Transcript:
Manjeet Kripalani (MK) – Going back to your time in Tehran, that was a decade ago. What was Iran like then? What was the political mood inside Iran and the outlook for ordinary people?
Ambassador Saurabh Kumar (SK) – I was in Iran in 2015, which was in fact, the year when the nuclear deal, what is commonly known as the JCPOA, had been concluded. There was a lot of optimism in the country. Of course, the deal had not been an easy process of negotiation. It had taken several years. It was a very comprehensive document and a good document, in my opinion. This is not to say that there were not any difficulties. I think implementation of the deal was not an easy process.
One example comes to my mind, which is that Iranians were really looking forward to utilising the money – their money, which was being released under the nuclear deal, to buy some new planes and renew their fleet, because the planes were old, and, in fact, there had been several crashes. Of course, under the deal, they were not permitted to buy American planes, but the deal kind of permitted them to buy airbuses, and there was a lot of enthusiasm to get a good number of airbuses, and the Europeans also were looking forward to that. But then it was discovered that in the airbus, there are parts which are made by Boeing, as a result of which these planes cannot be sold to the Iranians, and the whole initiative fell flat on its face. So this was just one example. There were other examples also of this nature, but overall, there was a great deal of optimism.
Bilaterally, we moved forward in our relationship with Iran during that period on several fronts. On Chabahar port, you know, we made a lot of progress, particularly in terms of equipping the port with cranes and other things, and also in 2018, we signed the first agreement between India Ports Global Limited and the Port and Maritime Organisation of Iran, under which, IPGL ran the port.
I think it was for a period of five years, if I remember correctly. On the International North-South Transport Corridor, we did the first dry run of a container, which, you know, moved out of Mumbai port and went right up through Iran into Russia. CIA opened its office out there, which ultimately had to be bound up when the U.S. withdrew from the deal. And we tried very hard to get an agreement with the Iranians on Farzad-B, the gas field, which you would remember had been discovered by ONGC Videsh Limited. But on that front, we were not successful and negotiations were going on till the time I left Iran.
But, you know, in a sense, the seeds to what we are seeing today were sowed during that period when the Americans withdrew from the deal and things went south from there.
MK – What is your assessment of the current situation, its roots, its causes? Are we in a stalemate now? Who controls the narrative in Iran? The clergy, the IRGC, the diaspora?
SK – We tend to think of Iran as a monolithic political entity. Those who follow Iran or those who have lived in Iran know that there are many stakeholders and each stakeholder has an opinion. And the system is kind of designed to take into account the voices of different stakeholders and then find a balance between these voices. I think structurally, in terms of organisation, I mean, there are many forums in which the synthesis of these voices is done, but the Supreme National Security Council is one of them. And ultimately what the Supreme Leader says is the final decision and that’s the way they go.
So even when the JCPOA, the earlier nuclear deal was being negotiated, there were so many different voices in Iran, but ultimately they came together and the deal was done. I think the situation this time, in a sense, is different because the Supreme Leader, the former Supreme Leader and the top leadership were taken out in the strike by the Americans and the Israelis.
So there is a new setup and, you know, once you have a new setup at the top, I think in any system, you know, to have certain kind of coherence in working would take time. And I think Iranians, in a sense, are going through a very challenging period. There are also reports that the new Supreme Leader, his medical condition is not the best and all these things bring about challenges.
So my sense would be that, I mean, there is nothing new. The traits of the Iranian political setup perhaps are more exaggerated at this point of time than they normally would have.
Now, coming to the present crisis, West Asia is a hugely complex region. I think the roots of the crisis are in the history of Iran, the Palestine issue, the creation of Israel, Iran-U.S. relationship, the revolution which took place in Iran. So, you know, it’s an amalgamation of many things. But as I said, you know, the JCPOA and the nuclear deal had proved one of the core and, or rather the core and central issue in a good place, which is the nuclear issue.
I think at the root of it is Iranian insistence that since they are a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, as per the treaty, they have the right to enrich and use uranium for peaceful purposes. The Americans and the Israelis contest that and they question Iran’s nuclear program and whether it is for peaceful purposes or not.
And I think this is in essence where the problem arises. What the JCPOA, the nuclear deal of 2015, had done was a compromise. They had given the Iranian, or rather the agreement had given the Iranian the right to enrich up to, I think, 3.67 percent.
There were a whole range of restrictions which had been put in, including, you know, monitoring, confirmation, very intrusive inspections undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). So one knew what was happening inside Iran as far as the nuclear program was concerned through the medium of IAEA. And there were restrictions to kind of restrict Iran’s nuclear program.
So once this agreement was done away with, with the Americans pulling out of it, the Iranians started taking incremental steps not to abide by their part of the bargain, because their argument was that they are not getting the benefits which were promised to them under the nuclear deal. So this is the nuclear part of it. The Americans pulled out of the deal, and I think there was a general political opposition to the deal, also on account of the argument which was put forward by the Israelis also, that it is not a comprehensive deal. It is dealing only with the nuclear issue. It is not dealing with Iran’s missiles and ballistic missiles. It is not dealing with aspects like what are called Iran’s proxies and Iran’s call them the resistance group. So, you know, it was felt that, you know, the deal was somewhat limited in being to nuclear and was not a holistic deal. And that was one of the reasons because of which it was pulled out.
Whether there is a stalemate, I think there are several angles through which we can see the present situation. Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz and the Americans put a blockade so that the Iranian vessels and vessels going to the Iranian ports can’t move through the Strait of Hormuz. So looking through this lens, yes, I think it is a stalemate.
