In July 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had announced plans to open two new consulates in Russia, in Kazan and Yekaterinburg.[1] These new missions are located in the industrial heartlands of the nation, and host industrial giants like chemicals maker Kazanorgsintez, the Kazan Helicopter Plant, Innopolis IT hub, engineering titan Uralmash, and the T-90 tank maker Ural Wagon Zavod. Opening the consulates will mark a new chapter in India-Russia relations, deepening the engagement by tapping into the growing people-to-people movement between the two nations.
India and Russia have set for themselves an ambitious target of increasing and broadening bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030. Currently it is driven by energy supplies – in 2024-25, India’s imports from Russia were $63.8 billion, while its exports were just $4.8 billion, creating a substantial trade deficit.[2] In this backdrop, expanding India–Russia labour cooperation can play a critical role in correcting the imbalance
The labour movement in the India-Russia corridor is a new element in the bilateral. It is visible in the Delhi–Moscow flights. The students and tourists are still there, but they now share the cabin with welders, salon workers, and builders, many on their first overseas assignment.[3] From classrooms to construction sites, India and Russia are now linked in ways trade data hasn’t fully captured.
India has become one of Russia’s fastest-growing sources of non-CIS labour. Sergei Markov, first Deputy Chairman of St. Petersburg’s Committee for External Relations, told Russia’s official news agency TASS that each of these local companies are prepared to hire 3,000–5,000 Indian workers this year and discussions are underway to use India’s existing skill-development centres, including in Maharashtra, to train workers for deployment to Russia, particularly in St. Petersburg’s industrial region. The partnership gains additional traction from the Mumbai–St Petersburg sister-cities initiative, linking two port-based economies with shared strengths in shipbuilding.[4]
The openness to Indian labour in Russia is due to the latter’s acute labour shortage. The birth rate is at a 200-year low, and in 2024 the population shrank by 0.08%, with the working-age segment contracting steadily,[5] The partial mobilisation of 300,000 reservists in 2022 triggered an exodus of young men fearing conscription, deepening the demographic crisis.[6] At the same time, Russia’s industrial efforts are expanding, given its need for extended self-sufficiency due to the sanctions. According to the estimates of the Russian Ministry of Labour, by 2030 the country is expected to see a shortfall of 3.1 million workers.[7]
For decades, Central Asia has been the largest source of migrants to fill this gap. In 2022, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan accounted for 86% of all worker entries.[8] This pattern is now breaking down. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s own construction booms are absorbing labour at home, while Tajikistan is destabilised by domestic political tensions and a surge in xenophobia across Russia. After the Crocus City Hall terror attack in Moscow in March 2024 -linked to Tajik nationals – chauvanistic sentiments have seen a significant spike. Rouble volatility, rising home-country wages, and competition from Turkey’s post-earthquake reconstruction sector have further thinned the traditional migrant pool. Russia’s labour market now needs new sources of manpower – and India is a good alternative.[9]
India has a demographic surplus. Each year, 11-12 million Indians enter the workforce.[10] India’s working-age population is set to reach 68.9% by 2030 and is projected to be the world’s largest such cohort.[11] The country is already the world’s largest supplier of labour, comprising 6% of global migrants.[12] While the Gulf has historically absorbed India’s blue-collar labour, Russia is beginning to tap into this surplus. New Delhi is in favour: Russia’s labour shortage and India’s skilled and unskilled workforce complement each other.
An industry of labour recruiters has popped up, and existing ones are branching beyond CIS into India. Moscow-based INTRUD is one such, which opened its doors to mass recruitment from non-CIS countries in 2024. Co-founder Dmitry Lapshinov says about 100,000 Indian workers are now employed in Russia.[13] In the fourth quarter of 2024, 9,400 Indian nationals arrived in Russia for employment – 2.5 times more than the previous year.[14] The surge has been visible to Indian officials as well. In an August 2025 interview with TASS, Indian Ambassador Vinay Kumar noted that Russia’s growing manpower needs are being met in part through Indian recruitment. Most Indian workers currently employed in Russia are in the construction and textile sectors, he said, but interest is expanding in the mechanical and electronic industries as Russian companies seek technically trained personnel.[15]As per Russian migration law for non-visa exempt countries,[16] a foreign national may be suspended from work if the employer’s permit to hire foreign workers is suspended or expired. Thus unlike Central Asians, Indians are contract-bound to a single employer and region. They don’t have the liberty to frequently change their jobs in chase of higher pay.
