Prime Minister Tarique Rahman-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) will complete six months in office in August. Rahman assumed charge on February 17 after winning a landslide victory in Bangladesh, which underwent a massive transformation following the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her party, Awami League, in July 2024. The BNP, which won the next election, was faced with a double crisis, with the West Asia war causing shortages in Bangladesh’s dwindling economy. Meanwhile, in a sharp departure from previous practice, Rahman chose to make China his first state visit abroad even as anti-India rhetoric continued in the streets of Dhaka.

On its part, Bangladesh sent M. Riaz Hamidullah, one of its top diplomats, to New Delhi to iron out the creases. After 1.5 years, Hamidullah, High Commissioner of Bangladesh to India, is heading to Geneva. He spoke exclusively to Nayanima Basu on the future of Delhi-Dhaka ties.

Nayanima Basu (NB): Which direction is Bangladesh’s foreign policy headed? After his first foreign trip to China, will Prime Minister Tarique Rahman visit India this year?

Riaz Hamidullah (RH): It will not be correct to say X country or Y country has been given priority. In the past also, Bangladesh’s head of state has undertaken early visits (to China). In PM Rahman’s case, China has been his first visit abroad for several economic necessities. That has happened because of symbolism and substance and also for the ground realities. Early visits are planned after careful calibration. In our case, it’s no surprise. Yes, the first visit could have been here (in India), but one also needs to appreciate that there are sensitive issues pertaining to the current state of affairs between Bangladesh and India.

The government of the day has to be mindful of the popular expectations. There are still cases of men, women and children lying in the hospital suffering from, two years on, the bullets they took or the way they have been impaired for the rest of their lives. Then there have been cases of enforced disappearances; we call it Aynaghor… These are not simply symbolism; these are not simply numbers in terms of how many thousands have been affected, but these have left large and deep wounds in the minds of a generation … The ground reality, the current expectation of the current demographic in Bangladesh, and the politics there not being understood in Delhi are making it difficult for the prime minister to come.

There have to be some signals, some gestures, that must come from our closest neighbour, India. India is one country with which we share an organic relationship.

NB: Is former PM Sheikh Hasina the problem? In a recent interview^[1] with Gateway House, she has said she is willing to return to Bangladesh.

RH: As long as Sheikh Hasina is here, she keeps making statements, which by every measure can be called anti-Bangladesh. Then how can the PM come here, or how can we call it an organic relationship? Besides, there has been constant rhetoric against Bangladesh going on for the past five-six months. These have become embedded in the mindscape of Bangladeshis. I have been saying constantly since I came to India that when such statements are made or when statements on “illegal immigration” are made, it hurts the ordinary people in Bangladesh.

Today, Sheikh Hasina’s presence, her activities, and her statements against Bangladesh have created disturbance there. India needs to see what is being hurled at Bangladesh. This looks like India has no respect or regard for Bangladesh. Not just in politics, even the common man in Bangladesh today is shocked at what comes out of India.

NB: Is Bangladesh willing to take her back?

RH: If she (Sheikh Hasina) opts to come back, then she definitely can. But then she will have to be in acceptance of facing the law and the verdict given by the courts there. She has to decide and understand (since she is facing the death penalty)… The death penalty stands. We are also constantly pushing for the bilateral extradition treaty to be moved. And that is not just for her but also for some other leaders of the Awami League party who were involved in the July 2024 massacre.

NB: How is Bangladesh addressing the issues concerning illegal immigration and border management under the new dispensation? 

RH: In the lead up to the elections in eastern India (Assam and West Bengal), many statements were made against Bangladesh. We thought, at that time, when the campaigns were going on, that this was some kind of political expediency and the rhetoric would come down eventually. But we saw that the opposite happened (even after State Assembly elections). These things have literally shut the door for any form of engagement with Bangladesh.

We have a porous border, and it has been so since the border was drawn in certain ways back in 1947. I have travelled to Northeastern parts of India and have witnessed how people there are aware of the border. But they don’t feel inhibited in terms of their interaction (with kin across the border). This is a border where trading of goods takes place and is important, but more important than that is trading of emotions.

NB: What about border management? There had been a two-day border coordination conference in June between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). Was the issue of border killings addressed?

RH: I do not think securitisation or dehumanisation of the border in terms of border management can be the answer toward resolving the border issues. Border killing is an issue that we have raised with India. I am fully mindful of the fact that the Indian government will do what it can to address its own concerns. But we should be careful of the sentiments and emotions of the people on both sides of the border.

The issue of border management comes under the India-Bangladesh Consular Dialogue. We have been repeatedly urging India to convene it so that issues concerning the border can be addressed forthwith. Our request has been lying with the Indian government since June. We have been telling India to put all issues on the table and resolve them one by one.

NB: India says Bangladesh indirectly allows illegal immigration, even under the new administration.

RH: We do not allow people to infiltrate and we do not push people inside India. Yes, human smuggling and human trafficking take place. Therefore, we need the border mechanism talks that happen under the Consular Dialogue. Our position is that if people cross the border illegally, they reach far-flung areas of Kashmir, Gujarat, and even the south of India. This means, within India, a certain ecosystem works to facilitate. How do they buy the tickets to travel to these areas? How do they get jobs? What kind of verification takes place? So both sides would need to dismantle the ecosystem at work.

This is in our shared interest. We are ready to cooperate in addressing this issue, but politicisation of this matter is not going to work. Therefore, blaming Bangladesh will not help. This would end up damaging ties on both sides (in the longer haul). It is one of the reasons why many Bangladeshis today are not as excited as they used to be to travel to India. Despite resuming the visa services, people are obtaining the visas, but then they are also apprehensive to come here; they are increasingly hesitant to come to India.

NB: Recently, the Ministry of External Affairs said India has asked Bangladesh to verify the nationality of over 2,680 individuals staying illegally in this country.

RH: The illegal immigration numbers mentioned by the MEA recently have been there since 2020. But, now that it has been raised by the MEA, to me particularly, since the summer of 2025, we are steadfastly analysing the numbers one by one. We found out that there are cases of duplicates; some are Rohingyas, and some are in detention centres. We have since been working on addressing all cases of individuals. These things need to be handled beyond the public spectacle.

NB: The BNP will complete six months in office. How would you assess these past months?

RH: When the government came to power, within two weeks the Iran war started. The government was then just settling in. BNP has come to power after nearly 17 years. The government had to go for firefighting in terms of getting diesel right and fertiliser right. I think like many other countries, we are learning how to grapple with these disruptions, especially in the energy segment. In the meantime, dialogue with India has steadily taken place. In fact, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, when he visited Dhaka, even met the Leader of the Opposition Shafiqur Rahman of the Jamaat-e-Islami party (on the sidelines of Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony in Dhaka on February 17).

Meanwhile, on 26 February, a warm, positive, pragmatic, and future-orientated letter came from Prime Minister Tarique Rahman addressed to Prime Minister Modi. The biggest takeaway in that letter was PM Rahman’s mention to “reinvigorate our cooperative engagements”. There was also a reference in his letter of ‘Viksit Bharat’. Since then, a lot of engagements have taken place. PM Rahman has made it clear that Bangladesh will move according to its own interest and not hurt other countries.

NB: What have been the achievements of BNP domestically?

RH: The government has been focused on two primary objectives since February – repair and reset. Repair was more important because when the government took charge, it realised that institutions had been botched up – be it political or electoral. Plundering was carried out under the previous (Sheikh Hasina) regime. The world only witnessed the killings, but in parallel, looting has been carried out. Looting of banks had taken place; the banking system has collapsed. If local investments do not come into the system, then foreign investments will remain a far cry. So, restoring public confidence was a challenge.

Restoring confidence in the police was a task. Bringing values back in society was also essential. The governance style has been like our late former President Zia-Ur-Rahman. He believed that whatever people might throw at him, his personal honesty was never questioned. Likewise, we see PM Rahman has been doing everything possible for him to do from digging canals to other things. Denying security protocols, he has gone inside people’s homes and tried to connect with them at the grassroots level. There was a gap that had emerged that needed to be restored.

The challenge was also to create a spontaneous public discourse, cutting across socio-political ideologies, restoring what was important. During the political upheaval that happened in Bangladesh in 2024, press freedom took a big hit. That had to be brought back. The government has taken active measures to also address widespread corruption. The government has passed the first budget. There are now concerns over revenue mobilisation, depending less on external or domestic borrowing. It had to be a growth-inducing budget and not to placate the oligarchs.

NB: What is happening to the July Charter that was drawn up so assiduously? What happened to the referendum that secured a 68% ‘Yes’ vote?

RH: It is under discussion in the Parliament – the contents of the referendum and the approach to the July Charter. We are speaking in the month of July, five months since Parliament has been convened. So, it would be early to say anything on the final shape of the July Charter.

NB: But the opposition parties there, especially Jamaat-e-Islami, say that by not giving priority to the referendum, the government is failing to meet people’s aspirations? 

RH: Aspiration is almost like an open pit where the sky’s the limit. Aspiration would come with two legs – one is that you can aspire for anything, but how much do you or how much wherewithal do you have to redeem that? Second is to deliver on the aspiration.

Bangladesh not only has a younger demography but also very open, liberal-minded people who have a tendency to question. I don’t think it is unfair to have that tendency because everyone has their sovereign choice. But one would also need to be mindful of the ability to deliver and the things in the command of the state to deliver on people’s diverse aspirations.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This interview was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

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References:

[1] Gateway House, “Threats Never Deterred Me. I’ll Be Back in Bangladesh”, November 24, 2025. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/threats-never-deterred-me-ill-be-back-in-bangladesh/

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The renewal of hostilities between the U.S. and Iran has created fresh uncertainty around energy prices. It raises three key questions. First, regarding the outlook for global oil markets: can prices go up further? Second, will there be new sanctions-related risks for oil buyers? Third, what strategies can oil importers use to manage their risks? Each of these questions is especially relevant for India, which consumes over 4.5 million barrels/day of oil and relies on imports for over 85% of its growing needs. Over the next two decades, India’s oil consumption is projected to double, reaching 10 million barrels/day.

The price of oil has been in the $85-95/barrel range since the conflict restarted in early July – an increase of 20% over the $70-72/barrel range in late June when the ceasefire was in place. At the peak of the conflict in March and April, the maximum price was $120/barrel – the single biggest disruption to global oil supply since World War II.

