In 2026, much like the pivotal year of 1971, Bangladesh will etch into its history, a significant chapter that reflects a fervent quest for a distinct and enduring identity. This quest emerges from the streets, where people are demanding an identity crafted by their own hands — one independent from influences and ties to neighboring India or the exploitation of Pakistan. The first independence struggle was the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, primarily driven by the need to protect Bengali identity, language, and culture against the hegemony of West Pakistan alongside severe economic exploitation and political disenfranchisement. Now a generation of Bangladeshis see a second struggle, with a new identity in place.
Today’s Bangladeshi seeks a renewed sense of nationalism enmeshed with cultural and religious identity. They believe the history of their independence was violently disrupted by Sheikh Mujibur and his family which continued their path of leaning on India in order to build the country from scratch.
They desire a future where independence is not viewed as a gift from India, but as a hard-earned reality forged through today’s struggles.
The younger generation is at the forefront of this movement. In the summer of 2024, they rose up against the ruling Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina, igniting the flame of a revolution that sought to redefine what it means to be Bangladeshi. They see this “New Bangladesh” as characterised by a rich tapestry of cultural and religious identities where everyone will be treated as a Bangladeshi and not as a Muslim, Hindu, Christian, Buddhist.
On the ground zero in Dhaka, there is an eerie sense of calm. People go by their business as usual throughout the day even as election rallies continue in various corners without much disruption to the normal flow of life. The two main contenders of the elections this time – Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) – are fighting neck-and-neck even as their election pitches get louder and shriller across the nooks and crannies of Bangladesh and on social media.
Both BNP as well as BJI have become proficient and regular on social media platforms like X, Facebook as well as Instagram, eager to appeal to the young voters. Facebook is the primary platform for information, with over 70 million users in Bangladesh, mostly males between 18-24 years of age. In terms of spending, digital campaigning has surged, with the BNP spending roughly $30,000 (Taka 3.7 million) and Jamaat approximately $11,000 (Taka 1.3 million) on Facebook advertising in just one month.
The BNP is campaigning with a populist social welfare agenda, promising “Family Cards” for 4 million households to provide monthly income support, “Farmer Cards” for subsidized agricultural services, and the creation of 10 million jobs within 18 months. Leading an 11-party alliance, Jamaat is positioning itself as a “new political force” for change. Its campaign emphasises a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system in the upcoming national elections. The party argues that the current “First Past the Post” system fosters authoritarianism and that only PR can ensure an inclusive parliament. Every vote, therefore is valued and governance reforms like prevention of prolonged single-party rule in the future, balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister and creation of a bicameral legislature among others, as laid out in the July 2024 charter based on which the referendum will take place.
Once former allies (several times since 1991) BNP and Jamaat are now trading sharp attacks. While BNP leaders have accused Jamaat of being “anti-liberation forces” due to their 1971 history supportingWest Pakistan. Jamaat leaders have labeled the BNP as “corrupt” and prone to “extortionism”. Serious allegations have surfaced regarding the systematic harassment of Jamaat female workers by BNP activists, who have even resorted to physical assault and the use of derogatory language at rallies.
On February 12, nearly 128 million eligible Bangladeshi voters will head to the polls. The voter base has increased by 3.2% since March 2025, adding over 3.9 million new names to the rolls, according to the Bangladesh Election Commission. Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated nations, with roughly 1,366 people per square kilometer. The median age is 26.3 years, reflecting a young demographic.
Interestingly, for the first time since 1991, the BNP is contesting the election without a formal or informal alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami.- a political decision made to present themselves as two separate political forces and isolate the Awami League gets isolated. However, an alliance of sorts cannot between BNP and Jamaat cannot be ruled out even though they differ significantly in their approach and timing.
Instead, the BNP leads a coalition of diverse smaller parties to present a “secular nationalist” front. The BNP has nominated several Hindu candidates as part of its effort to present an inclusive platform.
The BNP has also allocated seats to several smaller allies that participated in the 2024 “anti-fascist movement” against the previous regime. Of the total 300 seats being contested, the BNP-led alliance has fielded candidates in 272 constituencies, leaving 28 seats for its smaller partners.
The BNP’s current alliances are primarily anchored in its 31-point “Charter of public will”, which was developed through consensus with like-minded parties. The party is struggling with “rebel” candidates within its ranks, in at least 79 constituencies where local BNP leaders are running independently against official nominees, potentially splitting the opposition vote.
On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami has formed an 11-party alliance, which includes National Citizens Pary (NCP) of Nahid Islam, who has had a meteoric rise, being instrumental in steering the student-led mass uprising in July 2024. Jamaat is positioning itself as a “new political force” for change.
However, in run-up to the February 12 polls, the Jamaat is facing a dual challenge: defending its conservative ideological stance on women’s leadership – calling working women “morally decadent” – while simultaneously dealing with a wave of alleged targeted violence against its female activists
Despite having nearly 40% women workers, the party is currently under intense scrutiny by the public for its public conservative positions on gender, particularly the role of women. Some Jamaat leaders argue that securing fundamental rights and safety for women is more critical than having a woman in a symbolic top post, pointing out that 30 years of female prime ministers in Bangladesh has not ended violence against women.
Despite their differences, both BNP and BJI are united in one aspect: the ban on the Awami League party imposed by the Interim Government under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. Both these parties believe that Sheikh Hasina held flawed and rigged elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024, when the opposition BNP had boycotted the elections (in 2014 and in 2024).
Gateway House interviewed a cross-section of people and the opinion on the upcoming elections, referendum and their outcomes seems divided. Some believe the Awami League’s supporters will vote for the BNP as they will not want an Islamic fundamentalist party like Jamaat to takeover Bangladesh; they want to keep the country’s secular credentials robust. Others believe the motivation for Awami League supporters to vote for BJI over BNP is to stop a witch-hunt against them. BNP was last in power from 2001-2006.
Some voters think that the BNP and Awami League are two sides of the same coin. Many, especially in urban centres like Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Barisal believe that the Jamaat should be given a chance to run the country. This desire is more evident in the younger generation which do not feel it necessary to scrutinize Jamaat’s controversial role during the 1971 war, when Jamaat sided with Pakistan, then West Pakistan.
Another important vote will be cast on February 12, for a referendum, specifically with regard to changes in the framework for caretaker or interim administrations during elections, the powers and independence of the Bangladesh Election Commission and other constitutional bodies, and other governance arrangements, to prevent autocratic regimes. Since early 2025, the interim government and various political parties have been engaged in negotiations regarding a series of reforms collectively known as the July Charter. While the majority of political parties have endorsed the document, there are ongoing disagreements regarding its implementation and the logistics surrounding a potential referendum. This is certain to cause yet more disagreements.
How Bangladesh manages to manoeuvre its way despite all the challenges, remains to be seen. India has one goal: to ensure an amicable relationship with its eastern neighbour once an elected government finally takes its place in Dhaka’s Tejgaon.
Nayanima Basu is Adjunct Fellow, and an author.
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