But if you evaluate from the objective point of view, what were the American or the Israeli objectives in this war? I think it was regime change. It was to take care of Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile program and its proxies. So while an argument can be made that the military capabilities of Iran, its missile program has been degraded to a very large extent. We know that they have sufficient stockpiles of missiles, which they have been using.
Similarly, I think while there, again, an argument can be made that there has been a degradation of the proxies, the proxies are very much still active. So in a sense, I think as far as the American objectives were concerned, an argument can be made that these have not been fulfilled.
The Iranian objective was to survive the war and they have. So in a sense, one can make the argument again that Iranians come out of this not completely destroyed and not having surrendered to the Americans. That itself kind of weighs in favor of the Iranians.
And in terms of its economy, its infrastructure, its military capability, the challenges which it was facing as a result of sanctions. I think Iran would have a lot to do as it goes ahead. So this is where we are.
Just a point on the Strait of Hormuz. Now, Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz was not something which came out of the blue. Iranians have been talking about it. I think in strategic circles, this possibility was always a possibility, but it was a possibility. You know, that possibility as a result of this war became a reality and it’s a tool now. And I think it would require a lot of effort if it does happen to put the genie back to where it came off.
MK – Given that the economy of Iran is flattened and the people, we don’t hear a word about what Iranians are really thinking. Iranians are not the kind of people from other parts of the world that can be put down. These are highly educated people. They have STEM degrees. They’re very clever, but they’ve been remarkably quiet. And it seems that the diaspora is speaking on their behalf, or maybe not, what about them? Are they willing to, if you say that Iran is not going to recover, they will not accept that they can become, you know, as degraded as Myanmar, for instance. What about them?
SK – Let me clarify. I didn’t say that they would not recover. How soon or how slowly they recover would be an outcome of the present conflict. But see, Iranians have been living again under these sanctions for a very long time. Even when I went in 2015, there was optimism because of the nuclear deal. But I left when the mood was pretty pessimistic. And before the nuclear deal, you know, Iran faced challenges at different points of time. Then the economy was under a lot of stress. So having lived for such a long time under the sanctions regime, you know, they have found their own ways and means to survive with the sanctions. Life is not easy, but then Iranians can survive in that environment.
MK – Who are the players in this war? There’s the U.S., there are the Israelis, there are the Gulf states, through which Iran actually, Dubai, where they got some leeway to have some kind of normalcy in the economy. And there’s China, Russia and Pakistan. How are all these people interacting with these external elements?
SK – So the positive thing is that, you know, the active conflict, the active war is not taking place. There is a ceasefire. Diplomacy is being given a chance. Araghchi was two times in Pakistan. He was in Oman. He met some regional leaders while he was there. He traveled to Russia. And I think all these are positive signs.
A proposal, as we all have read in the newspapers, was given to the Americans. And President Trump’s security team deliberated on that. Reports are that President Trump is not happy. But I think, at least I have not seen that the proposal has been rejected. I did read some information that the Americans would be giving the counter proposal to that. So that was on the positive side that, you know, diplomacy is taking place.
These various stakeholders, which you referred to, are engaging with each other. Chinese, I’m sure, through the Pakistanis and otherwise also would be in touch with the Russians, would be in touch with the Iranians, with the Americans.
So in a sense, I think the positive side of the picture is that diplomacy is being given a chance. The negative is that, you know, very wide differences remain. And how these differences are narrowed, I think, would really be a challenge. As a diplomat, I’m an optimist. I think it is not that it cannot be done. But it would require deft diplomacy. Time would need to be given.
So one thing which bothers me is that this desire to get an agreement in a short span of time.
MK – Where do you think it’s going to move? Will there be some kind of arrangement? You said diplomacy is working but what could be the best kind of solution? Not optimum for everybody, but workable.
SK – One thing we’ll have to kind of understand is that, you know, this war would have changed things in a very fundamental way. I think the globe itself, the world itself was seeing very dramatic changes as far as the global order was concerned. This conflict would have only accentuated those changes, but brought in new ones also as far as the West Asia region is concerned.
If we are to think, would the Gulf states be the same after the conflict as they were before? What about their security guarantees? Will there be a haven for peace and prosperity? Or, you know, the risk and threat element would be a lot more. What kind of a state would Iran be once this conflict ends? Where would the U.S. be on the path which it has been pursuing? Would there be any change in the path which Israel has been pursuing and its own threat perceptions within the region? Would they have been assuaged or would they have been enhanced? What would be the great power dynamic within the region? Would there be shifts as far as those things are concerned? What measures would India need to take as far as its security and economic interests are concerned in the region? We have, as all of us know, around 10 million people who were living in the region. This was a region where Indians went for employment. Would that scenario remain or not? And to a very large extent, the answer to some of these questions at least would lie on the end point of this war.
Do we want a regime change? If there is regime change, what kind of a regime change? What kind of state would Iran be? Would it be a failed state or would it be a state on path to recovery under some kind of an arrangement? What kind of security framework would emerge in West Asia? So these are very big questions. I don’t think anybody at this point of time would have an answer to these questions.
But what it does point to is the enormity of the challenge which we face and the need for diplomacy to be given a chance. And regional actors, actors outside, sitting down and trying to work out a security architecture, which is a benefit for all the countries of the region.
Ambassador Saurabh Kumar is a Former Ambassador of India to Iran, European Union, Belgium, and Luxemborg.
Manjeet Kripalani is the Executuve Director at Gateway House.
This podcast was exclusively recorded for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can explore more exclusive content here.
Support our work here.
For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in
©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.