Seven years have passed since the monumental parliamentary decision on August 5, 2019, to abrogate Articles 370 and 35A, which irrevocably altered the semi-autonomous status of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. This bold move fragmented the region into two separate Union Territories (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh – a shift that has left geopolitical scars along the northern frontier. What was initially perceived by New Delhi as a strategic masterstroke aimed at fostering greater integration has instead evolved into a complex and precarious equilibrium, marked by tension and uncertainty. Local residents are restless, and there is some concern in New Delhi, especially as this border state is under threat from China and Pakistan.

Ladakh’s trajectory changed after its separation from Jammu and Kashmir. In Buddhist-majority Leh and the strategic border areas, the 2019 UT status was initially welcomed as an end to decades of perceived neglect by Srinagar.

But residents realized that lack of statehood also meant losing land, job, and demographic protections previously available under Article 370. Direct rule from New Delhi, without legislative safeguards, triggered fears of cultural erosion, bureaucratic overreach, and corporate land grabs. Complete statehood includes having its own legislative assembly. When Ladakh became a Union Territory without a legislature, it lost the four elected MLAs who had represented the region in the erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir Assembly. The lack of direct legislative representation has left a political void and is seen by many residents as a key driver of the current discontent.

For Shia-majority Kargil, the reorganization was opposed from the start — seen as a downgrade to a UT without elected representation and a forced severance from Jammu and Kashmir.  The discontent coalesced into two bodies: the Leh Apex Body (LAB) representing Leh, and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) representing Kargil. Formed after August 2019, both began agitating separately for statehood before joining hands in August 2021 to strengthen their leverage.

Despite deep historical and religious differences between Buddhist-majority Leh and Shia-majority Kargil, the LAB and KDA set aside their divide to forge a joint front. They united around a common four-point agenda — statehood for Ladakh, constitutional safeguards under the Sixth Schedule, which grants autonomous district councils with powers to make laws on land, forests and customary practice; separate Lok Sabha representation for Leh and Kargil; job reservations and a dedicated Public Service Commission for locals. This continues to form the core of the ongoing negotiations between the Ladakhis and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

The demand for statehood has been accompanied by protests, which culminated in violent clashes in September 2025 that led to civilian casualties and the invocation of the National Security Act (NSA) against prominent Ladakhi voices, including environmentalist and education reformer Sonam Wangchuk, who was put under preventive detention on September 26, 2025, and was subsequently held in Jodhpur Central Jail. The Ministry of Home Affairs officially revoked his detention and released him on March 14, 2026.

Against the backdrop of sustained local pressure and the strategic challenge of managing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, particularly after the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clashes, in 2021 the MHA opened high-level talks with Ladakh’s leadership. Instead of extending the Sixth Schedule, New Delhi has proposed an alternative model under Article 371 — similar to the special protections in place for Nagaland, Mizoram and Sikkim.

Statehood will give Ladakh full autonomy to govern the state, while as a UT it will be under direct control of New Delhi, as a hill regional council operates as a local governance body within the state or UT.

Meanwhile, New Delhi has begun mapping the region as a strategic, diplomatic, and cartographic countermeasure to assert its territorial sovereignty amid ongoing border standoffs with China. On October 2, 2026, the MHA, in coordination with the Survey of India and the Ladakh local administration, officially published a map establishing standardized names for 28 specific strategic locations and geographical features within the territory to streamline official cartography and improve public awareness (1). These 28 locations include 10 peaks and three mountains, two glaciers and two passes, seven land areas and one valley, one river, one lake and one water body.

The locations cover prominent border friction points along the LAC that were central to the 2020 military standoff – most notably Gogra and Hot Spring. It covers features in Aksai Chin (under Chinese control but claimed by India) and parts of Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan. This move is widely seen as a tit-for-tat cartographic response to Beijing, which, since 2017, has unilaterally issued multiple lists of altered Chinese names for places inside the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Two weeks later, on October 13, 2026, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning strongly protested the move, declaring India’s standardized map “illegal, null, and void.” China explicitly stated it “has never recognised the so-called Union Territory of Ladakh unilaterally and illegally established by India” following the August 2019 bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir. It asserted that India’s administrative mapping cannot alter the “objective fact” that the western section of the India-China border area belongs to China. New Delhi rejected these statements, asserting that Ladakh is an integral and inalienable part of India.

The statement was followed by yet another round of talks on Oct 15 between MHA and the Ladakh leadership, which again collapsed. The MHA provided a 32-page document to the Ladakh leadership, which envisages constitutional safeguards akin to Article 371, and gives 12 States special safeguards and administrative arrangements based on their distinct historical, cultural, and regional circumstances.

The government is now designing a new Constitutional provision for Ladakh in the form of Article 371 (K) that is expected to address some of the reservations and concerns unique to Ladakh. The latest proposal under Article 371, which the government presented to the Ladakhi leadership on October 17, seeks to strengthen the powers of Ladakh’s two Autonomous Hill Development Councils — Leh and Kargil — expanding their legislative, executive, and land-related authority, and introducing domicile-based protections for jobs and land. While seen as a step forward, civil society groups are insisting on substantive changes, which they say, will give them a greater say in how these safeguards are drafted and implemented.

For now, statehood is not on the agenda. In the meantime, in order to pacify the statehood demands, the government has taken some positive steps. On 19 October, the Chief Justice of India inaugurated the Ladakh Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Leh.^[1]

On October 21, the UT administration dissolved the Kargil Hill Council, as panchayat elections will be held there on November 21 this year. The move, though small, does have consequences as Ladakhis await the next meeting with the MHA to discuss the draft proposal on Article 371(K).

For a region that guards India’s most hostile frontier, treating Ladakh as a bureaucratic division run from Delhi is short-sighted and can be strategically reckless. Ladakhis have proved their allegiance to India in every war, every winter, every standoff on the LAC.

And in a borderland that faces China every single day, alienation is a national security threat that no amount of troops can fix.

Nayanima Basu is the Adjunct Fellow at Gateway House and an author. 

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References:

[1] Prior to this, on October 16, the Centre officially notified the creation of Sankoo as the eighth district of Ladakh, thereby separating it from Kargil district (3). Sankoo played a critical role by way of humanitarian and logistical hub during the 1999 Kargil War.

Administration of the Union Territory of Ladakh. “Chief Justice of India Inaugurates Ladakh Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Leh.” Press release, October 19, 2026. https://ladakh.gov.in/chief-justice-of-india-inaugurates-ladakh-bench-of-the-high-court-of-jammu-kashmir-and-ladakh-at-leh/.

Administration of the Union Territory of Ladakh. “Ladakh Administration Notifies Creation of Sankoo as New District of UT Ladakh.” Press release, October 16, 2026. https://ladakh.gov.in/ladakh-administration-notifies-creation-of-sankoo-as-new-district-of-ut-ladakh/.

Ministry of Home Affairs. “Government of India, in Consultation with UT of Ladakh, Identify 28 Places/Features, Located in the UT of Ladakh, by Standard Place and Feature Names on the Official Map of Survey of India (SoI).” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, October 2, 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2318027&reg=48&lang=2.

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Amid the noise surrounding the current tussle at Tata Sons, few have listened carefully to what Noel Tata, a member of the Tata family and one of two Tata Trusts representatives on the Tata Sons board, has been saying. He issued a statement in which he emphasised that listing Tata Sons, the Tata Group’s holding company, would destroy the ‘Tata Model.’^[1] He added that the Group was conceived as a national service carried on through business for over a century. If listed, it will destroy “the operating model of this House”, which has stood the test of time for more than 158 years. Effectively, short-term shareholder gains will take precedence over the long-term pioneering research, incubation, and industrial execution that Tata Sons and the Trusts together oversee. This will result from the Trusts’ shareholding being diluted after a public listing.^[2]

To understand the low-key ‘Tata Model’ of philanthropy through business, a good example is Mumbai’s Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR, est. 1945), founded during J.R.D. Tata’s stewardship of Tata Sons.  The Trust that provided seed capital for building its Colaba campus, and funds for the first nine years since its founding, was the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust (SDTT).^[3] The erstwhile Bombay government and central government contributed the rest. PM Nehru’s personal intervention with India’s Ministry of Defence helped acquire 30 acres for the TIFR campus in Colaba’s Navy Nagar.^[4] 

Dr Homi Bhabha explaining the TIFR building model to Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. To the left of Dr Bhabha is JRD Tata, and his wife, Thelma Tata, is standing beside PM Nehru; Dr S.S. Bhatnagar (next to PM Nehru) was head of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court M.C. Chagla (centre, wearing glasses), and next to him is Chief Minister of Bombay State Morarji Desai.

Source: TATA. Year 1954.

Although TIFR was the brainchild of Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, a young accomplished theoretical physicist from Cambridge University, it never would have been built without the Tata Trusts’ initial majority contribution. Bhabha’s vision remains intact today because, under a 1955 trilateral agreement, the head of SDTT serves as chair of the TIFR Council and continues to provide vision, guidance, and commitment to date.^[5][6]This unique governance structure and partnership between private capital and government is the Tata Model, and it has evolved over time, as TIFR’s history shows.

