaccessible. Big tech companies like Microsoft and Oracle suspended their operations.^[3] Over 550 companies’ tech has since moved out of Russia, and over 320 more are withholding investments or scaling back.^[4] In this scenario, Russia’s technology sector and its ambition of building a sovereign artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem should have collapsed.

It did not. Russia’s AI market was valued at $6.3 billion in 2025 and is estimated to reach $47.5 billion by 2034.^[5] AI has become a major focus in Russia in recent years, and it is reflected in the discussions at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), 2026, where at least 27 of 150^[6] sessions focused on AI.^[7] President Putin reiterated that his government is hard at work, building a sovereign AI ecosystem.^[8]

Sanctions bring self-reliance. Russia has built its own large language models (GigaChat and YandexGPT), its own neuromorphic chip (ALTAI) and its own national healthcare AI platform (MosMedAI) deployed across 74 regions and 2,000 hospitals.^[9] It has its own international AI alliance with 28 member countries. More than 52% of large organisations in Russia are implementing AI in their operations.^[10]

At this time, Russia is not a global AI contender at the level of the U.S. or China, largely due to its digital isolation. Brain drain is also a concern, with over 100,000 technology professionals having left Russia since 2022.^[11] At least eight companies originally founded in Russia, such as OZ Forensics, Retail Rocket, and Diagnocat, have relocated abroad.

But Russia has built something that most sanctioned economies have not: a functioning, sovereign AI ecosystem that is growing and expanding internationally. Understanding how it did this matters not just for Russia-watchers, but for any country seeking to build AI capability outside the Western or Chinese technological mainstream. That includes India.

This infographic maps the over three dozen AI companies operating in or originating from Russia, examining their ownership structures, state connections, product categories, and the linkages between their usage by the state and the civilians.

Figure 1: Russia’s AI stack

Source: Gateway House compilation

Prior to 2022, Russia’s technology sector was significantly, and predictably, dependent on Western infrastructure.^[12] Companies used Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure for cloud computing; Western social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Instagram; and Google Search and ChatGPT.

When ChatGPT became inaccessible and Western cloud services withdrew, domestic alternatives appeared: Sberbank’s GigaChat, also known as Russia’s ChatGPT, was launched in 2023.^[13] Yandex developed its own language learning model (LLM) – YandexGPT – in 2023.

Russian medical technology, which is considered world-class, grew 21.4% in 2025, following 18% growth in 2024, with a proliferation of AI in medtech. In 2024, Russia launched MosMedAI, a state initiative to standardise and scale AI-powered radiology and medical imaging across Russia’s public healthcare system. This platform currently offers 17 AI services designed to assist radiologists in detecting various conditions.^[14]

Figure 2: The Russian MedTech market (2025)

Source: Smart Ranking Russia ^[15],[16]

The Russian government played a significant role. In March 2022, when it looked like the war with Ukraine would drag on, Presidential Decree No. 83 was issued, which allowed faster development of the IT industry, allocation of funds from the federal budget for workers and institutions, and tax exemptions.^[17] The Kremlin acted as a deliberate ecosystem architect by identifying the gaps created by Western withdrawal and systematically filling them with funded domestic initiatives. It is also the primary financier – unlike the U.S., where AI development is driven by private venture capital, and China’s hybrid model, where the state sets goals and policies and the private sector contributes with investments and execution.

The state enables its AI ecosystem through three channels:

The first is the Skolkovo Foundation, Russia’s government-created technology hub that functions as a combination of tax haven, grant provider, and accelerator for AI startups. Skolkovo gives companies with high commercial potential a 100% tax exemption,^[18] grant financing of up to $5 million and a minimum of 50% in co-investments. The state provides intellectual property (IP) protection and provides access to research infrastructure and the business and science communities through the Skolkovo IP centre and shared-use research labs, modern office spaces, testing facilities and on-campus living.^[19]

Companies like Webiomed are Skolkovo beneficiaries. Its medical device was registered by the Federal Service for Surveillance in Healthcare (Roszdravnadzor) in 2020 to be integrated into existing healthcare software in Russia and was deployed across the country. ^[20],[21]

The second channel is the National Technology Initiative (NTI), a state programme for developing future technology markets, which has co-funded companies including Neiry and NeuroChat, both neuro-tech companies. The government as co-founder often absorbs losses – a big encouragement for start-ups doing research and development (R&D).

The third channel is direct investment by state institutions. The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, used to invest with foreign partners like the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Kuwait Investment Authority, and Mubadala Investment Company. Now RDIF goes it alone; Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, has invested in Botkin. AI, the medical imaging AI company.^{[22] [23]}

Across Russia’s AI ecosystem, the government operates through three distinct mechanisms:

The first mechanism is layered corporate ownership through state-adjacent entities. Sberbank is 50% owned by the Finance Ministry.^[24] VKontakte (VK), Russia’s largest online social networking service, is controlled by Gazprom subsidiaries.^[25] NTechLab, an AI company that specialises in advanced biometric and video analytic technology whose facial recognition systems cover most of the regions,^[26] is 12.5% owned by Rostec, Russia’s state defence corporation.^{[27] [28]}