This is a sharp contrast from the 2005-07 era, when oil supply was tight, and news such as an accident in an oil field or a terror attack in an oil-producing country was enough to send the price soaring. At that time, oil had crossed $140/barrel, well over the $200/barrel in today’s money. Judging by the relatively sluggish movements in oil prices of the past six months compared to the magnitude of such moves historically, it can be concluded that the global oil supply worldwide comfortably exceeds the demand.

Historically, OPEC has been regarded as the swing producer in the oil market, which sets prices by reducing or increasing oil production. However, it has lost this position over the past several years, largely due to rising oil production in the U.S. and falling oil demand from the Western world due to green policies.

Today, the shale oil producers in the U.S. are the true swing producers. The UAE’s exit from OPEC is a belated acknowledgement that the grouping is no longer a swing producer, and keeping ‘spare production capacity’, which Saudi Arabia and the UAE have traditionally maintained, incurs a cost without commensurate benefits. Once the situation in the Persian Gulf normalises, the UAE is likely to increase its production – and India will be a beneficiary.

Supply can be managed. But a new risk from the conflict is the use of sanctions and other related financial measures by the U.S., which has been unable to achieve its original aims on Russia and Iran via kinetic means. The Supporting Russia Act of 2026 proposes tariffs of up to 100% on countries importing Russian oil is an example. While most non-Western governments don’t recognise unilateral or American sanctions, multinational corporations have to contend with the reality of American centrality to the global financial system and plan and act accordingly. An oil company requires continued access to international financial markets to remain a going concern. Russia and Iran are two of the most heavily sanctioned countries and will continue to be at the receiving end of the U.S. exercising its leverage periodically. Given the surplus oil capacity in the world market, the U.S. will have greater freedom of action on this front, while exporters will be more vulnerable.

As an oil importer, these are risks that India will need to manage. Historically, India has invested in overseas oil and gas fields since the early 2000s to reduce the financial exposure to high oil prices. Over the past decade, outbound acquisitions by Indian oil companies have virtually come to a halt. This could have been due to the public signalling by the Indian government on renewable energy and green technologies but also because managing those oil fields at a long distance has been difficult.

Since 2019, Indian policymakers have pushed aggressively for electric vehicles, including support for manufacturing and other subsidies. However, penetration remains low at less than 5% for cars and 10% for two-wheelers. This is perhaps the lowest penetration of EVs for any major automotive market. Unless the issues related to the supply of critical minerals, including rare earth magnets, and China’s dominance of the supply chain are addressed, adoption will lag.

The other way in which India is trying to deal with high oil prices is by aggressively pushing for biofuels – ethanol, which can be blended with petrol. This is a faulty strategy, as it diverts agricultural land to growing cheap fuel. The ‘savings’ from importing less oil are illusory, as India ends up importing more oilseeds and pulses – crops which have been supplanted by bio-fuels. Crops used for ethanol production – sugarcane and maize – are also water-intensive, and India remains the most water-stressed among major economies.

India needs to re-examine its reluctance to invest in overseas oil and gas fields. Given the backdrop of sanctions, some of these investments can be based in jurisdictions less likely to be hit by sanctions – resource rich states such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia. The low energy prices of the past decade have been helpful tailwind for India, and the events of the past few months show why long-term preparation beats crisis management.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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Aizawl, capital of India’s northeast state of Mizoram, is a sprawling, densely built city that sits atop high mountains and gently slopes down to deep, lush, forested valleys. Its buildings, with few exceptions, are built on stilts and appear to cling precariously to the mountainsides. They flank both sides of its narrow, winding mountain roads – the only connectivity between its far-flung corners.

A district map of India’s northeast state of Mizoram. Champai district witnesses the highest refugee influx from Myanmar

Source: ResearchGate

Aizawl and the rest of Mizoram are ideal destinations for the nature-loving tourist. But because it is one of India’s four northeast border states that require an Inner Line Permit (ILP) for even Indian citizens to visit, it is quite rare to encounter tourists on Aizawl’s streets.^{[1] [2]} Flights into Aizawl are filled with Mizos returning home, as well as a sizeable number of Indian Army servicemen reporting back for duty at the Assam Rifles battalion base camp and administrative headquarters.^[3]

A Gateway House map showing the border regions of Northeast India (blue) and Myanmar (brown)

Source: Gateway House

Mizoram shares a border with Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is currently home to an estimated 40,000 Myanmar Chin refugees, many living in Aizawl, and about 1,000 Bawm and Chakma tribals from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, all of whom look like indigenous Mizos.^[4] This is not surprising, as they all belong to the same ethnic family of tribes, share a common culture, language (Tibeto-Burman family of languages), and religion; most are Presbyterian Christians.^{[5] [6]} The foreign tourists in Aizawl are usually expatriate Myanmar Chins from the U.S. who are visiting family living there or crossing the border to their home villages.^[7] Many entered the U.S. under the (now largely suspended) United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) from 1980 to 2025.^[8][9]

The refugee influx from Myanmar into India, Thailand, and Malaysia, though ongoing since the mid-1980s ethnic conflicts, has peaked with the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. But a wave of refugees crosses over when clashes escalate between the Myanmar military and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in its northeast border states of Chin, Sagaing, and Shan. The ongoing civil unrest in Bangladesh since 5 August 2024 has also brought Bawm refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) into Mizoram’s southeast border villages.

These refugees are putting a strain on a state which is just 12 lakhs in population. Already, refugees form 3.75% of the state,^[10] and their numbers sometimes hit 50,000 to 60,000, or 5% of its population, as they did in May 2023 when the Myanmar Army began bombing the EAOs in its northwest. Manipur, another Indian Northeast state, which also shares a border with Myanmar, currently hosts just 8,000 Myanmar Chin refugees after deporting many home in 2024.^[11]

So, how does Mizoram, India’s most remote state, bordered by two neighbours in political turmoil – Bangladesh and Myanmar – cope with the ebb and flow of refugees? And what drives its people to host them?

The answer to the first is the resilient informal partnership among civil society organisations, various church denominations, the state government, and international funding agencies and donors, which pool their resources and expertise to address the humanitarian crisis whenever it erupts.

The Young Mizo Association (YMA) flag

Source: Wikipedia

In this quartet, the foremost civil society association in refugee aid is the Young Mizo Association (YMA), with its vast network of 830 district groups and village branches in Mizoram. The presence of YMA (pronounced Y-mah) is everywhere. In Aizawl, the YMA flag, with its three consecutive horizontal stripes of red, white, and black, is everywhere – very different from the political party flags and hoardings that are common in most Indian cities. YMA flags are painted on traffic police islands and flutter from rooftops. It is a community-based, non-political organisation, founded in 1935 by Christian missionaries and Mizo Christians, with a membership of 500,000 in Mizoram and with a presence in Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Assam, and Tripura. It even has a branch in Bangladesh.^[12]

The second pillar is the Mizoram state government, which funds a large share of humanitarian aid. In the first year after the 2021 coup, it disbursed Rs 3.80 crore.^[13] It has been approaching the central government for aid, which last month disbursed Rs 10 crore in rice aid to Mizoram’s refugees. Also, state-run schools provide free education through the 10^th and 12^th standards to refugees.^[14] The next pillar is the many church organisations, such as the international Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), which fund health camps at local hospitals and classes for refugee children.^[15] The last are international agencies and donors, like the Chin Health Organisation, operated by former Chin refugees in the U.S.

What motivates the Mizo to host these refugees? Prof. Malsawmliana, the secretary general of the Central YMA, Aizawl, says they consider the Chin as “our ethnic relatives or cousins”. We welcome them with open arms and administer humanitarian assistance.” According to him, the initial aid when the influx began was deployed by YMA village branches, especially those in Champai District, which always bears the brunt of any humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. As regards the recent Bawm refugees from Bangladesh, given their smaller numbers, the Group YMA in southeast Mizoram looks after them.

In addition to tribal and familial loyalties, a key convergence is Christianity.

Like a majority of Mizos, the Chin too are Christians. Christian missionaries arrived in this region after it was finally subdued by the British Indian Army in 1896, in a campaign that began in 1871 after the abduction of six-year-old Mary Winchester, the child of a Scottish tea estate manager in the Cachar Hill Tracts (Assam), by one of the Mizo tribal chiefs.^[16] Within 50 years, the hill tribes, whether Kuki, Zo, Hmar, Ralte, Chin, or Naga, were largely converted to Christianity, mostly Presbyterianism.^[17] The influence of church pastors on the daily lives of their flock is profound even today. It is visible in the number of churches of different denominations at almost every traffic turn in Aizawl.

Solomon’s Temple, a church and tourist attraction in Aizawl

Source: Wikipedia

Despite this commonality between the local Mizo and Chin refugees, there are several areas of unease.

Ever since the 1980s, when Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts began, its illicit drug economy has grown in financial heft and spread across the land. Myanmar is part of the ‘Golden Triangle’ of illicit drug-exporting countries of Southeast Asia, which include Laos and Thailand. Since the military takeover in 2021 and with northwest Myanmar in the hands of EAOs, YMA secretary general Malsawmliana says the drug manufacturing units have shifted from Laos to the Indo-Myanmar border. This makes the Chin refugees both vulnerable and useful. They are used as carriers across the border and as peddlers. The local availability of drugs has increased addiction amongst local Mizo youth. Locals say the street price in Aizawl for a shot of heroin is just Rs 200 (USD $2).^[18] “This”, says Lalduhthlana Ralte, a local Mizo from the Ralte tribe who, after retirement from the Indian foreign service – he was India’s ambassador to the Philippines and India’s High Commissioner to Brunei – has settled in Aizawl, “is of grave concern for Mizos who have largely lived protected lives as part of India, unlike their Chin brothers and sisters who have had it rough.”