The early 1940s, when TIFR was established, were tumultuous years. The Second World War (1939-45) was ongoing, and it kept the brilliant physicist Dr Homi J. Bhabha from returning to England after travelling home to India in 1939 to visit family. This was also the time when India was on the cusp of Independence, and plans were already underway for rapid economic development after independence. One problem remained: an energy gap. It was clear that India would be partitioned and, in addition to losing its oilfields in Burma, which had been overrun by Japan in 1942, India would likely lose its oilfields in Kaur, Attock, in Northwest Punjab. The popularity of the internal combustion engine meant the country would remain a net importer of petroleum. To make post-Independence India energy self-sufficient, the country’s scientific community and its soon-to-be first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, were convinced that nuclear energy was the answer.^[7]

Against this geopolitical and economic backdrop, Dr Bhabha proposed an institute for blue-sky research in the physical sciences. He ran this idea by JRD Tata, who suggested he work on detailed plans to present to the Trustees of SDTT. The Sir Dorabji Tata Trust was recommended because one of its objects was ‘the advancement of learning in all its branches especially research work in connection with medical and industrial problems.’^[8] Bhabha did not immediately convince the Board about the need for an institute of fundamental research for India on the lines of those he had worked in abroad. It was only after JRD Tata put his weight behind the project that it took off. Thanks to his backing, TIFR (est. 1945) joined the ranks of two other pioneering institutions established by SDTT within a span of a decade: the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (est. 1936) and the Tata Memorial Hospital (est. 1941).

Aerial View of Royal Bombay Yacht Club.

Source: Captain Haseler (via Past-India)

TIFR, established on 1 June 1945, originally operated out of the cosmic ray unit at another Tata-established institute, the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) in Bangalore.^[9] Space soon ran out, and in October that year it shifted to new premises in Bombay: Bhabha’s birthplace, the Kenilworth bungalow on Peddar Road.^[10] Sir John Colville, governor of Bombay, inaugurated the new premises on December 19, 1945.

TIFR grew fast. The Nuclear Emulsion and the Electron Magnetism Group started in 1953. Work in Computer Science and Technology began in 1954.^[11] This necessitated more space, and the institute’s shift to the southern tip of Bombay city began when the sea-facing premises of the Old Royal Bombay Yacht Club at Apollo Bunder were acquired in  1949 to house TIFR’s fast-expanding work.

TIFRAC (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Automatic Calculator).

Source: TIFR Archives

Despite the whirlwind of setting up different specialised groups, the focus on nuclear energy was never lost. Almost simultaneously with establishing TIFR, the Atomic Energy Commission (1946) was set up in Bombay, with Bhabha as chairman. From TIFR also grew the Department of Atomic Energy (1954), which in the early years (but no longer) was considered part of TIFR and is today based in its old premises at the Old Yacht Club at Apollo Bunder.

India joined the nuclear club after its first indigenously built experimental nuclear reactor, Apsara, went critical in 1954 at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay (AEET). To consolidate TIFR’s expertise in reactor design, instrumentation, metallurgy, and materials science, the government spun off a separate institution on January 3, 1954—the Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay (AEET), later renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre after Bhabha’s death in 1966.

A critical pivot in TIFR’s evolution was the Tripartite Agreement of 1955-56.^[12] The funding contribution and involvement of the Government of India, the Government of Bombay and the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust were restructured. The new setup envisaged extensive financial support from the Government of India and, correspondingly, a greater and more permanent representative on TIFR’s Council of Management. But with a key provision: the SDTT chairman would always chair the Council.^[13]

The Canada-India Reactor Utility Services (CIRUS) research reactor.

Source: The Society for the Preservation of Canada’s Nuclear Heritage

India built its first nuclear reactor, the Canada India Reactor Utility Services (CIRUS), at AEET’s Trombay campus in 1956, the same year TIFR restructured its funding and governance.^[14] This nuclear reactor, which used Canadian natural uranium and US heavy water, went critical in July 1960.^[15] This was soon followed by a 1963 bilateral agreement between India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), when Dr Homi Bhabha was secretary, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which resulted in the establishment of units one and two of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, just north of Bombay, which still supplies electricity to the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat.^[16] It made TIFR the cradle of India’s nuclear research, and along with AEET (Trombay), AEC and DAE, it gave the country atomic energy and its nuclear program.

Tarapur Power Station (Unit 3 and 4).

Source: Department of Atomic Energy.

This public-private partnership model between the government and the Tatas has been time-tested not only by TIFR’s high-quality research and the institutional ecosystem it has spawned, but also by two enduring facts.

First, having the chair of SDTT heading the TIFR Council, like Ratan Tata most recently did, has ensured that fundamental research feeds into medical institutes and industry. Ratan Tata’s abiding interest was nuclear medicine and genetics. He ensured that the research carried out at TIFR and its sister institutes, the National Centre for Biological Sciences, the Tata Institute of Genetics and Society (TIGS), BRIC-inStem, and C-CAMP (a vibrant incubator), all in the Bangalore Life Sciences campus, feeds into India’s cancer research centres and hospitals, like Tata Memorial Centre.

Second, the SDTT’s continued presence on the Council has ensured project-wise endowments to TIFR, such as the Rs. 1 crore it donated on TIFR’s Golden Anniversary (1995) to establish its archives and chair professorships.^[17]

This public-private partnership in institution-building is a critical part of the Tata Model that Noel Tata refers to. This makes the Trusts a vital bridge between the philanthropy it practices and industry-scale incubation.

Sifra Lentin is Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Mitra, Chandrajit. “Tata Sons IPO Could Destroy Group’s National Service Character: Tata Trusts’ Noel Tata,” NDTV, September 18, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/tata-sons-ipo-could-destroy-groups-national-service-character-tata-trusts-noel-tata-12061056.

[2] Under the RBI’s NBFC regulations, Tata Sons is designated as a Core Investment Company and Non-Banking Financial Company – Upper Layer. This requires that it be a publicly listed company.

[3] The Sir Dorabji Tata Trust was then chaired by Sir Sohrab D. Saklatwala.

[4] The term Bombay Government is a reference to erstwhile Bombay State, which was partitioned on 1^st May 1960 to form the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat.

[5] Dr Homi Bhabha was related to the Tata family through Lady Meherbai Dorabji Tata. He was her nephew.

[7] In the 1940s, the thorium-rich sands of the Kerala Coast were identified as the fuel to power this growth.

[8] Lala, R.M., The Creation of Wealth (Bombay, IBH Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 3^rd Edition, 1992), p. 154

[9] The IISc was set up by the founder of the Group, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata, in collaboration with the government of the princely state of Mysore and the colonial government. J.N. Tata viewed establishing IISc as a national need and priority. This Institute was completed after J.N. Tata death in 1904. The annual income of the Institute (Rs. 2,62,500/-) was thus made up of Rs. 1,25,000 /- from Mr Tata’s two sons (Dorab and Ratan), Rs. 50,000 /from the Mysore Durbar, and Rs. 87,500/- from the Government of India. The Mysore Durbar contributed a further Rs. 5 lacs towards capital expenditure, and the Government of India added Rs. 2.5 lacs in accordance with its promise of a grant-in-aid.

Harris, F.R., Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata: A Chronicle Of His Life

[10] The Kenilworth bungalow no longer stands, and in its place are buildings for the staff of the Department of Atomic Energy and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. There is a plaque on the boundary wall facing the main Peddar Road commemorating Kenilworth Bungalow as the birthplace of Dr Homi Bhabha and TIFR’s first home in Bombay.

[11] The first pilot machine became operational in 1956, and TIFRAC (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Automatic Calculator) was commissioned in February 1960.

[12]“History,” Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, https://www.tifr.res.in/maincampus/history.php.

[13] Today, more than 99% of the expenditure of the Institute is borne by the Government of India. The Institute comes under the purview of the Department of Atomic Energy through which all grants are channelled.

[14] It was built under a bilateral treaty with Canada, which supplied the natural uranium used in this reactor, and a contract with the United States, which supplied heavy water used as a moderator for this reactor. CIRUS was modelled on the Canadian Chalk River National Research X-perimental (NRX) reactor. Similar to the one signed much later with the U.S. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called the ‘123 Agreement’ (1963).  India’s next two reactors were 160 MWe Boiling Water Reactors at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS), just north of Bombay.

[15] The CIRUS reactor was decommissioned in 2010.

[16] “Tarapur Atomic Power Station – Units 1 and 2,” Tata Consulting Engineers, https://www.tataconsultingengineers.com/project/tarapur-atomic-power-station-units-1-2/.

[17] “[Endowment],” Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, https://www.tifr.res.in/endowment/.

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Mikhail Kasko has been Belarus’s Ambassador to India since 2024 and is the non-resident Ambassador to Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.

Ajay Kamalakaran (AK): How does Belarus view its growing partnership with India?

Mikhail Kasko (MK): Belarus is open to cooperation with the entire world. We value each of our foreign trade partners. India as one of the most promising areas in Asia – politically, economically, and culturally. The interest is mutual, and cooperation between our official and business circles has significantly intensified and deepened in recent years.

What is particularly gratifying is the mutual and multifaceted interest in developing relations between our countries.

Since 2025, two high-level meetings have taken place between our leaders – H.E. Mr Aleksandr Lukashenko, President of Belarus, and H.E. Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India. Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov visited Delhi in September for the 18^th BRICS Summit. In 2026, India also hosted the Chairman of Belarus’s Supreme Court, the Chairman of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, the Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, the Minister of Health, and the deputy heads of the Foreign and Culture Ministries. Our foreign ministers regularly meet on the sidelines of the UN, BRICS, the SCO, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In October 2025, Minsk hosted the 8th round of political consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers. Ambassador Sibi George, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs,  participated in this event and also led the Indian delegation to the Third Eurasian Forum on Security.^[1]  We are expecting the visit of Indian Chief Justice Surya Kant to Belarus soon, where we hope both the Supreme Courts will sign a memorandum of cooperation.