Figure 3: Russian companies and its AI models

Source: Gateway House compilation

The second mechanism is forced ownership transfer under Kremlin pressure. Oleg Tinkov, the founder of Russia’s leading digital bank T-Bank, formerly Tinkoff Bank, publicly criticised Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He subsequently claimed he was forced to sell his 35% ownership stake^[29] without the opportunity to negotiate under pressure from the Putin administration.^[30] The bank was taken over by Interros Group, controlled by sanctioned Russian oligarch Vladimir Potanin.^[31]

Avito, Russia’s largest online classifieds and e-commerce site, is now partially owned by the state. In 2025, Russia’s state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank acquired 50% from Kismet Capital Group, an investment firm controlled by businessman Ivan Tavrin, who acquired Avito in October 2022 from South Africa’s Naspers.^[32]

The third mechanism is national policies and laws. On July 8, 2026, Russia’s State Duma passed a bill on the development of AI technologies — the country’s first comprehensive AI law.^[33]  It introduced a classification of “trusted AI” models, subject to formal security verification by federal bodies like the Ministry of Digital Development, responsible for technical intelligence and information security. Models that receive the “trusted AI” classification get preferential access to state procurement of AI-related products. Those that do not either do not get state funding or get a bare minimum. The law also requires AI systems to demonstrate alignment with “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”, which include life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and the unity of the peoples of Russia, among others.^[34] This has been criticised by the domestic IT industry.

Russia may not be a global AI superpower, but despite being severely sanctioned, with thinning private investment and a brain drain, it has built a genuinely distinctive product.

Its sovereign AI stack from chips to foundation models like GigaChat to sector-specific applications to international governance frameworks (the 28-member International AI Alliance, including India),^[35] function under the heaviest.

Raveena Shivashankar is the digital media associate at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Castellum.AI. Russia Sanctions Dashboard. Accessed August 6, 2026. https://www.castellum.ai/russia-sanctions-dashboard

^[2] American Enterprise Institute. The Impact of Semiconductor Sanctions on Russia. Washington, DC: AEI, 2024. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Impact-of-Semiconductor-Sanctions-on-Russia.pdf

^[3] Oracle. “Oracle and the Conflict in Ukraine.” https://www.oracle.com/corporate/conflict-in-ukraine/russia/

^[4] Yale School of Management. “Over 1,000 Companies Have Curtailed Operations in Russia—Some Remain.” https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain

^[5] IMARC Group. Russia Artificial Intelligence Market. https://www.imarcgroup.com/russia-artificial-intelligence-market

[6] Sberbank India. “SPIEF 2026 Programme: Dates and Key Events for Indian Participants.” https://sber.bank.in/media/publications/spief-2026-programme-dates-and-key-events-for-indian-participants

^[7] St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. “Business Programme.” https://forum-spb.ru/en/programme/business-programme/?+date+=date-3+June+2026%2Cdate-4+June+2026%2Cdate-5+June+2026%2Cdate-6+June+2026

^[8] At SPIEF 2026, more than 1,000 agreements worth 6.6 trillion roubles ($89.57 billion) were signed, with several involving AI partnerships, including between Sber and the Ministry of Finance, ITMO Highpark and VSP Global, and Financial University and China Media Group.

^[9] AuntMinnie Europe. “Moscow Creates Healthcare AI Platform.” https://www.auntminnieeurope.com/imaging-informatics/artificial-intelligence/news/15815698/moscow-creates-healthcare-ai-platform

^[10] Sberbank. “Sber Launches AI Healthcare Platform.” https://www.sberbank.ru/en/press_center/all/article?newsID=6c7943a8-91a9-4de1-b6f5-aa2079065e3f&blockID=1539&regionID=77&lang=en&type=NEWS

^[11] Council on Foreign Relations. “Russia’s Becoming More Digitally Isolated—and Dependent on China.” https://www.cfr.org/articles/russias-becoming-more-digitally-isolated-and-dependent-china

^[12] Atlantic Council. Russia’s Digital Tech Isolationism. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-digital-tech-isolationism/

^[13] Sberbank India. “India Plans to Use Sber’s GigaChat across Several Sectors.” https://sber.bank.in/media/news/india-plans-to-use-sbers-gigachat-across-several-sectors

^[14] HealthManagement.org. “Moscow’s Healthcare Screen.” 2024. https://healthmanagement.org/uploads/article_attachment/hm6-24-25-moscows-healthcare-screen.pdf

^[15] Smart Ranking. “Russian MedTech Enters the Era of AI Medicine.” https://smartranking.ru/ru/analytics/medicinskie-tehnologii/rossijskij-medteh-vstupaet-v-epohu-ii-mediciny/

^[16] RUB-USD conversions are based on the average 2026 exchange rate

[17] President of Russia. “Address of the President of the Russian Federation.” March 16, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67893

^[18] Federal Tax Service of Russia. Tax Code of the Russian Federation, Part Two.  https://www.nalog.gov.ru/html/sites/www.eng.nalog.ru/Tax%20Code%20Part%20Two.pdf

^[19] Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology. “Skolkovo Presentation.” 2015. https://back.skoltech.ru/storage/app/media/archive/2015/10/Fertman_presentation.pdf

^[20] Webiomed. “Registered Medical Devices Using Artificial Intelligence.” https://webiomed.ru/blog/zaregistrirovannye-meditsinskie-izdeliia-ai/

^[21] Webiomed. “The Map: Artificial Intelligence in Russian Healthcare.” https://webiomed.ru/en/blog/the-map-artificial-intelligence-in-russian-health-care/

^[22] Rosatom. “Images for Artificial Intelligence.” Rosatom Newsletter, January 28, 2021. https://rosatomnewsletter.com/2021/01/28/images-for-artificial-intelligence/

[23] Rosselkhozbank, Russia’s state agricultural bank, acquired a 50% stake in Avito, Russia’s largest classifieds platform with an active AI model.