A large part of this problem, locals say, is because Chin refugees have no legal avenues to earn a living, leaving the informal economy as their only source of income. Most refugees work as house help, taxi drivers, and day labourers and loiter in the bazaars; they often come across as ‘rude’ to the soft-spoken, courteous local Mizo.^[19]

To tackle the drug menace, the state home department, police, excise, and narcotics launched ‘Operation Jericho’ in 2025 with the Central YMA, which has been very successful. Mawlsawmliana of YMA says, “The aim was that the 14 border villages should put in more effort to stop the transit of drugs through their villages.” The police have now also been posted here. The grassroots intelligence has led to increased drug seizures, resulting in a shift of routes to the Myanmar-Manipur border.^[20]

Another point of unease is Chief Minister Lalduhoma’s outreach to overseas Mizos for FDI. There are a small number of Mizo families residing abroad. “This is something the people of Mizoram don’t like. We view Mizos outside Mizoram with a jaundiced eye,” observes Ralte. The two types of ‘outside’ money entering the state are drug money and refugee money. The refugee dollars are remittances from Chin refugees settled in the U.S. and Canada, resulting in their refugee relatives in Mizoram having plenty of money. Refugee dollars are rapidly buying up land in Aizawl and its surroundings, driving up prices beyond the reach of locals. Ralte points to the introduction of two flights a day on the New Delhi-Aizawl route. ‘Mizoram’s population alone would not justify the economics,’ he says, adding that the people returning ‘home’ for a visit are not Mizos but Myanmar Chins, who are identifiable to locals by their distinct dialect but are not recognisable by ordinary Indians.

To regulate the influx of foreigners, the Indian government reimposed the stringent Protected Area Regime (1958) in 2025, after relaxing it in 2011. A foreign tourist must have a Protected Area Permit before travelling to Mizoram. An unintended fallout has been on the few international students studying at Mizoram University who must leave and can return only once they have this permit.^[21]

For most Indians, Mizoram is the most remote Indian state and one they may never visit. But even a brief sojourn to this green mountainous state reveals its strategic importance in India’s Act East policy, sandwiched as it is between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Though distant from the peninsular mainland, the problems faced by local Mizos like drug abuse amongst young adults share a common angst with some of India’s bigger and more developed states.

Sifra Lentin is Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] The other three border states requiring ILPs are Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh.

[2] Most locals spoken to commend the Indian government’s northeast connectivity push, especially the newly operational railway line to Sairang, a terminus 17 km by road from Aizawl. The last segment – Bairabi-Sairang – was completed in June 2025 and inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 13 September 2025. Building this segment was challenging and an engineering feat due to the susceptibility of its mountainous terrain to landslides. Of note is the towering 114-metre bridge 196, which is 42 metres taller than the Qutub Minar.

[3] The Assam Rifles operational base has recently shifted 15 kms away from Aizawl to Zokhawsang, although some operations and key administrative offices still function from Aizawl city. Its 95-acre base within the city was handed over to the state government under a 2024 agreement.

[4] Many Myanmar refugees seek protection in neighbouring Thailand and Malaysia. Thailand is currently home to 90,000 refugees housed in nine camps in its bordering Tak district. The earliest refugees arrived here in the mid-1980s.

Voice of America (VOA), “White House Order Halts Myanmar Refugee Resettlement Deal with Thailand,” February 8, 2025. https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-order-halts-myanmar-refugee-resettlement-deal-with-thailand/7967957.html

[5] The previous umbrella term used to refer to the northeast mountain tribes was the Lushai Hill tribes. After the 1986 Peace Accord with the Mizo National Front, which envisaged the formation of a new state – Mizoram – the tribes within this state’s territory (Kuki, Zo, Ralte, Hmar, Chin, etc.) all call themselves ‘Mizo’ (Mi = Mountain, Zo = People, or people of the mountains).

[6] The Chin and Mizo dialects differ, although they belong to the same Tibeto-Burman family of languages. Only a Mizo speaker can distinguish the local dialect from its close cousin dialect spoken by the Chin.

[7] The Free Movement Regime (FMR) on the India-Myanmar border, meant to facilitate border trade, is greatly curtailed, with only one (Zokhawthar) functional border crossing in the State of Mizoram. The current FMR permits only residents living within 10 kms to cross over to Myanmar, and they must return within seven days at the same border crossing to return their temporary pass.

[8] See Gateway House’s CFR Fellow Purvi Patel’s article ‘US’s Temporary Protected Status for Myanmar’ (4 April 2024)

Gateway House, “Understanding Myanmar’s Temporary Protected Status,” February 13, 2025. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/understanding-myanmars-temporary-protected-status/

[9] The USRAP was introduced under the Refugee Act of 1980 and signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on 17 March 1980. Today, it is greatly curtailed (only 7500 refugees permitted in 2026) and suspended, except for specific groups like white South Africans, by an executive order signed by President Donald Trump in January 2025.

The United States of America has a few thousand (~35,000) Myanmar-origin citizens and residents, many of whom are refugees from Chin, Shan, and Sagaing states of Myanmar. They are concentrated largely in Indianapolis, Indiana, with some in the state of Texas.

Indianapolis Monthly, “Welcome to Chindianapolis,” December 12, 2020. https://www.indianapolismonthly.com/arts-and-culture/welcome-to-chindianapolis/

[10] People interviewed by the author spoke of about 12 lakh-plus persons. The India Census 2011 data states 10,97,206 persons, while the projected population for 2026 is 13,08,967 according to https://indiacensus.net/states/Mizoram

[11] The civil unrest in the State of Manipur caused by clashes between the Meitei and Kuki has resulted in the Ministry of Home Affairs closing Manipur’s border with Myanmar. Many Myanmar Chin refugees from this state were deported home in 2024, in light of the ongoing civil unrest.

[12] The legal status of YMA is that it is registered as a society under the Indian Societies Registration Act (Act XXI, 1860). It has five lakh members and 830 branches in Mizoram. The branch in Bangladesh came up in this author’s interview with Central YMA’s general secretary, Prof. Malsawmliana.

This interview took place on 11 June from 3 to 4 pm.

[13] See the Mizoram Finance Minister’s speech in the state assembly on the refugee crisis. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncuteHdNc10

[14] The state government in the initial stage of the humanitarian crisis deployed its own funds, but as the conflict in Myanmar and Bangladesh (the CHT has an ethnic insurgency movement) borders continues, it applies for central funding. The latest tranche of Rs 10 crore is under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme to Mizoram.

The Hindu, “Centre to Provide ₹10 Crore Rice Aid for Refugees in Mizoram,” June 14, 2026. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/centre-to-provide-10-crore-rice-aid-for-refugees-in-mizoram/article71098587.ece

[15] ADRA is an international humanitarian aid network, established by the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, and is headquartered in Silver Springs, Maryland.

[16] The first inroad by the British Indian government was in 1871 to rescue Mary Winchester, a six-year-old abducted by one of the Mizo tribal chiefs during a raid into Alexandrapur in the Cachar Hill Tracts (Assam). Mary Winchester, called Zoluti in the tribal chief’s household, was recovered from the tribe she lived amongst. Local lore says that at first she refused to return home to England but finally relented.

[17] The Presbyterian Church appealed to the tribals because it combined tribal structures (a committee of elders) with evangelical elements. There are different Christian denominations like Welsh Presbyterian, Baptist, Pentecostal, Salvation Army, Adventist, and Roman Catholic and sects (like the white-marbled Solomon’s Temple, which is listed as a tourist site).

[18] Myanmar’s northwest border states are under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations, and conditions here are disturbed; drug manufacturing facilities have also shifted from Laos closer to the India border. They enter India’s border states via traditional forest trails. What has led to unease among Mizos is that most drug carriers arrested so far have been Chin refugees, who undertake this work out of desperation to support their families. The heads of these drug cartels are not necessarily Chin, and they are difficult to nab, as they are often located overseas.

[19] India is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention (1951) and its 1967 Protocol, which defines the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of the host nation.

[20] Drugs are not the only items being smuggled across this border. Arms smuggling is also sizeable, as indicated by the recent arrest of an American and a Ukrainian attempting to cross into Myanmar from Mizoram.

[21] The Diplomat. “India Reimposes Restrictions on Foreign Nationals Visiting Three Northeastern States.” January 13, 2025.

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The war in West Asia ricochets between a state of tenuous ceasefire and aggressive bombing. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed between the U.S. and Iran and the framework agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon under the umbrella of the U.S. were baby steps taken to bring some semblance of normalcy in the region, but the reality overwhelmed even those tentative efforts. The fragility of the situation can be gauged from the fact that firing of drones and missiles took place on June 26, 2026, after the framework agreement was signed. Threats and counter-threats have become the norm.

A recent visit to Israel shows the damage but also allows for a revisiting of the original attack in Nova on October 7, 2023, that led to the retaliation and subsequent escalation of the conflict that has had a global impact.

Surprisingly, despite the war, Israel continues to build its cities. There is an enormous amount of new residential construction in Tel Aviv, with the skyline full of cranes, and the strict security measures are very visible. Given Israel’s proximity to countries that are inimical to its existence, these measures are necessary.

The October 7 incident, which the al-Qassam brigades launched during a concert in Nova, which is close to the Gaza border, has left a deep scar on the Israeli psyche. It was a turning point in the relations between Israel and other countries in West Asia. The actions that Israel took after that incident are seen as a response to that incident.

For India, there is deep respect. Prime Minister Modi had sent a tweet sympathising with Israel’s grief right after October 7, and it was followed by a state visit on February 25-26, 2026, just two days before Israel launched its retaliatory attack on Iran. This has played a role in the genuine thankfulness and gratitude for India’s support and relations with Israel. There are expectations from India to influence Saudi Arabia and Qatar to see Israel’s viewpoint and to rework the international laws and the Geneva Convention with other friendly countries. This has not transpired.

A visit to a kibbutz is an eye-opener and necessary to understand the Israeli way. Residents of a kibbutz lead a secluded life away from the cities, and they are well-organised and self-sufficient. The facilities in the kibbutz include a common dining hall, a small medical facility, an elementary school and a play area. For higher classes, a school services two or three adjoining kibbutzim. Each kibbutz has safe places to go to when the sirens are sounded. Each also has a first responder team of 10-15 persons armed with personal weapons.

The arming is necessary, as many Israelis, particularly those living in kibbutzim bordering Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, feel victimised and do not derive much hope for peace from the U.S.-Iran MOU. The absence of Israel in the MOU has created the impression that Israel’s position in the U.S. is weakening. Self-defence and self-preservation have therefore become the dominant tasks. The checkpoints at Gaza, from where 600 trucks pass per day with supplies to Gazans, undergo strict checking, and no unwanted items like explosives, weapons, or portable generators pass through.

