The opening hours of the current escalation between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. have been defined by an asymmetric dynamic between technological superiority and Iran’s capacity for operational persistence. From a strictly military standpoint, no clearly defined strategic-level objectives have been identified or disclosed that would justify a large-scale intervention in Iran – even when tactical objectives have been outlined[1] [2] – thereby increasing the risk of a protracted conflict without a decisive outcome and attendant humanitarian implications.
Israel and the U.S. have demonstrated strong joint-force coordination through integrating naval, air, ballistic, and intelligence assets in combined operations.[3] High interception rates and precise strikes indicate consolidated air and technical superiority, similar to that seen during the Twelve-Day War in June. So far, lessons learned from conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen, and Ukraine[4] show that air superiority has provided tactical benefits but has not been decisive on its own. Therefore, the advantage limits the immediate tactical effectiveness of Iranian systems but does not eliminate Iran’s ability to retaliate and to heavily increase the cost and the perimeter of the war.[5]
Iran has demonstrated the ability to sustain a conflict of varying intensity through the combined deployment of advanced ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Open-source and conservative assessments – estimate that Iran possesses a ballistic arsenal ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 missiles of various classes, as well as several thousand UAVs, including hundreds of long-range, strike-capable drones.[6] The use of staggered attack cycles indicates logistical planning and sufficient inventories for weeks of engagement. This organisational structure enables the coordination of multiple strikes designed to saturate air defences and degrade interception capabilities. Additionally, Iranian leaders have devolved powers to lower-level officials in order to decentralise and speed up tactical decision making.[7] On the other hand, this tempo may exceed the capacity to maintain it in the long run – even a tango requires pauses to last.
Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities suggest a flexible escalation. The current strategy appears focused on progressive attrition and the reduction of adversary resources across a broad operational theatre extending from Iraq to the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. This is – an area likely to encompass the operational zone of the USS Abraham Lincoln strike group, with potential targets including military installations in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Unknown UAVs and ballistic activity close to the UK’s Royal Air Force base in Cyprus and in Türkiye have been confirmed.[8] [9] The deployment of low-cost drones has placed additional strain on air defense systems and weakened existing security guarantees. By striking across such a dispersed theatre, Iran seeks to demonstrate its ability to impose costs and sustain deterrence methods. In this theatre, a miscalculation could potentially consolidate opposition coalitions.[10]
Several factors reveal potential vulnerabilities in Iran’s mid-term response. The removal of senior Iranian political and military leaders has introduced uncertainty into the chain of command. While a pre-established operational and decentralised framework exists and is ongoing, medium and long-term decision-making chains remain unclear. After the death of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Leadership Council, which includes Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Alireza Arafi of the Guardian Council, assumed power.[11] [12] Diverse open sources have claimed Mojtaba Khamenei or Alireza Arafi are prospects to be elected as the next Supreme Leader.[13] [14] Certainly, even when a name and a face have been chosen to take over, the measures regarding the succession question and factual leadership remain unanswered, but they will be key to navigating the conflict, gaining order and avoiding a civil war.
Iran’s immediate challenge is to reach command cohesion under wartime pressure. If they do, Tehran may pursue calibrated escalation in the service of regime preservation; if they do not, harder-line actors within the security apparatus could widen the conflict through riskier, less disciplined action. The gravest danger, therefore, is not only escalation itself, but escalation without unity of command. These competing postures raise the prospect of fragmented decision-making, heightening the likelihood of uncoordinated strikes and miscalculations.
Simultaneously, the conflict is exerting pressure on the internal structures of all parties involved. The mobilisation of reservists in Israel,[15] potential political fatigue in Washington during a protracted campaign, and social divisions within Iran may influence deployment priorities. On the chessboard, intelligence and sabotage operations, false-flag attacks, and cyberattacks are likely to play a major role in shaping the conflict’s trajectory. More broadly, disruptions to global energy systems are already unsettling energy and financial stability,[16] with Europe and China among the most exposed, as energy insecurity, inflationary pressure, and strategic geopolitical uncertainty converge.
The initial phase demonstrates rapid attrition among forces while underscoring their capacity to operate across a broad area and employ combined tactics and emerging technologies. In asymmetric warfare, thorough preparation often confers a structural advantage on the defender, particularly when it manifests in dispersion and the ability to absorb initial blows without strategic collapse. Recent campaigns in Yemen and Ukraine – also the examples of the fall of Saigon (1975) or the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989) – have shown that superior firepower does not necessarily overcome a prepared adversary.