^[24] Sberbank. “Sber Announces New AI Initiative.” https://www.sberbank.ru/en/press_center/all/article?newsID=11028575-1-2&blockID=1539&regionID=77&lang=en&type=NEWS

^[25] VK was founded in 2006 by Pavel Durov. In 2014, Durov fled the country, and oligarch Alisher Usmanov, Putin’s close aide, acquired 52% of the shares in MF Technologies, the holding company that controls VK. Then in December 2021, Usmanov sold his shares to Sogaz, an insurance company that is a subsidiary of Gazprom, Russia’s state gas giant. At the same time, Gazprombank, another Gazprom subsidiary, transferred its existing stake in MF Technologies to Gazprom-Media, a third Gazprom subsidiary. The end result: two Gazprom subsidiaries together hold 68% of MF Technologies. Since Gazprom is 50.2% owned by the Russian government, the Kremlin effectively controls VK through state-linked subsidiaries.

^[26] VSquare. “Kremlin Leaks Reveal Russia’s AI Surveillance System.” https://vsquare.org/kremlin-leaks-russia-putin-ai-surveillance-facial-recognition-ntechlab/

^[27] Rostec. “Rostec to Invest in Face Recognition Technology.” https://rostec.ru/en/media/news/rostec-to-invest-in-face-recognition-technology/

[28] Cognitive Pilot, a tech company which designs AI-driven agricultural machinery and urban public transport,  is a joint venture in which Sberbank holds 30%.^[28] None of these are formally government property, but neither do they operate independently.

[29] Martin, Iain. “Russian Tycoon Oleg Tinkov Sells Bank Stake to Oligarch Vladimir Potanin.” Forbes, April 28, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/iainmartin/2022/04/28/russian-tycoon-oleg-tinkov-sells-bank-stake-to-oligarch-vladimir-potanin/

^[30] Financial Times. “Potanin Acquires Tinkoff Stake.” 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/41b887c4-ed52-4cf0-8a6f-394d578ea6a2?syn-25a6b1a6=1

^[31] Interros. “Interros Acquires a Stake in Tinkoff Group.” https://interros.ru/en/press/releases/interros-acquires-a-stake-in-tinkoff-group/

^[32] Avito. “Rosselkhozbank Acquires a Stake in Avito.” https://www.avito.ru/company/press/avito-rshb

^[33] TASS. “Russia’s Economy…” https://tass.com/economy/2157507

[34] Russian House in New Delhi. “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809.” https://india-new-delhi.rs.gov.ru/en/doc/decree-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-of-november-9-2022-no-809/

[35] Launched in December 2024 by President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s International AI Alliance (the AI Alliance Network) unites national AI associations from BRICS countries and other partner nations. https://aianet.org/members

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The general view these days disparaging the United Nations is understandable given a war in the Persian Gulf and another in Europe directly involving two of the permanent five (P5) members of the UN Security Council and having two or more in active support of one side. Along with this, the world has witnessed killings on a genocidal scale in Gaza with hardly a whimper from the UN. And even the talks on climate change, said to be the greatest global challenge to humankind, are barely limping along with the issue almost wiped off the agenda of the World Bank.

Little doubt that much of this, in the past year and a half, has much to do with President Donald Trump who wants multilateralism fashioned in his America First-world view with even a willingness to withdraw from agencies and cut contributions to their budgets. There is also the rise of China, seeking to break the Western monopoly on global power by becoming the second-largest economy in the world and now contributing nearly as much (20%) as the U.S. (22%) to the assessed regular budget of the UN.

Regardless of the above, the world needs the institutional global governance provided by the UN. And, contrary to popular belief, it is the powerful that use the UN for their own agendas. It allows legitimising their interests, as witnessed when the UNSC adopted a resolution creating a Board of Peace, supposedly for Gaza, with President Trump as its president. Last year, President Trump spent over 40 minutes addressing the UNGA and had his wife, Melania Trump, preside over a UNSC meeting in the month when the U.S. was holding the UNSC presidency, which rotates every month.

In so far as the “South”, Ambassador Vijay Nambiar, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN and Chef de Cabinet of former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, rightly noted recently that the UN organs, along with their funds, programmes and regional bodies, remain an important source of support and practical benefit in the management of the lives of people in developing countries. The UN matters to the small countries, providing one of the few international platforms they have to express their views and needs. Moreover, with challenges of armed conflict, climate change, food insecurity, unsustainable debt, pandemics, technological disruption and large-scale human displacements, no state, however powerful, can address these interconnected crises alone. Their complexity has strengthened rather than weakened the case for international cooperation and multilateralism.

The UN thus faces expanding responsibilities even as its room for manoeuvre narrows. In such a scenario the UN Secretary General (UNSG)’s office must not only be endowed with diplomatic experience and administrative competence but also political resilience, strategic judgement and the ability to preserve dialogue in an increasingly polarised international system. Indeed, at the best of times, the effectiveness of UNSG has not depended so much on formal authority as on the confidence governments have been willing to place in the office. Of course, in the end, it is the political will of member states that moves the mountain.