The Israelis say the offensive in Lebanon was necessary, as Hezbollah possessed 150,000 missiles all aimed at Israel. There is keenness to disarm Hezbollah, but no clear indication of how to achieve it, though they feel incentives could work. For now, the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon is seen as a positive. On Hamas, Israel believes it should be disarmed by force. Threats from Gaza, the West Bank and Syria continue to exist.

Israelis would like to get back to their daily lives. Since the war, the cost of living in Israel has risen. The average monthly income of a middle-class family at $4,000 per month is stretched, and taxes are at 50%, among the highest in the world. The youth tend to marry late, but they believe in having children – a stark contrast to other developed and even developing countries. There is widespread apprehension about the present regime coming back to power in the next elections.

Regionally, there is tremendous change. It is clear that Iran retains the ability to go nuclear despite attacks on its nuclear installations by the U.S. and Israel. Iran is estimated to have 440 kgs of enriched uranium, and with that in its pocket, the regime is expected to become more hardline.

Not unnoticed by the West Asian powers is China’s assistance to Iran in the recent conflict, through the supply of parts and chemicals for manufacturing the missiles and intelligence.

New formations of countries are taking place, either as interlocutors, participants or victims of the war, and a new alphabet soup of influencers is noticeable. For example, PEST (Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), TIQ (Turkey, Iraq, Qatar) and the Diplomatic Group of Eight with Jordan at the core of activities. The UAE’s leaving OPEC gives it individual standing. All these create a sense of uncertainty in the region, and there is a perceptible apprehension about Qatar because of the role it plays in funding Hamas and Al Jazeera.

Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as a regional power in West Asia, has witnessed a change in position in the course of the crisis. Domestically, implementation of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is falling short of expectations. Regionally, it is also looking for new friends like Qatar, Pakistan and Egypt.

Despite the positive Western press, Pakistan as an interlocutor for peace is clearly a country fishing in troubled waters. After being reminded that it had to adhere to its defence agreement with Saudi Arabia, Rawalpindi placed a division and a squadron of fighters in Riyadh. In addition, it has forces placed in Qatar earlier and now also in Yemen. All this is inimical to itself, considering its internal security situation is precarious, with an attack on Gwadar killing 30 Pakistani Coast Guard personnel on July 3, 2026, the border issue with Afghanistan flaring up on a weekly basis and the protests in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The Gulf is now in a conundrum. The Gulf Cooperation Council, which was established in 1981, will function sub-optimally due to the internal friction between the member states. The UAE’s leaving OPEC has not helped. The expectation that Iran will be neutralised by the U.S. and Israel has been belied. The countries that hosted U.S. bases in the Gulf, which are targeted by Iran every day, are in a dilemma on how to view and manage their alliances with Washington. The hope that the Abraham Accords will include more countries from West Asia has been shattered – and with it, the operationalisation of the ambitious IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor that was to be an alternate connectivity offering to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Saudi Arabia-Iran agreement that was signed at the behest of China in 2023 has been wrecked due to the recent crisis. The internal dynamics between the countries of the GCC add to the problem.

With Iran effectively able to control the Strait of Hormuz and Bab El Mandeb through its proxies, it may be pragmatic for the West Asian countries to consider a better relationship with Iran. Its proxies in the region have little to lose by keeping the West Asia pot boiling.

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

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There is a palpable sensation that the global steering wheel has come loose. The “world in disarray” is no longer a headline—it is a lived reality, as the traditional architecture of the post-1945 order is being actively dismantled. It is being replaced by more fluid, pragmatic, and regional frameworks.

The Korber Stiftung’s Tested, Trusted, Torn? Emerging Middle Powers Report 2026 arrives as a vital flashlight on this landscape, illuminating the shifting postures of five pivotal nations: Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. This is not a vacuum born of accidents but of high-stakes friction.

The report documents a world reeling from the 2025 “America First” unilateral tariffs and the ongoing 2026 U.S.-Israel war against Iran—events that have forced middle powers to absorb massive economic shocks as they recognise the United Nations as paralysed.

First, a recession of trust facing the U.S. and its global influence.

The most startling revelation of the 2026 report is the precipitous decline in American prestige. Across the five surveyed powers, an average of 80% of experts now view U.S. influence negatively. This is not a static data point; it is a collapse of momentum. In South Africa, positive views of the U.S. have plummeted by roughly two-thirds, with a staggering 85% now rating Washington’s influence as negative. Germany follows closely at 81%.

The paradox is that the U.S. is seen as “at once essential and damaging”, particularly in Brazil and Germany. While it remains an indispensable security partner, its volatility—manifested in the 2025 tariffs and the formation of the “Board of Peace” as a suspected alternative to the UN—has created a crisis of confidence. As the report says: “Washington is losing favour faster than anticipated.”

Second, non-alignment is of significance beyond the Global South.

For decades, non-alignment was a relic of the Cold War. Today, it has moved into the heart of Europe. In a dramatic shift, 53% of German respondents now support a non-aligned stance, a massive leap from 29% in previous surveys. This is the intellectual and political fallout of the Zeitenwende — the “turning point” in which even established Western powers embrace a model of transactional realism.

This new posture is not about passive neutrality; it is the pursuit of strategic autonomy. Middle powers are increasingly resisting the pressure to choose between the hardening spheres of influence of Washington and Beijing. They are seeking the agency to navigate a multipolar world on their own terms. The report notes: “Non-alignment here is more the seeking of autonomy and less a position of neutrality.”

Third, the rise of “workarounding” and the pivot to regionalism.

As the WTO and UN succumb to gridlock, middle powers are utilising a new playbook: “Workarounding”. This involves interest-led, informal cooperation that bypasses superpower coercion. This is evident in the 2023 digitisation agreement between India and Saudi Arabia and the 2024 nuclear energy cooperation between Czechia and France. Rather than waiting for universal consensus, these nations are retreating to regional “shields”. In Germany, 48% of experts now view European integration as the top foreign policy priority to mitigate shocks from U.S. tariffs and Chinese economic coercion.

This pivot is most pronounced in three strategic sectors: (a) Technology: Small-group cooperation in AI, quantum computing, and space to avoid tech-bloc entrapment. (b) Climate: Pragmatic holding of the line on energy transitions, often despite frictions like the EU’s sustainability framework. And (c) Energy: Direct regional and bilateral deals to secure critical resource chains.

Fourth, India and Brazil are redrawing the bilateral map.

The bilateral preferences in the report will surprise Western readers. Indian experts now rank Russia as their most important partner, ahead of the U.S. In Brazil, China has claimed the top spot. India’s rationale is grounded in cold-eyed pragmatism: while the U.S. is seen as volatile, Russia is perceived as a stable, predictable partner. Perhaps most telling is the intensity of this preference.

In India, despite global condemnation of Moscow, experts view Russia’s influence as only 8% negative. Compare this to the 41% negative rating they give the U.S. However, a significant “connectivity gap” remains. These middle powers share a desire to reshape the order; they do not yet view each other as primary alternatives for trade or capital.

Fifth, the fear of further escalation is real, present, and grave.

Despite their newfound agility, middle powers are bracing for impact. Shared anxiety pervades the report, with 78% to 86% of respondents expecting military conflicts to escalate over the next five years. This highlights the “niche security” paradox: middle powers like Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE are excellent at “keeping the plumbing of the world running”—negotiating hostage releases or managing regional stability—but they cannot stop a flood.

Middle powers lack the hard power to enforce ceasefires in “hot wars” like the 2026 conflict in Iran. As Shashi Tharoor notes in the report: “Middle powers are rarely fast enough to stop a hot war.” They are stabilisers and innovators, but they remain highly vulnerable to the economic and security tremors generated by the major powers.

So, is trust the new strategic asset?

The core takeaway of the 2026 data is that the era of a universal, Western-underwritten order is ending. The world is entering a phase of “provincialising Europe”, where the West is no longer the linchpin but one significant global province among others. In this de-globalising landscape, trust has become a decisive strategic resource. Universal institutions no longer generate strategic confidence.

Therefore, trust must be built through “plurilateral” arrangements—flexible, thematic coalitions that deliver tangible results. These are being actively pursued by the middle powers, which are evolving from being mere bridge-builders – but are stopping short of transforming into the new architects of an international system they hold dear. As the old anchors are lifted, the defining question remains: can the middle powers build a new architecture of trust before the next “hot war” arrives?

Ashish Bharadwaj is Pro Vice Chancellor of WPU Goa and Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education at Gateway House.

You can download the 2026 Emerging Middle Powers Report here.

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All reports from Jakarta indicate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-day visit to Indonesia (July 6-8) was spectacular. A post-visit assessment is essential to sift and distinguish substance from spectacle.

The host, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, together with his government and people, extended an exceptionally warm welcome, demonstrating their desire to deepen friendship and cooperation with India. The honoured guest hit all the right buttons. Diplomats and officials on both sides worked hard to produce a substantive joint statement, 14 MOUs/agreements, and six new ‘announcements’ on bilateral relations. What does it all amount to, in real terms?

The answer lies in the subtle changes in the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific since January 2025, and especially after the outbreak of the Gulf War of 2026. The U.S.-China strategic rivalry is evolving into a more stable and friendly relationship. The U.S. is still committed to ensuring that the region is not dominated by “any hegemon”, as U.S. Defence Secretary Peter Hegseth announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, but plans to build with China “a constructive relationship of strategic stability, based on fairness and reciprocity.”^[1]

Appropriate conclusions have been drawn from this new approach by countries such as Indonesia and India. To manage their relations with China, they need to draw closer to each other because the U.S. commitment to regional security is weakening. China’s deterrence lies in stronger strategic cooperation between the two major Asian players – India and Indonesia.

In this light, the first takeaway from the Modi-Prabowo summit is a shared commitment to enhance strategic cooperation. They have defined their goal – a region with seven fundamental characteristics, namely “a free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”^[2]

This will be achieved through “greater strategic convergence and coordination between India and Indonesia in multilateral and regional forums.”^[3] The agreement to increase the role of South-South cooperation and “to enhance cooperation on strengthening the voice of the Global South”  is a new nuance. Therein, New Delhi has signalled its interest in forging collective leadership of the Global South, and Indonesia will be a part of the leading team.