Together, all these engagements signal to our business and humanitarian communities to step up their work on relevant tracks.

AK: Is there a possibility of regularising the schedule of high-level government meetings, as the bilateral engagements pick up?

MK: I think so.  Our leaders met again on the sidelines of the SCO, this time in Bishkek, and there’s a high probability that another meeting could take place as early as early next year in New Delhi between the two leaders. We are actively working to coordinate their schedules.

AK: During the brief India-Pakistan military confrontation in May 2025, Belarus reaffirmed its friendship with both countries and called for an end to hostilities, but some members of the Indian establishment believe Minsk is closer to Islamabad than to New Delhi. Is there any truth to this?

MK: I have already noted that we are open to cooperation with the entire world; this is the main principle in our work with our partners. At the same time, Belarus’s position remains unchanged: we are categorically opposed to resolving conflicts through military means. We have a saying: “A bad peace is better than a good quarrel.” The only sensible way to resolve the conflict between the parties is through peaceful negotiations. There is no change in this position, and none is expected in the future.

As for relations with your neighbours, they are built solely on the principle of non-interference in the affairs of third countries. No country can accuse us of building relationships and friendships against anyone.

Let’s continue to build on these basic principles.

AK: Belarus aspires to become a full member of BRICS and believes it can count on India’s support.

MK: We are certainly interested in full membership. BRICS is one of the most dynamically developing interstate cooperation organisations. Its scale is truly impressive. It is home to nearly half the world’s population, occupies 25 per cent of the world’s land area, 40 per cent of global GDP, 45 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and 30 per cent of its natural gas reserves.

India supported Belarus’ full membership in SCO in 2024 and our candidacy to become a BRICS partner country, for which we are immensely grateful.

These international organisation accessions have opened new opportunities in trade, investment, technology, and joint projects. They have also created opportunities for social and cultural exchanges such as student exchange programmes, research projects, and scientific initiatives. Member countries gain access to these programmes, which will contribute to the advanced training of young people, the development of scientific potential, and integration into the global scientific community. Cultural ties with countries such as India will open new horizons for Belarus in joint projects in the arts and popular culture.

Our positions on many global issues are similar or closely aligned, and our work at various international forums, be it the UN, BRICS, or the SCO, is characterised by constructiveness and mutual support.

We, therefore, sincerely count on our Indian friends’ support for Belarus’ full BRICS membership.

AK: How would you describe the defence and security partnership between our countries?

MK: The India-Belarus defence and security partnership is constructive and trusting and has been steadily developing since Belarus gained independence in 1991. Today, this cooperation encompasses a range of areas in the military-technical and defence spheres.

Our defence ministers hold regular working meetings. Our positions on global and regional security issues and the need to pursue dialogue and diplomacy to resolve international conflicts largely coincide.

The positions of the Belarusian and Indian defence ministries on pressing global and regional security issues largely coincide. Belarus and India agree on the need to pursue dialogue and diplomacy to resolve international conflicts.

One of the most dynamic developing areas of cooperation is military education. Belarusian military personnel regularly train in India, and we hope this will continue, as we highly value ​​the training in India.

In turn, we invite representatives of the Indian armed forces to observe combat training events in Belarus.

AK: Bilateral trade between the countries remains significantly below potential. What can be done to strengthen trade ties, and where does the potential lie?

MK: According to Belarusian statistics, the volume of bilateral trade in goods and services between the countries exceeded $1 billion for the first time in 2025, and the upward trend will continue in 2026.

Cooperation in the pharmaceutical industry is developing very dynamically. Belarus imports significant quantities of medicines and pharmaceutical substances, and Belarusian and Indian companies already jointly produce pharmaceuticals. We want to expand joint pharmaceutical production in Belarus and invest in technology transfer and development of new drugs.

In turn, Belarus can increase the export of trucks and mining equipment for India’s infrastructure projects. I believe we have good growth potential here. Our BELAZ mining dump trucks^[2] already operate in Indian coal quarries; they are strong in heavy segments and offer an attractive price-to-quality ratio. We are currently exploring the supply of electric mining dump trucks, which offer fuel efficiency and environmental benefits.

Light-duty dump trucks that are manufactured in India make it difficult for us to compete in this segment, but we are seriously exploring the possibility of establishing an assembly line with Indian partners. Supplies of mechanical engineering products and the establishment of assembly plants in India should drive export growth and strengthen the position of Belarusian goods in the Indian market.

We see a scope in developing cooperation with India on Artificial Intelligence, digital public infrastructure and telecommunications, nanotechnology, new materials, and high-precision engineering as of interest. Belarus has a strong school of applied science, programming, and microelectronics, while India has a developed IT sector with biopharmaceuticals expertise. This work runs through the Joint Commission on Science and Technology, joint research grants, and technology transfer.

To scale trade ties between Belarus and India, a comprehensive approach beyond the traditional “buy and sell” model is required. Given India’s emphasis on the “Make in India” programme, simple exports of finished goods are limited, so a shift to joint production and localisation is essential.

We hope to discuss these opportunities in more detail at the 12th meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission, scheduled for mid-November 2026 in New Delhi.

The early signing of the India-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement^[3]  will significantly ease market access.

It is important that trade turnover grows through new niches, not just traditional positions.

AK: What other areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation exist?

MK: Education is one.  Thousands of Indian students study at Belarusian universities, primarily medical and engineering institutions in Minsk, Vitebsk, and Grodno, drawn by the quality, affordability, and safety.

India, in turn, provides grants for the training of Belarusian specialists under the Indian Technical Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. A Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation is also active. Joint projects are being implemented in the fields of nanotechnology, optics, laser systems, and materials protection.

Health and recreation programmes for Indian children at the Zubrenok National Children’s Educational and Health Centre are becoming a good tradition. By decision of the President of Belarus, all travel and recreation expenses for the children are covered. Since 2025, two groups of Indian children have completed their health improvement programme at this centre.

For cultural cooperation, we will intensify mutual exchanges of theatre, music, and dance groups. I am also pleased to note the ongoing mutual participation of filmmakers and directors in film festivals held in Belarus and India.

We are pleased to invite leading Indian directors and actors on the jury of our annual Listapad Film Festival.

AK: What is being done to improve people-to-people ties?

MK: Intensifying contacts between our official and business communities, as well as deepening cooperation in various fields, requires appropriate conditions. We are actively working to create a favourable climate for this.

A direct  Minsk-Delhi flight was launched in 2023, connecting our capitals. We are currently working on opening two new additional routes: Minsk-Mumbai and Minsk-Goa.

Since September 2026, Indian citizens can apply for an e-visa without travelling to Delhi or Mumbai.

We are also working on raising awareness of Belarus among Indian citizens and businesses.

We have organised two visits by Indian bloggers to Belarus, and Belarusian creative groups are visiting India more often.

AK: Apart from Mumbai,  which other Indian cities are key for Belarus?

MK: The sister-city initiative came from the  Indian side. After visiting Moscow in May 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Minsk and noted its similarities with Bangalore. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Minsk-Bangalore cooperation agreement. Minsk has a Bangalore Square, and Bangalore has a Minsk Square. This is our happy history.

Additionally, memoranda of understanding between the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh and several Belarusian regions are currently in the final stages.

To deepen cooperation at the regional level, besides, we have a Consulate General in Mumbai and an Honorary Consulate in Kolkata, and we are working to open an Honorary Consulate in Bangalore.

Ajay Kamalakaran is a writer with a special interest in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

This interview was conducted exclusively for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, and has been edited and abridged for clarity and brevity. You can read more exclusive content here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in  

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

^[1] The Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security is a representative international forum held annually in Minsk, Belarus.

^[2] https://belaz.by/en/

^[3] A customs union of five countries, including Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia

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Ever since the phrase ‘Global South’ entered India’s diplomatic lexicon during its G20 presidency in 2022-23, Africa seems to have received somewhat diminished attention. This is ironic, given that Africa is seen as the heart of the Global South, and a major achievement of India’s G20 presidency was to deliver to the African Union (AU) full membership of the G20. And India has been struggling to host the fourth India–Africa Forum Summit for a decade, and the one planned for May 2026 had to be postponed on the eve of the meeting due to the outbreak of Ebola.

In this specific backdrop, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to three African countries – Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia – from October 6 to 10 was an important step in imparting fresh momentum to bilateral relations with these countries, and also to draw public attention to the imperative of continuing the multi-dimensional partnership between India and Africa. The choice of these three nations revealed a careful deliberation on New Delhi’s part: two cities in West Africa, one Anglophone and the other Francophone, and the third one located in Eastern Africa, which is often dubbed ‘Africa’s capital’.

With the rising influence of India on the world stage, its foreign minister is now given, almost as a matter of routine, a call on the country’s Head of Government. This is as true of President Putin and President Zelenskyy as of the presidents of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the prime minister of Ethiopia. Of course, substantive discussions took place at the level of Jaishankar’s counterparts, namely, foreign ministers and other ministers concerned.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi made state visits to Ghana and Ethiopia last year. Jaishankar was thus seen engaging in follow-up dialogue to push forward bilateral cooperation. His visit to Côte d’Ivoire showed that India’s engagement with Francophone Africa remains strong. His interaction with the country’s alumni of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme reflected the importance that training and capacity-building measures constitute in India’s strategy in the region. The visits to Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire were the first by Jaishankar as Foreign Minister of India.