The current UNSG’s term expires on Dec. 31, 2026. The UN began the process for choosing the next UNSG last November when the presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council requested member states to suggest candidates for this high position. He/she will assume office on 1 January 2027 for a five-year term.

The appointment of the UNSG is governed by Article 97 of the UN Charter that states that “the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”.

The primacy of the UNSC in this process is clear, as the practice is for it to forward just one name to the General Assembly for endorsement. This will happen during the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly starting the third week of September. In keeping with the 15-member UNSC’s rules for adoption of a resolution, the name must garner nine affirmative votes with no P-5 exercising the veto.

The UN’s membership is divided into five geographical groupings – Asia & the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Western Europe and others, a grouping that includes the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel.

An unwritten tradition at the UN is that the top positions see rotation among these geographical groups, and that is, indeed, the practice for the presidency of the General Assembly (a one-year term). However, the UN’s 80 years of existence have seen four West Europeans as UNSG, two each from Asia and Africa and one from Latin America. In that sense, this time it’s Latin America’s turn and possibly a woman, as none has held this position yet.

In 2016, the expectation was that someone from Eastern Europe would be selected, and several internationally known Eastern Europeans, including women with proven high-level multilateral experience, had thrown their hat into the ring. But it was Antonio Guterres, a former PM of Portugal, who succeeded and became the 9th UNSG. He will complete his second five-year term at the end of this year. No one has held the position for a third term.

The Eastern European grouping reflects Cold War divisions in Europe and gave the then USSR a certain leverage at the time. But now many of its members are part of the EU and/or NATO. It appears that in 2016, the Russians were less unhappy with a West European than one from a country that was earlier part of their bloc but is now on the other side.

This time, seven internationally well-known personalities are at the moment in the fray: (1) Michelle Bachelet, former President of Chile, nominated by Brazil and Mexico; (2) Maria Espinoza, former President of the UNGA and Foreign Minister of Ecuador, nominated by Antigua and Barbuda; (3) Rebeca Grynspan, former Vice President of Costa Rica and head of UNCTAD; (4) Carolyn Birkett, Permanent Representative of Guyana; (5) Rafael Grossi from Argentina, who is presently the Director General of the IAEA; (6) Macky Sall, former President of Senegal; and (7) Olara Otunnu, a former senior UN official from Uganda, who was nominated only days back. Other than Otunnu, all others have had an opportunity to present their vision to the General Assembly.

Every candidate needs to be endorsed by at least one member state of the UN, but this may not be the country of his/her nationality, though, of course, the lack of such a nomination has its own telling political effect. In the case of Michelle Bachelet, a socialist, Chile’s new government, elected in November 2025, withdrew its nomination for her. She was also the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at a time when a report by her office, critical of the Chinese on their actions in Xinjiang, was issued. Maria Espinsoza also doesn’t have her own country’s formal endorsement.

The UNSC has just held its first straw poll on the seven candidates. The voting slips have the candidate’s name with the option of ‘encourage’, ‘discourage’ or ‘no comment’, but the voting member state’s name is not known. Its results were not announced publicly, though informally it has been noted that Grynspan, Birkett and Rossi have done well.

In the next rounds, the UNSC will use coloured slips for the P5, though in the straw polls there is no disclosure of how particular UNSC members vote. Such draws will be repeated over the coming two to three months (the time between each such round is useful for canvassing or assessing winning or losing chances and hence pulling out of the race) till one candidate obtains nine “encourage” and no coloured slips. This is in keeping with the UNSC rule that for a resolution to be adopted, nine affirmative votes are needed and no veto. He/she will then get formally endorsed by the UNSC.

In the selection process, the P5 really call the shots. Here the main players are the U.S., Russia and China, with the U.S. being the key; indeed, no individual has held the position without the positive endorsement of the U.S. of their candidatures.

All three candidates reported to have done well in the first straw poll from countries with positive ties to the Trump administration. This is, of course, critically important today. Grynspan and Birkett appear to have benefited from a certain support of the developing countries, while Rossi may have had a big push from Western powers but would need to also have Russia and China agree on him. In the end the key standpoint will be overcoming P5 veto vulnerability. Sometimes this can lead to counterintuitive outcomes. India, though not on the UNSC, as a major global player must keep a close eye on the developments, including for securing senior UN positions in the upcoming administration.

Manjeev Puri is an Adjunct Distinguished Fellow and a former diplomat who served in the UN, EU and Nepal as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand’s visit to Pakistan last month, followed by delegation visits of senior Canadian officials and diplomats to Mumbai and Delhi, presents an opportunity to evaluate the reset in Canada-India relations. A bilateral relationship already strained by the issue of Khalistan plunged to its lowest during the September 2023 visit to India by former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. However, the down curve inverted almost immediately after the invitation by current Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend and meet on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June 2025. The momentum from that meeting has blossomed into a comprehensive strategic understanding and a mutually beneficial reset in relations, cemented by Carney’s visit to India in February-March 2026.

Quiet, calibrated efforts to advance the relationship have progressed so well that Anand’s one-day trip to Islamabad – the first by a Canadian foreign minister to Pakistan in nearly two decades – caused few ripples in New Delhi. Pakistan’s attempts to raise controversial issues regarding Kashmir and the Indus Waters Treaty with her seem to have been adroitly finessed by the Canadian side. Much is at stake for Canada in its relationship with India, and vice versa. Understanding what is now the exact nature of the bilateral and what is at the core of its progress will show how the two governments succeed in overcoming the inherent challenges and constraints in the relationship.