The second takeaway relates to maritime cooperation. Both sides are rediscovering their maritime proximity and consequential commonality of interests. Modi announced before the Indonesian Parliament, “From Sabang to Great Nicobar and from the Malacca Gateway to the Indo-Pacific, we will create new opportunities in connectivity, logistics, the blue economy, maritime security, and trade resilience.”^[4] This puts real pressure on officials of both sides.

So far, their discussions, initiated when Modi first visited Indonesia in 2018, have secured only limited gains in forging new connectivity between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Aceh Province and in building the Sabang port. With a renewed political push, proactive action may be initiated, but ample financial resources will need to be secured if the declaration is to be translated into delivery.

The third takeaway is more substantial, focusing on defence and security cooperation. The signing of the MOU on ‘Cooperation on Brahmos Missile System’ and ‘Air-to-Air Missile Cooperation Agreement’ clears the way for the sale of batteries of Brahmos and Astra missiles to Indonesia. Commercial agreements will be concluded soon. The significance of this development lies in the public perception that the Brahmos, with an operational range of 290 km to 800 km, is an instrument of deterrence against a particular country. With India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and now Indonesia equipped with them, Asian voices will be taken more seriously on issues affecting the future of the Indo-Pacific. For Indonesia, it was a courageous decision, as the former president Joko Widodo was widely perceived as maintaining closer ties with China, which may have contributed to Indonesia’s reluctance to procure BrahMos. In contrast, President Prabowo has pursued a more independent foreign policy. The decision to accept BrahMos is facilitated by the change of president and the incumbent’s reassessment of the nation’s security needs in a turbulent world.

The fourth takeaway is that, while the Modi visit has prepared the ground well, the trade and investment pillar encompassing economic cooperation needs careful nurturing and energetic follow-up action. Bilateral trade is at about $30 billion; Indian investment in Indonesia is valued at $1.56 billion, and Indonesian investment in India is a mere $654 million. This needs serious attention and improvement, in keeping with the logic of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ and the augmented ambiance of the recent visit.

The decision on cooperation in the critical minerals sector was important. New possibilities in domains such as steel, pharmaceuticals, medical products, agriculture, and communication technologies will be pursued. Digital linkages in the financial sector could be realised by the end of the year. All this should combine to result in further expansion and diversification in economic ties.

Indonesia’s inclination to benefit from India’s development journey and experience as an electoral democracy is the fifth takeaway. President Prabowo’s frank articulation of his personal admiration for Modi’s leadership and for the Indian government’s welfare policies and schemes was undoubtedly heart-warming. Greater cooperation between the electoral authorities of the two countries will be for mutual benefit.

Finally, both leaders placed a premium on strengthening people-to-people exchanges and the civilisational connection. India’s help in the restoration project of the majestic Prambanan temple complex; Jakarta‘s decision to facilitate the opening of a new campus of the Indian Institute of Management (Bangalore) in Indonesia’s Singhasari Special Economic Zone in Malang, East Java,^[5] and a combined endeavour to promote tourism in both directions are all steps in the right direction.

The presence of 150,000 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs, who are Indonesian citizens) and 15,000 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in Indonesia is a significant benefit: they are all positive contributors to Indonesia’s economy. However, the people-to-people exchange is minimal. There are just 150 Indonesian students in India and only one Indian student in Indonesia as of 2022.^[6] Indonesian students much prefer Australia, the U.S. and Singapore, especially for higher education. The focus in the future, therefore, should be on motivating more Indonesians to experience India as tourists, students, and business visitors. That is when stronger ties at the people’s level will become a reality.

Two observations merit mention here. One, on countering terrorism, India and Indonesia are broadly on the same page. Still, the latter did not go as far as Japan, which recently identified Pakistan as the source of cross-border terrorism in India.[6] Two, both nations advocate reform of the UN Security Council. Still, Jakarta does not support India’s candidature for a permanent seat in an expanded Security Council, given that Indonesia, as a major Asian player, has its own ambitions in that sphere.

The relationship has greatly benefited from Modi’s short sojourn in Indonesia. Now, what happens over the next year will be crucial. In six to nine months from now, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar should consider visiting Jakarta to review and re-energise follow-up, and officials must remember that the next summit could take place after a year.

Meanwhile, the two governments must encourage the continuation of Track 1.5 dialogues, which so handsomely contributed to this positive and optimistic phase in India-Indonesia relations.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House. He is a former diplomat who served in Jakarta as DCM and in Yangon as Ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

^[1] Pete Hegseth, ‘Remarks At The IIss Shangri-La Dialogue’, 30 May 2025 Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, Online Speech Bank, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/petehegsethshangri-ladialogue2026.htm

^[2] ‘India-Indonesia Joint Statement on the State Visit by Prime Minister of India to Indonesia (July 06 – 08, 2026)’ Ministry of External Affairs, 7 July 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41413/IndiaIndonesia_Joint_Statement_on_the_State_Visit_by_Prime_Minister_of_India_to_Indonesia_July_06__08_2026

^[3] Ibid

^[4] ‘English translation of Prime Minister’s Address to the Parliament of Indonesia’, Ministry of External Affairs, 7 July 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41412/English_translation_of_Prime_Ministers_Address_to_the_Parliament_of_Indonesia_July_07_2026

^[5] Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. “Prime Minister Narendra Modi Announces IIM Bangalore Campus in Indonesia.” July 7, 2026. https://www.iimb.ac.in/pm-narendra-modi-announces-iimb-campus-indonesia

^[6] Gateway House and Centre for Strategic and International Studies. India-Indonesia: Companion Souls in a New Era. Mumbai and Jakarta: Gateway House and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-indonesia-companion-souls-in-a-new-era/

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“Sovereign AI” has gone from a phrase coined by chipmakers to a working assumption in national policy. France backs Mistral, Saudi Arabia is building HUMAIN, and India has its India AI Mission. Across these efforts, the prevailing definition of sovereignty rests on a now-familiar checklist: own your chips, own your compute, own your data, and own your models, with talent as the connective tissue running through all four. ^[1]

Energy barely registers in this checklist, usually a footnote for utilities to resolve once policy and capital are in place. This article argues the ordering may be backwards. As the electricity bill for AI climbs into the hundreds of terawatt-hours worldwide, the ability to generate and reliably deliver power is becoming a hard constraint on what any country can do with AI. The question is not whether a country needs more electricity for its AI ambitions, but whether energy security deserves treatment as a core pillar of sovereign AI, rather than infrastructure beneath it.

The scale of AI’s electricity appetite is no longer speculative. Global data centre electricity use rose 17 per cent in 2025, and AI-focused facilities grew three times faster, against a 3 per cent rise in overall electricity demand. ^[2] The IEA projects data-centre electricity demand will more than double by 2030, reaching around 945 terawatt-hours, slightly more than Japan consumes today. ^[3] Five large technology companies directed over $400 billion in 2025 capital spending, projected to rise 75 per cent further in 2026, overwhelmingly toward compute and power. ^[4]

Training frontier models and serving inference at scale requires power that is concentrated, continuous and largely non-negotiable: a single large AI campus can draw as much electricity as a mid-sized city. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates the United States alone may need 40 to 90 additional gigawatts by 2030 for its AI build-out. ^[5] A country can hold the chips, the models and the data and still be unable to run AI at scale without power behind it.

This checklist was popularised in large part by Nvidia, whose business depends on governments believing they need exactly this. ^[6] It says almost nothing about the electricity that makes any of the five operable. Brookings Institution analysis this year argues full-stack AI sovereignty is out of reach for almost any country, since AI depends on a transnational web of inputs, minerals, chips, networks, data, talent and energy concentrated among a handful of suppliers. ^[7] Energy belongs on that list not as infrastructure beneath the “real” stack but as a resource a country must secure before exercising autonomy over the rest.

Washington has begun acting on this logic, if not in name: a July 2025 executive order fast-tracked federal permitting for AI-linked data centres, treating power access as core AI infrastructure policy. ^[8]

The United Kingdom has formalised the link institutionally through its AI Energy Council, co-chaired by the technology and energy secretaries since April 2025, ensuring the UK’s energy system is ready for AI infrastructure. ^[9] Its AI Growth Zones require candidate sites to demonstrate access to at least 500 megawatts of power. ^[10]

China’s experience is the most instructive, though not one India should simply replicate. For more than two decades, Beijing treated energy generation, hydropower, solar and wind manufacturing, and nuclear capacity as a strategic industrial capability rather than a supplementary layer, years before AI created any demand for it. By the time generative AI began consuming power at scale, China already possessed abundant, low-cost electricity in its resource-rich western provinces. The “Eastern Data, Western Computing” programme launched in 2022, backed by over 200 billion yuan (roughly $27 billion), relocated data-centre capacity west rather than building that abundance from scratch. ^[11] The 2025 plan binding data-centre approvals to electricity-supply planning reads as a second stage of a strategy laid down earlier. ^[12] The lesson generalises well beyond China’s model: a country’s capacity to scale AI a decade from now may already be fixed by decisions it makes, or fails to make, today.

AI’s energy efficiency is improving at a genuinely impressive rate; the IEA notes a single text query today can use less electricity than a television running for the same few seconds.² But aggregate demand is growing faster than efficiency gains can offset, as AI workloads multiply. Progress and consumption are pulling in opposite directions, and consumption is winning.

Renewables are expected to meet roughly half of the additional electricity data centres will need by 2030 in the IEA’s base case, but dispatchable power, generation available regardless of weather, remains essential where interruption cannot be tolerated, and nuclear, geothermal and storage-backed solar have deployment timelines longer than typical AI investment cycles. ^[13] None of this makes AI leadership and climate goals incompatible, but reconciling both depends on deliberate, early planning.