In Ghana, the focus was on bilateral cooperation, but larger regional and global issues too came up for detailed discussion. Defence cooperation and development partnership formed important pillars of the relationship, and an emphasis has been put on enhancing trade and investment components. There is broad policy convergence: India’s appreciation of Ghana’s leadership on reparatory justice and restitution of its own cultural properties, including at the UN, was complemented by Ghana’s admiration for India’s contribution to securing permanent membership to the AU in the G20. The developments in West Africa, ECOWAS, the AU, UN reform, and cooperation for the Global South were on the agenda. Ghana is keen to join BRICS, which it sees as a step to widen its international role. India was supportive but pointed to the requirements of the grouping’s collective process.

Côte d’Ivoire is interested too in strengthening defence and security cooperation in capacity-building with India. President Alassane Ouattara stressed the need for a strong and mutually beneficial partnership with India, and his ministers discussed in detail the full range of issues relating to trade and investment, agriculture, healthcare, digital technology, energy, and education. At the interaction with ITEC alumni, Jaishankar articulated India’s determination to continue widening the reach of capacity development initiatives.

Ethiopia was the last and perhaps the most important stop. Prime Minister Dr Abiy Ahmed Ali visited India just a month ago, in September 2026, during the BRICS Summit. The bilateral has been upgraded to a Strategic Partnership, carrying with it a full-spectrum dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues and potential cooperation in health, education, skill development, defence, mining, artificial intelligence, and digital public infrastructure. Given the persistent conflicts within the country, the announcement by Jaishankar to organise a second^[1] Jaipur Artificial Limb Fitment Camp in the country was welcomed.

While in Ethiopia, which is also the headquarters of the AU, Jaishankar hosted a meeting for the Indian Heads of Mission stationed in Africa. In a very special gesture, the Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed hosted a dinner to welcome the Indian ambassadors who came from different parts of Africa.

Equally significant is the substantive speech on India-Africa relations given by Jaishankar at the Adwa Victory Museum in Addis Ababa. He traced the history of this important relationship from the pre-colonial times, but said that realistically, it was time to move into the future: “It is no longer sufficient to describe India and Africa through the vocabulary of historical solidarity… history has given us trust; the future requires ambition.”

Ambition and acceleration are the keys to revving up the India-Africa partnership. India is Africa’s fourth-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade at $100 billion in 2025,^[2] 220 projects of $4.5 billion executed,^[3] and 70,000 African students, professionals and officials trained in the past decade.^[4] Compared with Africa’s $348 billion bilateral trade with China in 2025,^[5] and China being the single largest financier in infrastructure projects such as ports, power plants and railways built in Africa,^[6] and the 20,000 African officials trained by China every year,^[7] it is small. Luckily, India is willing to do more. Referring to the essential inequity of international order, Jaishankar noted how “Africa and the Global South are being directly impacted by conflicts, far-away conflicts in which they have no say.” The joint agenda for India and Africa, he said, “is to make global governance more democratic, more responsive and more represented.”

A disappointment of the trip was the missed meeting between Jaishankar and the chairperson of the AU Commission. This is regrettable. To finalise the dates of the fourth India-Africa Forum Summit in 2027, the cooperation of the AU Commission is essential. Thankfully, discussions are under way at the official and diplomatic levels.

Overall, then, the Jaishankar visit was a productive success. India’s diplomatic outreach and success will be noted in other parts of Africa, including in a country such as Kenya, which has enjoyed highly cooperative ties with India in the past but is now sadly taking a somewhat different path.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former diplomat who served as the High Commissioner to Kenya, South Africa and Lesotho.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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^[1] The last camp was in the Afar region of Ethiopia in 2024

^[2] India Is Africa’s 4th-Largest Trading Partner, Bilateral Trade Nears 100 Billion Dollar: EAM Jaishankar.” Akashvani News, February 26, 2025. https://newsonair.gov.in/india-is-africas-4th-largest-trading-partner-bilateral-trade-nears-100-billion-dollar-eam-jaishankar/

^[3] Jaishankar, S. “Address by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at Adwa Memorial Museum, Ethiopia, on India–Africa Partnership.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41864/Address_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_Adwa_Memorial_Museum_Ethiopia_on_India__Africa_Partnership

^[4] Jaishankar, S. “Address by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at Adwa Memorial Museum, Ethiopia, on India–Africa Partnership.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41864/Address_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_Adwa_Memorial_Museum_Ethiopia_on_India__Africa_Partnership

^[5] China Implements Historic Zero Tariffs for All African Nations with Diplomatic Ties.” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 1, 2026. https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/policywatch/202605/01/content_WS69f45e35c6d00ca5f9a0ac01.html

^[6] Jean-Pierre Labuschagne and Hannah Marais, “If You Want to Prosper, Consider Building Roads: China’s Role in African Infrastructure and Capital Projects,” Deloitte Insights, March 21, 2019. https://www.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/industry/government-public-sector-services/china-investment-africa-infrastructure-development.html

^[7] Alemu, Dawit, and Henry Tugendhat. “Changes in China’s Training Courses for African Officials.” Institute of Development Studies. https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/changes-in-chinas-training-courses-for-african-officials/

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Bangladesh has just signed a loan agreement of $335 million with China’s Exim Bank for modernising its second-largest port, Mongla. Mongla handles 10 million tonnes of cargo a year and has an attached Special Economic Zone (SEZ) with textile and related industries attached to the port. The loan is at a concessional interest rate of 2% and is to be repaid over 20 years.^[i]

This is the first significant loan agreement to have been signed between the two countries in the past three years and comes shortly after Prime Minister Tarique Rehman’s first external state visit to Malaysia, followed by China in June 2026. The project itself isn’t new – China first proposed the upgradation of the Mongla Port in 2016,^[ii] as a part of a basket of projects. Bangladesh has learned the lessons of its South Asian neighbours. The relatively smaller size of the loan, the concessional interest rate, and existing commercial traffic indicate this is unlikely to go the way of Gwadar or Hambantota Ports.

This development is part of Bangladesh’s attempts to expand its port infrastructure and to reduce its dependence on the port of Chittagong, which handles over 90% of all of Bangladesh’s seaborne trade (see table), and faces chronic congestion issues. Any disruption in Chittagong hits the economy immediately. In February 2026, a strike by the workers of the Chittagong Port forced the interim regime of Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus to back off from a proposed deal to lease part of the port infrastructure to the UAE’s DP World,^[iii] which was to invest in modernising the port’s infrastructure. This was one of the few instances of the Yunus regime stepping down in the face of popular protests. In October 2026, the newly elected Rehman government finally signed a deal with the Emirati port operator to run part of the Chittagong Port for 15 years^[iv] – with the government warning the unions against going on strike.^[v]

The third port being developed in Bangladesh is to the south of Chittagong, the Matarbari Deepwater Port at Cox’s Bazar. This port will have a deeper draft compared to Mongla and Chittagong, which are both shallow-water ports, and is currently being constructed with Japanese funding. Japan has committed close to $1 billion to the project, which is expected to be operational by 2029-30.

Thus, Bangladesh is spreading its international investment risk. It is working with Japan, DP World, and China, in that order of importance, to upgrade its port infrastructure. This ensures there is not a dependence on a single lender, as Pakistan has with China. Second, the Chittagong and Matarbari ports are much more important than Mongla, in terms of current traffic/future prospects, and these are both being done with non-China players.

A fourth country is supporting another major project in Bangladesh which is close to completion –  the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant built and financed by Russia. The total cost of the project is $11.38 billion, of which Russia has already disbursed over $8 billion. Total Japanese lending to Bangladesh is $13.7 billion. As a bilateral lender, China comes a distant third with outstanding loans of $5.8 billion.

Source: Gateway House Compilation

Bangladesh also depends upon the U.S. and the EU, which are the major markets for its textile exports. Although it has been facing a dollar crunch for several years now, Bangladesh recently signed deals to purchase Boeing^[vi] and Airbus^[vii] passenger aircraft to keep these two stakeholders happy.

Given its various dependencies, Bangladesh will have to maintain balanced ties with all of these economies. Therefore, despite the Mongla Port Agreement, the risk of Bangladesh becoming dependent on China is low.

Repaying the loans will be harder than anticipated, given the current global economic environment – and Bangladesh’s own economic prospects. The recent growth outlook for Bangladesh, released by the World Bank, has projected its growth for 2025-26 and 2026-27 at a modest 3.4% – well below the 6-7% growth that Dhaka has historically claimed. The high energy prices, especially for natural gas that Bangladesh is increasingly importing, have been a major financial blow and have resulted in electricity and energy shortages. The banking sector is underwater as more than one-third of outstanding loans have gone bad.

What does this mean for the Delhi-Dhaka relationship? Given these factors, Bangladesh will have to mend fences with India – and go easy on bonhomie with a bankrupt Pakistan that is facing internal unrest. India has to play the patient game till the newly elected Rehman government realises the futility of the path taken by the unelected Yunus regime.

Big-ticket infrastructure in Bangladesh is unlikely, but connecting natural gas infrastructure can be a way to deepen economic cooperation.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

Alaikaa Gupta is an Intern at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[i] China to Provide $335m for Modernizing Mongla Port Facilities, Deal Signed,” Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), October 12, 2026, https://www.bssnews.net/business/434012.

 [ii] Kayes Mohammad Sohel, “Bangladesh Close to Ink $6bn Deal with China,” Dhaka Tribune, August 25, 2016, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/bangladesh-others/3912/bangladesh-close-to-ink-6bn-deal-with-china.