Canadians view India and Canada as “natural partners”, both being pluralist democracies governed by the rule of law, respect for international law, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and are fellow members of the Commonwealth family. Indians generally agree that the North American nation is a well-intentioned global player. Economic considerations tend to bring them closer together, given the clear complementarities across the economy, energy, technology, agriculture, and education.

The two nations are also riding the Indo-Pacific wave, believing that this strategic concept – advanced in the first decade of the 21st century – shortens the geographical distance between the world’s two hemispheres. It unites them as strategic partners who share the vision of a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific, spanning the continuity of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Finally, the impact of the Trump 2.0 administration in bringing Canada and India closer should not be minimised. The rough geopolitical treatment meted out by Washington, first to Canada and then to India, has convinced both recipients that their salvation lies in deepening bilateral relations.

The India-Canada relationship stands on three vital pillars: security, trade and people-to-people ties.

First, security cooperation, defence dialogue, and strategic convergence have demonstrated rapid, visible progress over the past year. The Trudeau administration’s patent mishandling of the “K-factor” to secure narrow, domestic political goals ultimately backfired. In contrast, Prime Minister Carney’s instruction to his security establishment was to recognise India’s strong record and commitment to countering terrorism and radicalisation. This directive helped forge a partnership of trust between authorities on both sides – a process that is currently in full flow, sustained by regular discussions at the level of National Security Advisers.

This breakthrough has cleared the way for a long-term, institutionalised dialogue on defence cooperation. Both governments share a desire “to deepen defence relations through cooperative activities, joint training opportunities, and professional military exchanges”.^[1] Firming up this stance, the two prime ministers have directed their officials to forge “a new maritime security partnership in areas such as defence materiel cooperation, supply chain resilience, and training and exercises”.^[1] An important Track 1.5 Dialogue recently renewed these shared interests and concluded that significant achievements are within reach in the domains of defence-industrial cooperation, maritime security, critical materials, artificial intelligence, emerging technology, and cybersecurity.^[2]

Among the recommendations is the urgent need to prioritise negotiating and concluding a General Security Protection Agreement, which it labelled as “the most important enabler of defence-industrial and technology-led cooperation”.

On the strategic side, Canada seems increasingly interested in the evolution of the Quad – the grouping comprising India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. Carney visited all the first three countries during his Asia safari early this year. When asked during a recent podcast whether Canada wished to join the Quad, Canadian High Commissioner in Delhi Christopher Cooter replied, “We are not there yet.”^[3] On its part, India supports Canada’s bid to join the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an observer, to upgrade its participation in the International Solar Alliance (ISA), and to join the Global Biofuels Alliance as a full member.

Second, trade, investment, technology, and energy flows constitute the central pillar of the relationship. Bilateral trade comprising merchandise and services stood at $14 billion in 2024. The announced goal to raise it to $21 billion by 2030 seems realistic, provided that both governments and relevant stakeholders play a proactive role. Success hinges on the governments’ conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by the end of 2026. Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal’s visit to Canada in May 2026 – accompanied by a delegation of over 120 companies, the largest ever sent abroad – was a good omen. However, industry insiders point out that completing CEPA by year-end requires meeting a tight deadline. Should these efforts succeed, a visit by PM Modi to Canada by year-end is a distinct possibility.

The investment scene is equally substantial, with total Canadian institutional exposure in India standing at $100 billion.^[4] Canadian pension funds have been consistent supporters of India’s infrastructural development. Additionally, over 600 Canadian companies maintain a physical presence in India, and more than 1,000 companies are actively pursuing business opportunities in the Indian market.^[5]

Energy, both renewable and non-renewable, offers immense potential for collaboration. The current focus is on expanding bilateral energy trade, including increased exports of oil and LNG from Canada to India and the supply of refined petroleum products from India to Canada. The signing of a long-term commercial contract valued at $1.8 billion between India’s Department of Atomic Energy and Canada’s Cameco for the supply of 22 million pounds of uranium concentrates is significant.

Thirdly, the people-to-people connection and cooperation sustained through education, culture, creative industries, tourism, and other segments of society remain an important asset for the partnership. The presence of 1.8 million Indo-Canadians and an estimated 1 million non-resident Indians in Canada needs to be fully leveraged to strengthen bilateral ties. Yet, within this diaspora lie certain deep-seated challenges that derailed the relationship just three years ago. It remains to be seen whether both countries have drawn appropriate lessons from that painful experience.

India and Canada stand to gain considerable bilateral, regional, and global advantages through a more rejuvenated partnership. The two PMs are said to share excellent personal chemistry. It is their political will and ability to advance relations that will shape the future of the partnership.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1]‘India-Canada Joint Leaders’ Statement’, Prime Minister’s Office, 2 March 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2234572&reg=48&lang=2.

[2]From Freeze to Forward Motion, https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/CAN-IND_Summary_EN_V2.pdf.

[3]StratNewsGlobal, “Delhi, Ottawa Are Slowly Rebuilding Trust, Says Canada’s Ambassador || The Gist,” YouTube video, July 24, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZjANi1tbD4.

[4]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “English Translation of Press Statement by the Prime Minister during the Joint Press Statement with the Prime Minister of Canada,” March 2, 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/40837/English_translation_of_Press_Statement_by_the_Prime_Minister_during_the_Joint_Press_Statement_with_the_Prime_Minister_of_Canada_March_02_2026.