The current conflict is characterised by asymmetry: two nuclear-armed states – without considering the involvement of the UK and France[17] – with technological superiority confront Iran’s enduring defensive capabilities. Should strategic ambiguity persist, sources estimate the conflict may last four to six weeks.[18] Any meaningful change in Iran’s governing order, in U.S. policy, or in Israel’s political direction would reshape the trajectory of the conflict. If the present configuration endures, international security will require not only international vigilance but coordinated contingency in an international landscape that may soon differ from the world reality of today.
Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References:
[1] The White House; “Peace Through Strength: President Trump Launches Operation Epic Fury to Crush Iranian Regime, End Nuclear Threat”, The White House, March 1, 2026. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/03/peace-through-strength-president-trump-launches-operation-epic-fury-to-crush-iranian-regime-end-nuclear-threat/)
[2] The White House; “The Iranian Regime’s Decades of Terrorism Against American Citizens”, The White House, March 2, 2026. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/03/the-iranian-regimes-decades-of-terrorism-against-american-citizens/)
[3] Philip Loft; “US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026”, House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, March 2, 2026. (https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10521/)
[4] Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward, “Air Superiority in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Iran and Ukraine”, Ceter for Strategic & International Studies, October 10, 2025.( https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-superiority-twenty-first-century-lessons-iran-and-ukraine)
[5] Institute for the Study of War (IST), “Iran Update Evening Special Report”, IST, March 3, 2026. (https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/)
[6] Michael Elleman; “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program”, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 2024. (https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program)
[7] Institute for the Study of War (IST), “Iran Update Evening Special Report”, IST, March 3, 2026. (https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/)
[8] Sam LaGrone; “SECDEF Austin Orders Carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to Remain in Middle East”, USNI News, September 29, 2024. (https://news.usni.org/2024/09/29/secdef-austin-orders-carrier-uss-abraham-lincoln-to-remain-in-middle-east)
[9] NATO; “Joint Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with the President of North Macedonia Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova”, NATO, March 3, 2026. (https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/03/03/joint-press-conference-by-nato-secretary-general-with-the-president-of-north-macedonia)
[10] Constitute Project; “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 (rev. 1989) Constitution”, Constitute Project, n.d. (https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989)
[11] The White House; “Peace Through Strength: President Trump Launches Operation Epic Fury to Crush Iranian Regime, End Nuclear Threat”, The White House, March 1, 2026. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/03/peace-through-strength-president-trump-launches-operation-epic-fury-to-crush-iranian-regime-end-nuclear-threat/)
[12] Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (Leader.ir); “Notice on the Martyrdom of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei, Leader of the Islamic Revolution”, Leader.ir, February 28, 2026. (https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/28612/اطلاعیه-شهادت-حضرت-آیت-الله-العظمی-سیدعلی-حسینی-خامنه-ای-رهبر-انقلاب-اسلامی)
[13] Iran International; “Ali Khamenei’s Son Mojtaba Named Iran’s New Supreme Leader”, Iran International, March 3, 2026. (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603030390)
[14] Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan-e Rahbari); “Archive of News and Communiqués”, Assembly of Experts, n.d. (https://majlesekhobregan.ir/fa/conts/1/13/آرشیو-اخبار-و-اطلاعیه-ها)
[15] Emanuel Fabian; “IDF Mobilizes 100,000 Reservists Amid War with Iran”, The Times of Israel, March 1, 2026. (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-mobilizes-100000-reservists-amid-war-with-iran/)
[16] Yousef Saba and Ahmed Elimam; “Global Oil and Gas Prices Soar as Iran Crisis Disrupts Shipping, Production”, Reuters, March 3, 2026. (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/global-energy-costs-soar-iran-crisis-disrupts-shipping-oil-gas-production-2026-03-03/)
[17] The Leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom; “Joint Statement by the Leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on Iran”, Élysée, February 28, 2026. (https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/02/28/joint-statement-by-the-leaders-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom-on-iran)
[18] Barak Ravid; “Trump Says War Against Iran Moving ‘Substantially Ahead’ of Schedule”, Axios, March 2, 2026. (https://www.axios.com/2026/03/02/trump-address-iran-war-length)