[iii] “Ctg Port Workers Lift Strike until 15 Feb after Govt Says DP World Deal on Hold,” The Business Standard, February 9, 2026, https://publisher.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/ctg-port-workers-lift-strike-until-15-feb-after-govt-says-dp-world-deal-hold-1355606.

[iv] “CPA, DP World Sign Deal to Boost Chattogram Port Capacity,” Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), October 8, 2026, https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/432653.

[v] “Govt Warns of Legal Action over Ctg Port Disruption as DP World NCT Deal Looms,” The Business Standard, October 8, 2026, https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/govt-warns-legal-action-over-ctg-port-disruption-dp-world-nct-deal-looms-1566036.

[vi] Boeing, “Biman Bangladesh Airlines Orders 11 More Boeing Jets to Expand Fleet,” press release, September 23, 2026, https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2026/Biman-Bangladesh-Airlines-Orders-11-More-Boeing-Jets-to-Expand-Fleet/default.aspx.

[vii] Airbus, “Biman Bangladesh Airlines Places Firm Order for A350-900 and A321neo Airbus Aircraft,” press release, October 7, 2026, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2026-10-biman-bangladesh-airlines-places-firm-order-for-a350-900-and-a321neo-airbus-aircraft.

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October 9 is the second death anniversary of Ratan Tata, former Chairman of the Tata Group, a leader revered and admired by millions around the world. It is an appropriate time to assess how the Tata family sees the role of the group in India today, given the current challenge to the family’s 150-year legacy.

It is a dispute over whether to list Tata Sons, the unlisted parent company of the $180 billion group, that has stood the test of time since 1868. There are divisions among the trustees over the continuation of an executive chairman. On one side is Noel Tata, Chairman of the Tata Trusts and successor to Ratan Tata. On the other is N. Chandrasekaran (Chandra), the appointed Chairman of Tata Sons, in which the Trusts are the majority (66%) shareholder. Those who knew both the previous patriarch, JRD Tata, and Ratan Tata will find it poignant to see this unfold.

The reasons are many, but primary amongst them is the role the Tata family saw for themselves: first and foremost as guardians of the Trusts. Ratan Tata always spoke of himself as a custodian of the Trusts. This inheritance came from JRD Tata, whose offers to those whom he regarded would be good advisors or board members to the group came with caveats. The job carried great responsibility to the nation first, he always reminded, and while the Tatas treated all employees as family and looked after them well, they could not pay much in salary. Joining the Tata Administrative Services, or TAS, was much like joining the country’s prestigious civil services – the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or the Indian Foreign Service (IFS). JRD – and Ratan Tata – would then hand out books to read on wealth creation, trusts and social responsibility – well before Corporate Social Responsibility became a fashionable term.

Like trusteeship, modesty was also embedded in the Tata family, immediate and extended. When travelling in London or New York to meet friends, Ratan Tata would often ask which bus he could take to meet them for lunch. He shied away from any media reference to him as the “richest man in the country”. Humility was in his DNA. When he was Chairman of the government-owned Air India from 1986 to 1989 (a company the Tatas founded, which the Indian government took over and, years later, handed back to them), he was known to arrive at the check-in counter carrying his own bags, while others walked in with a retinue of porters and an air of self-importance.

Despite JRD Tata’s last wish of being buried in Paris, France, he was no less an Indian patriot than any other. He spent his life in India and gave away his own personal shares in the Tata companies to the Trusts. Ratan Tata followed the spirit of his predecessor and left his shares in his will to the Ratan Tata Endowment Trust and the Ratan Tata Endowment Foundation, for philanthropic causes.

Not much is known publicly about Noel Tata, who has kept away from the limelight. But Noel Tata has worked quietly within the group for decades, building new businesses like Trent, Tata International, and Tata’s recent joint venture with Mercuria in the global oil and commodity trade. He carries the Tata surname much like his older half-brother did: a little shy, but witty and filled with grace and humility. In a country of such great disparity as India, he is a man of simple tastes and not known for an extravagant lifestyle.

At the fireside chat at IIMBlue 2026, Noel Tata said that “the founders never set out to build the biggest company. The companies exist to serve India and to improve the quality of life.” In his first public interview after the conflict between him and Chandra, Noel Tata, in answer to the question of what he considered his primary job, said, “All I have is a couple of trust documents which basically say: we have left this money; do good for India; it was done over a hundred years ago.” The word philanthropy may not even have existed formally in the way we understand it today, but the principle clearly did.”

The introduction of the five-day week, provident fund, and retirement benefits was introduced by the Tata companies long before they became corporate requirements. Tata Sons’ responsibility is to keep increasing the value of the corpus so that the Trusts’ spending power stays ahead of inflation. And the focus of that spending remains largely health and education. If Tata Sons has a strategic mandate around “what India needs”, said Noel Tata, how is that translated into a mandate when the trust also has investors whose primary objective is financial returns? He remarked that some Tata institutions diminished during Ratan Tata’s final years and teams were disbanded, but that his aim is to try and rebuild them.

Clearly, Noel Tata sees himself first as a custodian in the continuum of the legacy that Tata Trusts has built and to pursue his plans to invigorate it in the spirit of his forebears.

The issue is being debated across India by legal experts, the media and the public. Those who carry the Tata name have served India well for generations and should not be hindered from their task by commercialisation of a sacred trust.

Bobby Saigal is a non-resident Indian businessman engaged in the global shipping, oil and gas business, who is also well-known in theatre.

This was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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The BRIC grouping was conceptualised as an economic grouping in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill. However, it started as a political cooperation group in 2006 and is slowly expanding, with more countries showing interest in joining it. From four members, it has grown to 11 members, 10 official partners, and about 30 countries waiting to join.

There are two reasons for the increased interest in BRICS. One, because the Bretton Woods Institutions are not sensitive to the requirements of the Least Developed and Developing Countries that need their assistance. Two, the UN system has become ineffective and needs reforms, which are being resisted by the West. With BRICS’s expansion, the activities of the grouping seem to be gaining momentum, spanning global governance, economy, people-to-people exchange, Sustainable Development Goals, Artificial Intelligence (AI), just renamed Super Intelligence by the U.S. President Donald Trump, and climate change.

India’s recently concluded 2026 presidency of the group culminated in the summit meeting in Delhi. Over 400 meetings of ministers and officials were held as part of India’s presidency. India’s theme was “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”. The Delhi Declaration, of 45 pages and 140 paragraphs that was adopted, generally covered that theme.

The lead-up to the meeting had some tensions. After much speculation over the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Summit, it was finally confirmed. This is not unusual. China generally confirms such visits only about a week prior to the event. However, it was the anxiety of the analysts and the media that raised the speculation.

At the meeting itself, Russia seemed a bit subdued. The Summit had its moments, and the one that caught world attention was having Xi, PM Narendra Modi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in one frame. This is the second time the trio has been captured together. The first being in August-September 2025 at the SCO Summit in Tianjin. It led to Trump saying on Truth Social,^[1] “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to the deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!”

These two pictures have raised red flags in the West that BRICS and SCO are increasingly becoming anti-West. However, BRICS being a multilateral forum, the presence of Xi and Putin is normal and in alignment with past practices. The capitals of the West need not read too much into it. On the contrary, their absence would have conveyed a deeper message.

The main focus of the New Delhi summit was to support the Global South. Both the Chair PM Modi and President Xi Jinping emphasised this, and the success of the summit is the adoption of the Delhi Declaration – the second time that India has been able to forge such a consensus, first during the G 20 summit in 2023 and now at the BRICS Summit. This places India in a unique position: soft power supported by strong economic growth and the strategic autonomy it practises amidst extreme global uncertainty.

The Global South agenda was prominent. On Inclusive Global Governance and Strengthening Multilateralism, there was consensus on enhancing the role of Emerging Markets and Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries in global governance, including having equitable geographical representation in the UN Secretariat and other international organisations. Reforms to the World Trade Organisation, Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN system, including its Security Council and a pitch for a female Secretary-General at the UN, were proposed. Without being named, the U.S. faced criticism for imposing unilateral tariffs, non-tariff measures and the blockade of Cuba. At the moment, this criticism is less serious, but it is gaining momentum. The U.S. should take note and be aware of the sensitivities of countries that its actions denigrate.

On the issues of international and regional peace and security, increased global military spending came in for criticism, as were concerns on nuclear danger and conflict. Support for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation was emphasised. Without being named, Israel was criticised for the use of excessive force in Gaza, and Palestine found support for its cause in the Delhi Declaration. The BRICS countries unanimously condemned terrorism and all activities related to it and recommended cross-border cooperation between multiple agencies to fight it.

One of the most important outcomes of the Summit was progress on the BRICS Cross Border Payment Initiative, trade settlements and investments in BRICS local currencies, a BRICS insurance ecosystem, and support for expansion of New Development Bank membership. The SWIFT system, which facilitates international payments, has been politically compromised by Western sanctions and needs an overhaul. Unsurprisingly then, the countries of the Global South are looking for alternatives.

On strengthening cultural and people-to-people cooperation, BRICS Network University plans for the possible inclusion of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge systems as an additional International Thematic Group.

A comparison of this year’s and last year’s declaration in Brasilia indicates that issues like the interests of the Global South, global governance and multilateral institutional reform, AI governance and multilateral trade are perennial agenda items for the BRICS group.

The 2027 mantle falls on China. Xi Jinping laid out a five-point agenda that will likely be the focus of  China’s presidency. They are on China’s primary domestic agenda too: open-source inclusive AI, trade and investment facilitation, digital industry cooperation, cooperation in intelligent manufacturing, and science and technology talent development.