[5]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Brief on India-Canada Bilateral Relations,” April 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Canada.pdf.

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In recent months, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), referred to as Azad Kashmir by Islamabad, has been engulfed in a wave of protests since June 5. The demonstrations, fuelled by widespread discontent over escalating prices, oppressive governance, and a glaring absence of accountability, escalated dramatically. By July, the situation had intensified so much that Pakistani security forces responded with unprecedented levels of violence, resulting in the deaths of up to 40 locals, particularly the unarmed protestors affiliated with the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), a civil society group. This group has been at the forefront of the peaceful protests, advocating for the rights and voices of the local population.

Compounding the unrest are the ongoing state elections, which began July 27 and whose process has become contentious, marked by violence and turmoil, making them one of the most fractious in recent years. The atmosphere is heavily charged, characterised by internet blackouts and shutdowns, with violent confrontations sparked by the stringent security crackdown.

The protests have focused on a provocative issue: the abolition of 12 legislative assembly seats that are reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir. The JKJAAC argues that these seats provide undue political influence to “non-residents”, calling for a system where only the “true” residents of Pakistan-administered Kashmir can stand for election and represent the interests of the local populace.

The 12 reserved seats in PoJK were established under the Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Interim Constitution Act of 1974. These were for refugees who fled or migrated from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir to mainland Pakistan following the 1947 Partition and the 1965 war. Thousands of individuals, primarily from the Jammu division and the Kashmir Valley on the Indian side, migrated to mainland Pakistan. Most of these refugees and their descendants settled in various provinces of Pakistan, mainly in Punjab, as well as in Sindh and Islamabad.

When the 53-member Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Legislative Assembly was formalised under the AJK Interim Constitution Act of 1974, 12 of the directly elected seats were specifically designated for these diaspora communities, with 6 seats for Jammu refugees and 6 for Kashmir Valley refugees.

The military has firmly resisted the JKJAAC’s demand to abolish the 12 seats because it allows Islamabad’s civil-military establishment to hand-pick winners and control government formation in Muzaffarabad, bypassing local resident voters entirely. As expected in this election too, JKJAAC has accused the Pakistan government of vote-rigging in the 12 reserved seats and of systemic manipulation and operational irregularities.

A majority decision in the Assembly requires the assent of 27 seats. The two competing political parties are the establishment-backed Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). In the three-phase election, Mirpur voted on July 27, Muzaffarabad and the 12 refugee constituencies on August 2, and Poonch – the JKJAAC stronghold – will vote on August 10. It is Poonch that has become a focal point of tension and violence, experiencing some of the deadliest clashes between protestors and authorities during this turbulent period. In Phase 2, the PML-N has already claimed victory in the majority of the refugee seats.

With security deteriorating, the residents of PoJK are experiencing deprivation at an unprecedented level. An internet shutdown has now been ongoing for over 50 days, making it nearly impossible to campaign or disseminate news from the area. Multiple high-level sources indicate that the Pakistani government has also halted food supplies to the region, leading to stress among sections of the population who were previously uninvolved in the protests. And Islamabad has ordered the temporary shutdown of banks, markets, petrol stations, and other institutions.

The root of these issues lies in a loose trilateral pact signed in October 2025 between the JKJAAC and major political parties like the PPP and the PML-N. The agreement promised to address JKJAAC’s multiple demands from economic subsidies to localised governance reforms one by one – and especially the abolition of the 12 reserved seats. So far, none have been fulfilled.

In late May 2026, formal negotiations between the parties – JAAC and PPP and PML-N – broke down over these demands. On June 5, 2026, the Pakistani government officially banned the JKJAAC under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Authorities simultaneously shut down the internet, raided the group’s offices, and initiated a widespread police crackdown, arresting over 100 leaders and activists. The same day, one of JAAC’s prominent leaders, Umar Nazir Kashmiri, was attacked, resulting in the death of his associate, Shahzeb Habib.

“Branding a grassroots organisation as ‘terrorist’ on vague grounds, while simultaneously cutting the region off from the outside world, raises serious concerns regarding the Pakistani authorities’ conduct and their disregard for human rights. The proscription of JKJAAC under anti-terror laws is disproportionate, unlawful and a violation of the right to freedom of association,” said Isabelle Lassee, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for South Asia, in a June 9 report.^[1]  Lassee demanded a reduction of violence, of the protestors and the police, and the upholding of international human rights efforts.

At a time when Pakistan has been trying to actively play the role of mediator in the ongoing West Asia crisis, these incidents on its side of Kashmir have dented its image and are in danger of tarnishing the reputation of Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir. He is now widely viewed by protesters and regional observers as the central architect behind the iron-fisted state response to the unrest.

The deadly violence and bloodshed in PoJK have also put under question Islamabad’s so-called sincerity in supporting the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) across the Line of Control (LoC) on the Indian side.

India has rejected the phased assembly elections in PoJK as a “cosmetic exercise” and a “camouflage” used by Islamabad to mask its illegal occupation and serious human rights abuses. New Delhi maintains that these exercises cannot alter the legal reality that the entire Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India.