India’s own sovereign AI programme illustrates the problem precisely. The IndiaAI Mission, backed by roughly Rs 10,372 crore ($1.25 billion), has built a national shared compute pool that crossed 34,000 GPUs by mid-2025, targeting 100,000 by end-2026, alongside pillars for models, data, safety and talent. ^[14]

Its energy foundation has not kept pace. Data centre capacity is projected to grow from roughly 1.2 GW today to between 4.5 and 10 GW by 2030, with annual electricity demand reaching 40 to 57 terawatt-hours, on top of overall demand the IEA expects to grow 6.4 per cent a year through 2030, among the world’s fastest. ^{[15] [16]} This growth is geographically concentrated: Mumbai and Chennai account for roughly three-fifths of operational capacity, straining grids least able to absorb new load. ^[17] Renewable capacity often cannot reach where needed either: IEEFA estimates over 50 gigawatts stood stranded as of mid-2025 for want of transmission, with FY25 additions running 42 per cent behind target. ^{[18] [19]}

India does hold real advantages, having crossed its COP26 target of 50 per cent installed capacity from non-fossil sources roughly five years early, in 2025. ^{[20] [21]} But headline renewable capacity is not the same as the firm, round-the-clock electricity AI infrastructure requires, and China’s experience suggests that closing that gap is what sustained, early planning is for, not a case for copying Beijing’s playbook wholesale. Some of that planning has begun: the Central Electricity Authority’s national resource adequacy plan for 2026-27 to 2035-36 has, for the first time, folded data-centre demand into the assumptions behind the country’s generation and storage build-out, alongside electric vehicles and green hydrogen. ^[22] That is a start, not yet a solution.

India is not alone in this bind. China keeps adding coal capacity even as it scales renewables and nuclear, commissioning 78 GW of new coal power in 2025, its highest annual total in a decade. ^[23] Europe leans on similar firm power as AI-driven demand rises, with the IEA expecting EU electricity consumption to grow through 2030 on a mix that includes gas-fired generation and a nuclear sector regaining policy support across advanced economies. ^[24] None of this argues for India to lean further on fossil fuels or to copy Beijing’s model. It is a reminder that AI readiness needs reliable, dispatchable electricity alongside, not instead of, a longer decarbonisation path.

Energy security deserves formal recognition as a core pillar of India’s sovereign AI strategy, integrated into the IndiaAI Mission itself rather than left as a separate infrastructure matter. AI demand should also be tracked as its own category in electricity planning, with IndiaAI Mission targets and the National Electricity Plan drawn into closer alignment. Transmission deserves the same priority as compute, given how much renewable capacity already sits stranded for want of it. ^[25] Dispatchable power needs a realistic mix rather than a single bet: the nuclear sector’s opening to private participation under the SHANTI Act, aiming for 100 gigawatts by 2047, was framed explicitly around supporting AI alongside storage and renewables. ^[26] New AI clusters could also be sited partly on power availability rather than the reverse. ^[27] A standing mechanism bringing MeitY, the Ministry of Power, the CEA, NITI Aayog and the IndiaAI Mission together, echoing the UK’s technology-energy council, could help close that gap.

Sovereign AI has typically been understood as a contest over chips, compute, data and foundation models. That framing captures what is most visible and easily funded, but not what is most decisive. As electricity rather than silicon increasingly sets the pace of AI at a national scale, energy security looks less like supporting infrastructure and more like a precondition for technological sovereignty, and Washington, London and Beijing already treat it that way in practice.

For India, the lesson from China is not to replicate a state-led model built for different conditions but to recognise that Beijing’s advantage was decades in the making, laid down before AI created the demand now exploiting it. The choices India makes on transmission, dispatchable capacity and institutional coordination over the next few years will likely decide how much of its AI ambition its grid can carry a decade out. The next race in artificial intelligence may not be won solely by the countries that build the best models but by those that build the energy systems capable of sustaining them.

Ashish Bharadwaj is the Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education, Gateway House.

Sairah Zahoor is a student at BITS Law School.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References:

^[1] Center for a New American Security (2026): “CNAS Sovereign AI Index.” Maps the compute/data/talent/capital framing of sovereign AI used by governments worldwide. (https://interactives.cnas.org/reports/sovereign-ai-index/)

^[2] International Energy Agency (April 2026): “Key Questions on Energy and AI.” Source for global data-centre electricity-demand figures and the AI-efficiency comparison cited in Sections II and IV. (https://www.iea.org/reports/key-questions-on-energy-and-ai)

^[3] International Energy Agency (2025): “Energy and AI Report.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/executive-summary)

^[4] International Energy Agency (April 2026): “Key Questions on Energy and AI.” Source for global data-centre electricity-demand figures and the AI-efficiency comparison cited in Sections II and IV. (https://www.iea.org/reports/key-questions-on-energy-and-ai)

^[5] Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 2025): “Securing Full Stack U.S. Leadership in AI.” Source of the 40–90 GW additional U.S. energy-demand estimate. (https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-full-stack-us-leadership-ai

^[6] NVIDIA Corporation (2025): “What Is Sovereign AI?” Note: Nvidia has a direct commercial interest in government adoption of this framing. (https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/what-is-sovereign-ai/)

^[7]Brookings Institution (February 2026): “Is AI Sovereignty Possible? Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence.” (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-ai-sovereignty-possible-balancing-autonomy-and-interdependence/).

^[8] The White House (23 July 2025): “Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure” (Executive Order). (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/accelerating-federal-permitting-of-data-center-infrastructure/)

^[9] UK Government, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (8 April 2025): “Technology and Energy Secretaries chair first meeting of AI Energy Council.” (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/technology-and-energy-secretaries-chair-first-meeting-of-ai-energy-council)

^[10] UK Government, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology: “Delivering AI Growth Zones” (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-ai-growth-zones/delivering-ai-growth-zones)

^[11] Jamestown Foundation (2026): “Energy and AI Coordination in the ‘Eastern Data Western Computing’ Plan.”  (https://jamestown.org/energy-and-ai-coordination-in-the-eastern-data-western-computing-plan/)

^[12] State Council, People’s Republic of China (September 2025): “China unveils plan on AI-energy integration to drive green transition.” (https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202509/08/content_WS68be8c3ec6d0868f4e8f566d.html)

^[13] International Energy Agency (April 2025): “Energy and AI – Energy Supply for AI.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/energy-supply-for-ai)

^[14] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India (May 2025): “India’s Common Compute Capacity Crosses 34,000 GPUs.” (https://indiaai.gov.in|   https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2132817)

^[15] International Energy Agency (January 2026): “Electricity 2026 – Demand.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/demand)

^[16] Deloitte India and S&P Global Commodity Insights, as reported in Outlook Business (January 2026) (https://www.outlookbusiness.com/planet/industry/india-ai-data-centre-energy-sustainability-2030)

^[17] Business Standard (October 2025) “India’s Data Centre Capacity to Double by 2027, Rise 5x by 2030: Macquarie” (https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-s-data-centre-capacity-to-double-by-2027-rise-5x-by-2030-macquarie-125102801409_1.html)

^[18] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) and JMK Research & Analytics (October 2025): “Green power transmission: The invisible barrier in India’s clean energy growth.” (https://ieefa.org/resources/green-power-transmission-invisible-barrier-indias-clean-energy-growth)

^[19] IEEFA (September 2025): “Transmission expansion trails renewable energy growth in India.” (https://ieefa.org/articles/transmission-expansion-trails-renewable-energy-growth-india)

^[20] Ministry of Power, Government of India, Press Information Bureau (September 2025). (https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2223720)

^[21] Enerdata (October 2025): “India hits 500 GW in installed power, over 50% from non-fossil sources,” (https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/india-hits-500-gw-installed-power-over-50-non-fossil-sources.html)

^[22] Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India (March 2026): “National Generation Adequacy Plan (2026-27 to 2035-36).” (https://jmkresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Generation-Adequacy-Plan-2035-36.pdf)

^[23] OilPrice.com (February 2026): “China Hits Renewable Milestone, But Coal Isn’t Going Anywhere.”(https://oilprice.com/Energy/Coal/China-Hits-Renewable-Milestone-But-Coal-Isnt-Going-Anywhere.html)

^[24] International Energy Agency (January 2026): “Electricity 2026 – Supply.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/supply)

^[25] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) and JMK Research & Analytics (October 2025): “Green power transmission: The invisible barrier in India’s clean energy growth.” (https://ieefa.org/resources/green-power-transmission-invisible-barrier-indias-clean-energy-growth)

^[26] Press Information Bureau, Government of India (December 2025): “The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025.” (https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2206598&reg=3&lang=1)

^[27] Business Standard (October 2025) “India’s Data Centre Capacity to Double by 2027, Rise 5x by 2030: Macquarie” (https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-s-data-centre-capacity-to-double-by-2027-rise-5x-by-2030-macquarie-125102801409_1.html).

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The 29th St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) was held in St Petersburg from June 3-6, 2026. The SPIEF has been an annual fixture on the global conference circuit since 1997, when the city of St Petersburg and Russia’s foreign ministry initiated it. Since 2006, the Forum has been held under the patronage and with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, this year’s SPIEF brought together over 24,500 participants from 142 countries. The largest delegations were from China, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, the UAE and Kazakhstan, respectively, but for the first time in many years, sizeable delegations from the UK and the EU attended the Forum, along with an official U.S. delegation, also for the first time, led by the Chairman of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Rodney Mims Cook Jr.^[1] Along with him was Robert Agee, President and CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Russia, who moderated a Russia-U.S. panel discussion.

Regardless, President Vladimir Putin, on his part, specifically focused on the need for Russia and members of the Global South to have technological sovereignty in order to avoid being held hostage to the West.

Russia understands this only too well. At the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022, one of the first punitive measures that the West imposed on Russia was the banning of Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments and settlement system, isolating Russia from the free movement of goods and services. It also withdrew its software suppliers. Visa and Mastercard suspended their services in Russia on March 5, 2022, halting transactions on Russian-issued cards outside the country while blocking the usage of foreign-issued cards in the country.^{[2] [3]}

The Russian domestic Mir payment system stepped up and has captured a 75% market share in the country, up from 25.7% in 2021.^[4] Since its introduction in May 2014, 493.9 million Mir cards have been issued in Russia, according to the Russian Central Bank. ^[5] A beneficiary has also been China’s UnionPay cards, which work in Russia.

Visa and Mastercard now have less than a 17% share in the Russian domestic market, Alla Bakina, head of the Central Bank’s Payments Systems Department, said^[6] at a press conference in May 2026.

At a press briefing on July 2 on the sidelines of the Russian Central Bank’s Financial Congress in St Petersburg, Governor Elvira Nabiullina told reporters^[7] that in her view, Visa and Mastercard would “gradually be phased out of circulation, and this is already happening, partly through economic measures.”

How do visitors to Russia manage? Russia has solved the “cash issue” for foreign visitors by enabling foreigners to purchase debit cards at designated banks and even airports. At Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport, a foreign visitor can buy a debit prepaid Mir card from Globus Bank by paying in hard currency. The currency is converted to rubles, and the card can be used by the holder without having a Russian bank account.