A bilateral meeting that was watched keenly in the subcontinent was that between PM Modi and Xi Jinping. However, little progress was made, and the meeting ended with both sides reiterating their respective positions on the bilateral. The eight-point consensus from the 25^th Special Representatives Talks between India and China, for resolution of the boundary question in August 2026, did not find mention in the readouts of both countries. This makes it clear that the status quo is maintained, while actual improvement in India-China relations still has some way to go before normalcy can be gained.

BRICS is slowly becoming a formidable group that will have to be taken seriously in issues of global governance, economics and development. This year’s BRICS Summit is particularly important because it preceded the visit of Xi to the U.S. by just a few days. The optics of the BRICS Summit will have been keenly watched in Washington for its effect on Xi’s important bilateral U.S. visit.

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] “Trump Says India and Russia Appear ‘lost’ to ‘Deepest, Darkest China.’” Reuters. September 6, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-india-russia-appear-lost-deepest-darkest-china-2025-09-05/.

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Most of these campaigns are  leaderless and organised on social media, primarily TikTok and Discord, making it challenging to identify their participants.^[1] The difficulty begins with a simpler question: who are the youth? And what did they achieve?

There is no globally accepted definition of ‘youth’. The United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Union all define ‘youth’ using different age ranges. This infographic uses the European Union definition, counting individuals aged 15-29 as youth.^[2] It aligns with the broader Generation Z, or Gen Z, identity, describing individuals born between 1997 and 2012 – the core identity of this wave of protests.^[3]

Their achievements are mixed, but important to study. This infographic maps the surge of youth-led protests across 39 countries, examining how they spread, what triggered them, how they were organised and executed, and how governments responded.^[4]

Figure 1: Outcomes of youth-led movements in 39 countries between January 2024 and June 2026

Source: Gateway House ^[5]

The outcomes of the protests vary widely. In four countries, the protests are ongoing, or the government response is still under deliberation. In 19 of the 39 countries, the government made policy concessions, officials resigned, or both. In the remaining 16 countries, the government did not concede to any demands made by protesters. There is no observable link between the end results of the protest and the country’s governance structure. Chile, a liberal democracy, conceded as little as China, a closed autocracy.^[6]

In three special cases, an official was removed from power. For instance, President Rajoelina of Madagascar was impeached, and the military took over in October 2025. In Kenya, the withdrawal of a Finance Bill in June 2024 imposing additional taxes on essential goods during a cost-of-living crisis was accompanied by a near-total cabinet dismissal.

Table 1: Timeline of youth-led protests across 39 countries

Source: Gateway House^[7]

By their causes, the protests do not appear to be a single, larger movement. The reasons for mobilising ranged from economic malaise and allegations of state corruption to allegations of electoral fraud and the introduction of unpopular bills or constitutional changes. The roots of the grievances vary even when viewed regionally.

Still, this youth wave saw protesters across the globe connect and inspire one another. Protesters in Togo, Kenya, and Morocco saw their movements as part of a wider youth awakening.^[8] Those in Madagascar, Mexico, and Peru were influenced by Nepalese protesters,^[9] who in turn drew connections with Filipino and Indonesian youth^[10] through hashtags such as #nepobaby and #lifestylecheck.^[11] Malagasy youth even joined Nepalese Discord servers for advice on mobilising.^[12]

Symbols from the protests travelled globally in a similar manner. The Straw Hat flag from the manga One Piece, meant to signify freedom and hope,^[13] appeared not only in the countries mentioned above but also in Timor-Leste, France, Bulgaria, and Paraguay. In Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, K-Pop light sticks were used to signify peaceful demonstrations.^[14] This connection through imitation, said Nuurrianti Jalli^[15], assistant professor of media at Oklahoma State University, “[t]hey’re not speaking the same language, but they understand what the story is about.”^[16] Social media enabled youth across the world, despite differences in identity, language, and issue, to support, learn, and connect with one another.

Figure 2: Number of protests globally, Jul 2010-Dec 2012 and Jan 2024-Jun 2026

Source: Gateway House

The idea of a global wave of youth protests is not new. Between July 2010 and December 2012, there were 28 youth protests across South Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and, particularly, West Asia and North Africa, where the Arab uprisings resulted in government and regime changes, and civil wars.

Figure 3: Number of protests globally, Jul 2010-Dec 2012 and Jan 2024-Jun 2026

Source: Gateway House^[17]

The two waves of protest followed a similar course. During the first wave, a six-month surge between January and June 2011 was largely propelled by movements against corruption and socioeconomic disparity in West Asia and North Africa – the Arab uprisings – and the India Against Corruption movement in India, with youth and digital participation.^[18] (The momentum from these carried into the Occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S. in September 2011, and the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong against Beijing’s tightening control over the city-state.)

A similar six-month surge in the recent wave, between July and December 2025, saw “Gen Z” protests break out in quick succession. Unlike in 2011, however, the current surge was not limited to one region; it spread across Southeast and South Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The protests were largely organised in the same way. Most seemed decentralised and leaderless, with social media used as a key platform for organising – although in 2025 the role of Facebook and Twitter was substituted by TikTok and Discord. Governments attempted to reuse old tactics: Egypt’s January 2011 internet shutdown to weaken mobilisations was replicated in Bangladesh in July 2024.^[19] However, protestors adapted, and in 2025, young protestors in Madagascar planned ahead by downloading a Bluetooth-based offline messaging app BitChat to communicate.^[20]

The outcomes reveal that protests are an effective tool for change: in 19 of the 39 countries, the government conceded, or an official resigned (see Figure 1). A resignation or a policy reversal, however, does not fix the underlying conditions in the country.

In a world with growing conflicts and strained economies, young people are engaging with global and regional issues more than ever. Yet, with the average age of parliamentarians at 51.6,^[21] they form one of the least represented groups in formal politics. In democracies, this leaves youth feeling underserved. In countries with authoritarian or hybrid regimes, there is often no meaningful channel to raise concerns or express dissent. In both cases, however, the street has become the most accessible political platform for young individuals to voice their frustrations.

N.B. Three suggestions to include the youth and take protests off the streets: greater transparency over decisions that impact them, lower entry barriers to candidacy in parliaments or political parties, and increased engagement with formal channels.

Viral Chheda, Arshia Dolwani, and Alaikaa Gupta are interns at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

 [1] United Nations, ‘From TikTok to Global Movements: How Young People Are Changing Activism’, United Nations Western Europe, 25 September 2026, https://unric.org/en/from-tiktok-to-global-movements-how-young-people-are-changing-activism/; Mantoiu, ‘The 2025 Surge in Gen Z Protests Is Continuing in 2026’.

[2] European Education and Culture Executive Agency, ‘New Publication: The Situation of Young People in the European Union – European Education and Culture Executive Agency’, European Commission, accessed 2 October 2026, https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/new-publication-situation-young-people-european-union-2025-05-02_en.

[3] Michael Dimock, ‘Defining generations: Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins’, Pew Research Center, 17 January 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/

[4] In this dataset, a country is included only if its protests were led or organised primarily by youth, or if the youth made up the majority of participants. Countries such as South Korea, where the “MZ” label groups teenagers with people in their 40s, and Mozambique, where demographic data for the protest is lacking despite knowledge that its population is skewed to a younger demographic, are intentionally excluded.

[5] Data collection began with a review of media coverage and news articles, which served as an entry point for identifying protest activity and led to related and more recent protest events. The dataset includes only protests that began between January 2024 and June 2026, while outcomes are recorded as they stood on August 31, 2026. A review of the overall number of protests recorded during the outlined period was conducted and it was further narrowed to those that were youth-led, Gen Z-led, or student-led. Local and international media sources, interviews and testimonies, academic journals, and protest trackers, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Global Protest Tracker and the Global Nonviolent Action Database, were used to cross-reference events and verify details such as dates, locations, and participant profiles.

[6] V-Dem, “Political Regime,” processed by Our World in Data, 2026, dataset, original data from V-Dem, Democracy Report v16, accessed October 7, 2026, https://ourworldindata.org/regimes-of-the-world-data.

[7] Click here for full data set reference document: Click here

[8] Kaamil Ahmed, ‘What Drove Gen Z Protests That Brought down Governments and Called out Corruption? Five Activists Explain’, Global Development, The Guardian, 30 December 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/dec/30/gen-z-protests-corruption-five-activists-nepal-madagascar-togo-kenya-morocco-protesters.

[9] ‘MEXICO: “The Protests Meant the Public Emergence of Gen Z as a Force with a Voice of Its Own”’, Civicus Lens: Perspectives for a Changing World, 31 May 2026, https://lens.civicus.org/interview/mexico-the-protests-meant-the-public-emergence-of-gen-z-as-a-force-with-a-voice-of-its-own/ ; Victoria Valenzuela, “Youth-Led Protesters Ousted Peru’s President, and They’re Not Done,” Waging Nonviolence, November 18, 2025, https://wagingnonviolence.org/2025/11/youth-protesters-ousted-peru-president-boluarte-not-done/.

[10] Will Mortenson, ‘Gen Z Protests Have Spread to Seven Countries. What Do They All Have in Common?’, Atlantic Council, 6 November 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/gen-z-protests-have-spread-to-seven-countries-what-do-they-all-have-in-common/.

[11]r/lifestylecheckPH, Reddit, accessed October 6, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/lifestylecheckPH/.

[12] Shi, Xuefei. “Gen Z, Digital Activism, and Regime Change in Madagascar.” Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP). Accessed October 7, 2026. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/mta-spotlight-61-gen-z-digital-activism-and-regime-change-in-madagascar.