Pakistan, on its part, has predictably accused JKJAAC of being backed, funded, and driven by India. In late July 2026, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif drew a direct line between the JKJAAC and India during a televised press briefing, thereby ruling out any peaceful negotiations. “There will be no dialogue with the protesters. I bracket them with India. I put them in the same category as India and consider them enemies of Pakistan,” Asif had said.

India’s security apparatus is currently examining the potential connections between the recent terror attacks in Anantnag on July 22 and Kulgam on August 1. These incidents are suspected to be linked to the ongoing unrest in PoJK, highlighting that the Pakistani Army may seize any opportunity to incite similar tensions across the LoC. Both attacks have been attributed to The Resistance Front (TRF), which operates as a proxy for the Pakistan-based terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

Still, while the Poonch protests continue, Pakistan is unlikely to ratchet up such incidents or launch a large-scale attack in Jammu and Kashmir, mindful that India could swiftly react by resuming Operation Sindoor at any moment.

The surge in tensions is a clear indicator that Pakistan has lost ground in the narrative battle over Jammu and Kashmir. Its claim that Muslims in J&K were being ill-treated is belied by its brutal crackdown in PoJK and neglect of the Kashmiris within its own borders. While it continues to promote cross-border terrorism as a strategy, its grip on the region appears to have slipped beyond recovery, effectively closing the door on any potential for broader India-Pakistan bilateral negotiations in the foreseeable future.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This interview was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

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References:

[1] Freedom of Association is provided under Section 7 of the AJK Interim Constitution Act of 1974.

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The ASEAN Chair, the Philippines, hosted the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and related meetings in Manila between July 20 and 24, 2026.

Though ASEAN centrality is now often called into question, these meetings demonstrated that ASEAN remains central to the diplomatic architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The wide variety of regional and global powers present in Manila participated in ASEAN-led meetings but also in an intense programme of bilateral and plurilateral engagements.

The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and the Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) with Dialogue Partners constituted the formal institutional diplomacy of the week. Added to these were the commemorative meetings marking the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a peace and cooperation pact signed by the original founders of ASEAN, which collectively reaffirmed ASEAN’s convening power in the region.

ASEAN continues to avoid being forced into difficult choices between the U.S. and China. Expectedly, the Joint Communiqué of the AMM^[1] did not contain headline initiatives, instead focusing on economic resilience, it being on par with regional security concerns. Current geopolitical crises of food and energy security, digital transformation, resilient supply chains and climate-friendly growth received as much attention as traditional political issues like the SCS, Myanmar and the West Asian crisis. ASEAN recognises that strategic competition is now conducted through supply chains, technology and economic security, rather than through military competition alone.

Myanmar remains ASEAN’s central challenge. While Myanmar’s foreign minister was not invited, ASEAN maintained its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus. This reflects both the steadiness of ASEAN diplomacy and its limitations. Without abandoning engagement with Myanmar, which has continued informally in recent months,^[2] ASEAN institutionally wishes to preserve the framework that permits gradual engagement without completely isolating the country.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the meetings was the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which, in many ways, underpins ASEAN centrality. The TAC remains ASEAN’s principal normative treaty. It binds parties to the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference, sovereign equality and the renunciation of the use of force.

It has now been acceded to by over 50 countries,^[3] making it one of the world’s most widely adhered-to regional treaties. The Golden Jubilee of the TAC demonstrated ASEAN’s influence, despite its limited military strength, through rule-making and norm-setting. TAC provides the common diplomatic space for engagement with a wide variety of partners. Several countries, including Sweden, Poland, Romania, and Lithuania, attended as newly acceding members. Oman and the Netherlands also participated. In total, 30 foreign ministers attended the commemoration, underscoring the importance attached to the anniversary.

The meeting in Manila also saw a significant shift in one of ASEAN’s fixed positions: having a moratorium on dialogue partners. For many years, there were only ten dialogue partners, including India, but in 2021, the moratorium was lifted to accommodate the UK.^[4] Türkiye, in line since 2017 to become a full entrant to the partnership, is officially the twelfth dialogue partner. Now ASEAN can admit partners it sees as strategic to its interests, which, like Türkiye, may not be traditionally viewed as a Pacific power. By admitting Türkiye, ASEAN demonstrated its attractiveness as a diplomatic platform extending beyond Asia. Moreover, it reflects ASEAN’s desire to diversify its Dialogue Partnerships beyond the major powers. For Ankara, its “Asia Anew Initiative” has perhaps found its crowning achievement in becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, thereby giving ASEAN a wider place in Eurasian diplomacy.

While dialogue partners remain important because they participate in the post-ministerial conferences and, in many cases, the East Asia Summit, they are not all on an equal footing. The European Union, Canada and the UK do not participate in every ASEAN-led meeting, but they regularly attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Plus One Foreign Ministers’ Meetings. The UK was admitted to the ARF this year. By expanding this diplomatic space, ASEAN is seeking to engage a wider spectrum of partners beyond the traditional dialogue partners.^[5]

Several middle powers like Brazil, Germany, France and the UAE also participated through sectoral partnerships, observer arrangements and bilateral consultations. This demonstrates ASEAN’s gradual evolution from a relatively closed regional organisation into a diplomatic hub where many countries gather annually.

Indeed, countries now attend the ASEAN meetings not only to engage ASEAN Member States but also to meet one another. This parallel network of meetings has become an important corollary to the formal ASEAN agenda.