Putin punched it to the U.S. banks at SPIEF 2026 when he stated that the global development model, long anchored in a limited number of financial centres, technological providers, insurance and logistics hubs, credit rating agencies, and reserve currencies, was under fire.^[8] He said this framework, though presented as universal and supposedly neutral, has been increasingly used as a tool to exert political pressure and promote unfair competition, whereby settlements, technologies, logistics, or even access to information could be cut off at a moment’s notice in order to punish countries acting in their own national interests.”

Russia is ensuring it does not get caught off guard again by focusing on AI in finance and other areas. The Russian government has been instructed to prepare a national strategy on autonomous systems and digital platforms modelled on the National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence that was initiated in 2019. Russia has invested $6.1 billion and involved large state-owned corporations like Rostec and Sberbank to develop AI applications in healthcare, education, national security, agriculture and transportation. It aims to train 6,000 AI specialists a year by 2030. The AI strategy is seen as a model to emulate for a new strategy on autonomous systems and digital platforms.

Not far behind in Putin’s priority was the BRICS, many of whose countries were becoming technological powerhouses. China, for instance, holds the largest number of AI patents (over 183,000 in 2023, according to a Stanford University study^[9]), while India accounts for a 17.58% share^[10] in the global software market. Putin reaffirmed that Russia is open to work with BRICS partners to build digital infrastructure.

Russia holds a strong position in the pace of adoption of digital and latest technological advancements in online marketplaces, financial solutions, municipal services, healthcare and education, and these adoptions have improved the quality of life for people in Russia. The biggest success story is the unified Public Services (Gosuslugi) portal. Russian citizens see this portal for a variety of services, including applying for driver’s licence and passport applications, insurance, booking medical appointments, registering births, accessing social welfare payments and managing pensions.

Foreigners can pre-register travel details, complete mandatory registration procedures online, apply for work permits and register for university entrance exams.

Cities such as Moscow that are part of a Smart City initiative offer electronic medical cards that keep a record of prescriptions and test results. It also offers a gateway to pay for housing services and utilities.

Over 81% of Russian citizens regularly use government electronic services, a study conducted by VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) found in 2024.^[11]

Oracle and Atlassian suspended services in Russia, while Alphabet exited the country. Microsoft has suspended new sales but continues to provide access to existing clients.^[12]

With no end in sight to the Ukraine war and the sanctions continuously imposed on Russian entities, Moscow also sees India as a key partner. At the Russia-India Business Dialogue held on the sidelines of the SPIEF 2026, where a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) delegation^[13] took part, the focus was on collaboration across “innovation, technology, investment and trade”.

A report^[14] by Russia’s largest financial institution, Sberbank, said the participants at the forum were interested in digitisation and artificial intelligence being a key part of the $100 billion bilateral trade target set for 2030. India is also negotiating with Sberbank to launch its flagship AI – GIGACHAT in India, the bank said in June.^[15]

Bilateral trade between the countries in the 2024-25 fiscal year stood at $68.7 billion from $13.2 billion in 2021-22, but this is heavily dependent on Indian purchases of Russian crude that has been subject to U.S. sanctions.

A key focus area for economic cooperation is now the connectivity of digital payment networks. Moscow and New Delhi have long discussed the integration of the Mir and RuPay. While India’s United Payments Interface (UPI) works in nine foreign countries, talks to integrate Russia into the system have not yielded any results. This is an important area that needs to be developed for Russia and India to build an infrastructure of technological sovereignty.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer with a special interest in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

^[1] Roscongress Foundation, “Results of the 29th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,” St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 8, 2026. https://forum-spb.ru/en/news/news/itogi-raboty-xxix-peterburgskogo-mezhdunarodnogo-ekonomicheskogo-foruma/

^[2] Mastercard, “Mastercard Statement on Suspension of Russian Operations,” Mastercard Newsroom, March 5, 2022. https://www.mastercard.com/us/en/news-and-trends/press/2022/march/mastercard-statement-on-suspension-of-russian-operations.html

^[3] Visa Inc., “Visa Suspends All Russia Operations,” Visa Newsroom, March 5, 2022. https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.18871.html

^[4] Kirill Kashtanov, “NSPK Proposes Gradual Withdrawal of Visa and Mastercard Cards from Circulation,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 17, 2026. https://rg.ru/2026/06/17/nspk-predlozhila-sposob-postepennogo-vyvoda-kart-visa-i-mastercard-iz-oborota.html

^[5] Central Bank of the Russian Federation, “National Payment System,” Central Bank of the Russian Federation, accessed July 9, 2026. https://www.cbr.ru/eng/psystem/

^[6] Evgeny Khodakov, “How Is It Translated? Russia’s Payment System Adapts after Visa and Mastercard,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 25, 2026. https://rg.ru/2026/05/25/kak-eto-perevoditsia.html

^[7]Bank of Russia, “Briefing by Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina”, VK Video, July 2, 2026. https://vkvideo.ru/video-165215852_456240070

^[8] resident of Russia, “Plenary session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum,” President of Russia, 2026. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79956

^[9] Hanming Fang, “China Leads the World in AI Patents, but Still Learns More from America,” Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions (SCCEI), Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, updated May 14, 2026. https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/china-leads-world-ai-patents-still-learns-more-america

^[10] India Brand Equity Foundation, “Information Technology,” India Brand Equity Foundation, accessed July 9, 2026. https://www.ibef.org/industry/information-technology-india

^[11] Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), “Our Digital Everyday Life,” VCIOM Analytical Review, May 14, 2024. https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/nasha-cifrovaja-povsednevnost

^[12] Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian, “Over 1,000 Companies Have Curtailed Operations in Russia—But Some Remain,” Yale School of Management, originally published February 28, 2022, updated January 28, 2024. https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain

^[13] Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), “A Day of Meaningful India–Russia Engagement,” December 8, 2025. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ficci_a-day-of-meaningful-indiarussia-engagement-activity-7469736346031411200-_Tdu#:~:text=A%20day%20of%20meaningful%20India%E2%80%93Russia,Cooperation%20between%20India%20and%20Russia.

^[14] Sberbank India, “Russia and India Discuss USD 100 Billion Trade Target at SPIEF 2026,” June 5, 2026. https://sber.bank.in/media/news/russia-and-india-discuss-usd-100-billion-trade-target-at-spief-2026

^[15] Sberbank India, “India Plans to Use Sber’s GigaChat Across Several Sectors,” June 8, 2026. https://sber.bank.in/media/news/india-plans-to-use-sbers-gigachat-across-several-sectors

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The India-Japan Annual Summit of 2 July 2026 marked the first visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to India. She established a warm rapport with Prime Minister Modi. This summit is an important evolution in perhaps the most important strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific. Prior India-Japan summits have gradually enhanced collaboration in infrastructure, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), investment, and security.

The 2026 summit has rejuvenated the relationship with a new base principle of cooperation — economic security. This refers to, and recognises the importance of, economic resilience, technological development, and stable supply chains as integral elements of national security. The pandemic, multiple geopolitical crises, the weaponisation of technology and supply chains, and increasing rivalry over semiconductors, AI, and critical minerals clearly manifest that strategic weaknesses are often rooted in the economic agenda. For India and Japan, growth requires open markets, secure sea lanes, and technological competitiveness, making it difficult to insulate economic policy from the larger strategic outlook of the two countries.

In terms of trade, India-Japan trade remains modest at $27.48 billion. Exports from Japan to India during this period were $21.43 billion, while imports were a third of that at $6.04 billion. Today, India ranks 14th in Japan’s total trade with a 1.75% share, while Japan ranks 10th in India’s total trade with a 2.26% share. This must be enhanced. The China-Japan bilateral trade is $300 billion annually, and even Indonesia’s is $28 billion. The historic India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), implemented from August 2011, has accelerated economic and commercial relations but needs a review, which is now under consideration.

The July 2 India-Japan Summit provided this recognition through a robust set of agreements. Besides the Joint Statement, the Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation,^[1] a Fact Sheet on the same,^[2] and Joint Statements on Artificial Intelligence and Energy Resilience were part of the bouquet that has put the India-Japan relationship on a path to deeper engagement. Collectively, the outcomes of the summit represent the first effort to create a bilateral framework that meshes economic and strategic resilience.

With this, the Special Strategic and Global Partnership has entered a new period in which trusted technologies, resilient manufacturing, and secure supply chains are its defining features. It will balance economic and security strategies by diversifying trusted partners and supply chains away from concentrated production zones.

Through its Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022^[3], Japan initiated this process domestically. Its policies now consider economic security above market efficiency as part of their decision-making processes. This will entail securing supply chains from disruption due to geopolitical conflict by indigenising them or by relying on allies or partners rather than on China. Unlike Japan’s legislative approach, India has adopted a more sector-specific approach, though often with common objectives. India is working through the PLI schemes, the India Semiconductor Mission, Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the National Critical Mineral Mission, and a focus on stepping up manufacturing capabilities, which together constitute India’s response to building an economic security architecture. In some ways, the 2026 summit brings convergence between these approaches, as on AI, semiconductors, and energy security taking their impact beyond the bilateral relationship. It is a new strategic vocabulary that will determine future economic and technological cooperation.

For instance, logistics networks are seen as facilitators of resilient supply chains, digital infrastructure supports trusted technologies, and industrial corridors are intended to enhance manufacturing capabilities. The role of infrastructure as a facilitator of national resilience has therefore come to the fore.

Japanese FDI is accelerating the existing trend. Investment targets announced during earlier summits suggested that Japan would mobilise ¥5 trillion ($35 billion) in public and private investment by 2027. At the 2025 summit, this target was raised to ¥10 trillion ($70 billion) by 2035. These targets are now not linked only to the pace of ODA rather, Japanese companies have been encouraged by the Government of Japan to enhance their economic profile in India and develop new investment plans over a five-to-ten-year period.

Japanese FDI has expanded considerably over the past decade. New investments have come from companies that have done well in India, such as Toyota, Suzuki, Hitachi, Fujifilm, and YKK, and they are expanding into newer sectors that bring strategic heft to Japanese investment. Therefore, the India-Japan FDI partnership is now going beyond individual investment projects towards the shared logic of strategic ecosystems that can operate in integrated clusters to enhance productivity and reduce vulnerabilities.