[13] “How Global Gen Z Protests Have Shocked and Transformed Governments | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed October 7, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-global-gen-z-protests-have-shocked-and-transformed-governments.

[14] ‘Youth Representation in Parliament Flatlines for First Time in 12 Years’, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 5 October 2026, https://www.ipu.org/news/press-releases/2026-04/youth-representation-in-parliament-flatlines-first-time-in-12-years; Yuko Sasama, ‘The Soundscape of Penlights’, note（ノート）, 18 April 2026, https://note.com/connectconnect/n/n12e848d2cf19; Lorraine Pan, ‘Taiwan Is My Favourite: K-Pop Fans in The Bluebird Movement’, Taiwan Insight, 2 May 2025, https://taiwaninsight.org/2025/05/02/taiwan-is-my-favourite-k-pop-fans-in-the-bluebird-movement/; Chee-Hann Wu, ‘Winter Bluebirds: K-Pop in the Social Movement’, Taiwan Insight, 27 January 2025, https://taiwaninsight.org/2025/01/27/winter-bluebirds-k-pop-in-the-social-movement/.

[15]  https://eastasiaforum.org/author/nuurrianti-jalli/ Nuurrianti Jalli | East Asia Forum | East Asia Forum. n.d. Accessed October 8, 2026. https://eastasiaforum.org/author/nuurrianti-jalli/.

[16]Nuurrianti Jalli, “From Anime to Activism: How the One Piece Pirate Flag Became the Global Emblem of Gen Z Resistance,” The Conversation, September 24, 2025, https://theconversation.com/from-anime-to-activism-how-the-one-piece-pirate-flag-became-the-global-emblem-of-gen-z-resistance-265526.

[17] Cumulative number of countries with youth protests, counted every six months. July 2010 to December 2012 (28 countries) includes the Arab uprisings and is compared with January 2024 to June 2026 (39 countries). The same inclusion criteria apply to both periods: protests led or organised primarily by youth, or with youth as the majority of participants. Data was gathered from news articles and research papers published at the time of each protest.

[18] Yerkes, Sarah, and Kathryn Selfe. ‘Why Morocco’s Gen Z Protests Aren’t a Second Arab Spring’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 October 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/10/morocco-gen-z-212-protests-arab-spring-healthcare-education-world-cup.

[19] Walid, Sad Ebne. ‘Internet Blackouts in Bangladesh: A Breach of Fundamental and International Human Rights’. Youth Policy Forum, 4 August 2024. https://ypfbd.org/internet-blackout-in-bd/; ‘The Case of Communications Suspension and Internet Shutdown During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution’, Global Freedom of Expression | Columbia University, n.d., accessed 1 October 2026, https://cgfoetestsite.mystagingwebsite.com/cases/communications-suspension-and-internet-shutdown-case-during-the-2011-egyptian-revolution/.

[20] Ibid note 12.

[21] ‘Data on Age: By Country’. IPU Parline: Global Data on National Parliaments, n.d. Accessed 6 October 2026. https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets/.

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President Xi Jinping of China paid a state visit to the U.S. on September 23-25, 2026. The invitation for this visit came from U.S. President Donald Trump, and it was accepted by Xi in May when the former visited China. Trump announced the date of Xi’s visit immediately after it was accepted, in contrast to the Chinese practice of announcing such visits a week prior to the actual dates. Almost certainly, China did not like being upended in that manner.

Trump laid out the red carpet and received the Chinese President on the tarmac with his wife, Melania, at the Joint Base Andrews Naval Air Facility, Washington, D.C. This is a rare honour given to a foreign dignitary after 64 years. The last time was when President John F. Kennedy received the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. With this gesture, the U.S. lost the edge over China during this visit. It appears that President Trump relies on his personal friendship with Xi, but that is not the way China does business. The visit did not result in a joint statement, which is indicative of the fact that there were major differences between both countries during discussions. This is also borne out by the fact that the respective statements issued by China and the U.S. have been divergent. Here are some insights.

The eight deliverables and understandings issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry,^[1] and the White House Fact Sheet,^[2] had only a few points in common. Points 3, 5, and 7 of the Chinese readout mentioned Iran, bilateral trade, and artificial intelligence (AI). While the leaders may have discussed Russia, North Korea and Iran, it is only on Iran that China and the U.S. seem to be clear that Iran should keep its promise of not developing nuclear weapons and that no country should be allowed to collect tolls in the Strait of Hormuz.

On bilateral trade, both sides seem to be at variance. China says that the Boards of Trade discussions have arrived at an understanding to reduce tariffs of $30 billion for both countries. However, the U.S. wants more favourable tariff treatment for $30 billion worth of non-sensitive goods. If the U.S. version is to be believed, the effect on tariffs will not be $30 billion but approximately $7 billion (U.S. tariffs on China are at 22 per cent).

The items that are being considered for this reduction reveal a vast divergence. The U.S. is concerned about the export of its agricultural products, whereas the items for import from China are toys, small appliances, holiday decorations, and children’s car seats. The trade truce that was agreed upon in Busan in October last year, which was to end on October 10 this year, has been extended by two months. This is another indication that there has been no meeting of minds on the trade issue. Consequently, on September 30, both countries released a list of items amounting to $30 billion each that will qualify for taxes at most favoured nation rates.

The third issue is AI. Both the U.S. and China decided to establish a dialogue on artificial intelligence and a crisis response mechanism. The only difference between both versions is the term used for AI. The U.S. version calls it Super Intelligence, the name used by Trump for AI.

An additional point in the Chinese statement is that both the countries’ militaries will sign a Memorandum of Understanding on crisis communication and prevention of crises, and the search for remains of U.S. soldiers in China^[3] will continue. With these points, the commonality of both the readouts ended.

The U.S. version, in addition to the details mentioned above, indicated its concerns. Psychotropic substances, which have been a problem for the U.S. because it resulted in the death of approximately 70,000 Americans in 2025, find mention as the first point. The ingredients to make fentanyl, one such psychotropic substance, originate from China.

On rare earths also, the U.S. is clearly dissatisfied with the restricted exports from China and indicated that the supply mutually agreed to have not been forthcoming.

There was a staleness to the meeting, as the remarks of both the leaders during the state banquet concentrated on the past rather than the present.

On Taiwan, a clear red line for China, the statements from both sides are at variance. Xi mentioned that he hoped that the U.S. would adhere to the correct position of opposing “Taiwan independence” and handle the Taiwan question with caution^[4] but Trump brushed aside a question on the subject that they did not talk much about.

The media in China was full of Xi’s visit and projected him and China as winners and as equal to Trump and the U.S., respectively. The aim of the U.S., in contrast, appears to “kick the can down the road” on contentious issues till the midterm elections are over in November this year.

Ever since Trump’s visit to China in May 2026, two dimensions have been highlighted. One is China and the U.S. becoming a G2. Nothing can be further from the truth. The contradictions between the two countries will indicate that this formulation is unlikely to fructify.

It has been noticed by all; even S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, remarked on it in a speech^[5] in the U.S. in September. The nature of the partnership pronounced by China as a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” seems to have been accepted by the U.S. This differs from the idea of a G2, in which the U.S. and China would work together on global issues. The new formulation is limited to the bilateral relationship between the two countries and is again a framing set by Beijing, and accepted by Washington.

What does all this indicate? Both the visits, one by Trump to China and the other by Xi to the U.S., appear to favour China. They also clearly signify the inability of the U.S. to prevail over China on issues that are important to the former. While it may not show the decline of the U.S. as yet, it certainly denotes the growing stature of China.

It takes two to tango, and this dance is guided by China.

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings.” September 26, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202609/t20260926_12031663.html.

[2] The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances a Fair and Reciprocal Relationship with China While Hosting Historic State Visit.” September 25, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/09/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-a-fair-and-reciprocal-relationship-with-china-while-hosting-historic-state-visit/.

[3] These are the remains of US soldiers who lost their lives while flying over the area called “the hump” over the Himalayas to logistically support the Allied Forces.

[4] https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202609/t20260925_12031181.html

[5] Asia Society Policy Institute, Sept 28, 2026.

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Ethiopia is in a new crisis that could possibly reorder the Horn of Africa, already fractured by several conflicts. The current catastrophe is not merely a resurgence of the civil war in Tigray. The renewed insurgency of this September has brought together seven varied ethnic militias that were often at loggerheads but which have now come together under the name Alliance for Survival with the stated aim of ousting the elected government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa.^[1] They challenge the government’s efforts at centralisation and complain of the lack of resolution of their political, territorial and ethnic rivalries within the Ethiopian state.

The impact of this conflict, which Ethiopians describe as existential,^[2] could extend well beyond Ethiopia. Sudan is already in the midst of a civil war. Somalia faces continuing insecurity and is pleading with Ethiopia not to withdraw its troops from the African Union (AU) mission. Relations between Eritrea and Addis Ababa have deteriorated, while the longstanding Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry over the waters of the Nile could take on a new dimension. All these could be affected by renewed armed conflict in Ethiopia.^[3]

The domestic and international issues are interconnected knots. Unresolved issues from the 2020–22 Tigray civil war remain, despite the Pretoria Agreement,^[4] which created a tenuous peace but failed to adjudicate some basic political questions. Western Tigray remains contested between Tigray and Amhara in northern Ethiopia, while displaced Tigrayans cannot return home. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has abandoned its earlier posture of accommodation and is again challenging the Abiy Ahmed government by assuming control in the region’s capital of Mekelle.

