The sands of the Gulf region have witnessed dramatic geopolitical shifts over the last few years. In that spirit, the Joint Trilateral Statement[1] of 10 March, 2023, between Saudi Arabia, Iran and China represents perhaps one of the most significant diplomatic achievements in the region since the Abraham Accords of 2018, and a continuity of regional narratives. The restoration of ties between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait in 2022[2] illustrates the diplomatic efforts of Iran to avoid the economic and diplomatic isolation brought on by the U.S. sanctions and the lack of progress on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Thus, the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, a historical antagonist, is meaningful. Indeed, this agreement blurs the polarization against Iran but does not erase it. [3]
Reestablishing diplomatic ties marked the end of a seven-year marathon of indirect confrontations and impasses involving a broad spectrum of actors. Although most agreement details have not been disclosed, the Iranians and Saudis will harvest the economic and political benefits[4] gained from a greater exchange and a continuously open political channel. The presumed entry of Iran to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[5] in 2023 and the Saudi Vision 2030 project will maximize this bond.
Additionally, China confirms its status as a significant power with enough influence to unlock broad and complex conversations that impact international security and to provide conditions of trust to follow the agreements. If everything works, a second summit will be held in November in Beijing. The credibility of China relies upon its ties with both parties, as a trading partner of Saudi Arabia, mainly for oil imports, and the “China-Iran 25-Year Cooperation Agreement”[6] signed with Iran in 2021, and a secrecy blueprint based on consultations with two longstanding facilitators, Iraq and Oman.
This is not the first time China has mediated in conflicts overseas. The Six-Party Talks in North Korea, the Myanmar peace process, and the conflict in Sudan are unsuccessful mediation examples. Nevertheless, its diplomatic displays have been more assertive recently. The leadership performed in the SCO towards de-escalation in Afghanistan is evidence of this.
With the Trilateral agreement, opportunities for de-escalation emerge among several regional conflicts as a direct outcome of the number of actors and their nexus with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Internal conflict dynamics in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen will get a golden chance to resume dialogues. Still, it is essential to consider the realm of diplomacy does not offer warranties; each victory would be followed by a stumbling.
Perhaps Yemen is the priority issue, an extended conflict where Saudi Arabia backs the government and Iran the Huthi group. Various non-state actors like Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula, the Southern Transitional Council and other local non-aligned forces increase the uncertainty. A truce was reached in Yemen the last year but did not last,[7] and this story may continue looking for the next chance. The number of insider actors with divergent objectives in the Yemen war can halt peace dialogues. Communication between longstanding rivals like Riyadh and Teheran is internationally welcomed, but distrust and sectarianism still dwell inside this conflict’s veins.
The Joint Trilateral Agreement is a signal on the road, but the destination is not any closer. The growing presence of China in Central Asia and the Gulf may define the geopolitical agenda, even the trade dynamics of the supply chain. The association of Gulf States with China, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, might concern the West. The political and economic weight, their strategic hydrocarbon production,[8] and the defense cooperation and the military equipment provided by the U.S. are sensitive topics for Washington and the European capitals which have interests in the region. It is not about changing sides or forgetting alliances; it is about diversifying relations and decreasing the dependence on the West in all sectors, from the military to the economy. However, the effects of the growing presence of China are unpredictable.
The Gulf and its strategic importance are not isolated from East Asia, which partially depends on the energy supply from abroad; this includes Japan, Australia or South Korea,[9] [10]countries that contain China in the Pacific. The concerns of India may navigate around a greater union of China and the Gulf countries, with its attendant geopolitical implications for the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In contrast, China secures its position on two sides: first, to strengthen its place in the global energy market, and second, to ensure its own energy supply from two leading exporters, Saudi Arabia and Iran. China already has a military base in Djibouti, safeguarding the Red Sea access, so the influence it gains in the Gulf can help it increase its presence in Ormuz; both are chokepoints for the world hydrocarbon world supply.
Finally, a new chapter of Iran and Saudi Arabia ties reshapes the regional architecture in opposition to the Abraham Accords agreement. The value of the Iranian-Saudi deal is amplified by the media and the international context filled with a chronology of dozens of conflicts and tensions scattered across the world and the rising geopolitical rivalries as the main narrative.
The relevance of China in this agreement becomes a significant precedent towards the stated Chinese intention to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Few actors can drive dialogues with both parties, and China is one of those. Hence, its diplomatic presence has increased expectations of a potential mediation plan despite the lack of trust and incentives on the front line.
Mauricio D. Aceves is Author in Foreign Affairs Latin America on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References
[1] Foreign Ministry of Saudi Arabia, “Joint Trilateral Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the People’s Republic of China”, Foreign Ministry of Saudi Arabia, March 10, 2023. https://twitter.com/ksamofaen/status/1634180277764276227?s=61&t=MT7UjJDfnZ-y4zN_uVVsBA
[2] Simeon Kerr, “UAE ambassador returns to Iran as regional tensions ease with Islamic republic”, Financial Times, Dubai, August 22, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/236a5b61-1b61-403c-aa96-b439632f9dc8
[3] The White House, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Consultative Group”, White House, Brieffing Room, March 06, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/06/joint-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-u-s-israel-strategic-consultative-group-3/
[4] Elis Gjevori, “Saudi-Iran reconciliation: Riyadh investments could start ‘very quickly’ following deal”, Middle East Eye, News inside Saudi Arabia, March 15, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-iran-deal-start-investing-very-quickly
[5] Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), “Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Complementary capacities, mutual benefits”, IRNA, September 14, 2022. https://www.irna.ir/news/84885435/ایران-و-سازمان-همکاری-شانگهای-ظرفیت-های-مکمل-منافع-متقابل
[6] China Briefing Team, “The China-Iran 25-Year Cooperation Agreement: What is it and Should Investors be Encouraged?”, China Briefing, June 16, 2021. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-china-iran-25-year-cooperation-agreement-what-is-it-and-should-regional-investors-traders-pay-attention/
[7] Office Of The Special Envoy Of The Secretary-General For Yemen (OSESGI), “Statement From The Un Special Envoy On The Negotiations To Extend And Expand The Nationwide Truce In Yemen”, United Nations, OSESGI. October 22, 2022. https://osesgy.unmissions.org/statement-un-special-envoy-negotiations-extend-and-expand-nationwide-truce-yemen
[8] Osamah Alsayegh, “How Economic and Political Factors Drive the Oil Strategy of Gulf Arab States”, Center for Energy Studies, Baker Institute for Public Policy. January 09, 2023. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/how-economic-and-political-factors-drive-oil-strategy-gulf-arab-states
[9] CEIC, “Japan Crude Oil: Imports”, Organization Of The Petroleum Exporting Countries. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/japan/crude-oil-imports
[10] The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), “Refined Petroleum in Australia”, OEC, 2023. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/refined-petroleum/reporter/aus