Now, these Japanese companies that have succeeded in automobiles, transport infrastructure, and consumer manufacturing are now expanding into semiconductors, electronics, renewable energy, advanced materials, financial services, logistics, digital infrastructure, and their ancillary industries. While the earlier phase of investment was driven largely by India’s domestic consumption, the current effort is to integrate India into regional production networks that could become part of diversified, non-China supply chains across the Indo-Pacific.

This trend is already visible. Toyota announced a new manufacturing facility in Maharashtra in 2024. Suzuki Motor Corporation unveiled plans in 2025 to invest about $7.3 billion (₹70,000 crore) over the next five years. MUFG completed an investment of $4.3 billion (₹40,000 crore) in Shriram Finance in 2026. Hitachi Energy is investing $24 million (₹2,000 crore) in a new facility in Vadodara. YKK announced a $150 million expansion in Chennai, while Yokohama Rubber is establishing a $130 million plant in Odisha. Mitsui Fudosan has entered India’s growing data-centre sector, Fujifilm is investing in semiconductor chemicals linked to Tata’s semiconductor ecosystem in Gujarat, and Japanese publisher Kodansha has entered India through a new partnership.

In an effort to leverage the complementary capabilities of India and Japan, Japan, as a global leader in semiconductor materials, manufacturing, and precision engineering, is seeking to invest^[4] in India, where fabrication, assembly, testing, and packaging under the India Semiconductor Mission^[5] are being promoted. Cooperation extends well beyond FDI and includes research and development, the development of a skilled workforce, and dependable manufacturing systems that could become part of Indo-Pacific supply chains.

Similarly, AI manifests the centrality it has acquired in the technological landscape. The Joint Statement on AI^[6] goes beyond research and development to embrace governance standards, applications, innovation, and the development of human capabilities. India possesses one of the world’s largest digital public infrastructure ecosystems and a growing skilled workforce. Japan’s advanced capabilities in robotics, precision engineering, and industrial automation can be combined with these Indian strengths to create stronger manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, and public administration through AI applications, while ensuring that governance standards remain consistent with the values shared by both democratic partners.

An important part of the strategic triangle is critical minerals. China’s dominance and weaponisation of mineral processing and exports have hurt both India and Japan. Japan has modern processing technologies, financing, and industrial strength, while India offers a growing overseas mineral partnership effort and plans for increasing downstream processing within India. This partnership will look at obtaining raw materials and building midstream and downstream value chains – which will also help supplier countries in Africa and elsewhere.

The Joint Statement on Energy Resilience^[7] shows that the logic of cooperation for economic security is now taking the geopolitics of the West Asia crisis on board and trying to go beyond dependence on fossil fuels. Cooperative efforts on hydrogen, ammonia, LNG, biofuels, and clean energy technologies, including financial support for biogas and ammonia plants in India that could supply their production to Japanese entities overseas, provide a strong push towards energy resilience.

Like most things, the achievement of economic security from concept to reality will be judged by its implementation. The summit has provided strategic direction, but it is research and development, financing institutions, B2B connections, and collaboration and coordination among regulators that will actually create resilient supply chains. The challenge ahead is to create an integrated industrial system out of the shared strategic vision, in which India will become part of resilient regional supply chains that could give a serious fillip to its growth and export capabilities.

Despite the efforts of important Japanese companies that have done well in India, the next phase will require the participation of a much larger number of Japanese MSMEs, which form the backbone of manufacturing supply chains by producing specialised components and precision technologies that support larger industries. The movement of such MSMEs to India is vital to the next phase of the economic partnership.

However, many of Japan’s MSMEs remain anxious about entering India. Their concerns are well documented in JETRO’s surveys.^[8] Regulatory complexity, differing procedures among Indian states, challenges relating to land acquisition and logistics, and uncertain approval timelines are issues that larger companies have largely overcome. Smaller companies, however, compare these conditions with what they receive in countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, and India fares poorly, causing concern.

These concerns are also augmented by issues relating to standards and certification. Japanese companies believe that compliance with the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) requirements is time-consuming and costly, even though their products may already be certified under Japanese or internationally accepted standards. They therefore prefer greater harmonisation between BIS and internationally recognised certification systems, particularly on technical issues of products of interest. ^[9] Mutual recognition of technical standards, where possible, would reduce costs and approval times and make India a more attractive destination for technology-led FDI.

Addressing such concerns is now understood to be part of the economic security partnership. Accordingly, the Indian side announced a Japan Business Week, under the PMO, during which such issues would be taken up for resolution. This will augment the special facilitation mechanism that already exists to address Japanese investors’ concerns.

The Modi-Takaichi Summit also elevated bilateral cooperation by placing it within larger frameworks, including the G7, the G20, the Quad, and ASEAN. The Joint Statement recognises India’s expanding engagement with ASEAN, South Asia, and Africa and links it with Japan’s revised Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. Clearly, economic resilience cannot be pursued bilaterally alone.

ASEAN, therefore, assumes greater significance, and Japan and India must be on the same page economically and strategically. The strategic side is stronger, and India and Japan have reaffirmed their support for ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as part of the effort to maintain an inclusive and rules-based regional order. The decision made during the summit to establish a trilateral India-Japan-Philippines Track 1.5 Dialogue is welcome. It demonstrates that India and Japan are pursuing the idea of engaging ASEAN member states voluntarily in ASEAN-plus initiatives. The Philippines has now become a strategic partner of both India and Japan, with a special focus on maritime security, infrastructure development, and supply-chain resilience. How this evolves could well become the basis for similar engagement with Vietnam or Indonesia.

Africa is another important dimension. Japan’s enhanced FOIP and India’s India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) process share common objectives in promoting infrastructure, digital connectivity, healthcare, clean energy, and critical minerals in Africa. Jointly developed projects in third countries in Africa could become important instruments for supporting sustainable development while also helping to diversify supply chains, particularly for critical minerals.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding the Quad, particularly with U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, India and Japan have reiterated its importance. The Joint Statement expands the Quad’s agenda beyond maritime security to include critical technologies, resilient supply chains, climate change, public health, and infrastructure development. The economic security framework provides a practical basis for implementing Quad initiatives.^[10] By working more closely together, India and Japan, along with Australia and willing ASEAN partners, can provide greater stability across the region.

The Modi-Takaichi Summit is more than merely another diplomatic event. It clearly demonstrated the desire to establish economic security as the defining principle of the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership. This partnership has evolved through several phases. Initially, it was led by ODA and infrastructure development. Subsequently, FDI, industrial corridors, and manufacturing cooperation came to the fore. With this summit, the next phase—centred on resilient supply chains, trusted technologies, AI, critical minerals, and energy resilience—has emerged.

India and Japan have articulated a clear vision, and the India-Japan Economic Summit demonstrated significant opportunities through the 129 MoUs that were concluded. What lies ahead is the need for sustained implementation through a faster pace of regulatory reform, stronger institutional coordination, and greater facilitation of innovation and investment.

Such achievements will enable the legacy of the Modi-Takaichi Summit to extend well beyond the bilateral relationship. They will demonstrate that middle powers, through responsible and sustained action, are capable of shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific through strategic intent and the resilient economic networks that back it up to promote regional stability. Economic security is therefore no longer simply another area of cooperation between India and Japan. It has become the foundation upon which the next generation of the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership will be built.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

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References:

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India–Japan Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, Ministry of External Affairs, July 2, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41395/IndiaJapan_Joint_Declaration_on_Economic_Security_Cooperation

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Fact Sheet 2.0: India–Japan Economic Security Cooperation,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 2, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41396/Fact_Sheet_20_IndiaJapan_Economic_Security_Cooperation

[3] Ministry of Justice, Japan, Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security Through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures. https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4716/en

[4] The agreements reached at the summit identify semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and energy resilience as priority areas because they influence both national security and economic competitiveness. Semiconductors perhaps illustrate this best. Modern production lines depend upon supply chains that are, however, geographically concentrated. The chips produced are vital for a variety of sectors, from consumer electronics to telecommunications, defence, automobiles, industrial automation, and AI. Disruptions in their supply therefore have far-reaching commercial consequences.

[5] Indian Strategic Minerals Foundation (ISM), “Home,” n.d. (accessed July 9, 2026). https://ism.gov.in/

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan–India Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World, December 12, 2015. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/101054202.pdf

[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Joint Statement between Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan on Energy Resilience.” February 19, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41389/Joint_Statement_between_Ministry_of_Petroleum_and_Natural_Gas_of_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Ministry_of_Economy_Trade_and_Industry_of_Japan_on_Energy_Resilience

[8] Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). “India–Japan Industry Co-Creation, Co-Innovation Initiative Launched to Strengthen Bilateral Business Cooperation.” February 19, 2025. https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/2025/04461099867183d4.html

[9] Bureau of Indian Standards published 21,890 standards for products, process specifications, service sectors, codes of practice and methods of test terminology, PIB, 23 December 2022. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1886025&reg=48&lang=2

[10] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “16th India–Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement.” February 19, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41391/16th_IndiaJapan_Annual_Summit_Joint_Statement

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Beneath this rhythm of annual crises, a pattern has emerged. What links the five countries surveyed here is a shared posture: non-alignment as the preferred response to a fragmenting order. Non-alignment here is more the seeking of autonomy and less a position of neutrality. From Brasília to Pretoria, Jakarta and New Delhi, and more quietly Berlin, experts say their country increasingly resists having to choose sides. This is a pragmatic recalibration to a global order marked by an unpredictable U.S., an assertive China and institutions built for an earlier world. The practice of non-alignment still varies (read more on page 45) – Germany’s version is not India’s, and Indonesia’s is not Brazil’s – but the underlying drive is similar. This posture is no longer confined to the Global South.

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Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director of Gateway House.  

Dr Sarah Pagung is the Executive Director of International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung.

Florian Bigge is the Programme Director of International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung. 

Paulo Esteves is a member of the Academic Council, BRICS Policy Center. 

Carlos Frederico de Souza Coelho is a researcher at BRICS Policy Center.

Gustavo de Carvalho is the Acting Head, African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg. 

Steven Gruzd is the former Head of African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Dr Dino Patti Djalal is the Founder and Chairman of Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI). 

Jenny Sari Winata is the Programme and Research Manager at Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI).

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