Eritrea, which joined Ethiopia in fighting the TPLF during the earlier civil war, was not part of the Pretoria process and felt ignored by Addis Ababa. It is now hostile to the Ethiopian government, which fears that Eritrea is working towards the Balkanisation of Ethiopia. The TPLF, in turn, finds itself aligned, at least indirectly, with its former arch-enemy Eritrea because it believes Addis Ababa seeks to weaken or even eliminate it after the civil war.

The 2026 general elections did little to resolve these political tensions. Elections could not be held in Tigray and parts of Oromia and Amhara because of a lack of security. The TPLF had been denied party status and therefore could not contest. The Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, now in the Alliance for Survival, faced splits and restrictions. In Amhara, the militia that had fought alongside the government against the TPLF disrupted elections and has now joined the Alliance forces.^[5]

The AU noted that voting did not take place in Tigray and parts of Amhara and Oromia, casting a shadow over the ruling Prosperity Party’s massive victory elsewhere in the country. Consequently, the election could not provide the political space that Ethiopia so urgently required. Instead, it further cemented the perception among politically mobilised groups in Tigray, Oromia and Amhara that their political voices were being militarily curtailed.^[6]

These grievances are now embedded in the renewed TPLF control of Tigray and in the wider debate over Ethiopia’s system of ethno-federalism, which many of its opponents feel has run its course.

September has therefore been a significant month. The emergence of the Alliance^[7]has brought together s bitter enemies despite their very different objectives, competing conceptions of nationalism and divergent ideas about Ethiopia’s future. These could make the Alliance difficult to sustain, but for now, their shared objective is to open multiple fronts and disrupt state control, including connectivity to the main port of Djibouti.^[8]

The deeper problem is that unresolved political issues were pushed towards military solutions. The determination of both Addis Ababa and its opponents to seek military rather than political answers represents a failure of preventive diplomacy, despite the efforts of AU special envoy Olusegun Obasanjo and the engagement of the UN, EU, and U.S., all of which have their own competing preoccupations in this region.

The regional implications of this emerging situation are considerable. Eritrea and access to the Red Sea are the first major issues.

Although Ethiopia aligned with its old enemy, Eritrea, to suppress the TPLF between 2020 and 2022, subsequent Ethiopian statements about seeking access to the Red Sea have complicated relations with Eritrea, which believes Ethiopia has designs on its port of Assab on the Red Sea. Somalia, meanwhile, sees Ethiopian efforts to engage Somaliland for access to the port of Berbera as detrimental to its sovereignty.

Landlocked Ethiopia is dependent on Djibouti for most of its external trade, and believes that, for a country of its size and ambition, it must have its own access to the sea. Somalia and Eritrea are apprehensive about Ethiopia’s ambitions and want them curtailed if Ethiopia gains sea access at their expense.

The partnership between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki, which followed the extraordinary rapprochement of 2018 and led to Abiy’s Nobel Peace Prize, is now in a deep cleft. Egypt has consequently developed a closer partnership with Eritrea, including around the Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa.

This leads to the second major issue: the Nile waters. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has severely strained Ethiopia’s relationship with Egypt and Sudan.^[9] Ethiopia sees the dam primarily as a developmental project. Egypt sees the Nile as an existential issue. The unresolved GERD dispute^[2], particularly over the dam’s filling and operation, has contributed to closer Egyptian-Eritrean ties and could make both more assertive in countering Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions.

The third uncertainty is Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan have always had a tenuous relationship because of their porous border, and both are now increasingly enmeshed in each other’s civil wars. The Sudanese army in Khartoum believes that Ethiopia supports the Rapid Support Forces, while Ethiopia believes Sudan is helping the TPLF. Both sides use logistical networks through western Ethiopia.

The rivalries within Ethiopia could now easily acquire a Sudanese dimension. The border areas of Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea could transform into adjoining conflicts that begin to overrun one another.

South Sudan, comparatively less central to the immediate crisis but itself vulnerable, is again experiencing civil conflict and a surge in internally displaced people. Many refugees cross into Gambella in southern Ethiopia. Instability in Ethiopia could therefore transform Gambella from a refugee centre into a contested borderland. Gambellan rebels have not, for the moment, joined the TPLF-led alliance. The situation could widen the humanitarian consequences of the growing conflict.

Somalia remains another critical part of this strategic conundrum. It has been unable to resolve its internal problems despite the presence of an AU mission. The question of Somaliland’s independence, with support from the UAE, Taiwan and Ethiopia, among others, remains a major distraction. At the same time, Egypt has enhanced its security partnership with Somalia, even though Ethiopia has been Somalia’s principal security partner through AU missions against the jihadist group al-Shabab. The U.S. accuses al-Shabab of linking with the Houthis in Yemen, thus aggravating the Gulf crisis.

Any reduction in the Ethiopian military presence in Somalia could create additional space for al-Shabab. Somalia is therefore walking a tightrope between confronting al-Shabab and managing its difficult relationship with Ethiopia. Its president’s recent visit to Addis Ababa, followed by one to Egypt, illustrates the delicacy of that balancing act.

At the same time, Somalia sits at the intersection of a wider Red Sea rivalry involving Egypt, Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and to some extent Qatar. The Horn of Africa is consequently beginning to look less like a collage of separate conflicts and more like an intermeshed strategic conundrum.

In this simmering conflagration, four BRICS members are involved. Ethiopia is a direct participant; Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are indirect but influential participants.^[10]

The humanitarian consequences of a renewed Ethiopian civil war are particularly frightening. Ethiopia is home to more than 130 million people, with about 4.2 million internally displaced people and more than 800,000 refugees and asylum seekers. UNICEF has warned that further conflict and displacement could greatly increase disease and destruction, particularly affecting women and children. An estimated 6.3 million children would require humanitarian assistance in 2026.

The last Tigray war had devastating consequences. Estimates that around 600,000 people perished include those who died from famine, disease, and the lack of health services, as well as those killed directly in the conflict. Sexual violence against women and the displacement of children created additional humanitarian crises. These problems have not disappeared with the Pretoria Agreement. Gender-based violence and malnutrition remain serious problems in conflict-affected areas.

A renewed war could therefore multiply this tragedy, not only within Ethiopia but across the region. The UN Secretary-General has cautioned that the Tigray crisis could lead to an even more devastating humanitarian crisis across the Horn.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing competing interests in the Red Sea.^[11] Saudi Arabia is working with the Khartoum government and supports Eritrea, while the UAE has sought access and influence through different Red Sea and Horn partners, including Somaliland. Egypt is also playing a role, essentially seeking to counter Ethiopian influence in Somalia, Eritrea, and elsewhere.

These alliances are fluid and often shift with the crisis and the geography involved. That makes the present situation particularly difficult to fathom.

The larger point is clear. Ethiopia’s internal conflict can no longer be viewed in isolation.^[12] The country sits at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Nile, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, while Gulf powers and other external actors pursue their own strategic interests. What begins as an internal Ethiopian struggle could therefore become a regional conflict system. The Horn of Africa may be approaching a point where its discrete crises cease to be so.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited. 

References:

[1] “Seven Ethiopian armed groups formally announce formation of a coalition,” Addis Standard, 20 September 2026, https://addisstandard.com/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-formally-announce-formation-of-a-coalition/.

[2] Andrea Korybko, “Top Ethiopian Officials Confirmed the Existential Stakes of Their Country’s Latest Conflict,” The AltWorld, 29 September 2026. https://thealtworld.com/andrew_korybko/top-ethiopian-officials-confirmed-the-existential-stakes-of-their-countrys-latest-conflict.

[3] “Ethiopia’s army promises restraint amid fears of new civil war,” Hiiraan Online, 27 September 2026. https://www.hiiraan.com/world4/2026/Sep/206370/ethiopias_army_promises_restraint_amid_fears_of_new_civil_war.aspx.

[4] “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), “African Union, 2 November 2022. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-tplf.

[5] Tigray has allied itself with six other movements that are pledged to remove Prime Minister Abiy and form a new Ethiopian government. The allies are: Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM), Oromo Liberation Army (OLF-OLA), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front (Ugugumo), Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM)

[6] “AUC Chairperson Calls for Utmost Restraint and Immediate De-Escalation in Northern Ethiopia,” African Union, 26 September 2026. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260923/chairperson-calls-restraint-and-immediate-de-escalation-northern-ethiopia.

[7] The Alliance for Survival comprises seven armed militias, including the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army and representatives from the Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali regions. Their stated aim is to remove the government in Addis Ababa and establish transitional arrangements for a new political consensus.

[8] “Afar Regional President: The Ongoing War in the Region Aims to Cut Ethiopia Off from the Red Sea,” Al Jazeera Arabic, 29 September 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EcAUFi8SWX8.

[9] Gurjit Singh, “The politics of the Ethiopian dam,” Gateway House, 26 July 2021. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-politics-of-the-ethiopian-dam/.

[10] Gurjit Singh, “The changing face of Ethiopia,” ORF, 25 January 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-changing-face-of-ethiopia.

[11] Gurjit Singh, “Crisis in Sudan: Current trigger, old fault lines, and the human cost,” Indian Express, 7 November 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/expert-explains-l-global-crisis-in-sudan-current-trigger-old-faultlines-and-the-human-cost-10350457/.

[12] Martin Plaut, A brief update on Ethiopia’s 2026 war, 28 September 2026. https://martinplaut.com/2026/09/28/a-brief-summary-of-ethiopias-2026-war/.

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