The ARF, which meets only at the Foreign Ministers’ level, remains Asia’s only inclusive security mechanism. It brings together ASEAN members and partners and also includes North Korea, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

The ARF focused on current concerns, including maritime security, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and transnational crime. Its Chair’s Statement^[6], reflecting the views of 27 members, carefully avoided language that might appear to favour either the U.S. or China, particularly on the South China Sea. Instead, it reaffirmed freedom of navigation, the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for international law.

This balancing act is ASEAN’s hallmark. Although its usefulness is often questioned, ASEAN recognises that it cannot resolve great-power rivalry. Through the ARF, however, it seeks to prevent that rivalry from becoming a source of regional instability. Whether it succeeds is an open question.

The East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting serves as the precursor to the 49^th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in November 2026. Unlike the ARF, participation is limited to the 11 ASEAN countries and the eight Dialogue Partners that are also members of the EAS and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

The EAS focused on longer-term strategic issues, including economic security, maritime connectivity, digital cooperation, energy transition and emerging technologies.

The Indo-Pacific featured prominently, although ASEAN continues to interpret it through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), emphasising inclusiveness, openness and cooperation rather than alliance politics. For most EAS participants, this remains an acceptable framework.

Perhaps one of the major achievements of the meetings was ASEAN’s ability to maintain strategic balance. The U.S. and the other Quad partners, including India, reiterated their support for ASEAN centrality, while China emphasised economic integration, regional stability and continued negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, recognising that progress now largely depends on ASEAN Member States.

ASEAN’s success lay in accommodating both the American and Chinese narratives without fully endorsing either. This careful balancing remains central to ASEAN’s strategy of inclusive regionalism, recognising the importance of American security engagement while acknowledging Southeast Asia’s deep economic interdependence with China.

Russia’s participation followed closely after the Russia-ASEAN Summit in June. It reflected Moscow’s determination to remain an Indo-Pacific power despite its present strategic preoccupation with Europe.

Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated Russia’s support for ASEAN centrality while advocating a broader Eurasian security architecture. Russia’s economic engagement with ASEAN remains modest compared with China, India and Japan. Nevertheless, ASEAN-led meetings continue to provide Moscow with valuable diplomatic space to engage partners who may not otherwise interact with Russia extensively.

An interesting development was the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings. Significantly, the meeting took place within the ASEAN process rather than outside it, emphasising that all four Quad members are Dialogue Partners and East Asia Summit participants.^[7]

The Quad has consistently supported ASEAN centrality and has been careful to demonstrate that it is complementary to, rather than competitive with, ASEAN-led institutions. It continues to focus on practical cooperation in maritime domain awareness, resilient supply chains, critical technologies and HADR. Its brief communiqué recognised ASEAN sensitivities and avoided portraying the Quad as an exclusive security alliance, instead presenting it as a strong partner of ASEAN.

Indian diplomacy perhaps best illustrated the continuing importance of ASEAN-led forums. External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar was busy, participating actively in the ASEAN-India Post-Ministerial Conference.^[8] The ARF and EAS meetings, as well as numerous bilateral meetings with ASEAN members, China, Russia, the European Union, the UK, New Zealand, Oman and others, besides the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

India increasingly regards ASEAN-led forums as the diplomatic fulcrum of its Indo-Pacific engagement, enabling bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral diplomacy to be conducted simultaneously at a single venue.

The Manila meetings, coming amid continuing crises in Ukraine and West Asia, demonstrated that ASEAN centrality has not gone out of fashion. Neither the U.S. nor China, despite scepticism about ASEAN’s effectiveness, wishes ASEAN institutions to disappear. Russia, Japan, Australia, the European Union and the UK likewise continue to use these meetings as valuable platforms for Indo-Pacific engagement.

India, too, has used these forums effectively across multiple diplomatic tracks, contributing increasingly to the evolution of regional norms.

The real success of the Manila meetings did not lie in dramatic declarations but in the sheer intensity and diversity of the engagements. They demonstrated that ASEAN-led forums are an indispensable platform where competing powers can communicate, cooperate and manage differences even as strategic divisions deepen across the Indo-Pacific. This convening function remains ASEAN’s greatest contribution to regional stability.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

^[1] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Joint Communiqué of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, July 21, 2026. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/FINAL-Joint-Communique%CC%81-of-the-59th-ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Meeting-21-July-2026.pdf

^[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, “Informal Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers with Myanmar and the Extended Informal Consultation on Myanmar”, July 12, 2026. https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/informal-meeting-asean-fms-myanmar-eic-120726-en

^[3] The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), ASEAN

https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-tac

^[4] Singh, Gurjit. “India–Japan Strategic Partnership: New Opportunities in a Changing Global Order.” Rajasthan Foundation, 2025. https://www.rajraf.org/10282/uploads/article/1034/3_Gurjit_Singh.pdf

^[5] Our Communities, ASEAN.org, https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/external-relations/

^[6] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “Chair’s Statement of the 33rd ASEAN Regional Forum,” July 25, 2026. https://asean.org/chairs-statement-of-the-33rd-asean-regional-forum/

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Press Release on Cooperation with ASEAN by the Quad Foreign Ministers.” July 22, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/41494/Joint_Press_Release_on_Cooperation_with_ASEAN_by_the_Quad_Foreign_Ministers

^[8] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “EAM’s Remarks during ASEAN–India Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (July 22, 2026),” July 22, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements?dtl/41496/EAMs_remarks_during_ASEANIndia_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_July_22_2026

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