A sharp wage differential exists between the wages in India and Russia. Job-portal data from HH.ru, SuperJob, Rabota.ru, Zarplata.ru and Trudvsem show that entry-level roles – such as loaders, warehouse staff, and sewing-machine operators – offer between US $490–690 per month in Russia’s non-urban regions. These wages may rise to $1,200–1,850 in Moscow and other urban clusters. Skilled trades like welders and machine technicians may pay $2,100–2,740.[17]By contrast, a regular salaried employee in India may earn an average of just $240 per month.[18]
India already has a large mission in Moscow. With the new consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg, India will have five diplomatic missions in Russia: the embassy in Moscow and consulates in St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Kazan, and Yekaterinburg. This is one of India’s largest diplomatic footprints anywhere in the world. Each of these locations plugs India into a different part of Russia’s economy – Moscow for finance and diplomacy, St. Petersburg for shipbuilding and pharmaceuticals, Kazan for petrochemicals and IT, and Yekaterinburg for metallurgy and construction. Taken together, they anchor India’s presence in Russia’s industrial heartlands rather than just its political capitals. For workers who live and labour far from Red Square, this network means consular access where it matters most, and for policymakers it lays the foundation of a structured labour corridor.
The opportunities in Russia come with serious risks. Reports of Indians being duped into support roles in the war zone remain a major concern. The language barrier proves to be the biggest challenge. Unlike the Gulf countries where English suffices, knowledge of the Russian language is mandatory for employment in Russia. The xenophobia towards the migrants adds to the challenge. And some Indians see Russia as a stepping stone to Eastern Europe, thus entering Russia only with the intention to move further into Eastern European nations that offer higher remuneration.
The new mobility is evolving; for it to work, India and Russia will need a structured and safeguarded framework, drawing lessons from India’s arrangements with Japan, Israel, and the Gulf. A bilateral mobility agreement with a clear clause excluding employment linked to the military, is required. Pilot programs in strategic sectors such as construction in the Far East, healthcare in under-served regions, and IT back-end support, could set the pace. In addition, skill and language training through Indo-Russian centres must be provided. The Russian language should be integrated into Skill India modules. In order to improve worker protection, labour desks must be established in Moscow and Vladivostok, with joint grievance redressal mechanisms. To ensure retention, multi-year contracts with housing or residency) pathways —- particularly in the Far East – will be crucial.
If managed well, India–Russia labour cooperation could have far-reaching implications. It would reduce Russia’s vulnerability to sudden labour outflows, and balance concerns over large-scale Chinese migration and demographic change. For India, it would open a new remittance corridor, relieve domestic unemployment pressures, and extend its influence into the Russian Far East and Arctic – a natural fit with the Act Far East policy. For the bilateral, it will be significant in reducing the trade deficit.
Rupal Mishra is a Russia expert.
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References:
[1] Press Information Bureau (PIB). Cabinet approves Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme. Government of India, July 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2031691
[2] Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. A Changed India–Russia Equation. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-changed-india-russia-equation/
[3] Gateway House: https://www.gatewayhouse.in/astrakhan-indias-gateway-russia/
[4] TASS. V Rossii uvelichivaetsya spros na inostrannykh rabochikh [Russia’s Demand for Foreign Workers is Rising]. 2024. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/21661139
[5] Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). Labour Market Indicators – 2024 Report. https://showdata.rosstat.gov.ru/report/278928/
[6] President of Russia (Kremlin). Meeting on Socio-Economic Development: Transcript. 2024. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/72259/print
[7] Federation Council of the Russian Federation. Meeting Transcript. http://council.gov.ru/activity/meetings/163849/transcript/
[8] Denisenko, Mikhail. Migration Trends in North and Central Asia. United Nations ESCAP, 2023. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/Denisenko_Migration_trends_in_NCA.pdf
[9] Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. A Changed India–Russia Equation. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-changed-india-russia-equation/
[10] Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). Workforce Development in India. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/159351/adbi-workforce-dev-india.pdf
[11] Ernst & Young (EY India). Reaping the Demographic Dividend. https://www.ey.com/en_in/insights/india-at-100/reaping-the-demographic-dividend
[12] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). International Migration 2020 Highlights. https://www.un.org/en/desa/international-migration-2020-highlights
[13] Intrud. Official Website. https://www.intrud.ru/en/home
[14] Sberbank India. Labour Migration to Russia. https://sberbank.co.in/media/publications/labour-migration-to-russia
[15] Embassy of India, Moscow. Ambassador Vinay Kumar’s Interview with TASS – 24 August 2025. https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/pdf/ENG%20TASS%20Interview%2024.08.2025.pdf
[16] Ministry of Justice, Russian Federation: https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/documents/7621/
[17] Labour Market Survey (compiled by author). Based on job postings across hh.ru, SuperJob, Rabota.ru, Zarplata.ru, and Trudvsem.ru (October 2025), converted at the Central Bank of Russia average exchange rate of ₽ 81.4 = US $ 1.
[18] Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India. Average Wage/Salary Earnings During the Preceding Calendar Month from Regular Wage/Salaried Employment (PLFS 2023–24). https://www.mospi.gov.in/average-wage-salary-earnings-during-preceding-calendar-month-regular-wage-salaried-employment-amon-5